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  • The Largest Arms Haul in Bangladesh’s History Just Vanished From the Record Books

    4,930 guns. 27,020 grenades. 840 rocket launchers. Over 1 million bullets. Smuggled through a state-owned fertilizer factory jetty under the watch of intelligence agencies. Every single accused — acquitted. Welcome to Bangladesh, 2025.

    Let me tell you about the night Bangladesh caught the largest illegal arms shipment in its history. And then let me tell you how every single person responsible for it walked free.

    Because that story — the acquittal story — is the one that matters now. Not because the arms haul itself is ancient history. But because the acquittal happened in December 2024, under the current government, and nobody seems to care.

    They should.


    The Night of April 1, 2004

    On the night of April 1, 2004, police and Coast Guard officers, acting on a tip-off, interrupted the loading of weapons onto ten trucks at the Chittagong Urea Fertilizer Limited (CUFL) jetty on the Karnaphuli River. What they found was staggering.

    Here is the inventory. Read it slowly:

    • 4,930 sophisticated firearms — rifles, sub-machine guns, pistols
    • 27,020 grenades
    • 840 rocket launchers
    • 300 rockets
    • 2,000 grenade launching tubes
    • 6,392 magazines
    • 1,140,520 bullets

    That is not a typo. Over one million rounds of ammunition. Twenty-seven thousand grenades. Enough weaponry to arm a small war — or fuel several.

    This was, and remains, the single largest arms smuggling incident in the history of Bangladesh. And it happened at a state-owned facility, on a government jetty, under a government that was busy telling the world it had nothing to do with terrorism.


    Who Was It For?

    The weapons were destined for the United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA) — a militant group fighting for Assam’s independence from India. ULFA’s military wing chief, Paresh Baruah, was living in Dhaka at the time and was among the 50 persons eventually charged.

    Indian intelligence confirmed the ULFA connection. Retired Indian intelligence officer Major General Gaganjit Singh told India Today in February 2023 that the arms were “meant not only for ULFA but also for a few other rebel groups in India’s Northeast to destabilize the country.”

    This was not some freelance smuggling operation. This was state-enabled weapons trafficking through a state-owned facility. And the evidence for that statement comes not from opposition politicians or foreign NGOs — it comes from the accused themselves.


    The Confessions That Disappeared

    Two accused persons, Md Hafizur Rahman and Din Mohammad, submitted statements to the Metropolitan Magistrate on March 2, 2009. Here is what they said:

    The arms were being smuggled under the direct supervision of ULFA leader Paresh Baruah. And — this is the part that matters — numerous men associated with the BNP-led government and Jatiya Party, including members of parliament, government officials, and leaders of National Security Intelligence (NSI) and the Directorate General of Forces Intelligence (DGFI), were aware of the operation.

    But here is what happened next. Hafizur’s earlier confessions — the ones that might have named names earlier — were never recorded. And officials warned him against making statements, threatening him with death.

    Let that sink in. A man who was part of the largest arms smuggling operation in Bangladesh’s history tried to confess. The system didn’t lose his confession. The system prevented his confession from being recorded. And then threatened to kill him if he talked.

    This is not a justice system. This is a protection racket.


    The Accused — A Who’s Who of BNP Power

    The case eventually named 50 persons in the smuggling case and 52 in the arms case. Among the most significant:

    • Motiur Rahman Nizami — Jamaat-e-Islami chief, former Industries Minister in the BNP government. The man whose ministry oversaw CUFL, the very facility where the arms were being loaded.
    • Lutfozzaman Babar — former State Minister for Home Affairs. The same Babar who would later be sentenced to death for the August 21 grenade attack. The same Babar who ordered the Shamsunnahar Hall raid. The same Babar whose fingerprints are on every major crime of the BNP era.
    • Major General Rezzakul Haider Chowdhury — former Director General of NSI. The nation’s top intelligence officer.
    • Brigadier General Abdur Rahim — another former DG of NSI.
    • Nurul Amin — former Additional Secretary, Industries Ministry.
    • Wing Commander Shahabuddin Ahmed — former NSI director.
    • Mohshin Talukder — Managing Director of CUFL. The head of the very factory where the arms were being loaded.

    Notice something? The Minister of Industries — who oversaw the factory where weapons were being smuggled onto trucks. The State Home Minister — responsible for internal security. The heads of NSI — responsible for national intelligence. The Managing Director of the factory itself.

    This was not a rogue operation. This was the state.


    The 2014 Verdict: Justice Showed Up Late, But It Showed Up

    On January 30, 2014, a special court in Chittagong delivered its verdict. Paresh Baruah and 13 others were sentenced to death, including Nizami and Babar.

    For a moment — just a moment — it looked like accountability might actually exist in Bangladesh. The court acknowledged what everyone already knew: that these weapons moved through state infrastructure with state knowledge, facilitated by state officials.

    But in Bangladesh, verdicts are not endpoints. They are waystations. And the road from verdict to accountability runs directly through the political desires of whoever is in power.


    The 2024 Acquittal: Justice Walked Back Out the Door

    On December 18, 2024, the High Court acquitted Lutfozzaman Babar and five others, including Major General Rezzakul Haider Chowdhury.

    Then, on January 14, 2025, the High Court acquitted Babar and Chowdhury in the Arms Act case as well. Paresh Baruah’s death sentence was reduced to 14 years. Four others had their sentences reduced to 10 years.

    Let me translate this into plain language.

    The State Home Minister who oversaw the largest arms smuggling operation in Bangladesh’s history — a man already convicted of helping orchestrate a grenade attack that killed 24 people — walked free.

    The head of the National Security Intelligence — the man supposed to be protecting Bangladesh from exactly this kind of threat — walked free.

    The managing director of the factory where the weapons were being loaded — walked free.

    And the only person whose sentence was reduced rather than eliminated was Paresh Baruah — the foreign militant. The one person who wasn’t Bangladeshi. The one person who didn’t have political connections to protect him in 2025.

    Convenient, isn’t it? The foreigner gets a reduced sentence. Every Bangladeshi official walks. The weapons — 4,930 guns, 27,020 grenades, 840 rocket launchers, over a million bullets — remain unaccounted for. The case, effectively, is closed.


    The Pattern (Because You’ve Seen This Before)

    If this story feels familiar, it’s because it is. This is the same pattern Bangladesh has watched unfold across every major case from the BNP era:

    • August 21 grenade attack — killed 24, injured 500+. All 49 accused acquitted, December 2024.
    • Tarique Rahman’s 84 cases — corruption, money laundering, murder conspiracy. All acquitted.
    • Khaleda Zia’s cases — orphanage trust, charitable trust, GATCO. All acquitted.
    • Shamim Iskander’s Biman corruption — 36 witnesses, Tk 250 crore in losses. Case discharged.
    • Zia Orphanage Trust — Tk 2.1 crore stolen from orphans. Acquitted.

    And now the Chittagong arms haul joins the list.

    The pattern is not subtle. It is not nuanced. It does not require legal expertise to decode. The BNP returns to power, and the courts — the same courts, the same judges, the same buildings — produce acquittals. Not through new evidence. Not through exonerating testimony. Through the simple, gravitational force of political power on a judicial system that has never been independent enough to resist it.


    Why This Case Matters More Than You Think

    You might be asking: this happened in 2004. The acquittal happened in 2024-2025. Why should anyone care now?

    Here is why.

    The Chittagong arms haul was not just about Bangladesh. Those weapons were headed for India’s Northeast — to fuel insurgencies, destabilize a neighboring country, and arm groups that have killed hundreds of Indian soldiers and civilians. ULFA’s war with India has claimed over 12,000 lives since 1979.

    The BNP-Jamaat government allowed its territory to be used as a transshipment point for weapons of war destined for a neighboring country’s insurgents. This was not just corruption. This was not just negligence. This was a state policy of enabling cross-border terrorism.

    And the officials who oversaw it — the Home Minister, the intelligence chiefs, the factory bosses — have now been legally cleared of all responsibility.

    India was told, effectively, that Bangladesh does not consider arming insurgents on its soil to be a crime worth punishing. The United States, which has sanctioned RAB for human rights abuses, has not commented on the acquittal of officials who facilitated the largest arms smuggling operation in South Asian history. The international community, which was quick to condemn the January 2007 emergency, has been silent about the systematic dismantling of every conviction from the BNP era.


    The Intelligence Agencies’ Role

    There is one more thing that needs to be said, because it keeps getting buried.

    The Chittagong arms haul was not a failure of intelligence. It was a success of intelligence — just not the kind that protects citizens. Both NSI (National Security Intelligence) and DGFI (Directorate General of Forces Intelligence) were implicated in the arms smuggling. Not peripheral figures. The directors general themselves.

    When the heads of your national security intelligence agencies are facilitating the movement of 27,000 grenades through a state-owned facility, you don’t have a intelligence failure. You have a state capture problem. The intelligence services were not watching the border for threats. They were managing the border for the ruling party’s interests.

    And when both DGFI directors and NSI chiefs were acquitted in December 2024, what message does that send to every intelligence officer currently serving? The message is: if you serve the party in power, you will be protected. If you don’t, you won’t.

    That is not a professional intelligence service. That is a private security firm for the ruling party. And every country that shares intelligence with Bangladesh — including the United States, India, and the United Kingdom — should be asking what exactly they are sharing it with.


    The CUFL Connection: A Factory That Became a Weapons Depot

    There is a detail in this story that encapsulates the entire BNP era, and it is this: the arms were being loaded at the Chittagong Urea Fertilizer Limited jetty.

    CUFL was a state-owned enterprise. Its jetty was government infrastructure. Its managing director, Mohshin Talukder, was among those charged. The factory was under the Ministry of Industries — whose minister was Motiur Rahman Nizami, also charged.

    You cannot load ten trucks with nearly 5,000 guns, 27,000 grenades, and over a million rounds of ammunition at a government facility without someone noticing. The security at a state-owned industrial facility does not just look the other way when trucks start loading weapons. Someone gave the order. Someone arranged the access. Someone ensured that the Coast Guard and police — who ultimately interrupted the loading — were not stationed there that night as a matter of routine.

    The original tip-off came from somewhere. The Coast Guard and police showed up because someone warned them. But the fact that the loading had progressed as far as it did — that ten trucks worth of military hardware had reached the jetty and were being loaded — means that the people who were supposed to prevent exactly this from happening were either complicit or deliberately absent.

    And the man whose ministry oversaw the factory where it happened? He walked free. The man who ran the factory? He walked free. The men who ran the intelligence services that should have caught it? They walked free.

    Everyone walked free.


    The Hafizur Rahman Story: A Microcosm of Everything Wrong

    I want to come back to Hafizur Rahman, because his story is the story of this entire era compressed into one person’s experience.

    Hafizur was an accused in the arms haul case. He was prepared to confess. He had information — names, connections, the works. He went to the magistrate. He tried to make a statement under Section 164 of the Criminal Procedure Code, which allows confessions to be recorded by a magistrate and used as evidence.

    His first confessions were never recorded.

    Officials warned him against making statements.

    They threatened him with death.

    Let me be clear about what this means. A man in custody, wanting to confess to involvement in the largest arms smuggling operation in the country’s history, was prevented from doing so by the very state apparatus that was supposedly investigating the case. The justice system did not fail Hafizur Rahman. The justice system was used to silence Hafizur Rahman.

    This is what impunity looks like. Not just the absence of justice, but the active prevention of justice. Not just failing to investigate, but preventing investigation. Not just losing evidence, but destroying it before it can be recorded.

    Hafizur Rahman is not a household name in Bangladesh. He should be. Because his story proves what the state has always denied: that the cover-up was not incompetence. It was policy.


    What the Acquittals Actually Mean

    Let me be precise about what happened in December 2024 and January 2025, because precision matters.

    The High Court did not find the accused innocent. It did not declare that the arms haul didn’t happen. It did not rule that Babar, Rezzakul Haider, and the others had no connection to the case. It acquitted them — which in Bangladesh’s legal system can mean many things, from insufficient evidence to procedural irregularities to, most commonly in politically sensitive cases, the simple fact that the current government has no interest in seeing these convictions upheld.

    The weapons were real. The loading at CUFL was real. The 50 accused persons were real. The confessional statements were real. The connection to ULFA was confirmed by Indian intelligence. The involvement of NSI and DGFI directors was documented. None of these facts were disputed by the court.

    What changed between 2014 and 2024 was not the evidence. What changed was the government.

    In 2014, under Awami League rule, the courts convicted. In 2024-2025, under BNP rule, the courts acquitted. Same courts. Same judges’ chambers. Same legal system. Different political masters. Different outcomes.

    If you believe this is coincidence, I have a bridge to sell you. It’s in Chittagong. You can’t miss it — there are ten trucks parked next to it full of weapons that nobody seems to remember anymore.


    The India Question Nobody Is Asking

    There is an aspect of this case that receives far too little attention, and it concerns Bangladesh’s relationship with India.

    The weapons were destined for ULFA — a group fighting the Indian state. The BNP-Jamaat government allowed Bangladeshi territory to be used as a transshipment point for weapons intended to kill Indian soldiers and destabilize India’s Northeast. This was not a border skirmish. This was state-enabled arms trafficking to an insurgency in a neighboring democracy.

    India has never forgotten this. The Indian intelligence establishment has long maintained that Bangladesh under BNP-Jamaat rule was a “safe haven” for anti-India insurgent groups. The Chittagong arms haul was the most dramatic proof of that claim. And now, the officials who facilitated it have been acquitted by the courts of the same party that was in power when it happened.

    For India, this is not an abstract legal matter. ULFA’s insurgency has killed thousands of Indian citizens. The weapons that passed through Chittagong were meant to kill more. And the government that enabled that flow is back in power, with every conviction against its officials wiped clean.

    The implications for Bangladesh-India relations are significant. Every time Bangladesh asks India for cooperation — on border management, on water sharing, on trade — the memory of those ten trucks full of weapons sits in the room. And now, the official Bangladeshi position is that nobody was responsible for them.


    The Numbers Don’t Lie (But the Courts Do)

    Let me end with the numbers, because numbers don’t have political affiliations.

    4,930 firearms. Not hunting rifles. Not homemade weapons. Military-grade firearms — sub-machine guns, assault rifles, pistols designed for war.

    27,020 grenades. Each one capable of killing dozens in a crowded space. Each one a weapon of terror.

    840 rocket launchers. Weapons designed to destroy armored vehicles and fortified positions.

    1,140,520 bullets. Over a million rounds of ammunition, each one capable of ending a life.

    Ten trucks. That is what it took to carry this arsenal. Ten trucks, loaded at a state-owned facility, under the noses of the intelligence services that were supposedly protecting the country.

    Zero convictions remaining. Zero. Every single person convicted in this case has been acquitted. The case is effectively closed. The weapons are evidence of nothing. The dead — because ULFA’s war killed thousands — have no legal recognition that these weapons were meant for them.

    This is what the BNP era was. This is what the BNP era still is. Not just the corruption, not just the killings, not just the grenade attacks on political rallies. But the systematic facilitation of cross-border terrorism through state infrastructure, followed by the systematic legal erasure of accountability through state courts.

    The weapons were real. The threat was real. The cover-up was real. The acquittals are real. The only thing that isn’t real anymore, apparently, is the idea that anyone will be held responsible for any of it.


    Sources

    • India Today (February 2023): Confirmed ULFA connection with ex-Indian intelligence officer testimony
    • BBC News (February 2005): Bangladesh as safe haven for insurgent groups
    • The Daily Star (January 2014): Coverage of death sentences in arms haul case
    • Dhaka Tribune (December 2024): High Court acquittal of Babar and others
    • Court records: Special Court, Chittagong, Case No. 1/2007 (Arms Case) and Case No. 2/2007 (Smuggling Case)
    • Confessional statements: Hafizur Rahman and Din Mohammad, Metropolitan Magistrate, March 2, 2009
    • Human Rights Watch: “Judge, Jury, and Executioner” (December 2006)
    • International Crisis Group: Asia Report No. 121, “Bangladesh Today” (October 2006)
    • Times of India: Coverage of death sentences (January 2014)

    Published by Bangladesh Untold. Every claim in this article is sourced from court records, international human rights reports, verified media coverage, and official government documents. The pattern is not an interpretation. The pattern is a fact.

  • Every Case, Every Acquittal: How Bangladesh’s Courts Were Turned Into an Eraser for the Ruling Party’s Past

    Eighty-four cases. Every single one gone. The grenade attack? Acquitted. The arms haul? Acquitted. The orphanage theft? Acquitted. The money laundering? Acquitted. When the accused become the government, justice doesn’t stand a chance.

    There is a number you need to understand before you read any further.

    Eighty-four.

    That is how many cases were filed against Tarique Rahman between 2007 and 2024. Corruption. Money laundering. Grenade attack conspiracy. Arms trafficking facilitation. Extortion. Murder. You name the charge, it was filed. Eighty-four separate legal proceedings against one man — the son of a former Prime Minister, the senior vice-chairman of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party, the person US diplomatic cables described as a “symbol of kleptocratic government” and the “Dark Prince” of Bangladeshi politics.

    And now?

    Zero.

    Zero convictions. Zero active cases. Zero pending charges. Every single one of those eighty-four cases has been acquitted, discharged, withdrawn, or quietly buried. The man who was convicted in absentia for orchestrating a grenade attack that killed 24 people is now the Prime Minister of Bangladesh. The man found guilty of laundering $2.5 million through Singapore sits in the chair that was once held by his mother. The man whose government oversaw the most corrupt period in Bangladesh’s history — five consecutive years ranked dead last on Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index — now runs the country.

    This is not a story about one man’s legal luck. This is a story about a system. A system where courts don’t dispense justice — they dispense acquittals on demand. A system where the rule of law bends, folds, and collapses under the weight of political power. A system that Bangladesh has seen before, under Awami League, and is now watching repeat under BNP with breathtaking speed and thoroughness.

    Let me walk you through exactly how it happened.


    The Great Acquittal: A Timeline

    What follows is not a comprehensive legal document. It is a chronological record of how every major case from the BNP era (2001-2006) and its aftermath was systematically dismantled following the July 2024 uprising and BNP’s return to power. I am not going to give you legal analysis. I am going to give you dates, verdicts, and the unmistakable pattern they reveal.

    The August 21 Grenade Attack (2004)

    Let’s start with the biggest one.

    On August 21, 2004, 13 military-grade Arges grenades were thrown into a crowd of 20,000 people at an Awami League rally on Bangabandhu Avenue in Dhaka. 24 people were killed. Over 500 were injured. Ivy Rahman, the AL Women’s Affairs Secretary, died three days later. Sheikh Hasina, then Leader of the Opposition, was injured but survived.

    The investigation that followed was one of the most corrupt in Bangladesh’s history. The BNP government refused to register a proper FIR. They invented a scapegoat — “Joj Mia,” a pickpocket — and tortured him into a false confession. They washed the crime scene with detergent. They buried unidentified victims in the middle of the night. They formed a one-man judicial commission that blamed a “neighboring country” instead of investigating the actual perpetrators.

    Eventually, the truth came out. In 2018, a special court delivered its verdict:

    • 19 people sentenced to death, including Lutfozzaman Babar (former State Minister for Home Affairs), Abdus Salam Pintu (former Deputy Minister), and Major General Rezzakul Haider Chowdhury (former DGFI Director)
    • 19 people sentenced to life imprisonment, including Tarique Rahman himself, along with Harris Chowdhury (Political Secretary to the PM) and Kazi Shah Mofazzal Hossain Kaikobad (former MP)
    • Several others sentenced for harboring offenders, misleading the investigation, and fabricating the “Joj Mia” confession

    The judge declared: “The specialised deadly Arges grenades that are used in wars were blasted at the Awami League’s central office on 23 Bangabandhu Avenue in broad daylight with the help of the then state machinery.”

    This was a landmark verdict. It named names. It convicted a sitting minister, intelligence chiefs, and the Prime Minister’s own son. It established, in a court of law, that the 2004 grenade attack was a state-sponsored assassination attempt.

    And then, on December 1, 2024, the High Court acquitted every single accused. All 49 of them. Tarique Rahman. Babar. Pintu. The intelligence chiefs. The HUJI operatives. Everyone.

    The court said the trial court had failed to prove the charges. The witnesses were unreliable. The evidence was insufficient. The entire prosecution case, built over more than a decade, collapsed in a single ruling.

    On September 4, 2025, the Appellate Division dismissed a petition for retrial, putting a final nail in the coffin. The grenade attack that killed 24 people, injured 500, and was adjudicated through one of the longest and most watched trials in Bangladesh’s history now has zero convicted perpetrators.

    The Chittagong Arms Haul (2004)

    Same year. Same pattern. Different atrocity.

    On April 1, 2004, police and Coast Guard intercepted the loading of weapons onto ten trucks at the Chittagong Urea Fertilizer Limited jetty. This was the largest arms smuggling operation in the history of Bangladesh:

    • 4,930 firearms
    • 27,020 grenades
    • 840 rocket launchers
    • 300 rockets
    • 2,000 grenade launching tubes
    • 6,392 magazines
    • 1,140,520 bullets

    These weapons were bound for ULFA — the United Liberation Front of Asom, an insurgent group fighting for Assam’s independence from India. Confessions established that the operation was conducted under the direct supervision of ULFA leader Paresh Baruah, with the knowledge and involvement of BNP government officials, National Security Intelligence (NSI) officers, and Directorate General of Forces Intelligence (DGFI) personnel.

    Those charged included Motiur Rahman Nizami (Jamaat-e-Islami chief, former Industries Minister in the BNP government) and Lutfozzaman Babar (State Minister for Home Affairs — the same Babar convicted in the grenade attack case).

    In January 2014, a special court sentenced 14 people to death, including Nizami, Babar, and former NSI chiefs.

    Then, on December 18, 2024, the High Court acquitted Babar and five others, including former NSI Director General Major General Rezzakul Haider Chowdhury. On January 14, 2025, the High Court acquitted Babar and Chowdhury in the Arms Act case as well. Paresh Baruah’s death sentence was reduced to 14 years. Four others had their sentences reduced to 10 years.

    The largest arms cache ever seized on Bangladeshi soil, linked to an insurgency in a neighboring country, facilitated by the sitting government’s intelligence apparatus — and the key political figures walk free.

    The Zia Orphanage Trust Case

    In 2009, the Anti-Corruption Commission accused Khaleda Zia and Tarique Rahman of embezzling Tk 2.1 crore (US $305,000) from the Zia Orphanage Trust — a charity fund for orphans, named after former President Ziaur Rahman. Foreign donations intended for parentless children were allegedly siphoned by the former Prime Minister and her son.

    This wasn’t a fringe case. The evidence was documented. The money trail was traced. The orphans who were supposed to benefit never received what was promised.

    In February 2018, a special court convicted both Khaleda and Tarique. Khaleda was sentenced to 5 years (later enhanced to 10 years by the High Court in October 2018). Tarique was sentenced to 10 years in absentia.

    On January 16, 2025, the Supreme Court acquitted both Khaleda and Tarique. The orphans’ money — gone. The conviction — erased.

    The Zia Charitable Trust Case

    A separate but related corruption case involving the Zia Charitable Trust. Same pattern. Same family. Same outcome.

    Khaleda convicted. Sentenced to 7 years rigorous imprisonment with a fine of Tk 1 million.

    On November 27, 2024, the High Court acquitted Khaleda Zia, declaring the verdict null and void.

    The Money Laundering Case

    Tarique Rahman and his business partner Giasuddin Al Mamun were accused of laundering approximately $20 million abroad. The FBI investigated. Singapore courts found evidence. The ACC filed the case in June 2007.

    In November 2013, the trial court acquitted Tarique. In July 2016, the High Court overturned the acquittal and sentenced him to 7 years’ imprisonment with a fine of Tk 20 crore. The High Court said Tarique had “influenced political power to help his close friend, Giasuddin Mamun, to get and then launder 200 million taka ($2.5m).”

    On December 10, 2024, the Supreme Court stayed the 7-year sentence. On March 6, 2025, the Appellate Division acquitted both Tarique and Mamun.

    $2.5 million. Proven in two courts. Gone in one ruling.

    Shamim Iskander’s Corruption Case

    Khaleda Zia’s younger brother, Shamim Iskander, was accused of amassing Tk 1.33 crore through illegal means and concealing information about Tk 81.81 lakh from the ACC. The ACC filed charges with 36 prosecution witnesses. This was the man who nearly bankrupted Biman Bangladesh Airlines through crooked aircraft leasing deals, earning at least Tk 40 crore in commissions while the national carrier bled Tk 250 crore on leased aircraft that could have been purchased outright for less.

    On March 25, 2025, a Dhaka court discharged Shamim Iskander and his wife from the corruption case. Discharged. Not retried. Not reduced. Dismissed.

    And in March 2026, Shamim Iskander sat in the VIP gallery of Parliament at the maiden session of the 13th Parliament, in the second row, alongside his wife and the Prime Minister’s sister-in-law. From accused corrupt figure bleeding the national airline dry to Parliament VIP. That’s the trajectory. That’s the system.


    The Pattern: Identical Playbook, Different Party

    If this feels familiar, it should. Because we have seen this exact pattern before — under Awami League.

    When Sheikh Hasina returned to power in 2009, her government systematically pursued cases against BNP leaders. The International Crimes Tribunal was established to try war criminals from 1971, and while its stated purpose was legitimate, its execution was widely criticized as a tool for eliminating political opposition. BNP and Jamaat leaders were tried, convicted, and in some cases executed. The process was criticized by international legal observers, including the International Bar Association, for lacking due process.

    BNP called this a witch hunt. They said the cases were politically motivated. They said the courts were compromised. They said the justice system had been weaponized.

    And they had a point. Not about every case — some of the charges were based on real evidence — but about the pattern. When the ruling party controls the judiciary, the judiciary serves the ruling party. This is not a controversial statement. It is a documented fact in Bangladesh. The International Crisis Group said it. Human Rights Watch said it. The US State Department said it. Everyone who has studied Bangladesh’s legal system has said it.

    But here is what BNP does not say anymore, now that they are the ones in power:

    The same thing is happening in reverse.

    Every conviction from the BNP era has been overturned. Every case has been acquitted. Every accused person has walked free. And the speed is staggering. Between December 2024 and March 2025 — a four-month window — the following cases were resolved:

    • August 21 grenade attack: All 49 accused acquitted (December 2024)
    • Chittagong arms haul: Babar and 5 others acquitted (December 2024–January 2025)
    • Zia Charitable Trust: Khaleda Zia acquitted (November 2024)
    • Zia Orphanage Trust: Khaleda and Tarique acquitted (January 2025)
    • Tarique money laundering: Tarique and Mamun acquitted (March 2025)
    • Shamim Iskander corruption: Case discharged (March 2025)

    Six months. Every major BNP-era case. Gone.

    Coincidence? You can believe that if you want. You can tell yourself that the legal system finally corrected itself, that the original trials were indeed flawed, that justice has been served. But you would have to believe something remarkable: that every single case against every single BNP figure was illegitimate. Not some. Not most. All of them. The grenade attack. The arms smuggling. The money laundering. The corruption. The orphanage theft. All of it — every charge, every conviction, every piece of evidence — was wrong.

    That is not the behavior of a justice system correcting errors. That is the behavior of a justice system being operated by remote control.


    The Math Doesn’t Lie

    Let me give you some numbers that should make anyone pause.

    In the August 21 grenade attack case, the trial court heard testimony from 225 witnesses. The investigation spanned 14 years. The charge sheet alone ran to 6,000+ pages. The verdict was delivered after one of the longest trials in Bangladesh’s history. And then the High Court threw it all out in a single ruling.

    In the money laundering case, the High Court upheld Tarique’s conviction in 2016, explicitly stating he had used political influence to launder money. Eight years later, the Appellate Division acquitted him. Same facts. Same evidence. Different government. Different result.

    In the Chittagong arms haul case, confessional statements from accused persons established the involvement of NSI and DGFI officers in the smuggling operation. The trial court found the evidence sufficient for the death penalty. The High Court said it wasn’t sufficient for any penalty at all.

    This is not about whether the original trials were perfect. They almost certainly were not. In Bangladesh, few trials meet the standards of due process that international law requires. But the issue is not the imperfections of the original proceedings. The issue is the pattern of total, systematic, complete exoneration that follows every change of government. The issue is that the outcome of every case is predetermined by who holds power, not by what the evidence shows.

    When Awami League was in power, BNP leaders went to jail. When BNP is in power, BNP leaders walk free. The evidence hasn’t changed. The witnesses haven’t changed. The only thing that changed is the government.

    That is not a justice system. That is a revolving door.


    What About the Victims?

    You know what gets lost in all the legal proceedings and political spin? The people who were actually hurt.

    The 24 people who died on August 21, 2004. They have names. Ivy Rahman. Women’s Affairs Secretary of the Awami League, who held on for three days before succumbing to her injuries. There were 23 others — students, activists, bodyguards, ordinary citizens who came to a political rally and never went home. Their families waited 14 years for a verdict. They got one in 2018. And then, in 2024, that verdict was wiped away like it never happened.

    The 44 people who died in custody during Operation Clean Heart. The government called them “heart attacks.” The Indemnity Act protected their killers. The law was eventually struck down — in 2015, twelve years after the operation ended. But no one was ever held accountable. Not before. Not after. Not under any government.

    The 600+ Hindu women of Bhola, raped in the aftermath of the 2001 election. A judicial inquiry commission documented 18,000 rapes. The BNP called the commission’s findings “partisan.” The victims are still waiting.

    The 600+ people killed by RAB in “crossfire” encounters. The US Treasury Department imposed Global Magnitsky sanctions on RAB in December 2021, citing “serious human rights violations” including extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances. After the sanctions, the killings dropped dramatically. Which tells you something about whether they were necessary or not.

    Every single one of these victims has been told, in one way or another, that their suffering doesn’t matter. That the legal system exists to protect the powerful, not to deliver justice to the harmed. That the courts are a tool of the state, not a check on it.

    And now, the ultimate insult: the courts have confirmed it. Every conviction overturned. Every accused freed. Every case resolved in favor of the people who now hold power.


    The International Dimension

    It is worth noting that this pattern is not just a domestic concern. The international community has been watching, and what they see is troubling.

    The United States, through its diplomatic cables released by WikiLeaks, described Tarique Rahman as a “symbol of kleptocratic government” and the “Dark Prince” of Bangladeshi politics. The FBI investigated his money laundering. Singapore courts found evidence of it. The US Treasury sanctioned RAB for extrajudicial killings. The International Crisis Group, Human Rights Watch, and Amnesty International all documented systematic human rights violations under BNP rule.

    These are not partisan Bangladeshi organizations with political axes to grind. These are independent international bodies with established methodologies and reputations to protect. Their findings were based on field documentation, witness testimony, and forensic evidence. And now, every single one of those findings has been effectively nullified by Bangladeshi courts operating under a BNP government.

    What message does this send? It tells the international community that Bangladesh’s courts are not independent. That legal outcomes are determined by political power, not by evidence. That a change in government means a complete rewrite of the legal record. And it tells future investigators — whether from the UN, the US, or anywhere else — that their work will be undone the moment the political winds shift.

    This has consequences. Trade preferences. Development assistance. Military cooperation. All of these are tied, in various ways, to governance standards. When a country’s justice system operates as an extension of the ruling party, the world takes notice. And not in a good way.


    The Whataboutism Defense

    Here is what BNP supporters will say, and it’s worth addressing head-on.

    “What about Awami League? They did the same thing. They used the courts to persecute BNP leaders. They rigged the ICT to execute Jamaat leaders. They disappeared hundreds of people. They stole elections. Why aren’t you writing about that?”

    Let me be very clear: I have written about that. Extensively. This publication has documented Awami League’s abuses in detail — the enforced disappearances, the press suppression, the election rigging, the institutional capture, the political persecution. Every single one of those articles is still up. Every accusation is still sourced. Every condemnation still stands.

    But here’s the thing: Awami League’s abuses do not justify BNP’s abuses. The fact that one party weaponized the courts does not make it acceptable when the other party does the same thing. The fact that Hasina’s government persecuted BNP leaders does not make it right for Tarique’s government to erase every case against itself.

    That is not justice. That is not accountability. That is not even revenge. That is the same playbook with different actors.

    And if we accept it — if we shrug and say “well, the other side did it too” — then we are accepting that Bangladesh’s courts will forever be a tool of whoever holds power. We are accepting that there is no such thing as accountability, only power. We are accepting that the rule of law is a fiction, and that the only law that matters is the law of the powerful.

    I refuse to accept that. And if you care about Bangladesh’s future, you should refuse too.


    The Fundamental Question

    All of this — the acquittals, the discharged cases, the overturned convictions — raises a question that nobody in Bangladesh’s current government wants to answer:

    If none of these cases had merit, why did it take a change of government for the courts to figure that out?

    If Tarique Rahman was innocent of money laundering, the evidence should have been insufficient regardless of who was in power. If the grenade attack investigation was flawed, the High Court should have identified those flaws years ago, not in December 2024, three months after BNP took control. If Shamim Iskander’s corruption case was baseless, it should have been dismissed on its merits, not after his sister-in-law became the most powerful person in the country.

    But that’s not what happened. What happened is that the courts waited. They waited until the political moment was right. They waited until the people they were asked to judge were the ones signing their appointments. And then they delivered the verdicts that were expected of them.

    This is not a coincidence. It is a pattern. And the pattern is this: in Bangladesh, the courts answer to the government, not to the constitution.

    That was true under Awami League. It is true under BNP. It has been true under every government since independence. And until it changes — until the judiciary becomes genuinely independent, until judges are appointed on merit rather than loyalty, until the legal system serves the people instead of the party in power — it will remain true.

    The acquittals are not the problem. The problem is that every single acquittal went in the same direction. The problem is the 100% success rate. The problem is that in a country where the courts are supposed to be independent, the outcome of every politically charged case is perfectly correlated with who holds power.

    Statistically, that is impossible unless the system is rigged.


    What Comes Next

    So where does this leave Bangladesh?

    It leaves a country where the past cannot be reckoned with because the present won’t allow it. It leaves the families of 24 grenade attack victims with no legal recourse. It leaves the survivors of Operation Clean Heart with no accountability. It leaves the women of Bhola with no justice. It leaves a nation where the most powerful people can commit the most serious crimes and face absolutely no consequences, as long as they win the next election.

    It leaves a country where the legal system is not a shield for the weak — it is a weapon for the strong.

    And it leaves a question that every Bangladeshi must answer: if the courts won’t hold the powerful accountable, who will?

    The international community? The US has already sanctioned RAB and expressed concerns about judicial independence. But sanctions are tools of foreign policy, not instruments of justice. They can pressure governments, but they cannot replace a broken legal system.

    Civil society? Human rights organizations in Bangladesh operate under increasing pressure. The Digital Security Act — renamed but not reformed — still criminalizes criticism. Journalists still face harassment, intimidation, and worse. The space for independent reporting is shrinking, not expanding.

    The people? The people of Bangladesh have shown, twice in living memory, that they can remove a government they no longer trust. They did it in 2007, when the 1/11 caretaker government stepped in. They did it again in July 2024, when the student-led uprising toppled Awami League. But removing a government is not the same as holding it accountable. And if the pattern continues — if every new government simply reverses the convictions of the previous government — then the cycle of impunity will never end.


    The Real Acquittal

    There is one more thing to say, and it is the most important thing.

    The courts acquitted Tarique Rahman. They acquitted Babar. They acquitted Khaleda Zia. They discharged Shamim Iskander. They threw out the grenade attack case, the arms haul case, the money laundering case, the corruption cases, the orphanage trust case, the charitable trust case.

    But the courts cannot acquit history.

    The US diplomatic cables describing Tarique as a “symbol of kleptocratic government” still exist. The FBI investigation into his money laundering still happened. The Singapore court findings still stand. The Human Rights Watch reports, the Amnesty International documentation, the International Crisis Group analyses — none of these have been overturned, because they exist outside Bangladesh’s courts, beyond the reach of whatever government is in power in Dhaka.

    The 24 people who died on August 21, 2004 still died. The 44 people who were killed in custody during Operation Clean Heart still never came home. The 18,000 rapes documented by the judicial inquiry commission still happened. The Tk 2.1 crore that was supposed to go to orphans still disappeared. The $2.5 million that was laundered through Singapore still moved through those accounts. The 4,930 guns and 27,020 grenades found at the Chittagong jetty still existed.

    A court can overturn a conviction. A government can withdraw a case. A party can rewrite the legal record. But it cannot un-kill the dead. It cannot un-rape the living. It cannot un-steal the money. It cannot un-smuggle the weapons.

    The facts are the facts. And the facts say that between 2001 and 2006, Bangladesh was run by a government that presided over the most corrupt period in the country’s history, that allowed — and in many cases directed — systematic human rights violations, that protected Islamist militants, that facilitated arms smuggling to foreign insurgents, that covered up a grenade attack on the political opposition, and that used every lever of state power to shield itself from accountability.

    The courts may have said “not guilty.” The history says otherwise.

    And history, unlike Bangladesh’s courts, does not change its verdict when the government changes.


    Next in the series: We examine how BNP’s control of the judiciary extends beyond acquittals — into the appointment of judges, the restructuring of the Anti-Corruption Commission, and the systematic dismantling of every institution designed to check the power of the ruling party.

    Sources: Bangladesh Special Court verdicts (2018); High Court acquittal orders (2024-2025); Supreme Court Appellate Division rulings; Anti-Corruption Commission case records; US Embassy Cables (WikiLeaks, 2005-2006); Human Rights Watch, “Judge, Jury, and Executioner” (2006); International Crisis Group reports; Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index (2001-2005); The Daily Star; Dhaka Tribune; bdnews24.com; Prothom Alo; BBC News; AFP.


  • The Dynasty’s Next Chapter: How the Zia Family Is Securing Its Future While Bangladesh Pays for Its Past






    The Dynasty’s Next Chapter: How the Zia Family Is Securing Its Future While Bangladesh Pays for Its Past — Bangladesh Untold

    The Dynasty’s Next Chapter: How the Zia Family Is Securing Its Future While Bangladesh Pays for Its Past

    The brother looted an airline. The nephew runs “independent” media. The son is Prime Minister. And now the next generation is being positioned for power. This isn’t a political party. It’s a family business. And business is booming.

    Let me tell you something that nobody in Bangladesh’s mainstream media wants to talk about.

    While you’ve been reading this series — while you’ve been learning about the orphanage trust, the money laundering, the GATCO contracts, the court acquittals, and the bank accounts — the Zia family has been busy doing something else entirely. They’ve been planning for the future. Not Bangladesh’s future. Theirs.

    Every dynasty needs three things to survive: wealth that outlasts the current generation, institutions that protect that wealth, and heirs who can inherit both. The Zia family has been building all three. And they’ve been doing it in plain sight, which is either the most brazen thing I’ve ever documented or the most depressing — because the reason they can do it in plain sight is that nobody with the power to stop them has any interest in doing so.

    This article is about the Zia family’s next chapter. Not the history — you’ve read the history in the previous articles in this series. This is about what’s happening right now, today, in 2026, while you’re reading this. The past is prologue. The present is the heist. And the future? That’s already been claimed.

    The VIP Gallery: From Accused to Honored Guest

    On March 5, 2026, something happened that should have been a scandal but wasn’t even a headline.

    Shamim Iskander — Khaleda Zia’s younger brother, the man who looted Biman Bangladesh Airlines of Tk 250 crore, whose corruption case with 36 witnesses was discharged just months earlier — sat in the VIP gallery of the 13th Parliament’s maiden session. He was in the second row. Beside him sat his wife Kaniz Fatema — his co-accused in the same corruption case, also discharged. Beside them sat Shahina Khan Bindu, the elder sister of Zubaida Rahman, who is Tarique Rahman’s wife.

    Let me paint this picture for you, because the details matter.

    A man who was arrested by joint forces in July 2008 for systematically looting the national flag carrier. A man whose wealth statement showed assets of Tk 4 crore plus 75 tolas of gold, with Tk 20.47 lakh beyond known income — and that was just what the ACC could trace. A man whose brother-in-law Shamsul Haque fled the country after January 11, 2007 rather than face investigation for his role in Biman’s procurement kickbacks. A man whose case was discharged in March 2025 — not acquitted after a full trial, not found innocent, but discharged, meaning the court decided there wasn’t enough evidence to even proceed — despite 36 witnesses being listed. That man is now sitting in the VIP gallery of Bangladesh’s Parliament, and the only thing between his corrupt past and his honored present is a court order that came four months after his family returned to power.

    But this isn’t really about Shamim. Shamim is the past — the crude, obvious, 2000s-era corruption where a Prime Minister’s brother walked into a national airline and started treating it like his personal ATM. What’s happening now is more sophisticated. What’s happening now is the institutionalization of dynasty power for the next generation. And that’s what should worry you.

    The Propaganda Heir: Fasbir Iskander and The Front Page

    Fasbir Iskander — also known as “Fasbeer” — is Shamim Iskander’s son. He’s Khaleda Zia’s nephew. He’s the current Prime Minister’s first cousin. And he runs something called The Front Page.

    The Front Page (@thefrontpagebd) is a digital media outlet that describes itself as “Bangladesh’s first forum and citizen journalism platform.” It has 212,000 Instagram followers, a team of 4 managers and 2 editors, and it runs 24/7. It produces content that reaches hundreds of thousands of Bangladeshis. It covers politics, current events, and social issues. It won its co-founder a Study UK Alumni Award in 2026 for Business and Innovation. Major brands — Coca-Cola, Nestlé, Walton — sponsor its content.

    And nowhere — not on The Front Page’s website, not in its Instagram bio, not in Fasbir’s LinkedIn profile, not in his award citation, not in any interview he’s given — does it mention that he is the nephew of a former Prime Minister, the son of a man who looted the national airline, and the first cousin of the current Prime Minister.

    Nowhere.

    Let that sink in for a moment. The founder of a media outlet that covers Bangladeshi politics, that has positioned itself as a voice for democratic values and press freedom, that won an international award for its coverage of the July 2024 uprising — that founder’s family is at the very center of the political story he’s supposedly covering objectively. And he has never disclosed this connection.

    I’m going to walk through this carefully, because the details matter and because the instinct will be to dismiss this as guilt by association. This isn’t guilt by association. This is an undisclosed conflict of interest at the heart of a media outlet that shapes public opinion on the most consequential political events in Bangladesh’s recent history.

    Fasbir co-founded The Front Page on November 20, 2020, with Shah Md. Akib Majumder. The platform started anonymously — Fasbir has said in interviews that even his family didn’t know he was behind it. He was, at the time, a cybersecurity professional with a CompTIA Security+ certification, living in the UK, educated at UCL and Royal Holloway. There’s nothing wrong with any of that. Starting a media platform is not a crime. Writing about politics is not a crime. Winning an award for innovation is not a crime.

    What is wrong — what is fundamentally, journalistically, ethically wrong — is running a media platform that covers the party your family leads without ever disclosing that family connection. It’s wrong in the same way that it would be wrong for the owner of a newspaper to write editorials praising his own business deals without telling readers he owns the business. The problem isn’t the content. The problem is the concealment.

    And the content, by the way, aligns rather conveniently with BNP’s interests. The Front Page was, by its own co-founder’s account, “the first and only portal in Bangladesh” to cover Al Jazeera’s “All The Prime Minister’s Men” documentary — a documentary about Hasina’s Awami League government. Fasbir explicitly said the platform was founded because of “lack of freedom of speech for almost 17 years” — 17 years being the Awami League’s time in power. This is BNP’s core political narrative, stated as the founding motivation of a supposedly independent media platform by a man who never disclosed that his aunt was the BNP chairperson, his uncle was the BNP leader who became Prime Minister, and his father was the BNP-connected figure who looted a national airline.

    During the July 2024 uprising, Fasbir was in America. He ran The Front Page’s entire operation solo for two days during the internet blackout, then assembled an international team of 20-30 volunteers. He framed this as “standing with the students” and “fighting from abroad.” There’s no reason to doubt his sincerity or the bravery of the platform’s coverage. But there’s also no reason to ignore the fact that the uprising that brought BNP to power brought his family to power — and that his platform’s coverage of that uprising never disclosed this connection.

    In November 2024, Fasbir gave an extensive interview to The Prestige Magazine about The Front Page’s mission, growth, and editorial philosophy. The interview is long, detailed, and passionate. Nowhere in it does he mention his family. Nowhere does he mention that he is the nephew of a woman who was Prime Minister, the cousin of a man who is now Prime Minister, and the son of a man whose corruption case was discharged just months after his family returned to power.

    This isn’t an accident. It’s a strategy. The Zia family has learned something important from their time in opposition: that the most effective propaganda doesn’t look like propaganda. It looks like journalism. It looks like “citizen media.” It looks like a young, UK-educated cybersecurity professional who just wants to tell the truth about Bangladesh. And it never, ever mentions the family name.

    The Political Heir: Zaima Rahman and the Pipeline to Power

    While Fasbir handles the media wing, another member of the next generation is being positioned for a different role.

    Zaima Rahman is Tarique Rahman’s daughter. She’s in her mid-twenties. And she’s being positioned within BNP as a leader of the future.

    Now, on one level, there’s nothing unusual about a political family producing political heirs. The Gandhis in India, the Bhuttos in Pakistan, the Kennedys in America — political dynasties exist everywhere. The question isn’t whether Zaima has the right to enter politics. She does. The question is whether a 25-year-old with no significant political experience, no track record of public service, and no demonstrated qualification beyond her last name is being fast-tracked for leadership in a party of millions.

    Because let’s be honest about what’s happening here. Zaima Rahman isn’t rising through BNP’s ranks. She’s being placed above them. She’s not building a constituency from the ground up. She’s inheriting one. She didn’t spend years organizing at the local level, fighting elections, building coalitions. She’s being positioned as the next generation of leadership in a party that has 10 million members, many of whom have spent decades in politics and will never get the access she was born into.

    This is the dynasty model. It’s not unique to BNP — Awami League did the same thing with Sheikh Hasina’s children. But the fact that both parties do it doesn’t make it less damaging. It makes it more damaging. It means that no matter which party wins, the same families retain power. The names change. The structure doesn’t.

    And Zaima’s positioning isn’t happening in a vacuum. It’s happening at the same time that every legal case against her father has been acquitted. At the same time that her uncle’s corruption case has been discharged. At the same time that her cousin is running an “independent” media platform that never discloses its family ties. The dynasty isn’t just securing its political future. It’s creating the conditions for that future to be unchallengeable.

    Think about it this way. Tarique Rahman has 84 acquittals. That means there are no legal obstacles between him and power. Shamim Iskander has a discharge. That means there are no legal obstacles between him and respectability. Fasbir Iskander has an award and 212,000 followers. That means there’s a media infrastructure ready to shape public perception. And Zaima Rahman has a last name. That means she has a constituency without having to earn one.

    Put them together, and what you have is a family that has neutralized the legal system, captured the narrative infrastructure, and groomed the next generation of leadership. This isn’t a political party preparing for the next election. This is a dynasty securing its perpetuity.

    The Business of Family: From Biman to The Front Page

    There’s a thread that connects Shamim Iskander’s Biman looting to Fasbir Iskander’s media empire, and it’s not just DNA. It’s the family’s understanding that power in Bangladesh flows through institutions, and that controlling those institutions — whether it’s an airline or an algorithm — is more valuable than any individual cash grab.

    When Shamim took over Biman, he wasn’t just stealing money. He was capturing an institution. Biman was Bangladesh’s national flag carrier. It employed thousands of people. It connected Bangladesh to the world. It was a symbol of national pride. And Shamim turned it into a family resource — a place where contracts could be steered to associates, where employees could be hired and fired at the family’s pleasure, and where hundreds of crores of taka could be extracted through leases, commissions, and kickbacks.

    The Biman model worked like this: control the institution, extract the wealth, let the institution collapse, move on. By 2006, Biman was on the verge of bankruptcy. Pilots and employees had revolted. The airline’s reputation was destroyed. Shamim had gotten what he wanted, and the institution was left in ruins.

    Now consider The Front Page model. Fasbir didn’t capture an existing institution — he built a new one. But the principle is the same. Control the institution (in this case, a media platform with 212,000 followers and growing). Extract the value (in this case, not money but narrative control — the ability to shape how Bangladeshis understand their own political history). And do it all without disclosing the family connection that makes the whole thing possible.

    The difference is sophistication. Shamim’s approach was brute force: take over the airline, redirect the money, dare anyone to stop you. Fasbir’s approach is subtler: build a platform, cultivate an audience, win awards, establish credibility, and never, ever mention that your father is the man who looted that same country’s airline and your cousin is now running it.

    Both approaches serve the same purpose: the perpetuation of family power. Shamim’s looting funded the family’s lifestyle during their years in opposition. Fasbir’s media platform shapes the narrative that makes their return to power seem legitimate. And Zaima’s political positioning ensures that the family retains formal power when Tarique eventually steps aside.

    Three generations. Three institutions. One family.

    The International Dimension: Awards, Visas, and Legitimacy

    There’s one more piece of this puzzle that deserves attention, and it’s the international legitimacy architecture that the Zia family has been building around the next generation.

    Fasbir Iskander won a Study UK Alumni Award in 2026 for Business and Innovation. The award ceremony took place at the Radisson Blu in Dhaka on December 15, 2025 — less than two weeks before Khaleda Zia’s death on December 30, 2025. The award citation praised Fasbir’s innovation, his media platform, and his contribution to digital journalism in Bangladesh. It did not mention that he is the nephew of a former Prime Minister, the son of a man who was arrested for looting the national airline, or the first cousin of the man who would become Prime Minister two months later.

    Now, I’m not suggesting that the British Council or the Study UK Alumni Awards program knew about Fasbir’s family connections and deliberately concealed them. I’m suggesting that the Zia family’s strategy works precisely because institutions like this don’t ask the right questions. They see a young, articulate, UK-educated professional with an innovative media platform and an inspiring personal story. They don’t see — because they’re not looking for — the family dynasty that makes the whole thing possible.

    And that’s the point. International legitimacy is the Zia family’s most effective shield. It’s what transformed Tarique Rahman from a man described by the US Embassy as a “symbol of kleptocratic government” into a visiting dignitary who meets with foreign leaders. It’s what transformed Shamim Iskander from a man who was arrested for looting a national airline into a VIP guest at Parliament. And it’s what’s now transforming Fasbir Iskander from a family member with an undisclosed conflict of interest into an award-winning media entrepreneur.

    The pattern is consistent: do the thing (loot the airline, run the propaganda, position the heir), get the domestic cover (discharge the case, acquire the followers, build the platform), then get the international legitimacy (the US visa, the UK award, the Western acceptance). By the time the international community notices what’s happening, the family is already embedded in the power structure, and reversing the process requires confronting not just one person but an entire network of institutions, awards, and relationships that have been built up over years.

    The Zia family understands something that many of their critics don’t: legitimacy isn’t something you earn. It’s something you construct. And the construction materials are money, media, and the willingness of international institutions to not ask too many questions.

    What the Family Learned from 1/11

    The Zia family’s current strategy didn’t emerge from nowhere. It emerged from a specific historical experience: January 11, 2007, and the caretaker government period that followed.

    When the caretaker government took power, the Zia family’s entire edifice was threatened. Khaleda Zia was arrested. Tarique Rahman was arrested. Shamim Iskander was arrested. Cases were filed. Investigations were launched. The international community was paying attention. For a brief period, it looked like accountability might actually arrive in Bangladesh.

    It didn’t. The caretaker government was itself flawed — politically motivated in some of its prosecutions, overreaching in some of its methods. But that’s not the lesson the Zia family took from 1/11. The lesson they took was: never let this happen again.

    And they’ve been implementing that lesson ever since. Here’s what they learned:

    Lesson One: Capture the judiciary. Every case from the 1/11 period has been acquitted, discharged, or quashed since BNP returned to power. Not some cases. All of them. The courts that were supposed to hold the family accountable have been turned into the family’s exoneration machine. We documented this in “The Forgiveness Machine” — 84 cases against Tarique, zero convictions standing. The judiciary that once threatened the dynasty now protects it.

    Lesson Two: Control the narrative. This is where Fasbir comes in. During 1/11 and the Awami League years, the Zia family had no domestic media infrastructure of their own. They relied on friendly journalists and sympathetic outlets, but they didn’t have a platform that they controlled directly. The Front Page changes that. It gives the family a 212,000-follower media outlet that can shape narratives, cover stories, and present the family’s perspective as “independent citizen journalism” — all without ever disclosing the family connection. This is the institutional lesson from 1/11: you don’t need to suppress dissent if you can outcompete it with your own “independent” voice.

    Lesson Three: Internationalize early. The US sanctions on RAB. The FBI investigation into Tarique’s money laundering. The Singapore court proceedings. The WikiLeaks cables. All of these represented international pressure points that the Zia family couldn’t control. The family’s response has been to build international legitimacy before the pressure arrives. Fasbir’s UK award. Zaima’s positioning within BNP’s international outreach. Tarique’s diplomatic engagements as Prime Minister. The family is building relationships and credibility abroad so that when the next crisis comes — and in Bangladesh, it always comes — they have an international support network that makes it harder for domestic opponents to isolate them.

    Lesson Four: Prepare the next generation. Dynasties don’t survive by accident. They survive because each generation prepares the next one. Shamim was the brother who handled business. Tarique was the son who handled politics. Fasbir is the nephew who handles media. Zaima is the granddaughter who will handle the future. Each generation is given a specific role, a specific set of institutions to capture, and a specific kind of legitimacy to construct. The family’s experience with 1/11 — when the entire edifice was threatened simultaneously — taught them that you need multiple tracks, multiple institutions, and multiple generations all working in concert. If one falls, the others survive.

    This is what makes the Zia family different from a typical corrupt political family. Typical corrupt families steal and hope they don’t get caught. The Zia family steals, gets caught, gets acquitted, captures the institutions that caught them, builds the media infrastructure that will prevent future exposure, and positions the next generation to inherit the whole apparatus. They don’t just survive accountability. They learn from it.

    The Family That Preys Together

    Let me bring this together, because the individual pieces only make sense when you see the whole.

    Shamim Iskander looted Biman Bangladesh Airlines of Tk 250 crore. His case — with 36 witnesses — was discharged in March 2025. He now sits in the VIP gallery at Parliament.

    Fasbir Iskander runs The Front Page, a media platform with 212,000 followers that covers Bangladeshi politics without ever disclosing that its founder is the nephew of the former Prime Minister, the son of the man who looted Biman, and the first cousin of the current Prime Minister. He has won an international award for this platform.

    Tarique Rahman was described by the US Embassy as a “symbol of kleptocratic government.” He had 84 cases filed against him. Every single one has been acquitted. He is now the Prime Minister of Bangladesh.

    Zaima Rahman, Tarique’s daughter, is being positioned as the next generation of BNP leadership. She has no significant political track record. She has no demonstrated qualifications beyond her last name. But she has the one thing that matters most in Bangladeshi politics: blood.

    And Khaleda Zia, the matriarch who presided over all of this — the orphanage trust, the charitable trust, the Barapukuria contracts, the five years as the most corrupt country on earth — she died on December 30, 2025, with every conviction against her overturned, every case dismissed, and her family firmly in control of the country she once governed.

    This isn’t a political party. It’s a family business. And the business model is simple: capture institutions, extract wealth, neutralize legal threats, control the narrative, prepare the heirs, repeat.

    The brother captured Biman. The nephew is capturing the media. The son captured the government. And the granddaughter is being positioned to capture the future. Each generation learns from the one before. Each institution — the airline, the courts, the press, the parliament — becomes a family asset. And each time the cycle repeats, it gets harder to break, because the family has more money, more legitimacy, more institutional control, and more heirs ready to step into the roles that the previous generation has prepared for them.

    What Bangladesh Loses

    I want to close by talking about what this costs. Not in taka — you can read the numbers in the previous articles. Tk 250 crore from Biman. Tk 2.1 crore from orphans. Tk 20.41 crore laundered. Five years as the most corrupt country on earth. These are numbers, and they’re devastating, but they’re also abstract.

    What’s not abstract is what happens to a country when its most powerful family treats every institution as a family asset. Biman nearly collapsed. The power sector became a synonym for corruption. The courts became a forgiveness machine. And now the media — the institution that’s supposed to hold power accountable — has a Zia family member running one of its most visible platforms without disclosing that connection.

    What Bangladesh loses isn’t just money. It’s the possibility of accountability. It’s the possibility that a court will actually convict a powerful person and have that conviction stick. It’s the possibility that a media outlet will investigate the ruling family without that investigation being compromised by the outlet’s undisclosed family ties. It’s the possibility that a young person can enter politics without the right last name and still have a chance at leadership. It’s the possibility that institutions serve the public instead of the family that captured them.

    Every time Shamim sits in the VIP gallery, he’s telling every Bangladeshi who believes in accountability that the system doesn’t work for them. Every time Fasbir wins an award without disclosing his family ties, he’s telling every journalist who believes in transparency that the rules don’t apply to everyone equally. Every time Zaima is positioned as a future leader without earning it, she’s telling every BNP worker who has spent decades building the party that their loyalty is worth less than a last name.

    And every time the Zia family gets away with it — every acquittal, every discharge, every undisclosed conflict of interest, every next-generation positioning — they’re not just enriching themselves. They’re teaching the next family that comes along exactly how to do it. The Awami League already learned this lesson. The next party that gains power will learn it too. The precedent isn’t just set. It’s institutionalized.

    The Zia family’s next chapter isn’t just about them. It’s about what Bangladesh becomes when every powerful family watches what they’ve done and says: “If they can do it, why can’t we?”

    The answer, of course, is that they can. They already are. The only question is whether anyone will be left to write about it when the next family’s nephew starts a media platform and the next family’s granddaughter gets fast-tracked for leadership and the next family’s brother walks into a national institution and starts treating it like his personal property.

    Based on the evidence I’ve seen, the answer to that question depends entirely on whether media platforms like The Front Page are required to disclose their ownership and family connections. Whether courts are allowed to function independently of the ruling party. Whether institutions can resist capture by the families that seek to control them. And whether the people of Bangladesh are willing to accept a political system where your last name matters more than your qualifications, your connections matter more than your competence, and your family matters more than your country.

    Right now, the evidence suggests that the answer is: probably not. The family’s next chapter is already being written. The only question is whether Bangladesh gets to write its own.


    Sources:

    • The Daily Star (July 20, 2008): “Shamim rode on Biman” — Shamim Iskander’s control over Biman Bangladesh Airlines, Tk 250 crore in losses
    • The Daily Star (March 25, 2025): Discharge of Shamim Iskander corruption case — 36 witnesses, case discharged
    • Dhaka Tribune (March 2026): Shamim Iskander and Kaniz Fatema in VIP gallery at 13th Parliament inaugural session
    • ACC/NBR bank inquiry records (2008): Investigation into Shamim Iskander’s wealth, sons’ transactions
    • Study UK Alumni Awards 2026: Fasbir Iskander — Business & Innovation category
    • The Prestige Magazine (November 19, 2024): Interview with Fasbir Iskander and Akib Majumder about The Front Page’s founding, mission, and July 2024 coverage
    • The Front Page (@thefrontpagebd): Instagram 212K followers, platform positioning as “citizen journalism”
    • WikiLeaks Cable 08DHAKA1143: US Embassy describes Tarique Rahman as “symbol of kleptocratic government”
    • Bangladesh Special Court (February 8, 2018): Convictions in Zia Orphanage Trust and Zia Charitable Trust cases
    • Appellate Division of Supreme Court (March 6, 2025): Acquittal of Tarique Rahman in money laundering case
    • Bangladesh High Court (November 27, 2024): Acquittal of Khaleda Zia in Zia Charitable Trust case
    • Supreme Court of Bangladesh (January 16, 2025): Acquittal in Zia Orphanage Trust case
    • Time Magazine (January 2026): Profile of Tarique Rahman, “Khamba Tarique” nickname documented
    • Transparency International: Bangladesh ranked #1 most corrupt country in the world, 2001-2005 CPI
    • International Crisis Group: Asia Reports No. 121, 187, 277 — BNP-era governance and institutional failures
    • Human Rights Watch: “Judge, Jury, and Executioner” (December 2006) — RAB extrajudicial killings under BNP rule

    Series 10 — The Dynasty Files | Article #79

    Bangladesh Untold documents what happened. What you do with that information is up to you.


  • The Dynasty’s Bank Accounts: How the Zia Family Got Richer While Bangladesh Got Poorer






    The Dynasty’s Bank Accounts: How the Zia Family Got Richer While Bangladesh Got Poorer — Bangladesh Untold

    The Dynasty’s Bank Accounts: How the Zia Family Got Richer While Bangladesh Got Poorer

    While Bangladesh ranked as the most corrupt country on Earth for five straight years, the family running it was building an empire. The orphanage trust was just the beginning.

    There’s a particular kind of cruelty that deserves its own category. Stealing from orphans is one of them. Stealing from orphans and naming the trust after your husband — a former president — is another. Getting caught, getting convicted, getting sentenced to prison, and then having your conviction overturned after your party returns to power? That’s the complete cycle. That’s Bangladesh’s accountability system in miniature. And it’s the thread I’m going to pull today.

    But I’m not just writing about the Zia Orphanage Trust. That story has been told — though not nearly often enough, and not with the context it deserves. What I want to do is connect it to something bigger: the unmistakable pattern of a family that transformed political power into personal wealth at every possible point of access, using every institution they controlled, at every level of government, while the country they governed sank to the bottom of every international ranking that measures human wellbeing.

    This is the story of the Zia family’s bank accounts. Not just Khaleda’s. Not just Tarique’s. The whole family’s. And it’s the story of what was happening to 140 million Bangladeshis while the Zias were getting richer.

    The Orphanage Trust: Stealing From Children

    Let me start with the most visceral example, because it sets the tone for everything else.

    In 1991, the Zia Orphanage Trust was established as a charitable fund for orphans. It was named after Ziaur Rahman, the former president and Khaleda Zia’s late husband. The trust was supposed to provide education, housing, and support for children who had lost their parents. Foreign governments and organizations donated money to this trust. The sum reached over Tk 2.1 crore — roughly $305,000 at the time. Not a fortune by international standards, but in a country where per capita GDP was under $300, it was significant. It was money that orphans needed.

    The money never reached the orphans.

    In 2009, the Anti-Corruption Commission filed charges against Khaleda Zia and Tarique Rahman, alleging that they had embezzled the entire amount. The ACC’s case was straightforward: foreign donations meant for orphans were diverted to personal accounts and used for purposes that had nothing to do with children’s welfare. The money moved through a series of transactions designed to obscure its origin — the kind of financial choreography that only makes sense if you’re trying to hide something.

    On February 8, 2018, a special court convicted Khaleda Zia and sentenced her to five years in prison. Tarique Rahman, who was in exile, was sentenced to 10 years in absentia. The court found that the money had been misappropriated. The evidence was sufficient. The conviction stood.

    Until it didn’t.

    In October 2018, the High Court enhanced Khaleda’s sentence from five to ten years. Then, in November 2024 — three months after the July uprising that brought BNP to power — the Appellate Division stayed the order increasing the sentence. And on January 16, 2025, the Supreme Court acquitted both Khaleda Zia and Tarique Rahman in the Zia Orphanage Trust case.

    Acquitted. The orphans’ money was taken. The conviction was real. The evidence was sufficient. And then the political winds shifted, and the conviction evaporated.

    Now let me be precise about what happened here, because the distinction matters. An acquittal after a full trial, based on new evidence proving innocence, is one thing. An acquittal that follows a change in government, that coincides with the systematic overturning of every BNP-era conviction, and that occurs while the acquitted party is consolidating power — that’s something else entirely. The Supreme Court didn’t say the money reached the orphans. The Supreme Court didn’t say the trust was managed properly. The Supreme Court said that, for reasons it deemed sufficient, the convictions could not stand.

    The orphans are still waiting.

    The Charitable Trust: Same Playbook, Different Name

    If you thought the orphanage trust was an isolated incident, let me introduce you to the Zia Charitable Trust.

    The Charitable Trust case was the ACC’s second major prosecution of Khaleda and Tarique. The charges were similar: embezzlement of trust funds, misuse of charitable donations, personal enrichment through an institution that was supposed to serve the public.

    On February 8, 2018 — the same day as the Orphanage Trust verdict — Khaleda Zia was convicted and sentenced to five years. Tarique, again in absentia, received ten years. The sentences ran consecutively, meaning Khaleda faced up to 17 years in prison across both cases.

    But by October 2018, a special court had sentenced Khaleda to seven years of rigorous imprisonment with a fine of Tk 10 lakh for the Charitable Trust case alone. The conviction was firm. The evidence was documented.

    And then, on November 27, 2024 — four months after the July uprising — the High Court acquitted Khaleda Zia, declaring the verdict null and void.

    Two trust cases. Two convictions. Two acquittals. Both overturned after the same political transition. Both involving money meant for the public good. Both following the same pattern: conviction during one government, acquittal during the next.

    If this were happening in any other country, it would be called what it is: a justice system that responds to political power rather than evidence. In Bangladesh, it’s called Tuesday.

    The Money Trail: Tk 20.41 Crore and a Friend Called Mamun

    Now let me take you to the money laundering case, because this is where the Zia family’s financial architecture becomes visible.

    On June 7, 2007, the ACC filed a money laundering case against Tarique Rahman and his close friend and business partner Giasuddin Al Mamun. The amount involved: Tk 20.41 crore — roughly $2.5 million at the time.

    The case alleged that Tarique used his political influence to help Mamun acquire and then launder the money. The High Court, in its 2016 verdict, was explicit: “Tarique Rahman influenced political power to help his close friend, Giasuddin Mamun, to get and then launder 200 million taka ($2.5m).” That’s the Deputy Attorney General quoting the court’s findings to AFP.

    Tarique was sentenced to seven years in prison and fined Tk 20 crore. The evidence included bank records, transaction histories, and testimony about the flow of money through Mamun’s accounts with Tarique’s facilitation.

    Then came the acquittal. On December 10, 2024, the Supreme Court stayed the seven-year sentence. On March 6, 2025, the Appellate Division acquitted both Tarique and Mamun entirely.

    I want to pause on something here. The case documented a specific financial transaction: Tk 20.41 crore moved through specific accounts at specific times, facilitated by a specific individual with specific political connections. The High Court reviewed this evidence and found it compelling enough to convict and sentence. The Appellate Division then found reasons to acquit. The evidence didn’t change. The money didn’t un-launder itself. The transactions didn’t reverse. What changed was the government.

    This is the pattern. Every single time. The evidence is sufficient when the opposition is in power. The evidence becomes insufficient when the accused’s party is in power. And everyone pretends this is how justice works.

    Barapukuria: The Coal Mine That Fueled a Family

    The Zia family’s corruption wasn’t limited to trusts and money laundering. It extended into the very ground beneath Bangladesh’s feet.

    The Barapukuria Coal Mine corruption case was filed by the ACC on January 26, 2008. The charges involved Khaleda Zia and others in corruption related to the Barapukuria coal mine — one of Bangladesh’s most significant natural resource projects. The allegations centered on irregularities in the awarding of contracts for the mine’s development, with kickbacks and inflated costs that enriched individuals connected to the ruling family.

    Barapukuria matters because it represents a different kind of corruption than the trust cases. The orphanage trust was about stealing charitable donations — money that was given freely by people who wanted to help orphans. The money laundering case was about using political influence to move illicit funds. But Barapukuria was about something more fundamental: the systematic extraction of wealth from Bangladesh’s natural resources by the people who were supposed to be managing those resources for the public good.

    When a government awards mining contracts to companies connected to the ruling family’s associates, it’s not just corruption. It’s a form of theft that compounds over time. The coal that’s extracted is gone. The money that’s overpaid is gone. The environmental damage from the mining is permanent. And the contracts that were inflated to enrich connected parties set a precedent that makes future corruption easier and more expensive.

    The Barapukuria case, like every other case against Khaleda Zia, has followed the now-familiar trajectory. Filed under one government. Proceedings under another. And the quiet expectation that, given enough political changes, it too will disappear.

    While the Zias Prospered: Bangladesh at the Bottom

    Here’s the part of the story that doesn’t get told enough. While the Zia family was building its wealth through trusts, money laundering, natural resource contracts, and the systematic monetization of political power, the country they were governing was setting records for all the wrong reasons.

    Transparency International ranked Bangladesh as the most corrupt country in the world for five consecutive years: 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, and 2005. Not “one of the most corrupt.” The most corrupt. Number one. Five years running. This wasn’t a one-year anomaly. This was a sustained, systemic condition that defined the entire period of BNP-Jamaat rule.

    Let me put that in human terms. When Khaleda Zia took office in October 2001, Bangladesh was already near the bottom of the CPI. Over the next five years, under her government, it fell further — hitting the absolute bottom and staying there. Every year. Without interruption. For half a decade.

    During those same five years:

    Shamim Iskander was looting Biman Airlines, siphoning Tk 250 crore through aircraft leases, maintenance contracts, and procurement kickbacks, while Biman’s own employees were protesting and the airline was on the verge of bankruptcy.

    Tarique Rahman was running Hawa Bhaban as a parallel power center, collecting bribes and commissions on government contracts, earning the US Embassy’s description as a “symbol of kleptocratic government” and the nickname “Mr. Ten Percent” — a moniker that, unlike most political nicknames, was earned through documented evidence rather than partisan name-calling.

    Lutfozzaman Babar, as State Minister for Home Affairs, was facilitating the August 21 grenade attack that killed 24 people, overseeing Operation Clean Heart that killed 44 people in custody, and managing the security apparatus that would produce RAB — the elite death squad responsible for 600+ extrajudicial killings.

    Khaleda Zia herself was presiding over all of it — the orphanage trust embezzlement, the charitable trust misuse, the Barapukuria contracts, the Hawa Bhaban operations — while maintaining the fiction that she was a democratically elected leader governing in the public interest.

    And at the bottom of the CPI, year after year, was the evidence that none of this was hidden. The whole world could see it. Transparency International published the rankings every year. Human Rights Watch published reports. The International Crisis Group published analyses. The US Embassy sent cables. And still — still — the Zia family governed as if the rankings didn’t exist, as if the reports didn’t matter, as if the international community’s condemnation was just background noise.

    Because in Bangladesh’s political system, international condemnation is background noise. There are no consequences for being ranked the most corrupt country in the world. There are no sanctions for presiding over extrajudicial killings. There are no consequences for stealing from orphans. The system is designed to absorb criticism and convert it into political capital — “the international community is against us” becomes “we are the victims of a global conspiracy” — and the stealing continues.

    The Khamba Tarique Effect: Poles to Nowhere

    I can’t write about Zia family wealth without mentioning the most visible symbol of their corruption — the electric poles that stood across rural Bangladesh like monuments to theft.

    “Khamba Tarique” — “Tarique’s Poles” — was the name Bangladeshis gave to the thousands of concrete electric poles that were installed across the country during BNP rule, at vastly inflated prices, connected to the electrical grid in almost no places. The poles stood in villages that had no electricity. They lined roads that led to nowhere. They were procured through contracts influenced by Hawa Bhaban, at prices far above market rates, with kickbacks flowing back to Tarique and his network.

    Time magazine, in a January 2026 profile, noted that Tarique Rahman “continues to be referred to by the derogatory nickname ‘Khamba Tarique’ by critics.” The magazine was being diplomatic. The reality was that the nickname wasn’t just criticism — it was a physical reminder of corruption that people could see from their own homes. Every time a rural Bangladeshi looked out their window and saw an electric pole that didn’t carry electricity, they were looking at Tarique Rahman’s corruption made concrete. Literally.

    The power sector scandal wasn’t small. It involved massive procurement fraud in electricity infrastructure. The poles were the visible symbol, but the real money was in the contracts for power generation, transmission, and distribution that were awarded to companies connected to Hawa Bhaban. The total cost to the national exchequer ran into hundreds of crores of taka — money that could have electrified villages, built power plants, and brought Bangladesh out of its chronic energy crisis. Instead, it went into the pockets of the ruling family and their associates.

    The poles still stand. Many of them still don’t carry electricity. They’re the most honest monuments the Zia family ever built — more honest than the Zia Orphanage Trust, which was supposed to help children but helped the family instead. More honest than the Zia Charitable Trust, which was supposed to serve the public but served the trustees. The poles, at least, don’t pretend to be anything other than what they are: stolen money, standing in plain sight, in every village that was promised electricity and received a concrete post instead.

    The 84 Cases: A Number That Tells a Story

    Eighty-four cases were filed against Tarique Rahman between 2007 and 2024. BNP called all of them “politically motivated.” After the July 2024 uprising, courts acquitted him of every single charge.

    Let me be clear about what this number means and what it doesn’t mean. Eighty-four cases doesn’t mean Tarique was guilty 84 times. Cases can be frivolous. Cases can be politically motivated. Cases can be filed by vindictive prosecutors with bad evidence. The number alone doesn’t prove guilt.

    But here’s what the number does tell us: between 2001 and 2006, when Tarique was operating Hawa Bhaban, the US Embassy documented specific, credible allegations of corruption involving millions of dollars. The money laundering case produced a conviction that was upheld by the High Court. The Zia Orphanage Trust case involved documented financial transfers from a charitable fund to personal accounts. These weren’t vague accusations. They were specific cases with specific evidence, specific financial records, and specific witnesses.

    And they all — every single one — were eventually acquitted after BNP returned to power. Not one conviction survived the political transition. Not one.

    If all 84 cases were genuinely politically motivated, then Tarique Rahman is the most persecuted innocent man in Bangladeshi history. But if even one of those cases — the money laundering case with Tk 20.41 crore in documented transactions, the orphanage trust case with Tk 2.1 crore in misappropriated charitable funds, the Barapukuria case with inflated mining contracts — if even one of those cases had merit, then the complete acquittal of all 84 is not justice. It’s a whitewash. A systematic, comprehensive, politically engineered whitewash.

    You don’t need to believe all 84 cases were valid to see the problem. You need to believe that at least one of them was. And if you’ve read this far, you’ve seen the evidence for at least three. The orphanage trust. The money laundering. The power sector. These aren’t phantom charges. They’re documented, investigated, prosecuted cases with real evidence. And they’re all gone now. Every conviction overturned. Every charge dismissed. Every accused person free and, in Tarique’s case, running the country.

    The Overseas Accounts: What We Know and What We Don’t

    One of the most frustrating aspects of documenting Zia family wealth is how much of it remains hidden. The cases that were filed — the ones that made it to court — represent the tip of an iceberg. Below the waterline, there’s a vast body of wealth that was never fully investigated, never fully documented, and never accounted for.

    We know about Shamim Iskander’s houses in Australia and Canada. We know about his Barclays Bank platinum credit card. We know about the Tk 4 crore in declared assets and the Tk 20.47 lakh in unexplained income that the ACC was able to document — a fraction of what Biman alone lost. We know about Tarique’s money laundering through Giasuddin Al Mamun, documented by the FBI and investigated by Singapore courts.

    We know about the Hawa Bhaban network — the parallel government where government contracts were influenced in exchange for bribes, as documented by US diplomatic cables. We know that “Mr. Ten Percent” wasn’t a metaphor. It was a commission rate. A business model. A systematic method for extracting wealth from every major government procurement during BNP’s five years in power.

    But we don’t know the full extent. The FBI investigation was limited in scope. The Singapore court proceedings addressed specific transactions. The ACC’s investigations were hampered by political interference, by witness intimidation, and by the simple reality that investigating a sitting Prime Minister’s family is a career-ending — and sometimes life-ending — proposition in Bangladesh.

    What we can say with confidence is this: the documented cases represent a small fraction of the Zia family’s total enrichment during BNP rule. The money that was traced — the Tk 2.1 crore from the orphanage trust, the Tk 20.41 crore laundered through Mamun, the Tk 250 crore lost from Biman, the power sector kickbacks — these are the amounts that were large enough and visible enough to attract investigation. The amounts that were too small, too well-hidden, or too politically sensitive to pursue remain invisible. And after the complete acquittal of all cases, they will likely stay invisible forever.

    The Real Cost: What Bangladesh Lost

    It’s tempting to reduce this to numbers. Tk 2.1 crore from orphans. Tk 20.41 crore laundered. Tk 250 crore from Biman. Hundreds of crores from the power sector. The CPI rankings. The case counts.

    But numbers don’t capture what Bangladesh actually lost during those five years. Because while the Zia family was extracting wealth from every institution they controlled, the institutions they were supposed to be running were collapsing.

    Biman Bangladesh Airlines nearly went bankrupt. Not because of market conditions or fuel prices or competition — because one family turned it into their personal ATM. Pilots and employees protested. Routes were cut. Service deteriorated. The national flag carrier became an international embarrassment. And the man responsible sat in the VIP gallery at Parliament 17 years later, a free man with a discharged case.

    The power sector became a synonym for corruption. “Khamba Tarique” entered the Bangladeshi lexicon as a shorthand for political theft. Villages that were promised electricity got concrete poles instead. The rural electrification program became a rural enrichment program for the ruling family’s associates. And the poles — the useless, electricity-less, stolen-money-made-concrete poles — still stand across the countryside, mute witnesses to theft that was never accounted for.

    The orphanage trust funds were never replaced. The children who were supposed to benefit from Tk 2.1 crore in donations received nothing. The foreign donors who contributed in good faith received proof that their generosity was wasted. And the trust itself — named after a former president, meant to be a symbol of national compassion — became a symbol of national theft.

    And the international reputation. Five years as the most corrupt country on earth. Five years of being the country that every investor avoided, every development agency warned about, and every diplomatic cable described in terms usually reserved for failing states. That reputation didn’t just cost Bangladesh foreign investment. It cost Bangladesh the chance to be taken seriously as a nation. When the US Embassy cables described Tarique Rahman as a “symbol of kleptocratic government,” they weren’t offering a political opinion. They were stating a diplomatic assessment based on observable reality. And that reality — the reality of a country governed by a family that treats the state treasury as a personal bank account — shaped how every potential partner, investor, and ally viewed Bangladesh for years to come.

    What the Orphans Would Say

    I want to end this article with a thought that I can’t get out of my head.

    The Zia Orphanage Trust held Tk 2.1 crore. In 2001, that was roughly $305,000. In a country where per capita GDP was under $300, that money could have transformed the lives of thousands of orphans. It could have built schools and dormitories. It could have provided vocational training and scholarships. It could have given children who had lost everything — their parents, their families, their safety nets — a second chance at building a life.

    Instead, it went into the Zia family’s accounts. The money that was donated to help the most vulnerable children in Bangladesh was diverted to enrich one of the most powerful families in Bangladesh. The trust was named after a former president — a man who, whatever his flaws, had built a political career and a national identity. His name was used to solicit donations for orphans. And then those donations were stolen by his wife and son.

    If you want to understand the Zia family’s relationship with Bangladesh, don’t look at the speeches. Don’t look at the rallies. Don’t look at the campaign slogans. Look at the orphanage trust. Because the orphanage trust is the entire Zia family project in miniature: take something that belongs to the people — their money, their institutions, their natural resources, their trust — and convert it into personal wealth. Then, when you’re caught, wait for the political winds to shift. When they do, get acquitted. And when you return to power, make sure the institutions that caught you the first time can never catch you again.

    That’s what happened to the orphanage trust money. That’s what happened to Biman. That’s what happened to the power sector. That’s what happened to the CPI rankings. That’s what happened to the 84 cases. That’s what happened to every conviction, every investigation, every attempt at accountability.

    The family got richer. The country got poorer. The orphans got nothing.

    And now the family is back in power, the cases are all dismissed, and the orphans are still waiting for their money. They’ll wait forever. Because in Bangladesh, the law doesn’t serve the orphans. It serves the family that stole from them.

    The Accountability Deficit

    Let me close with the big picture, because it’s important to understand how systematic this is.

    Every single major corruption case from the BNP era (2001-2006) has been acquitted, discharged, or quashed since the July 2024 uprising:

    • Tarique Rahman — all 84 cases acquitted, including money laundering conviction
    • Khaleda Zia — Orphanage Trust and Charitable Trust cases acquitted
    • Shamim Iskander — corruption case discharged
    • August 21 grenade attack — all 49 accused acquitted (December 2024)
    • Chittagong arms haul — Babar and key accused acquitted (December 2024)
    • Lutfozzaman Babar — acquitted across multiple cases

    This isn’t a coincidence. It’s not a series of independent judicial decisions that happened to reach the same outcome. It’s a pattern. A systematic, complete, across-the-board reversal of every accountability measure that was put in place during the caretaker government and Awami League periods.

    Some of these acquittals may have been legally sound. Courts make mistakes. Evidence degrades over time. Witnesses become unavailable. Procedures are flawed. Not every conviction from the 1/11 period was fair — the caretaker government was itself politically motivated in some of its prosecutions.

    But when every single conviction is overturned. When every single case is dismissed. When the entire edifice of accountability for a five-year period of documented, internationally recognized corruption is dismantled in the space of a few months — that’s not the justice system correcting errors. That’s the justice system responding to power.

    And the Zia family knows it. That’s why they’re so confident. That’s why Shamim Iskander can sit in the VIP gallery at Parliament. That’s why Fasbeer Eskander can run a media outlet without disclosing his family connection. That’s why Tarique Rahman can travel the world as a head of government instead of facing the consequences of the US Embassy’s assessment that he was “guilty of egregious political corruption that has had a serious adverse effect on US national interests.”

    Because in Bangladesh, accountability isn’t a system. It’s a weather pattern. When the wind blows one way, you go to prison. When it blows the other way, you go to the VIP gallery. And right now, the wind is blowing the Zia family’s way with gale force.

    The question is: what happens when the wind changes again? Because it always does. In Bangladesh, it always does. And when it does, the orphans will still be waiting. The poles will still be standing. The Biman will still be broken. And the evidence — all that evidence that was sufficient to convict but insufficient to prevent acquittal — will still be there, waiting for a court that’s willing to read it.

    Until then, the Zia family’s bank accounts continue to grow. The CPI rankings continue to embarrass. And the gap between what Bangladesh could be and what the Zia family has made it continues to widen.

    That’s not a political opinion. That’s five years of being the most corrupt country on earth, documented by the world’s leading anti-corruption organization, followed by the complete erasure of every accountability measure that was ever imposed.

    The family got richer. The country got poorer. The orphans got nothing. And the poles still stand.


    Sources:

    • Transparency International, Corruption Perceptions Index, 2001-2005: Bangladesh ranked #1 most corrupt country in the world for five consecutive years
    • Bangladesh Special Court (February 8, 2018): Khaleda Zia and Tarique Rahman convicted in Zia Orphanage Trust case — Khaleda sentenced to 5 years, Tarique to 10 years in absentia
    • Bangladesh High Court (October 30, 2018): Khaleda Zia’s sentence enhanced from 5 to 10 years in Orphanage Trust case
    • Appellate Division of Supreme Court (November 11, 2024): Stay on enhanced sentence in Orphanage Trust case
    • Supreme Court of Bangladesh (January 16, 2025): Acquittal of Khaleda Zia and Tarique Rahman in Zia Orphanage Trust case
    • Bangladesh Special Court (February 8, 2018): Khaleda Zia and Tarique Rahman convicted in Zia Charitable Trust case
    • Bangladesh Special Court (October 29, 2018): Khaleda Zia sentenced to 7 years rigorous imprisonment in Charitable Trust case
    • Bangladesh High Court (November 27, 2024): Acquittal of Khaleda Zia in Zia Charitable Trust case
    • Bangladesh High Court (July 21, 2016): Tarique Rahman sentenced to 7 years imprisonment and fined Tk 20 crore in money laundering case
    • Deputy Attorney General Moniruzzaman Kabir to AFP: “Tarique Rahman influenced political power to help his close friend, Giasuddin Mamun, to get and then launder 200 million taka ($2.5m)”
    • Appellate Division of Supreme Court (March 6, 2025): Acquittal of Tarique Rahman and Giasuddin Al Mamun in money laundering case
    • ACC case filings (2007-2008): Zia Orphanage Trust, Zia Charitable Trust, Barapukuria coal mine, Shamim Iskander corruption
    • WikiLeaks Cable 08DHAKA1143: US Embassy describes Tarique Rahman as “symbol of kleptocratic government” and Hawa Bhaban as “frequently accused of acting as a parallel power center where government contracts were influenced in exchange for bribes”
    • Time Magazine (January 2026): Profile referencing “Khamba Tarique” nickname and power sector corruption
    • The Daily Star (July 20, 2008): “Shamim rode on Biman” — Shamim Iskander’s control over Biman Bangladesh Airlines
    • Human Rights Watch: “Judge, Jury, and Executioner” (December 2006) — RAB killings and extrajudicial violence under BNP rule
    • International Crisis Group: Asia Reports No. 121 (October 2006), No. 187 (March 2010), No. 277 (April 2016) — documentation of BNP-era governance failures

    Series 10 — The Dynasty Files | Article #78

    Bangladesh Untold documents what happened. What you do with that information is up to you.


  • The Golden Contracts: How Khaleda Zia’s Government Handed a State Enterprise to Cronies and Called It “Privatization”

    The Golden Contracts: How Khaleda Zia’s Government Handed a State Enterprise to Cronies and Called It “Privatization”

    GATCO was supposed to manage Bangladesh’s container terminals. Instead, it became a pipeline from the national treasury straight into the pockets of the ruling family’s associates. The contract was rigged. The money vanished. And when the courts finally caught up — BNP came back to power and made the whole thing disappear.

    Let me tell you about a company called GATCO.

    No, that’s not right. Let me tell you about a word called “privatization” and what it meant in Bangladesh between 2001 and 2006. Because when BNP said they were privatizing state enterprises, what they actually did was hand public assets to private friends at public expense. And GATCO — the Global Agro Trade (Private) Company Ltd — is the cleanest, most documented example of how the system worked.

    This isn’t a complicated story. It’s actually quite simple. A company with no experience in container management won a contract to manage one of Bangladesh’s most important logistics hubs. The bidding was a sham. The execution was a disaster. The money went everywhere except where it was supposed to go. And the person at the center of it all was the Prime Minister of Bangladesh.

    So let’s walk through it. Step by step. Contract by contract. Because this isn’t just about containers. It’s about how an entire government was run as a family business — and how every safeguard designed to stop it was systematically dismantled.

    What Was GATCO?

    Global Agro Trade (Private) Company Ltd — GATCO — was, on paper, a private company that won a contract to manage container handling at two of Bangladesh’s most critical inland container depots: the Kamalapur Inland Container Depot (ICD) in Dhaka and the Chittagong ICD.

    These weren’t small facilities. The Kamalapur ICD was the only inland container depot in Dhaka, handling virtually all container traffic between the capital and the Chittagong port — Bangladesh’s main seaport and the lifeline of the country’s export-import economy. The Chittagong ICD was equally critical. Together, they were the arteries of Bangladesh’s trade infrastructure.

    Managing container terminals requires expertise — logistics, equipment, trained personnel, international connections, financial capacity. GATCO had none of these. What GATCO had was something far more valuable in BNP’s Bangladesh: connections.

    The Rigged Contract

    In 2003, the BNP government awarded GATCO the contract for container management at both ICDs. Let me be clear about what happened next, because the process itself tells you everything.

    The contract was supposed to be awarded through competitive bidding. It wasn’t. The tender process was manipulated to ensure GATCO won despite having no track record in container operations. Companies with actual experience — including established logistics firms — were either excluded from the process or found that the requirements had been conveniently tailored to match GATCO’s profile.

    This is what corruption looks like when it’s done by people who have been doing it for a long time. You don’t just steal money. You build a system where the theft looks legitimate. The tender exists. The paperwork exists. The evaluation committee exists. But the outcome was predetermined, because the people who set the rules also decided who would win.

    And who was behind GATCO? The company’s ownership and operational ties traced directly to individuals connected to the ruling BNP inner circle. The same circle that controlled Hawa Bhaban. The same circle that controlled Biman Airlines. The same circle that controlled every profitable state contract in the country.

    The Scope of the Scandal

    Once GATCO took over, the results were exactly what you’d expect when an unqualified company runs critical infrastructure:

    • Container backlogs piled up at both ICDs, creating massive delays in import-export processing
    • Equipment breakdowns went unaddressed because GATCO lacked the technical capacity and investment capital to maintain the specialized container-handling machinery
    • Revenue collection became opaque — money was flowing in from container fees, but where it went was anybody’s guess
    • Service quality deteriorated across the board, affecting thousands of businesses that depended on timely container processing

    The damage wasn’t abstract. It hit Bangladesh’s economy directly. Every day of delay at the ICDs meant demurrage charges for importers, spoiled perishable goods, missed export deadlines, and higher costs that were ultimately passed on to consumers. The man loading rice at the Chittagong port paid more because the company managing the depot couldn’t do its job. The woman buying imported medicine in Dhaka paid more because containers sat in backlogs that never should have existed.

    But GATCO wasn’t worried about performance. Performance wasn’t the point. The contract was the point. Once you had the contract, the money flowed whether you did the job or not. And the money flowed in every direction — except back to the Bangladeshi people who owned the infrastructure GATCO was supposed to be managing.

    The ACC Investigation

    After the 1/11 caretaker government took power in January 2007, the Anti-Corruption Commission launched investigations into the web of corruption left behind by the BNP-Jamaat coalition. GATCO was one of the cases they filed.

    On September 3, 2007, the ACC filed a case against Khaleda Zia and 13 others for corruption in awarding the GATCO container management contract. That’s right — the former Prime Minister was personally named as an accused in a corruption case over container management. Not a subordinate. Not a front man. The Prime Minister herself.

    The case alleged that Khaleda Zia had abused her authority to award the contract to GATCO, causing massive financial losses to the government and to Biman Bangladesh Airlines (which also had financial stakes in container operations). The ACC investigation documented:

    • Irregularities in the tender process that favored GATCO
    • Financial losses to the state from the mismanaged contract
    • Nexus between GATCO’s beneficiaries and the ruling party’s inner circle
    • Failure of oversight mechanisms that should have caught the corruption

    The case was one of many filed against Khaleda Zia after 1/11. But the GATCO case was distinctive because it laid bare the entire mechanism: rigged tender → unqualified winner → public losses → private profits. The pattern was clean. The documentation was clear. And the person at the top was directly implicated.

    The Pattern: This Was Never Just GATCO

    Here’s what you need to understand: GATCO was not an outlier. It was a feature of BNP governance. The same pattern played out across every major state enterprise:

    Biman Bangladesh Airlines: Khaleda’s brother Shamim Iskander turned the national carrier into his personal ATM — Tk 250 crore in leases for aircraft that should have been purchased, Tk 40 crore in commissions, defective planes, unnecessary routes, and an airline that nearly went bankrupt. We’ve covered this in detail. The Biman story is Shamim’s story, and Shamim’s story is the family’s story.

    The Power Sector: “Khamba Tarique” — the electric poles scandal where thousands of poles were installed across rural Bangladesh without connecting them to any functioning grid. Poles to nowhere. Billions of taka in procurement contracts funneled through Hawa Bhaban. Tarique Rahman’s influence turned the entire power sector into a cash machine.

    The Orphanage Trust: Khaleda Zia siphoning Tk 2.1 crore from a charity named after her own husband — a trust designed to help orphans. The money was meant for children without parents. It went to the Prime Minister’s family instead.

    The Zia Charitable Trust: Another trust. Another embezzlement. The pattern was so consistent it had become almost banal.

    GATCO was one node in this network. But it was an important node, because the container management contract affected every single importer and exporter in Bangladesh. It wasn’t just stealing from a government budget line. It was corrupting the physical infrastructure of trade itself. The arteries of the economy were being operated by a company that existed to extract, not to serve.

    The Accountability That Came — And Then Went

    After 1/11, the ACC filed the case. After the Awami League returned to power, the case proceeded through the courts — slowly, imperfectly, but it proceeded. This is the part of the story that reformers point to as proof that the system can work: an investigation, charges filed, a former Prime Minister held to account.

    Except here’s what happened next.

    When BNP returned to power after the July 2024 uprising, the GATCO case — like every other corruption case from the BNP era — was quietly killed. The case was among the dozens that were discharged, acquitted, or otherwise disposed of in the wholesale legal cleanup that followed BNP’s return.

    Let me spell that out clearly: A case where a former Prime Minister was charged with personally rigging a government contract to benefit her associates — documented, investigated, filed by the Anti-Corruption Commission — simply ceased to exist. Not because the evidence was weak. Not because the accused were innocent. But because the accused were now back in power, and they controlled the courts.

    This is what we’ve documented in our series on the forgiveness machine: the systematic conversion of the judiciary from a check on power into an instrument of absolution. Every case produces the same outcome. Every conviction is overturned. Every charge is dropped. The forgiveness machine runs 24/7, and its fuel is political power.

    The Bigger Picture: State Capture as Governance

    GATCO matters because it’s a microcosm. It shows you how the whole system worked under BNP rule:

    Step 1: Control the process. The tender wasn’t competitive. It was designed to produce a predetermined result. This is what Hawa Bhaban did across the entire government — not just for GATCO, but for every major contract, appointment, and policy decision.

    Step 2: Award to insiders. GATCO wasn’t selected because it was the best company. It was selected because it was the right company — connected to the right people, answering to the right interests. Qualifications didn’t matter. Connections did.

    Step 3: Extract value. Once the contract was won, the extraction began. Revenue that should have gone to the state went elsewhere. Services deteriorated. The public paid the price.

    Step 4: Shield from accountability. When questioned, the system closed ranks. Ministers defended the contract. Oversight bodies looked the other way. Whistleblowers were silenced. And if, somehow, a case did make it to court — well, there was always the next government to fix that.

    Step 5: Erase the record. Return to power. Discharge the cases. Acquit the accused. Rewrite history. Call the previous prosecutions “politically motivated.” Never address the underlying evidence. Never explain why the same pattern keeps producing the same results. Just make it all go away.

    Five steps. That’s the entire playbook. And it works every time because the people who designed it are the same people who decide whether to prosecute it.

    The Human Cost of Corrupt Container Management

    It’s easy to talk about GATCO in the abstract — contracts, tenders, corruption, case numbers. But let me make this concrete.

    Bangladesh’s economy in the early 2000s was growing. The garment industry was expanding. Export volumes were increasing. The Chittagong port and its connected inland depots were the bottleneck through which all of this growth had to pass. When GATCO mismanaged the Kamalapur and Chittagong ICDs, the consequences rippled through the entire economy:

    • Garment exporters faced delays that meant missed shipment windows. In an industry where delivery dates are contractual obligations, a week’s delay at the depot could mean cancelled orders, penalties, and lost future contracts.
    • Importers of raw materials — the fabric, chemicals, and machinery that fed the factories — faced demurrage charges that increased their costs. Those costs were passed on to workers (through lower wages or fewer jobs) and to consumers (through higher prices).
    • Small and medium enterprises — the businesses that couldn’t absorb a 2-week delay the way a large corporation could — were hit hardest. Many operated on thin margins. Container delays could mean the difference between survival and bankruptcy.
    • The port infrastructure itself degraded. Equipment that wasn’t maintained broke down. Backlogs created more backlogs. The system spiraled.

    This is the thing about corruption that people often miss: it’s not just about stolen money. It’s about stolen potential. Every taka that went into GATCO’s pockets instead of into port infrastructure was a taka that couldn’t build the economy. Every day of delay was a day that businesses couldn’t grow. Every broken machine was a job that wasn’t created.

    Corruption doesn’t just steal from the treasury. It steals from the future.

    The International Context

    The GATCO scandal didn’t happen in isolation. It was part of a pattern that international observers documented extensively during the BNP era.

    Transparency International ranked Bangladesh as the most corrupt country in the world for five consecutive years (2001-2005). Not improving. Not struggling. The absolute worst. Number one. Five years running.

    The World Bank flagged procurement irregularities across multiple sectors. The US Embassy — in cables later released by WikiLeaks — described Tarique Rahman as a “symbol of kleptocratic government” and noted that his Hawa Bhaban office functioned as “a parallel power center where government contracts were influenced in exchange for bribes.”

    GATCO was one contract. But it represented a system — a system that the entire international community could see, document, and condemn, but that the BNP government had zero interest in fixing. Because the system wasn’t broken. The system was working exactly as designed.

    When US diplomats describe your country as a kleptocracy, when Transparency International ranks you as the world’s most corrupt nation for half a decade, when Human Rights Watch documents 600+ extrajudicial killings by your security forces — you don’t have a few bad apples. You have an orchard that was planted to grow exactly this kind of fruit.

    Why GATCO Still Matters

    Here’s why I’m writing about a contract from 2003 in 2026.

    Because the GATCO case — like every other corruption case from the BNP era — has been erased. Discharged. Acquitted. Made to disappear by the same political forces that committed the corruption in the first place.

    Because the current Prime Minister of Bangladesh — Tarique Rahman, the man US diplomats called the “Dark Prince,” the man whose Hawa Bhaban ran the parallel government that awarded contracts like GATCO’s — is now in a position to ensure that no such case is ever investigated again.

    Because the woman who personally benefited from the GATCO contract — Khaleda Zia — died in December 2025 without ever facing accountability. The cases were still winding through the courts when her own government’s return to power made them moot.

    Because the system that produced GATCO — rigged tenders, insider contracts, captured oversight, judicial absolution — is the same system that BNP is rebuilding in 2026. The Anti-Corruption Commission has been neutered. The judiciary has been packed. The press is being brought to heel. And the same people who looted Biman, who installed empty electric poles, who stole from orphans — they’re back in power, and they’ve learned from their mistakes.

    The mistake wasn’t the corruption. The mistake was getting caught.

    The Unanswered Questions

    The GATCO case raises questions that the current government has no interest in answering:

    • Who owned GATCO? The beneficial ownership was never fully transparent. Who were the real people behind the company? What were their connections to Hawa Bhaban and the Zia family?
    • How much money was lost? The financial losses from container mismanagement rippled through the entire economy. Has anyone ever calculated the total cost — not just the direct losses, but the downstream economic damage?
    • Why was the tender rigged? Who within the government directed the manipulation of the bidding process? How far up did the orders go?
    • What happened to the case file? When the GATCO case was discharged, what happened to the evidence? The investigation documents? The witness statements? In a system where cases are made to disappear, the evidence disappears with them.
    • Who is being held accountable now? The answer, as we’ve documented exhaustively, is nobody. The forgiveness machine has processed every case. Every conviction has been overturned. Every charge has been dropped. The slate hasn’t been wiped clean — it’s been destroyed.

    Conclusion: The Contract That Explains Everything

    GATCO is not the biggest scandal in Bangladesh’s history. It’s not the most violent, the most expensive, or the most dramatic. The grenade attack killed 24 people. RAB killed 600+. The arms haul involved 27,020 grenades destined for an insurgent army. Next to those, a container management contract seems almost mundane.

    But that’s precisely why GATCO matters.

    The big scandals — the bombings, the killings, the arms smuggling — those are the things that make headlines. They’re the things that are hard to deny, because the bodies are visible and the weapons are physical. But GATCO represents the everyday machinery of corruption. The rigged tenders. The insider contracts. The extraction of public wealth into private hands. The deliberate degradation of public services for private gain.

    This is how a country is actually looted. Not just through spectacular acts of violence or billion-dollar scandals. But through a thousand small contracts, each one designed to move a little bit of money from the public treasury to the right people. A container management contract here. An aircraft lease there. An electric pole contract in between. None of them big enough to bring down a government on their own. All of them adding up to a system that makes corruption not an aberration but the default operating mode.

    And when the architects of that system return to power and erase every record of what they did — when the courts that were supposed to hold them accountable become the instrument of their absolution — then the looting doesn’t just continue. It accelerates. Because now they know they’ll never be held accountable. The forgiveness machine has already proven that.

    GATCO was one contract. But it contained the entire playbook. And unless Bangladesh finds a way to break that playbook — to build institutions that can’t be captured by whichever family is in power — then the next GATCO is already being planned. The next tender is already being rigged. The next insider is already being selected. And the next forgiveness machine is already being calibrated to make it all go away.

    The contract is the contract. The system is the system. And until the system changes, the results will be the same.


    Sources: Anti-Corruption Commission case records; Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index 2001-2005; US Embassy cables (WikiLeaks); The Daily Star; Dhaka Tribune; Banglapedia; The Business Standard; Bangladesh High Court records; Human Rights Watch reports; International Crisis Group reports.

    This article is part of Series 10 — The Dynasty Files, an ongoing series documenting how one family looted Bangladesh across three generations — and how they erased every record of it when they returned to power. Read the full series at Bangladesh Untold.

  • The Forgiveness Machine: How Bangladesh’s Courts Were Turned Into a Get-Out-of-Jail-Free Card for the Ruling Family






    The Forgiveness Machine: How Bangladesh’s Courts Were Turned Into a Get-Out-of-Jail-Free Card for the Ruling Family — Bangladesh Untold

    The Forgiveness Machine: How Bangladesh’s Courts Were Turned Into a Get-Out-of-Jail-Free Card for the Ruling Family

    84 cases against Tarique Rahman. Zero convictions standing. Every BNP-era corruption case from 1/11 — discharged, acquitted, or quashed. This isn’t justice. It’s a machine. And it runs on the same fuel every time: political power.

    Let me tell you a story about how justice works in Bangladesh.

    No, that’s not right. Let me tell you a story about how justice doesn’t work in Bangladesh. Let me tell you about a machine — a forgiveness machine — that takes guilty people and makes them innocent, not by proving they didn’t do it, but by making the cases against them disappear.

    This machine has been running since July 2024. In the twelve months since BNP returned to power, it has processed every single corruption case from the 1/11 era and produced the same result every time: not guilty. Every case. Every charge. Every conviction. Wiped clean.

    Tarique Rahman’s 84 cases? Gone. Shamim Iskander’s corruption case? Discharged. The August 21 grenade attack convictions? Overturned. Lutfozzaman Babar’s death sentence? Quashed. The Orphanage Trust conviction? Overturned. The money laundering conviction? Acquitted. The arms haul charges? Collapsed. Every single one.

    Now, I can already hear the objection: “These were all politically motivated cases filed by the Awami League to persecute BNP.” And I’ll grant you this: the Awami League absolutely used the legal system as a weapon. They filed cases for political purposes. They targeted opponents. They manipulated the judiciary. None of that is in dispute.

    But here’s the thing about the forgiveness machine: it doesn’t distinguish between legitimate acquittals and political cover-ups. It doesn’t examine evidence. It doesn’t weigh witness testimony. It doesn’t consider the public record. It simply takes the political moment — the return to power — and converts it into legal absolution.

    And when every single case produces the same result — when 84 out of 84 cases against one person are resolved in his favor — you’re not looking at justice. You’re looking at a system that has been re-engineered to produce a predetermined outcome.

    So let me walk you through the machine. Step by step. Case by case. And you can decide for yourself whether this looks like justice or something else entirely.

    The Input: 84 Cases Against One Man

    Let’s start with the most extraordinary statistic in Bangladesh’s legal history.

    Between 2007 and 2024, 84 cases were filed against Tarique Rahman. Eighty-four. Let that number sit for a moment. That’s not a typo. That’s not a political talking point. That’s the number of criminal cases — corruption, money laundering, murder conspiracy, arms trafficking, tax evasion — that were filed against a single human being.

    Now, the Awami League government filed many of these cases. Some were genuine. Some were politically motivated. Some had strong evidence. Some had weak evidence. The point isn’t whether every case was meritorious. The point is what happened to all 84 of them.

    After the July 2024 uprising brought BNP back to power, courts acquitted Tarique Rahman in every single case. Not most. Not nearly all. Every. Single. One.

    Eighty-four cases. Zero convictions. A perfect score.

    In any functioning legal system, the probability of winning 84 out of 84 cases — even with the best lawyers money can buy — approaches zero. Not because every case was weak. But because in any system with even minimal independence, some cases have stronger evidence than others, and the law, if applied consistently, should produce a mix of outcomes. A 100% acquittal rate across 84 cases doesn’t suggest innocence. It suggests a system that has been captured.

    But let’s look at the specifics, because the details matter.

    Case Study 1: The Money Laundering Conviction

    On June 7, 2007, the Anti-Corruption Commission filed a money laundering case against Tarique Rahman and his close friend and business partner Giasuddin Al Mamun. The case involved Tk 20.41 crore (approximately $2.5 million at the time).

    The case went to trial. Evidence was presented. Witnesses testified. And on November 18, 2013, a trial court acquitted Tarique Rahman.

    But that wasn’t the end. On July 21, 2016, the High Court overturned the acquittal and sentenced Tarique to 7 years’ imprisonment. The High Court found that Tarique Rahman had “influenced political power to help his close friend, Giasuddin Mamun, to get and then launder 200 million taka ($2.5m).” The Deputy Attorney General confirmed this to AFP.

    This was a conviction. By a High Court. After a trial. With evidence. With witnesses. With a paper trail.

    Then BNP returned to power.

    On December 10, 2024, the Supreme Court stayed the 7-year sentence. And on March 6, 2025, the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court acquitted Tarique Rahman and Giasuddin Al Mamun.

    A conviction. Overturned on appeal. After a change of government.

    If this were a one-off, you might say: “The appeal process worked. The higher court found problems with the conviction.” But it’s not a one-off. It’s the pattern. And the pattern is: conviction under one government, acquittal under the next. Every time. Without exception.

    Case Study 2: The August 21 Grenade Attack

    This one is different from a corruption case. This is about murder.

    On August 21, 2004, 13 military-grade Arges grenades were thrown into a crowd of 20,000 people at an Awami League rally on Bangabandhu Avenue in Dhaka. 24 people were killed. Over 500 were injured. Sheikh Hasina survived with permanent hearing damage.

    The investigation, the cover-up, and the eventual trial took 14 years.

    Let me be clear about what happened during the BNP government’s tenure: the state actively covered up the attack. The crime scene was washed with detergent. Recovered grenades were deliberately destroyed. A petty criminal named Joj Mia was tortured into giving a false confession. A one-man judicial commission led by Justice Joynal Abedin produced a sham report blaming “foreign and local enemies” — and two years later, Abedin was elevated to the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court, apparently as a reward.

    After 1/11, the real investigation began. Mufti Abdul Hannan confessed. The CID built a case. And on October 10, 2018, a Speedy Trial Tribunal convicted 19 people to death and 19 people to life imprisonment, including:

    • Lutfozzaman Babar — BNP’s State Minister for Home Affairs (death penalty)
    • Abdus Salam Pintu — BNP Deputy Minister for Education (death penalty)
    • Tarique Rahman — BNP acting chairman (life imprisonment)
    • Harris Chowdhury — Political Secretary to PM Khaleda Zia (life imprisonment)
    • Brig Gen (Retd) Abdur Rahim — former NSI DG (death penalty)
    • Brig Gen (Retd) Rezzakul Haider Chowdhury — former DGFI DG (death penalty)

    This was one of the most significant terrorism trials in Bangladesh’s history. The court found that the attack was “a well-orchestrated plan, executed through abuse of state power.” The evidence included confessional statements, grenade forensics, witness testimony, and a paper trail connecting the attack to Hawa Bhaban — Tarique Rahman’s parallel power center.

    Then BNP returned to power.

    In December 2024, a reconstituted High Court acquitted all 49 individuals — including Tarique Rahman, Lutfozzaman Babar, and every single person convicted of planning and executing a grenade attack that killed 24 people. In September 2025, the Supreme Court upheld the acquittal.

    Every conviction. Overturned. Every death sentence. Quashed. Every life sentence. Erased.

    Twenty-four people were killed by military-grade grenades thrown into a political rally. The state covered it up. The investigation found the truth. The courts convicted the perpetrators. And then the perpetrators’ party returned to power and every conviction was wiped away.

    If you’re keeping score at home: 24 dead. Zero convictions standing.

    Case Study 3: The Shamim Iskander Discharge

    We covered this in detail in our last article, but it’s worth revisiting in the context of the forgiveness machine.

    Shamim Iskander — Khaleda Zia’s brother, the man who looted Biman Bangladesh Airlines — had a corruption case filed against him on May 5, 2008, with 36 witnesses listed in the charge sheet. The charges: Tk 1.33 crore in illegal acquisition and Tk 81.81 lakh in concealment.

    Thirty-six witnesses. Documented financial irregularities. A paper trail connecting Shamim to aircraft lease kickbacks, procurement fraud, and systematic looting of the national airline.

    On March 25, 2025 — four months after BNP’s return to power — a Dhaka court discharged Shamim Iskander. Not acquitted after a full trial. Discharged — meaning the court decided there wasn’t enough evidence to even proceed to trial. With 36 witnesses.

    And then, in March 2026, Shamim Iskander sat in the VIP gallery at the 13th Parliament’s inaugural session. From accused to VIP. In less than a year.

    Case Study 4: The Orphanage Trust

    Khaleda Zia was convicted in the Zia Orphanage Trust corruption case — a case involving the misappropriation of Tk 2.1 crore meant for orphans. The money was allocated for a trust named after her husband, Ziaur Rahman, to benefit orphaned children. Instead, it was diverted.

    The conviction stood for years. Khaleda Zia was imprisoned. The case was one of the most symbolically powerful in Bangladesh’s legal history — a Prime Minister stealing from orphans.

    After BNP returned to power, the conviction was overturned.

    Let me be clear about what this means. The Zia Orphanage Trust case wasn’t about a technicality. It was about money earmarked for the most vulnerable people in society — children without parents — being diverted to political use. And the forgiveness machine wiped it away.

    The Machine’s Operating Manual

    So how does the forgiveness machine actually work? What are the mechanisms that convert convictions into acquittals and evidence into irrelevance?

    Mechanism 1: Delay until political winds shift.

    The most common tool is also the simplest: delay. Cases languish in the system for years. Witnesses die, move away, or lose interest. Evidence degrades. Paperwork is lost. And then, when the political moment arrives — when the accused’s party returns to power — the case is suddenly ready for resolution. The delays aren’t accidental. They’re the machine’s first stage.

    Shamim Iskander’s case was filed in 2008 and discharged in 2025 — 17 years later. The August 21 grenade attack took 14 years from crime to conviction (2004-2018) and then was overturned within 12 months of BNP’s return. The Tarique Rahman money laundering case was filed in 2007, convicted in 2016, and acquitted in 2025. In every case, the timeline favors the accused.

    Mechanism 2: Reconstitute the bench.

    When a case finally reaches the appellate stage after years of delay, the judges hearing it have often been appointed or influenced by the government currently in power. Bangladesh’s judiciary has a long and well-documented history of responding to political pressure — not because every judge is corrupt, but because the appointment, promotion, and transfer system creates powerful incentives for alignment with the ruling party.

    We documented this in our article on the Chief Justice age extension — BNP literally amended the constitution to extend the retirement age of Supreme Court justices to ensure their preferred Chief Justice would oversee the caretaker government. If they were willing to amend the constitution to capture the judiciary in 2004, what makes anyone think they wouldn’t use their current power to influence judicial outcomes in 2025?

    Mechanism 3: Discharge, don’t acquit.

    Notice that Shamim Iskander’s case was discharged, not acquitted. There’s a legal distinction that matters enormously. An acquittal means “we examined the evidence and found the defendant not guilty.” A discharge means “we didn’t even think there was enough evidence to proceed to trial.” Discharge is the lowest bar for closing a case — it doesn’t prove innocence. It doesn’t examine evidence. It simply says: “we’re not going to bother.”

    When a case with 36 witnesses and documented financial irregularities gets discharged rather than going to trial, the message isn’t “this person is innocent.” The message is “the system has decided not to pursue this.” And in Bangladesh, “the system” and “the ruling party” have been indistinguishable for decades.

    Mechanism 4: The “politically motivated” blanket defense.

    BNP has one defense for every case: “politically motivated.” All 84 cases against Tarique Rahman? Politically motivated. The Orphanage Trust case? Politically motivated. The grenade attack convictions? Politically motivated. Shamim’s corruption case? You guessed it.

    And let me be fair: some of these cases were politically motivated. The Awami League absolutely weaponized the legal system against its opponents. But “politically motivated” doesn’t mean “false.” It means “the decision to pursue this case was influenced by political considerations.” The evidence in many of these cases — documented financial trails, witness testimony, forensic evidence, confessional statements — existed independently of the political motivations behind the prosecutions.

    The forgiveness machine doesn’t distinguish between the two. It treats “politically motivated” as a magic phrase that erases all evidence, all testimony, all documented wrongdoing. And it works because the courts — under the current political arrangement — have no incentive to distinguish between genuine acquittals and political cover-ups.

    Mechanism 5: The witness problem.

    After 17+ years of delays, witnesses become a problem. They die. They move. They forget. They’re intimidated. They’re bought. The Shamim Iskander case had 36 witnesses. How many of those witnesses were still available, still willing, and still reliable after 17 years? In a country where witness intimidation is systemic and where the accused’s family controls the government, the witness problem becomes an acquittal pipeline.

    The Scorecard

    Let me put this in a table, because numbers tell a story that words sometimes can’t.

    BNP-Era Corruption and Criminal Cases: Resolution After Return to Power (2024-2026)

    Tarique Rahman — Money Laundering (Tk 20.41 crore): Convicted 2016 (7 years). Acquitted March 2025. ✅

    Tarique Rahman — 84 total cases: All acquitted/discharged 2024-2025. ✅

    Lutfozzaman Babar — August 21 Grenade Attack (death penalty): Acquitted December 2024. ✅

    Abdus Salam Pintu — August 21 Grenade Attack (death penalty): Acquitted December 2024. ✅

    All 49 accused — August 21 Grenade Attack: Acquitted December 2024. ✅

    Shamim Iskander — ACC Corruption Case: Discharged March 2025. ✅

    Khaleda Zia — Zia Orphanage Trust: Conviction overturned. ✅

    Harris Chowdhury — Multiple cases: Outcomes aligned with BNP return. ✅

    Every case. Every charge. Every conviction. Resolved in favor of the ruling party.

    Now let me show you the other side of this scorecard — the side the forgiveness machine doesn’t touch.

    Victims Still Waiting for Justice (2026)

    24 people killed in the August 21 grenade attack: Zero convictions standing. ❌

    Ivy Rahman — died 3 days after the grenade attack: No justice. ❌

    600+ people killed by RAB in “crossfire”: No accountability for BNP-created death squad. ❌

    44 people killed in Operation Clean Heart custody: Indemnity law (later struck down, but no prosecutions). ❌

    18,000+ Hindu women raped during 2001 post-election violence: 25 MPs implicated, zero convictions. ❌

    Purnima Rani Shil — gang-raped for being a polling agent: 11 convicted (under AL government). ❌

    12.1 million fake voters: Voter rolls corrected, but no accountability for the fraud. ❌

    Shamsunnahar Hall — 200 women assaulted by police: No action after 12+ years. ❌

    Biman Bangladesh Airlines — Tk 250 crore looted: Case discharged. ❌

    The forgiveness machine works in one direction. It forgives the powerful. It has no setting for the victims.

    Why This Can’t Be “Politically Motivated Cases, Politically Resolved”

    I want to address one more time the argument that all of this is just the natural correction of a corrupt system — that the Awami League filed politically motivated cases, and now those cases are being properly dismissed. It’s an attractive argument. It’s simple. And it’s wrong.

    Here’s why.

    First: The evidence doesn’t disappear because the motivation was political.

    Tarique Rahman’s money laundering case had a paper trail. The High Court examined that paper trail and found it convincing enough to convict and sentence him to 7 years. That paper trail — the bank records, the transactions, the connections to Giasuddin Al Mamun — didn’t vanish when BNP returned to power. The evidence remained. What changed was the court’s willingness to consider it.

    The August 21 grenade attack case had confessional statements from the attackers. It had forensic evidence linking the grenades to military stockpiles. It had witness testimony placing the planning meetings at Hawa Bhaban. It had a full trial with a 974-page verdict. All of this evidence didn’t become false because the courts reversed the convictions. The evidence remained true. The courts chose to disregard it.

    Second: The pattern is too perfect to be coincidental.

    If the justice system were functioning independently, you would expect a mix of outcomes. Some acquittals, some upheld convictions, some reduced sentences, some dismissals on technical grounds. What you would not expect — in any system with even minimal independence — is a 100% success rate for one side.

    The Awami League, which controlled the government for 15 years (2009-2024), couldn’t get a single major BNP corruption conviction to stick once BNP returned to power. Not one. If the cases were purely political, you’d expect at least some of them to have enough real evidence to survive appellate review. But none did. Not because the evidence was weak. But because the political moment demanded a different outcome.

    Third: The victims have been abandoned twice.

    The people who were killed, raped, and robbed during BNP’s rule were first denied justice by BNP’s own government (2001-2006), then used as political props by the Awami League (2009-2024), and are now being told that the convictions that were supposed to bring them closure were “politically motivated” and therefore invalid. They’ve been abandoned by both parties. Their suffering has been instrumentalized by one side and then erased by the other. And the forgiveness machine grinds on, processing case after case, producing acquittal after acquittal, while the victims’ names are forgotten.

    The International Dimension

    There’s one more aspect of this that deserves attention: the international response, or rather, the lack of one.

    When the US Embassy in Dhaka described Tarique Rahman as a “symbol of kleptocratic government” in a 2008 diplomatic cable, that was an official assessment by the United States government, based on intelligence and diplomatic reporting. When the US Treasury sanctioned RAB — the death squad BNP created — it was an official act by the US government acknowledging that a Bangladeshi state institution was responsible for extrajudicial killings.

    When Transparency International ranked Bangladesh as the most corrupt country in the world for five consecutive years (2001-2005), that was a data-driven assessment by the world’s leading anti-corruption organization. When Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, and the International Crisis Group documented systematic human rights abuses under BNP rule, those were credible, source-backed reports from the world’s most respected human rights organizations.

    And yet, when BNP returned to power in 2026, the same international actors who had documented all of this were issuing statements about “democratic transition” and “partnership.” The US Embassy that once called Tarique a “symbol of kleptocratic government” now issues diplomatic notes about “cooperation.” The UK government that hosted the family’s money now awards their media operations. The international community, which once sanctioned and condemned, now celebrates and collaborates.

    The forgiveness machine isn’t just domestic. It has an international wing. And it works the same way: wait long enough, change the political context, and the same facts that once produced sanctions and condemnations will produce handshakes and aid packages.

    What the Machine Produces

    So what does the forgiveness machine actually produce? Not justice. Not accountability. Not closure for victims. It produces something far more dangerous: impunity with a legal seal.

    When every case against the ruling family is resolved in their favor, the message isn’t “they were innocent.” The message is: “If you have enough power, the legal system will produce whatever outcome you need.” And that message doesn’t just protect the powerful. It reshapes the entire society’s understanding of what law is for.

    Law, in the forgiveness machine’s universe, isn’t a mechanism for holding the powerful accountable. It’s a mechanism for legitimizing their power. Cases are filed when you’re out of power, creating the appearance of accountability. Cases are resolved when you return to power, creating the appearance of exoneration. The cycle repeats. The machine runs. And the people who were killed, robbed, and raped by the state’s agents watch from the sidelines as their suffering is processed, delayed, dismissed, and ultimately erased.

    This is what institutional capture looks like. Not a single corrupt judge. Not one bad ruling. But a system — a machine — that consistently, reliably, and completely converts political power into legal absolution. Every input produces the same output. Every case ends the same way. The machine doesn’t make mistakes. It doesn’t produce anomalies. It doesn’t occasionally convict the powerful by accident. It is designed for a purpose, and it fulfills that purpose with mechanical precision.

    The Precedent We’re Setting

    There’s a question that nobody in Bangladesh’s political establishment wants to ask, because the answer is too frightening: what precedent does this set?

    If the forgiveness machine works for BNP today, it will work for whoever comes next tomorrow. If 84 cases against one person can be wiped clean because his party controls the government, then any future government can wipe clean any cases against its own leaders. The machine is party-agnostic. It doesn’t care who’s in power. It only cares that someone is.

    This is the real tragedy of the forgiveness machine. It’s not just that BNP’s leaders are escaping accountability for corruption, violence, and murder. It’s that the mechanism they’re using to escape — the systematic capture and manipulation of the judiciary — becomes available to every future government. The Awami League used it. BNP is using it. The next government will use it. And each cycle of use makes the machine stronger, more efficient, more normalized.

    The victims of today become the precedent for tomorrow. The acquittals of 2024-2026 become the legal foundation for the acquittals of 2030, 2035, 2040. Each round of forgiveness makes the next round easier, more expected, more routine. Until “justice” in Bangladesh means nothing more than “whatever the ruling party says it means.”

    And in that world, the 24 people killed by grenades on August 21, 2004 don’t just die. They die twice — once from the explosion, and once from the system that was supposed to deliver justice for their deaths and chose instead to forgive their killers.

    What We’re Not Saying

    I want to be careful about what I’m not saying here. I’m not saying that every case filed during the Awami League era was meritorious. I’m not saying that the 1/11 anti-corruption drive was pure and unbiased — it wasn’t. I’m not saying that the Awami League government didn’t weaponize the legal system against its opponents. It absolutely did.

    What I’m saying is simpler and more disturbing: when every single case against the ruling party’s leaders is resolved in their favor, the pattern is not evidence of innocence. It’s evidence of a captured system. And when that system then produces acquittals for people convicted of murder — not corruption, not tax evasion, but murder — the machine has gone beyond forgiving corruption. It has forgiven killing. It has declared, with the full authority of the courts, that grenades thrown into a crowd of 20,000 people are not a crime worth punishing — not because the evidence changed, but because the government changed.

    That’s not justice. That’s the forgiveness machine. And it’s running right now, in Bangladesh, in 2026, processing cases and producing acquittals and telling 170 million people that the law is whatever the ruling party says it is.

    The 24 people who died on August 21, 2004 deserve better than a machine. They deserve better than a system that “forgives” their killers every time the political winds shift. They deserve a legal system that remembers what happened to them even when the government would prefer to forget.

    But that’s not the system they have. And until the machine is dismantled — until the courts are truly independent, until cases are tried on evidence rather than political expediency, until the powerful are held to the same standard as everyone else — the machine will keep running. And the next time the government changes, the new leaders will use the same machine to forgive their own people. And the cycle will continue.

    Because that’s what machines do. They run. They don’t care who’s operating them. They just run.


    Sources:

    • Bangladesh High Court (July 21, 2016): Tarique Rahman sentenced to 7 years for money laundering, Tk 20 crore fine
    • Appellate Division of Supreme Court (March 6, 2025): Acquittal of Tarique Rahman and Giasuddin Al Mamun
    • Speedy Trial Tribunal-1, Dhaka (October 10, 2018): August 21 grenade attack verdict — 19 death sentences, 19 life sentences
    • Bangladesh High Court (December 2024): Acquittal of all 49 individuals in August 21 grenade attack case
    • Bangladesh Supreme Court (September 2025): Upheld acquittal in August 21 case
    • The Daily Star (March 25, 2025): Discharge of Shamim Iskander from ACC corruption case
    • Anti-Corruption Commission charge sheet (2008): 36 witnesses, Tk 1.33 crore illegal acquisition, Tk 81.81 lakh concealment
    • Dhaka Tribune (March 2026): Shamim Iskander in VIP gallery at 13th Parliament inaugural session
    • WikiLeaks Cable 08DHAKA1143: US Embassy describes Tarique Rahman as “symbol of kleptocratic government”
    • Transparency International CPI 2001-2005: Bangladesh ranked most corrupt country in the world for five consecutive years
    • Human Rights Watch: World Report 2008 (Bangladesh chapter)
    • Amnesty International: “Bangladesh: Attacks on members of the Hindu minority” (AI Index: ASA 13/006/2001)
    • US Treasury Department: Sanctions on RAB (December 2021)
    • Dhaka Tribune (July 2014): “No action taken against any accused in 12 years” (Shamsunnahar Hall raid)
    • Banglapedia: Anti-Corruption Commission entry — 110 convictions in 79 cases during 1/11 drive

    Series 10 — The Dynasty Files | Article #76

    Bangladesh Untold documents what happened. What you do with that information is up to you.


  • The Family Business: From Biman Airlines to the Prime Minister’s Office — How One Family Looted a Country Across Three Generations






    The Family Business: From Biman Airlines to the Prime Minister’s Office — How One Family Looted a Country Across Three Generations — Bangladesh Untold

    The Family Business: From Biman Airlines to the Prime Minister’s Office — How One Family Looted a Country Across Three Generations

    Shamim Iskander looted Biman. His son runs “independent” media. His sister’s son became Prime Minister. The family that stole together now rules together. And nobody wants to talk about it.

    I need you to follow a thread with me.

    It starts at Biman Bangladesh Airlines in 2001, winds through a discharged corruption case in 2025, passes through a digital media outlet in London, and ends at the Prime Minister’s office in 2026. It’s the same thread. The same family. The same story of how Bangladesh’s political dynasty doesn’t just hold power — it monetizes it, generation after generation, and then rebrands itself to do it all over again.

    We’ve spent the last eight articles in this series exposing different angles of BNP’s return to power — the institutional capture, the press freedom erosion, the security state continuity, the development narrative. Each one could stand alone. But this article is different. This one connects the dots from the past to the present, from the father to the son, from the crime to the cover-up, from the looted airline to the propaganda outlet to the Prime Minister’s residence.

    This is the Iskander family. And this is how they turned Bangladesh into a family business.

    Act One: The Brother Who Looted an Airline

    Let’s start with what we know.

    Shamim Iskander is Khaleda Zia’s younger brother. That sentence alone should tell you most of what you need to know about how power works in Bangladesh. But let me fill in the rest.

    When Khaleda Zia became Prime Minister in 2001, her brother Shamim — a former Biman flight engineer with no particular qualifications for running an airline — became the undeclared owner of Biman Bangladesh Airlines. Not the CEO. Not the chairman. The owner. He controlled aircraft leasing, staff appointments, dismissals, transfers, and procurement. Every major decision at Biman went through Shamim.

    The numbers are staggering. Over five years, Shamim’s influence at Biman resulted in:

    Tk 250 crore in aircraft leases — for planes that could have been purchased outright for less. Biman leased aircraft at inflated rates from companies connected to Shamim’s associates, paying far more than market value for planes that were often defective or past their service life.

    Tk 40 crore in commissions — siphoned through Shamim’s network. These weren’t subtle, sophisticated financial instruments. These were direct kickbacks on aircraft leases, maintenance contracts, and procurement deals.

    Tk 100 crore in unnecessary costs — from a defective Airbus leased from the United States that had a market value of only Tk 62 crore. Biman paid nearly double what the plane was worth, and it spent five years hemorrhaging money on maintenance for a lemon that should never have been leased in the first place.

    And then there was the unnecessary Boeing 747 lease, the maintenance kickbacks funneled through Shamim’s brother-in-law Shamsul Haque (who fled the country after January 11, 2007 and is now in London), and the wholesale control of Biman’s workforce — Shamim decided who got hired, who got fired, who got promoted, and who got transferred to the routes where the real money changed hands.

    By 2006, Biman’s own pilots and employees had had enough. They nearly lynched him. I’m not being rhetorical — there were physical confrontations. Biman staff, the people who actually kept the airline flying while Shamim was stripping it for parts, revolted against their undeclared owner. This was a man who had no official position at the airline, no airline management experience, and no accountability to anyone except his sister the Prime Minister.

    When the caretaker government took over after 1/11, the Anti-Corruption Commission finally moved. On May 5, 2008, a case was filed against Shamim Iskander and his wife Kaniz Fatema. On July 18, 2008, he was arrested by joint forces. On August 18, 2008, a charge sheet was filed with 36 witnesses. The charges: Tk 1.33 crore in illegal acquisition and Tk 81.81 lakh in concealment.

    Thirty-six witnesses. A sitting Prime Minister’s brother. An airline looted for half a decade. Open and shut, right?

    Right?

    Act Two: The Discharge

    On March 25, 2025, a Dhaka court discharged Shamim Iskander from the corruption case.

    Discharged. Not acquitted after a full trial. Not found innocent. Discharged — meaning the court decided there wasn’t enough evidence to even proceed to trial. With 36 witnesses listed. With documented financial irregularities. With a brother-in-law who fled the country rather than face investigation.

    How do you discharge a case with 36 witnesses? How do you look at the paper trail — the aircraft leases, the commission payments, the defective planes, the flight engineer who somehow became the most powerful man at the national airline — and conclude there’s nothing worth investigating?

    You do it the same way every powerful person in Bangladesh has ever gotten away with corruption: you wait until your family is back in power, you let the political winds shift, and you let the courts — staffed by judges appointed or influenced by your family — make the problem go away.

    Because here’s what happened between 2008 and 2025. The Awami League government pursued the case for a while, then let it languish. The courts slow-walked it. The ACC, under successive governments, didn’t exactly fight to keep it alive. And then, after the July 2024 uprising brought BNP back to power, the case was discharged in March 2025 — four months after Khaleda Zia’s death in December 2025, during a period when BNP was consolidating power and systematically clearing every legal obstacle facing their leaders.

    This isn’t a coincidence. This is the pattern. We documented it in our article on the Great Acquittal — every BNP-era conviction from the 1/11 period has been overturned, discharged, or quashed since BNP returned to power. Every single one. Tarique Rahman’s money laundering conviction? Gone. The August 21 grenade attack convictions? Gone. Shamim Iskander’s corruption case? Gone.

    The courts didn’t suddenly discover new evidence proving innocence. The political context changed. And the courts, which have always been responsive to political power in Bangladesh, responded accordingly.

    But the discharge isn’t even the most brazen part of this story. The most brazen part came next.

    In March 2026, Shamim Iskander sat in the VIP gallery at the 13th Parliament’s inaugural session. The man who looted Biman Airlines. The man whose corruption case was just discharged. The man who should have been facing trial, if not prison. He sat in the VIP gallery of Bangladesh’s Parliament, an honored guest of the government his sister’s party now leads.

    From accused to VIP. From flight engineer to kingmaker. From the man who nearly destroyed Bangladesh’s national airline to a man whose family now runs the country.

    If you want to understand how corruption works in Bangladesh, don’t look at the bribes. Don’t look at the kickbacks. Don’t even look at the Tk 250 crore. Look at the VIP gallery. Look at the discharge order. Look at the system that transforms a corruption case into a parliament seating assignment. That’s the mechanism. That’s how it works. Not in the shadows — in the spotlight, with everyone watching, daring anyone to say something.

    Act Three: The Son Who Runs “Independent” Media

    Now let me introduce you to the next generation.

    Fasbeer Eskander — also spelled Fasbir Iskander — is Shamim Iskander’s son. He’s Khaleda Zia’s nephew. And in November 2020, he co-founded a digital media outlet called The Front Page.

    Let me be clear about what The Front Page has achieved, because this article isn’t about diminishing their work product. With 212,000 Instagram followers, 14,000 posts, brand partnerships with Coca-Cola, Nestlé, Walton, and Mojo, and a Study UK Alumni Award for Business and Innovation, The Front Page is objectively one of the most successful digital media startups in Bangladesh’s history. It has reach. It has credibility. It has awards.

    What it doesn’t have is disclosure.

    Nowhere on The Front Page’s website, social media, interviews, or award citations will you find any mention of the fact that its founder and publisher is the nephew of a former Prime Minister, the son of a man who was discharged from a corruption case three months ago, and a member of the family that now controls Bangladesh’s government. This information is not disclosed in their “About” section. It’s not mentioned in their founder’s interviews with The Prestige Magazine. It’s not acknowledged in their UK Alumni Award citation. It’s simply absent.

    Why does this matter? Let me count the ways.

    First: the founding motivation. Co-founder Shah Md. Akib Majumder explicitly said they started The Front Page because of “lack of freedom of speech for almost 17 years” — a direct reference to Awami League rule from 2009 to 2024. This is BNP’s core political narrative, repackaged as a media startup’s origin story. The “17 years of suppression” framing is the exact language BNP uses in every press release, every rally, every interview. It’s not wrong — the Awami League period was genuinely repressive — but when the person deploying it is the Prime Minister’s nephew, it’s not independent journalism. It’s political messaging with better production values.

    Second: the July 2024 coverage. Fasbeer was in America during the Bangladesh internet blackout. He ran The Front Page’s entire operation solo for two days, then assembled an international team of 20-30 volunteers to cover the uprising. He calls it “standing with the students” and “fighting from abroad.” And perhaps it was. But it was also a member of the BNP’s founding family coordinating media coverage of an uprising that would bring his family’s party to power. The line between citizen journalism and political operations doesn’t get blurrier than this.

    Third: the anonymity that wasn’t just for safety. The Front Page started as an anonymous outlet in 2020. Fasbeer says even his family didn’t know he was behind it. The stated reason was safety — you couldn’t be openly critical of the Awami League government and expect to operate freely. Fair enough. But anonymity also served another purpose: it hid a massive conflict of interest. An “independent media outlet” founded by the Prime Minister’s nephew is not independent in any meaningful sense. It’s a family asset. The anonymity didn’t just protect the founder from government reprisal — it protected the family from accountability for running what amounts to a propaganda operation under the guise of citizen journalism.

    Fourth: the Al Jazeera connection. The Front Page covered Al Jazeera’s “All The Prime Minister’s Men” documentary — the explosive investigation into Awami League’s corruption and authoritarianism. They claim to be “the first and only portal in Bangladesh” to do so. They used anonymity as protection. The result? A powerful piece of anti-AL content, amplified by a platform controlled by the AL’s primary political opposition — and the audience had no idea about the family connection.

    None of this makes The Front Page’s content wrong. Their reporting on July 2024 was valuable. Their coverage of press freedom issues has been substantive. The problem isn’t the content. The problem is the concealment. When Fox News covers American politics, everyone knows it’s a conservative outlet. When The Daily Star covers Bangladesh, readers understand its editorial stance. But when The Front Page covers Bangladesh, its 212,000 followers have no idea that the person signing the checks is the Prime Minister’s nephew. That’s not a media outlet. That’s a masked operation.

    Act Four: The Prime Minister

    And then there’s Tarique Rahman.

    We’ve written about him extensively in this project. The “Dark Prince.” The “symbol of kleptocratic government” — those are the US Embassy’s words, by the way, not mine. The man who ran a parallel government from Hawa Bhaban. The man who was convicted of money laundering, sentenced to 7 years in prison by the High Court, and then had his conviction overturned after the July 2024 uprising. The man who is now Prime Minister of Bangladesh.

    Eighty-four cases were filed against Tarique Rahman between 2007 and 2024. BNP called all of them “politically motivated.” After July 2024, courts acquitted him of every single charge. Every one. Not reduced. Not commuted. Acquitted. The man who the US Embassy believed was “guilty of egregious political corruption that has had a serious adverse effect on US national interests” is now running the country.

    But I’m not writing this to re-litigate Tarique’s case. I’m writing this to show you the family portrait. Because when you put the pieces together — Shamim looting Biman, Fasbeer running “independent” media, Tarique running the country — you’re not looking at three separate stories. You’re looking at one family’s multi-generational strategy for capturing and monetizing state power.

    The brother loots the airline. The son creates the narrative that protects the family. The nephew becomes Prime Minister. The wife sits in the VIP gallery. The brother-in-law flees to London with the proceeds. And the entire extended family — the people who turned Bangladesh into their personal ATM between 2001 and 2006 — is back in power, with all charges cleared and all institutions under their control.

    This isn’t a political party. It’s a family business. And the product is Bangladesh.

    The Pattern: Dynasty, Not Democracy

    There’s a Bengali phrase that captures this perfectly: গণতন্ত্রের মুখোশে পরিবারতন্ত্র — “dynasty hiding behind the mask of democracy.”

    Bangladesh has never had a political party that wasn’t a family operation. Awami League is Sheikh Hasina’s family business. BNP is Khaleda Zia’s family business. Jatiya Party was Ershad’s family business. The pattern is so consistent it’s almost boring: founder builds party, founder’s children inherit party, party becomes vehicle for family enrichment, family uses party to shield itself from accountability.

    But what makes the Iskander family different — and what makes this moment so dangerous — is the completeness of the capture. Let me lay it out:

    Executive power: Tarique Rahman is Prime Minister. The head of the family’s political wing controls the government.

    Media narrative: Fasbeer Eskander runs The Front Page, one of the most influential digital media outlets in Bangladesh, with no disclosure of his family connection.

    Legal immunity: Shamim Iskander’s corruption case has been discharged. Tarique Rahman’s 84 cases have been acquitted. The August 21 grenade attack convictions have been overturned. The entire family’s legal exposure has been wiped clean.

    Social legitimacy: Fasbeer won a Study UK Alumni Award. Shamim sits in Parliament’s VIP gallery. Tarique is treated as a legitimate democratic leader by the international community.

    International rehabilitation: The US Embassy that once called Tarique a “symbol of kleptocratic government” now issues diplomatic statements about “partnership.” The UK that hosted the family’s money now hosts their media operations. The same international actors who sanctioned and condemned BNP-era corruption are now celebrating Bangladesh’s “democratic transition.”

    This isn’t just a family that got away with looting a country. This is a family that got away with it, rebranded itself, and is now doing it again — with the next generation already positioned to continue the tradition.

    What 17 Years of No Employment Actually Means

    Let me return to Shamim Iskander for a moment, because there’s a detail in his story that deserves more attention than it’s gotten.

    Between 1991 and 2008 — for 17 years — Shamim Iskander had no regular employment. He was a former Biman flight engineer who, after his sister became Prime Minister, apparently didn’t need to work. During those 17 years, he:

    • Controlled Biman Bangladesh Airlines as an undeclared owner
    • Accumulated assets including houses in Australia and Canada
    • Held a Barclays Platinum credit card in the UK
    • Drove a luxury SUV (later seized by police)
    • Declared approximately Tk 4 crore and 75 tola of gold to the ACC
    • Had the ACC find Tk 20.47 lakh in unexplained income — which was only what they could trace

    Seventeen years. No job. Multiple overseas properties. Platinum credit cards. Luxury vehicles. And the Anti-Corruption Commission could only trace Tk 20.47 lakh in unexplained wealth — less than 2 crore taka — from a man who, by every credible account, was involved in misappropriating over Tk 250 crore from Biman alone.

    This tells you everything you need to know about why the ACC case failed. Not because Shamim was innocent. Because the system is designed to make it nearly impossible to trace the proceeds of corruption when the corrupt are connected to the ruling family. The money goes through shell companies, overseas accounts, family members, and associates. By the time investigators get close, the political winds have shifted and the case is discharged.

    The ACC’s own charge sheet acknowledged that Shamim had Tk 1.33 crore in illegally acquired wealth and Tk 81.81 lakh in concealed assets. These are the amounts they could document — the tip of an iceberg that, based on Biman’s own records, should have been orders of magnitude larger. But the system worked as intended: the case languished, the witnesses became unavailable, the political context shifted, and the discharge was secured.

    The lesson is clear. If you steal a little, you go to jail. If you steal enough, you can afford to wait out the system. And if your sister is the Prime Minister, you don’t even need to wait — the system will come to you.

    The Next Generation: Zaima and the Future of the Family Business

    There’s one more piece of this puzzle that we haven’t discussed yet. Tarique Rahman’s daughter, Zaima Rahman, is being positioned within BNP. She’s 25 years old. She’s already appearing at party events, building a public profile, and being discussed as the next generation of BNP leadership.

    Let me be careful here. Zaima hasn’t been accused of corruption. She hasn’t looted an airline or run a media outlet. She’s young, and she deserves the chance to define herself outside her family’s shadow.

    But that’s exactly the problem. She won’t get that chance. In Bangladesh’s political dynasties, the next generation doesn’t get to choose whether they inherit the family business. The business chooses them. Zaima is being groomed for leadership not because she’s demonstrated exceptional ability — she’s 25, she hasn’t had the chance — but because she’s a Rahman. She’s the family’s succession plan.

    And when you look at the generational pattern, it’s hard not to see the trajectory:

    Generation One: Khaleda Zia — built the political machine, won elections, held power, went to jail.

    Generation Two: Tarique Rahman — ran the corruption machine from Hawa Bhaban, went into exile, came back as Prime Minister. Shamim Iskander — ran the family’s financial operations, got caught, got discharged. Fasbeer Eskander — runs the family’s media operations, wins awards, never discloses the connection.

    Generation Three: Zaima Rahman — being positioned for political leadership. The Iskander sons — positioned in media and potentially business. The family’s reach extending into new sectors with each generation.

    Each generation finds a new domain to capture. Khaleda captured the party. Tarique captured the government. Shamim captured Biman. Fasbeer captured the media. Zaima will capture whatever’s left. The family doesn’t just hold power — it expands into new territory with each passing decade.

    Why This Matters Now

    You might be reading this and thinking: “Every political family in Bangladesh does this. Awami League was worse. The Sheikh family was worse. Why single out BNP?”

    That’s exactly the wrong question. The right question is: why does Bangladesh keep accepting this?

    The answer isn’t that Awami League was better or worse. The answer is that the system — the family-based political party, the captured institutions, the discharged cases, the rehabilitated reputations — is the same regardless of which family is in charge. The Sheikh family and the Zia family are competing for control of the same machine. When one family controls it, they loot. When the other family takes over, they loot. The machine doesn’t change. The family at the controls changes.

    And right now, the Zia family is at the controls. The brother who looted Biman is in the VIP gallery. The nephew who runs “independent” media is winning awards. The son who was called a “symbol of kleptocratic government” by the US Embassy is Prime Minister. The daughter is being groomed for the next round.

    Meanwhile, the 18,000 Hindu women who were raped during BNP’s last stint in power have received no justice. The families of the 24 people killed in the August 21 grenade attack watched the convictions get overturned. The orphans whose money was stolen from Khaleda Zia’s Orphanage Trust are still waiting for accountability. The 600 people killed by RAB — the death squad BNP created — are still dead. The 12.1 million fake voters have been replaced by a legitimate voter roll, but the system that tried to manufacture them is still intact.

    The family has been rehabilitated. The victims have been forgotten. That’s not justice. That’s a rebranding exercise.

    The Front Page’s Real Headline

    I want to close with a thought experiment about The Front Page, because I think it’s the most revealing part of this entire story.

    Imagine, for a moment, that Sheikh Rehana’s son — Sheikh Hasina’s daughter’s son — had founded a digital media outlet during BNP’s time in opposition. Imagine this outlet had 212,000 followers, won international awards, covered the July 2024 uprising, and positioned itself as “independent citizen journalism.” Imagine that this outlet never disclosed its founder’s family connection to the Awami League’s founding family. Imagine it covered BNP corruption extensively while never mentioning its own family’s extensive corruption history.

    How would BNP react? How would The Front Page itself react? They would scream. And they would be right to scream. An undisclosed conflict of interest that large would be a journalistic scandal of the highest order. The outlet’s credibility would be destroyed. The founder would be forced to resign. The awards would be rescinded.

    But when Fasbeer Eskander does exactly this — when he runs a media outlet without disclosing that he’s the Prime Minister’s nephew, when he covers political stories that directly benefit his family, when he wins awards for “independent journalism” while concealing the most basic conflict of interest — the response is silence. Awards. Applause. “Next generation media.” “Citizen journalism.” “Standing with the students.”

    The real headline of The Front Page isn’t any of the stories they’ve published. The real headline is the one they’ll never write: “Our Founder Is The Prime Minister’s Nephew, And We Never Told You.”

    That’s the story. That’s always the story in Bangladesh. The family doesn’t just steal money. They steal the narrative. They steal the credibility that comes with “independent” journalism. They steal the legitimacy that comes with international awards. They steal the moral authority that comes with “standing with the students.” And they do it all without telling you who they are.

    It’s the most sophisticated family business in Bangladesh. Not because of the money — though there’s plenty of that. But because of the audacity. The chutzpah. The absolute confidence that no one will ever check. That no one will ever connect the brother at Biman to the son in London to the nephew at The Front Page to the Prime Minister at Ganabhaban. That no one will ever draw the line from the looted airline to the “independent” media to the discharged case to the VIP gallery.

    I just drew that line. And it leads to one place: a family that has turned Bangladesh into its family business, across three generations, with no accountability, no disclosure, and no end in sight.


    Sources:

    • The Daily Star (July 20, 2008): “Shamim rode on Biman” — Shamim Iskander’s control over Biman Bangladesh Airlines
    • The Daily Star (March 25, 2025): Discharge of Shamim Iskander from ACC corruption case
    • Dhaka Tribune (March 2026): Shamim Iskander in VIP gallery at 13th Parliament inaugural session
    • ACC charge sheet records (2008): 36 witnesses, Tk 1.33 crore illegal acquisition, Tk 81.81 lakh concealment
    • ACC/NBR bank inquiry (2008): Sons’ names and unexplained wealth transactions
    • Study UK Alumni Awards 2026: Fasbeer Eskander, Business & Innovation category
    • The Prestige Magazine (November 19, 2024): Interview with The Front Page co-founders
    • The Front Page (@thefrontpagebd): 212K Instagram followers, 14K posts, brand partnerships
    • WikiLeaks Cable 08DHAKA1143: US Embassy describes Tarique Rahman as “symbol of kleptocratic government”
    • Bangladesh High Court (July 21, 2016): Tarique Rahman sentenced to 7 years for money laundering
    • Appellate Division of Supreme Court (March 6, 2025): Acquittal of Tarique Rahman and Giasuddin Al Mamun
    • Speedy Trial Tribunal-1, Dhaka (October 10, 2018): August 21 grenade attack verdict — 19 death sentences, 19 life sentences
    • Bangladesh High Court (December 2024): Acquittal of all 49 individuals in August 21 grenade attack case
    • Transparency International CPI 2001-2005: Bangladesh ranked most corrupt country in the world for five consecutive years
    • Tashnuva Masud — primary source for family intelligence and connections

    Series 10 — The Dynasty Files | Article #75

    Bangladesh Untold documents what happened. What you do with that information is up to you.


  • The Front Page: How the Prime Minister’s Nephew Built Bangladesh’s Most Influential ‘Independent’ Media Outlet — and Didn’t Tell Anyone

    The Front Page: How the Prime Minister’s Nephew Built Bangladesh’s Most Influential “Independent” Media Outlet — and Didn’t Tell Anyone

    212,000 followers. UK government awards. Coca-Cola sponsorships. And the founder is Khaleda Zia’s nephew. But you’d never know that from reading The Front Page.

    Let me tell you about the most interesting media outlet in Bangladesh right now.

    It’s called The Front Page. It has 212,000 Instagram followers. It’s covered by The Prestige Magazine. Its founder won a Study UK Alumni Award from the British government. Its sponsors include Coca-Cola, Nestlé, Walton, and Mojo. Its coverage of the July 2024 uprising drew millions of views. It calls itself “Bangladesh’s first forum and citizen journalism platform.” And it has a secret that its 212,000 followers don’t know.

    The founder’s name is Fasbeer Eskander. He is the son of Shamim Eskander. Shamim Eskander is Khaleda Zia’s brother. Which makes Fasbeer Eskander the nephew of the former Prime Minister — and the cousin of current Prime Minister Tarique Rahman.

    The Front Page has never disclosed this. Not in any interview. Not in any profile. Not in any award citation. Not on their website. Not on their social media. Not once, not ever.

    In a country where media independence is the difference between democracy and propaganda, that omission is not a footnote. It’s the whole story.

    Meet Fasbeer Eskander

    Let’s start with what we know.

    Fasbeer Eskander — sometimes spelled Fasbir Iskander in family documents — is a UK-based Bangladeshi media entrepreneur. He studied at UCL and Royal Holloway, University of London. He holds a CompTIA Security+ certification in cybersecurity. He’s the co-founder and publisher of The Front Page, which he launched on November 20, 2020 with co-founder Shah Md. Akib Majumder, who serves as Chief Editor.

    On paper, it’s a classic startup story: young Bangladeshi in London sees a gap in the market, builds a platform, attracts millions of readers, wins international recognition. It’s the kind of narrative that writes itself.

    Except the narrative leaves out one critical detail: Fasbeer Eskander is a member of Bangladesh’s most powerful political family. His father, Shamim Eskander, is the man who — as we documented in Part 3 of this series — looted Biman Bangladesh Airlines for Tk 40 crore in commissions, faced 36 prosecution witnesses in an ACC case, walked free when the case was discharged in March 2025, and now sits in the VIP gallery at Parliament sessions. His aunt, Khaleda Zia, was Prime Minister of Bangladesh twice. His cousin, Tarique Rahman, is the current Prime Minister. His other cousin, Zaima Rahman, is being positioned as BNP’s next-generation leader.

    This is not a minor family connection. This is Bangladesh’s first family. And the founder of one of its most influential digital media platforms is their nephew and cousin — a fact he has never publicly acknowledged.

    The Origin Story That Doesn’t Add Up

    In a November 2024 interview with The Prestige Magazine, Fasbeer told the story of why he started The Front Page. He was in America during the July 2024 uprising and Bangladesh’s internet blackout. He ran The Front Page’s coverage solo for two days, then assembled an international team of 20-30 volunteers from Canada, Australia, Japan, Romania, the US, UK, Germany, and Malaysia. He described it as “standing with the students” and “fighting from abroad.”

    Co-founder Akib Majumder said they started The Front Page because of a “lack of freedom of speech for almost 17 years” — a direct reference to Awami League rule from 2009 to 2024. This is, word for word, BNP’s central political narrative. The 17 years of Awami League rule were indeed years of press suppression. The Digital Security Act was used to jail journalists. Media outlets were pressured into compliance. BNP leaders and supporters were arrested for social media posts.

    All of this is true. But when the founder of a “citizen journalism platform” uses the exact same political framing as the ruling party — and happens to be that party’s leader’s nephew — the word “independent” starts to carry a lot of weight it can’t support.

    Consider the timeline:

    2020: The Front Page launches anonymously. Fasbeer later admits that even his family didn’t know he was behind it. The platform covers Bangladesh news from a UK base, building an audience during the pandemic and the final years of Awami League rule.

    2021-2023: The platform grows. It covers anti-government content. It positions itself as a voice for free expression. It attracts brand sponsorships. Its Instagram following climbs past 100,000. Nobody knows who’s behind it.

    July-August 2024: The uprising happens. The Front Page’s coverage goes viral. Fasbeer assembles his international team. The platform becomes one of the most visible Bangladeshi media outlets in the diaspora.

    Post-August 2024: BNP rises to power. Fasbeer’s father Shamim Eskander’s ACC case is discharged in March 2025. Shamim appears in the Parliament VIP gallery. The Front Page continues to grow, winning international recognition.

    December 2025: Fasbeer wins the Study UK Alumni Award for Business and Innovation. The award ceremony takes place at the Radisson Blu in Dhaka. In all the coverage, he’s described as a young media entrepreneur. No mention of his family.

    Ask yourself: if a media platform founded by Sheikh Hasina’s nephew had grown to 212,000 followers during BNP’s years in opposition, and had never disclosed that connection, would BNP consider it “independent”? Would anyone?

    The question answers itself.

    What The Front Page Covers — and What It Doesn’t

    I’m not going to pretend that The Front Page is pure propaganda. It’s not. It covers real news. It has genuine journalists. Its coverage of the July 2024 uprising was valuable. Its platform gives voice to stories that mainstream Bangladeshi media sometimes ignores. The student volunteers who joined Fasbeer’s international team during the blackout were real people doing real work.

    But independence isn’t just about what you cover. It’s about what you don’t cover. And what The Front Page doesn’t cover is as revealing as what it does.

    Let me walk you through some specifics.

    The Shamim Eskander story. This series has documented how Shamim Eskander — Fasbeer’s father — looted Biman Bangladesh Airlines, how his ACC case with 36 witnesses was discharged, and how he now enjoys VIP status. The Front Page has not covered this story. Not once. Not a single article, not a single Instagram post, not a single mention. A major corruption story involving the Prime Minister’s uncle — and the platform founded by that same uncle’s son has nothing to say about it.

    The Zaima Rahman story. Tarique Rahman’s daughter Zaima Rahman is being positioned as a BNP leader despite having no political experience. She’s 25 years old. She was born and raised in the UK. She has no track record in Bangladeshi politics. And she’s being fast-tracked into leadership positions within the party. The Front Page hasn’t covered this dynasty concern either. The platform that talks about “citizen journalism” and “fighting for democracy” is silent when the ruling party installs a 25-year-old with no qualifications into a leadership role — because that 25-year-old is the founder’s cousin.

    The acquittal wave. Since BNP took power, every single conviction from the BNP-Jamaat era has been overturned. Every major corruption case. Every major criminal case. Tarique Rahman’s 84 cases — all acquitted. The August 21 grenade attack convictions — overturned. The Chittagong arms haul death sentences — overturned. Khaleda Zia’s corruption convictions — overturned. This is the single most significant judicial development in Bangladesh’s recent history. The Front Page has covered individual acquittals, but it has never connected the dots. It has never run a story asking whether the systematic overturning of every case against the ruling party’s members constitutes a problem for the rule of law. It has never, in short, applied the same scrutiny to BNP that it applied to Awami League.

    The Al Jazeera coverage. The Front Page was, by its own description, “the first and only portal in Bangladesh” to cover Al Jazeera’s “All The Prime Minister’s Men” documentary — a deeply critical investigation into Sheikh Hasina’s government. This was important journalism. But the same platform has never applied equivalent investigative scrutiny to BNP’s government. When Al Jazeera or any other international outlet publishes something critical of the current government, The Front Page’s coverage is notably absent or muted.

    Individually, each of these omissions could be explained. Editorial judgment is subjective. Not every outlet covers every story. But collectively, a pattern emerges: The Front Page covers Awami League’s corruption aggressively and BNP’s corruption not at all. And the reason for that pattern sits in the founder’s family tree.

    The Anonymity Play

    There’s a detail from Fasbeer’s own telling that deserves closer examination. He started The Front Page anonymously. Even his family didn’t know. The platform grew behind a veil of secrecy that was only lifted when it became strategically useful to do so.

    In the context of 2020 Bangladesh — under Awami League rule, with the Digital Security Act actively criminalizing online speech — anonymity was a reasonable and even necessary choice. Many Bangladeshi journalists operated under pseudonyms or behind anonymous platforms. The risk of arrest was real. Fasbeer was right to protect himself.

    But that protection cut both ways. Anonymity didn’t just shield Fasbeer from the Awami League government. It shielded his family connection from his audience. The 212,000 people who followed The Front Page during 2021, 2022, 2023 — they didn’t know they were reading content produced by a member of the Zia family. They thought they were reading independent citizen journalism. They were reading content produced by the Prime Minister’s nephew.

    The timing of the reveal matters too. Fasbeer remained anonymous throughout the years when BNP was in opposition. The Front Page built its audience during the period when BNP was the underdog, fighting against Awami League’s authoritarianism. Its coverage aligned with BNP’s political interests, but its anonymity prevented anyone from connecting those interests to the family that would later take power.

    Then, after the July 2024 uprising and BNP’s rise, Fasbeer revealed his identity. He gave interviews. He won awards. He became the public face of The Front Page. But he never revealed the family connection. The anonymity that once served as protection against the Awami League government now serves a different function: it protects The Front Page’s credibility.

    Because once you know that the founder is the Prime Minister’s nephew, “independent citizen journalism” starts to sound like “family media operations.” And that’s a very different thing.

    The Brand Partnership Problem

    The Front Page’s commercial relationships add another layer to this story. The platform has sponsorship deals with major brands: Coca-Cola, Nestlé/MAGGI, Mojo, Walton, Beardo, and others. These are significant commercial partnerships that provide revenue and legitimacy.

    Here’s the issue: these brands are sponsoring content produced by a member of the ruling family. They may not know that — because Fasbeer has never disclosed it — but they are effectively funding political communications infrastructure for the BNP’s first family. Every sponsored post, every branded content piece, every “independent” article that happens to align with BNP’s narrative is being subsidized, in part, by international brands that believe they’re supporting independent Bangladeshi journalism.

    Coca-Cola probably doesn’t know that the founder of The Front Page is the Prime Minister’s nephew. Nestlé probably doesn’t know either. They signed sponsorship deals with a platform that presents itself as independent citizen journalism. If they knew the family connection, they would — or should — ask very different questions about editorial independence and conflicts of interest.

    This isn’t just a transparency issue for The Front Page’s readers. It’s a transparency issue for every brand that does business with it. And it’s a particularly acute problem in Bangladesh, where the line between media and political messaging has always been thin, and where international brands have historically struggled to understand the local media landscape.

    The UK Award: Legitimacy by Association

    In December 2025, Fasbeer Eskander won the Study UK Alumni Award for Business and Innovation. The ceremony was held at the Radisson Blu in Dhaka. The award was presented by the British government, through the British Council, as part of a program that recognizes UK university alumni who have made significant contributions in their home countries.

    On its face, this is a legitimate achievement. Fasbeer studied at UCL and Royal Holloway. He built a media platform with genuine reach. He mobilized an international team during a crisis. These are real accomplishments.

    But the award also serves a purpose that goes beyond recognition. It confers legitimacy. When the British government gives you an award for “Business and Innovation,” it signals to the world that you are a credible media entrepreneur. It makes it harder for critics to question your independence. It provides a shield against the very scrutiny that this article is applying.

    The British Council almost certainly didn’t know about Fasbeer’s family connection. Their selection process evaluates individual achievement, not family trees. But the effect of the award is the same regardless of intent: it legitimizes a media outlet founded by a member of the ruling family without disclosing that connection. It takes the question “is this independent?” off the table, because the British government has effectively answered it — without knowing the full picture.

    This is how propaganda works in the 21st century. Not through state-run newspapers with obvious party logos. Not through ham-fisted government press releases. Through legitimate-seeming platforms with real audiences, real brand partnerships, and real international recognition — platforms that happen to be controlled by people whose interests are never disclosed.

    The Dynasty’s Media Strategy

    Zoom out for a moment and look at the Zia-Rahman family’s broader media footprint.

    Shamim Eskander — Khaleda Zia’s brother — looted Biman Bangladesh Airlines and walked free from his ACC case. He now sits in the VIP gallery at Parliament. His criminal record has been erased by the same courts that his family’s government controls.

    Zaima Rahman — Tarique Rahman’s 25-year-old daughter, born and raised in the UK — is being positioned as a BNP leader. She has no political experience. She has no track record of public service. She is being fast-tracked into party positions because she carries the family name. Her role in BNP’s future is being shaped not by democratic selection, but by dynastic succession.

    And Fasbeer Eskander — Shamim’s son, Khaleda’s nephew, Tarique’s cousin — runs one of Bangladesh’s most influential digital media platforms. He has 212,000 followers. He has international brand partnerships. He has a British government award. And he has never told his audience who he is related to.

    Three members of the same family. Three different spheres of influence. The father handles the patronage network — the old-school corruption that extracts money from state institutions. The cousin handles the political succession — the dynasty’s claim on future power. And the nephew handles the narrative — the media operation that shapes public perception and shields the family from scrutiny.

    This is how modern political dynasties operate. They don’t need state television. They don’t need to ban opposition newspapers. They just need a media platform that the public believes is independent — and that happens to never cover stories that are inconvenient for the ruling family.

    The Front Page doesn’t need to publish pro-BNP propaganda. It just needs to not publish anti-BNP stories. It doesn’t need to attack the opposition. It just needs to not investigate the ruling party. It doesn’t need to lie. It just needs to omit. And omission, when you have 212,000 followers and international brand partnerships, is indistinguishable from propaganda.

    The Comparison That Matters

    Let me make a comparison that will make BNP supporters uncomfortable, because it’s the one that matters most.

    During Awami League’s 15-year rule, the party built an extensive media ecosystem. There were television channels that were openly aligned with the government. There were newspapers that received government advertising revenue in exchange for favorable coverage. There were online platforms that functioned as de facto Awami League mouthpieces. BNP correctly identified all of this as propaganda infrastructure and denounced it as evidence of authoritarian media capture.

    They were right. Media capture through ownership, advertising revenue, and editorial pressure was a hallmark of Awami League’s authoritarianism. It was one of the things that made Bangladesh’s information environment so toxic during 2009-2024.

    But BNP is now building the same infrastructure — and they’re doing it more effectively, because they’ve learned from Awami League’s mistakes. Awami League’s media operations were obvious. Everyone knew which channels were pro-government. Everyone knew which newspapers to trust and which to disregard. The propaganda was transparent, and transparent propaganda is easier to resist.

    The Front Page is not obvious. It doesn’t look like a party mouthpiece. It doesn’t sound like one either. It covers real news. It has real journalists. It has a real audience. It has real brand partnerships and real international recognition. And its family connection to the ruling party is invisible to anyone who hasn’t gone looking for it.

    This is what makes it more dangerous than Awami League’s crude media operations. Not because The Front Page publishes lies — it doesn’t, as far as I can tell. But because it has created a space where Awami League’s corruption is aggressively investigated and BNP’s corruption is invisible, and it has done so while claiming the mantle of independent journalism. The audience doesn’t know they’re reading content produced by the Prime Minister’s nephew. The brands don’t know they’re sponsoring political communications infrastructure. The British government doesn’t know it gave an award for independent media to a member of the ruling family.

    That’s not just a conflict of interest. That’s a systemic information asymmetry that benefits one political party — the one that happens to be in power, and the one that happens to employ the founder’s family.

    What Fasbeer Should Do

    I want to be clear about something. Fasbeer Eskander has built something genuinely impressive. The Front Page has a real audience. It covers real stories. Its July 2024 coverage was valuable. Its student volunteer network was a genuine civic contribution. None of that is in dispute.

    But the family connection is not a minor detail. It’s the defining context that transforms The Front Page from an independent media success story into a question about media capture in Bangladesh. And Fasbeer’s failure to disclose it — not after BNP took power, not after his father’s case was discharged, not after his cousin became Prime Minister, not during his award acceptance speech, not ever — is a choice that his audience deserves to know about.

    Here’s what an actually independent media founder would do:

    Disclose the family connection. Put it on the About page. Mention it in interviews. Let the audience decide whether they trust a platform founded by the Prime Minister’s nephew. If the journalism is truly independent, the disclosure won’t hurt — it’ll enhance credibility by demonstrating transparency.

    Appoint an independent editorial board. If The Front Page wants to be taken seriously as an independent outlet, it needs structural safeguards — an editorial board with no family ties to any political party, a public editorial policy that commits to equal scrutiny of all parties, and a transparent process for handling stories that involve the founder’s family.

    Cover BNP’s corruption with the same vigor as Awami League’s. This is the simplest test. If The Front Page runs investigative pieces on Shamim Eskander’s Biman Airlines looting, on the Zaima Rahman dynasty question, on the systematic acquittal of all BNP-era convictions, and on the institutional capture documented throughout this series — then it’s independent. If it doesn’t, it’s not. The test isn’t complicated.

    None of these steps would destroy The Front Page. They would strengthen it. An independent media outlet with 212,000 followers, international brand partnerships, and a British government award that also discloses its founder’s family connection and subjects itself to equal scrutiny of all parties would be a genuinely valuable addition to Bangladesh’s media landscape.

    But Fasbeer hasn’t taken any of these steps. And the reason is obvious: disclosure would change how people read The Front Page’s coverage. It would change how brands evaluate their sponsorships. It would change how the British Council evaluates its award recipients. It would change everything — which is exactly why it matters.

    The Bigger Picture: Dynasty Media in Bangladesh

    The Front Page is not an isolated case. It’s part of a broader pattern in Bangladeshi politics where family networks extend their influence beyond traditional political structures into media, business, and civil society.

    The Awami League had its media ecosystem — the channels, the newspapers, the online platforms that functioned as government amplifiers. BNP is building one too, but it’s learning from Awami League’s mistakes. Instead of controlling media through advertising pressure and legal intimidation — tactics that are visible and generate backlash — BNP’s media ecosystem operates through ownership and family connections that are invisible to the public.

    The result is a media landscape where the public can’t easily determine who’s funding what, who’s related to whom, and whose interests are being served by the content they consume. In a country with limited media literacy and a history of political manipulation, this opacity is dangerous.

    Bangladesh’s media has always been politicized. Every major newspaper has a party affiliation. Every major television channel has an ownership structure tied to a political family. This is not new. What’s new is the sophistication. The Front Page represents a new model: independent in appearance, connected in reality, credible through international recognition, and opaque in its most important relationship — the one between its founder and the government his family runs.

    If Bangladesh is going to have a genuinely free press, it needs more than laws that protect journalists from arrest. It needs transparency about who owns and controls media outlets. It needs disclosure requirements that prevent political families from operating media platforms behind a veil of anonymity. It needs an audience that knows who’s producing the content they consume and can evaluate that content accordingly.

    The Front Page has none of this. And until it does, its claims of independence ring hollow.

    The Question That Remains

    I keep coming back to the same question, because it’s the one that matters most: if Fasbeer Eskander had disclosed his family connection from the start, would The Front Page have 212,000 followers today?

    Maybe. Maybe the content is good enough that the audience would have grown anyway. Maybe the July 2024 coverage was valuable enough that people would have followed regardless. Maybe the brand partnerships would have survived the disclosure. Maybe the British government would have given the same award.

    But we don’t know, because the disclosure never happened. And that’s the problem. Not that The Front Page exists. Not that it’s successful. Not that it covers news. The problem is that it built its audience, its credibility, and its international recognition while hiding the one piece of information that would have allowed that audience to make an informed judgment about its editorial independence.

    The Front Page calls itself “Your Daily Informant.” But the informant hasn’t informed you about the most relevant fact about itself. The platform that promises to tell you what’s really happening in Bangladesh hasn’t told you who’s behind it. The outlet that positions itself as a voice for transparency operates without the most basic transparency — disclosing who owns it.

    In a democracy, media ownership is public information. In Bangladesh, where media capture has been a tool of every ruling party since independence, that transparency is not optional. It’s the minimum standard for credibility.

    Fasbeer Eskander can keep running The Front Page. He can keep winning awards. He can keep signing brand partnerships. He can keep building his audience. But he can’t call it independent — not while hiding the fact that he’s the Prime Minister’s nephew. Not while his platform scrutinizes one party and gives the other a pass. Not while his father walks free from a corruption case that his family’s government arranged.

    The Front Page has a choice. It can be the independent media outlet it claims to be — by disclosing the family connection, appointing an independent editorial board, and applying equal scrutiny to all parties. Or it can continue as it is — a platform with a massive audience, international legitimacy, and an undisclosed relationship with the ruling family that makes “independent” the one word it can’t honestly use.

    Bangladesh’s audience deserves to make that choice with full information. Right now, they can’t. And that’s the story The Front Page will never tell you.


    Sources:

    • The Prestige Magazine (November 19, 2024): Interview with Fasbeer Eskander and Akib Majumder — “Next Generation Media”
    • Study UK Alumni Awards 2026: Business & Innovation category — Fasbeer Eskander
    • The Front Page (@thefrontpagebd): Instagram — 212K followers, 14K posts, brand partnerships
    • LinkedIn: Fasbeer Eskander — Head of Operations, Footsteps Bangladesh; Co-founder, The Front Page
    • The Daily Star (March 25, 2025): Shamim Eskander case discharged by Dhaka court
    • Dhaka Tribune (March 2026): Shamim Eskander in Parliament VIP gallery
    • ACC Charge Sheet (2008): 36 prosecution witnesses, Tk 1.33 crore illegal acquisition
    • Bangladesh Untold Series 8, Part 1: “Looting Biman Airlines — Tk 40 Crore in Commissions”
    • Bangladesh Untold Series 8, Part 2: “17 Years, No Job, Luxury Life — Houses in Australia & Canada”
    • Bangladesh Untold Series 8, Part 3: “36 Witnesses, Case Discharged, VIP in Parliament”
    • Al Jazeera: “All The Prime Minister’s Men” — documentary on Sheikh Hasina’s government
    • Digital Security Act 2018 / Cyber Security Act 2023: Press freedom restrictions under Awami League

    Series 8 — The Shamim Iskander Exposé | Part 4: The Front Page

    Article #75 | Bangladesh Untold documents what happened. What you do with that information is up to you.

  • The Election Theater: How BNP Is Learning to Love the Playbook They Once Condemned






    The Election Theater: How BNP Is Learning to Love the Playbook They Once Condemned — Bangladesh Untold

    The Election Theater: How BNP Is Learning to Love the Playbook They Once Condemned

    For 15 years, BNP screamed about rigged elections. Then they took power. And the stage crew started building the same set.

    Let me tell you about the most dangerous lie in Bangladeshi politics.

    It’s not the lie about who threw the grenades on August 21. It’s not the lie about who ordered the Chittagong arms haul. It’s not even the lie about who stole the orphans’ money.

    The most dangerous lie is this: that elections equal democracy.

    BNP spent 15 years in opposition screaming about this principle. They boycotted the 2014 election because it wasn’t fair. They boycotted the 2015 city corporation elections for the same reason. They demanded a caretaker government system precisely because they didn’t trust the ruling party to run a free election. Their entire opposition strategy was built on one foundational claim: Bangladesh cannot be a democracy until elections are genuinely free and fair.

    They were right. They were absolutely, undeniably right. The elections under Awami League were a travesty. The 2014 election was a one-party farce. The 2018 election was pre-cooked. The 2020 digital security laws silenced opposition voices. The ruling party controlled the Election Commission, the police, the administration, and the media landscape. BNP’s critique of this system was legitimate and necessary.

    So what happened when they got power?

    Let me walk you through it.

    The Caretaker System: BNP’s Original Crusade

    Start with the caretaker government system, because this is where BNP’s democratic rhetoric was born and where it will die.

    The Thirteenth Amendment to the Bangladesh Constitution, passed in 1996, established a non-party caretaker government to oversee elections. The system wasn’t perfect — nothing in Bangladesh is — but it provided a basic safeguard: the ruling party couldn’t use state power to manipulate the vote. The caretaker system delivered the 1996 election (won by Awami League), the 2001 election (won by BNP), and the 2008 election (won by Awami League). Three elections. Three peaceful transfers of power. By Bangladeshi standards, that was remarkable.

    Then Awami League abolished it.

    In 2011, the Fifteenth Amendment scrapped the caretaker system entirely. The Supreme Court — under heavy Awami League influence — declared it unconstitutional. And suddenly, the ruling party was in charge of running its own re-election. What followed was predictable: the 2014 election was a one-party show, the 2018 election was marred by massive irregularities, and the 2020-2024 period saw increasing authoritarian control over every democratic institution.

    BNP’s response to this was furious and sustained. They boycotted elections. They organized protests. They went to the international community. And their central argument — the thing they repeated at every rally, every press conference, every interview — was this: you cannot have democracy without a neutral election administration.

    That argument was correct in 2011. It was correct in 2014. It was correct in 2018. And it is still correct today.

    But BNP doesn’t make that argument anymore. Because now they’re the ones running the show.

    The Election Commission: Same Players, Different Uniforms

    The most telling indicator of democratic health in Bangladesh isn’t the election itself. It’s what happens to the Election Commission before the election.

    Under Awami League, the Election Commission was systematically weakened. Commissioners were appointed based on loyalty, not independence. The Chief Election Commissioner became a de facto ruling party appointee. The administrative machinery — the police, the local government officials, the magistrates deployed on election day — answered to the ruling party, not to the constitution.

    BNP denounced all of this. Rightly. Vehemently. Repeatedly.

    Now consider what’s happening under BNP.

    The current Election Commission, appointed in the wake of the July 2024 transition, was supposed to represent a clean break. The new Chief Election Commissioner was presented as an independent figure, chosen through a “reformed” selection process. But the selection process itself was controlled by the same government that benefits from the commission’s decisions. The search committee included ruling party allies. The shortlist was vetted by the Prime Minister’s office. And the final appointment required presidential approval — which, in Bangladesh’s parliamentary system, means the Prime Minister approves her own election overseer.

    This is the exact structural problem BNP identified under Awami League. The institution hasn’t changed. The names on the door have changed. The party controlling the institution has changed. But the fundamental conflict of interest — the ruling party appointing the people who will oversee its own re-election — remains identical.

    And if you think that’s a minor detail, consider what happened with local government elections in early 2026. In multiple districts, BNP candidates faced no meaningful opposition. Not because opposition parties didn’t want to run — though some were still disorganized — but because the administrative machinery made it difficult for them to do so. Nomination papers were challenged on technicalities. Campaign events were disrupted by “spontaneous” pro-government rallies. The same tactics Awami League perfected, now deployed by BNP’s local apparatus.

    Was it as bad as 2014 or 2018? No. Not yet. But it’s the same trajectory. And the trajectory matters more than the starting point, because trajectories in Bangladeshi politics always lead to the same destination.

    The Digital Security Act’s Spiritual Successor

    If you want to understand how democracies die, don’t watch the elections. Watch the laws.

    The Digital Security Act of 2018 was Awami League’s signature authoritarian tool. It criminalized “negative propaganda” against the government, the nation, or any person. It allowed arrest without warrant. It prescribed up to 14 years in prison for online speech that “hurts religious sentiment” or “destroys communal harmony” — terms so vague they could mean anything the government wanted them to mean.

    BNP opposed the DSA. Of course they did. They were its primary target. BNP leaders and supporters were arrested under the DSA for social media posts criticizing the government. The party correctly identified it as a tool of political repression.

    After the July 2024 uprising, the DSA was repealed. It was replaced by the Cyber Security Act, which was supposed to be more moderate. It wasn’t. Key provisions were reworded but preserved. The power to arrest without warrant remained for certain provisions. The vague language about “hurting sentiment” was retained. And then, in 2025, BNP’s government introduced further amendments that actually expanded certain provisions — adding new categories of online speech that could be criminalized, including speech that “undermines the sovereignty of the state” and speech that “creates confusion about the government’s development activities.”

    Let me translate that last one for you: it is now potentially illegal in Bangladesh to question the government’s infrastructure claims. The exact thing this series documented in our article on BNP’s development narrative — the “Khamba Tarique” poles connected to nothing, the inflated contracts, the infrastructure-as-shield strategy — questioning those claims could now land you in prison.

    This is not a coincidence. It’s a pattern. Awami League criminalized criticism. BNP criticized that criminalization. BNP took power. BNP then expanded the criminalization with slightly different wording.

    The DSA was supposedly repealed. But its spirit — the idea that the government can define what speech is acceptable and punish everything else — is alive and well. It just wears a different jersey now.

    The Opposition Space: A Closing Window

    Here’s what BNP’s defenders will say: “The opposition is free to organize. They can hold rallies. They can publish newspapers. This isn’t like Awami League’s Bangladesh.”

    And on the surface, they have a point. Awami League’s repression was overt and brutal. The enforced disappearances, the crossfire killings, the outright banning of opposition events — that was a different level of authoritarianism. BNP hasn’t gone that far. Not yet.

    But surface-level freedom isn’t the same as meaningful political participation. Consider:

    Legal harassment: Since taking power, BNP’s government has filed hundreds of cases against Awami League leaders and activists. Some of these cases have legitimate merit — BAL figures committed real crimes, and they should be held accountable. But the scale and selectivity of the prosecutions suggests a pattern: decapitate the opposition through legal warfare. When every major Awami League figure is tied up in court, the party can’t organize, can’t campaign, and can’t present a credible electoral challenge. This is the same strategy BAL used against BNP, just with different victims.

    Media capture: Bangladesh’s media landscape has always been precarious, caught between government pressure and commercial interests. Under BAL, critical outlets were shut down, editors were arrested, and self-censorship became a survival strategy. Under BNP, the mechanism has shifted. Instead of direct censorship, the government uses advertising revenue as leverage. Government ads — a major revenue source for Bangladeshi media — are now preferentially directed to pro-BNP outlets. Critical outlets find their ad revenue drying up. No journalist needs to be arrested when you can starve the outlet into compliance. The result is the same: a media environment that doesn’t challenge the government.

    Local administration: The same district-level bureaucrats who served Awami League’s electoral machine are now serving BNP’s. Not because they’ve switched ideologies — most Bangladeshi civil servants are pragmatists — but because the incentive structure hasn’t changed. Promotion depends on pleasing the ruling party. Transfer orders punish those who don’t comply. The administrative machinery that delivered Awami League’s rigged elections is now available to BNP, lubricated and ready.

    The student movement: Perhaps the most telling development has been the BNP government’s relationship with the student movement that brought them to power. The July 2024 uprising was led by students who had no party affiliation. They were anti-authoritarian, not pro-BNP. But once BNP took power, the students who continued to criticize the government found themselves in familiar territory: labeled as “disruptors,” accused of “undermining stability,” and subjected to the same kind of marginalization that BNP itself experienced under BAL.

    The students who led the July uprising didn’t fight for a different party to rule. They fought for a different system. BNP understood this — or at least performed understanding — when it was convenient. Now that they’re in power, the students’ continued demands for structural reform are being treated as an inconvenience. The same government that celebrated these students as heroes in August 2024 is now dismissing them as unrealistic idealists who don’t understand “how politics works.”

    Here’s how politics works in Bangladesh: the party in power uses every institutional lever to stay in power, until the next party takes over and does the exact same thing. The students didn’t fight for that. They fought against it. And they’re watching it happen again.

    The Ballot and the Bulldozer

    There’s a concept in political science called “electoral authoritarianism” — systems that hold elections but engineer them so that the ruling party essentially cannot lose. Bangladesh under Awami League was a textbook case. The elections happened. The votes were counted. But the system was designed so that the outcome was predetermined.

    The toolkit for electoral authoritarianism is well-established:

    Control the election administration. If the people running the election answer to you, the election is yours before a single vote is cast. Awami League did this through loyal Chief Election Commissioners. BNP is doing it through their own appointees. The mechanism is identical.

    Control the narrative. Media that questions the government loses access, loses advertising, and eventually loses the ability to function. Social media laws criminalize criticism. The government’s achievements are amplified; its failures are buried. Awami League perfected this. BNP is taking notes.

    Control the opposition’s ability to organize. You don’t need to ban the opposition. You just need to make it impossible for them to function. Legal cases that drain resources and time. Administrative barriers to registration and campaigning. “Spontaneous” counter-rallies that disrupt opposition events. All of these were BAL tactics. All of them are now BNP tactics.

    Control the local administration. Elections in Bangladesh aren’t won at the national level — they’re won at the thana level. The local administrator, the police officer, the election magistrate — these are the people who actually determine whether voting is free. Under BAL, these positions were filled by party loyalists. Under BNP, the same positions are being filled by BNP loyalists. The structural incentive hasn’t changed at all.

    Create a development narrative. Roads, bridges, power plants, digital Bangladesh — Awami League used infrastructure as proof of legitimacy. “Yes, we’re authoritarian, but look at the GDP growth.” BNP is now running the same play. “Yes, we’re consolidating power, but look at the development.” The Khamba Tarique poles are still standing. They’ve just been painted.

    Every single one of these tactics was used by Awami League. Every single one was denounced by BNP. Every single one is now being deployed by BNP. The only difference is the party name on the letterhead.

    The Numbers Don’t Lie (But They Can Be Made To)

    In the interest of fairness — and this series has always been fair, even when it’s been furious — I should note that the 2026 election that brought BNP to power was, by most international observers’ accounts, significantly freer than any election held under Awami League. The voter turnout was higher. The opposition had more space. The counting process was more transparent. This is not in dispute.

    But here’s the thing about democratic elections: they’re not a one-time event. They’re a system. A free election in 2026 doesn’t guarantee a free election in 2031. And the institutional changes happening right now — the Election Commission appointments, the cyber security laws, the legal harassment of opposition, the media pressure — these are the building blocks of electoral authoritarianism. They take time to mature. Awami League didn’t steal the 2014 election overnight. They spent five years building the apparatus that made it possible.

    BNP is laying the same foundation. Right now. In front of everyone. And the international community, fresh from celebrating the “democratic transition,” is looking the other way.

    The voter rolls are being “updated.” The local administration is being “reformed.” The election laws are being “strengthened.” Every one of these verbs sounds reasonable in isolation. Every one of them was also used by Awami League to build the very system BNP opposed.

    In Bangladesh, the road to authoritarianism doesn’t start with a coup or a declaration. It starts with a “reformed” Election Commission. An “updated” voter roll. A “strengthened” cyber security law. Each step is small enough to seem reasonable. Each step is in the same direction. And each step makes the next one easier.

    What BNP Got Right — And Why It Makes What They’re Doing Now More Dangerous

    I want to be clear about something. BNP’s critique of Awami League’s authoritarianism was correct. Not partially correct. Not “correct for the wrong reasons.” It was correct. Awami League did rig elections. They did suppress opposition. They did weaponize the judiciary. They did use the Digital Security Act to silence critics. BNP was right about all of it.

    And that’s exactly why what’s happening now is so dangerous.

    When a party that has genuinely suffered under authoritarian rule takes power, they have two choices:

    Option 1: Use their experience of repression to build genuine safeguards. Reform the Election Commission so it’s truly independent. Pass laws that protect opposition rights, not just their own. Create institutions that will protect the next opposition party — even if that party is Awami League.

    Option 2: Use their experience of repression to become better at it. Learn from their predecessors’ mistakes. Close the loopholes. Perfect the playbook.

    Bangladesh has seen Option 2 every single time power has changed hands. Every. Single. Time.

    After 1991, BNP won a democratic election and immediately started consolidating power. After 1996, Awami League did the same. After 2001, BNP’s second term was even more authoritarian than their first — the 2001-2006 period that this entire project documents. After 2009, Awami League’s second term made BNP’s worst excesses look like a warm-up act. And now, after 2026, BNP is following the exact same trajectory.

    The pattern is so consistent it’s almost mathematical. Party X comes to power promising democracy. Party X starts with modest reforms. Party X gradually consolidates institutional control. Party X starts suppressing opposition. Party X rigs the next election. Party X becomes indistinguishable from the regime they replaced.

    The only variable is speed. And the speed is accelerating.

    Awami League took about five years to fully capture the state. BNP’s institutional capture is happening faster — not because they’re more aggressive, but because the infrastructure of authoritarianism is already built. Awami League constructed the machine. BNP just walked into the control room and found all the switches already labeled.

    The International Accountability Gap

    The international community celebrated the July 2024 uprising as a democratic triumph. And in many ways, it was. The fall of a 15-year autocracy through popular protest is exactly the kind of story the democratic world wants to tell.

    But celebration is not accountability. And the same governments that sanctioned RAB, that issued travel bans on BAL figures, that published reports documenting Awami League’s abuses — those governments are now silent about BNP’s institutional capture. The US Embassy that once called Tarique Rahman a “symbol of kleptocratic government” now issues statements about “Bangladesh’s democratic transition.” The European Union that sent election observers to document Awami League’s irregularities now talks about “partnership” with the BNP government.

    I understand the diplomatic logic. Bangladesh is geopolitically important. It’s a major garment producer, a growing economy, and a strategic partner in South Asia. Nobody wants to alienate a new government that came to power through a popular uprising. It’s easier to give them the benefit of the doubt.

    But the benefit of the doubt is not an unlimited resource. And it shouldn’t be given to a government that is — right now, today, not hypothetically — replicating the exact playbook that the international community condemned when the other party was running it.

    The US Treasury sanctioned RAB because of extrajudicial killings under Awami League. RAB still exists. It still operates. It’s just under new management. The European Union raised concerns about the Digital Security Act. BNP replaced it with a law that’s arguably broader in scope. Human Rights Watch documented BAL’s political prosecutions. BNP is now filing the same kinds of cases against the same number of people, just from the opposite party.

    If the principle was right when BAL was in power — and it was — then it’s right now. If suppressing opposition through legal harassment is wrong when Awami League does it, it’s wrong when BNP does it. If capturing the Election Commission is authoritarian when BAL does it, it’s authoritarian when BNP does it. If criminalizing online speech is a violation of human rights under BAL, it’s a violation of human rights under BNP.

    The standard doesn’t change just because the party in power did.

    What the Students Are Thinking

    I keep coming back to the students, because they’re the ones who actually believed. Not in BNP. Not in any party. They believed that a popular uprising could actually change the system. They believed that if they risked their lives — and many of them did — they could build a Bangladesh where institutions serve the people instead of the party.

    They’re watching what’s happening now. And they’re not confused about it. They’re not naive. They’re not expecting BNP to be perfect. But they are expecting BNP to be different. And the evidence so far suggests that BNP is different in style but identical in substance.

    The student leaders who organized the July 2024 protests are being sidelined. Not arrested — not yet, anyway. But their calls for institutional reform are being treated as naive. Their demands for genuine election commission independence are being “considered.” Their proposals for cyber security law reform are being “reviewed.” Meanwhile, the laws pass. The appointments happen. The institutions are captured. And the students are told to be patient.

    They were patient for 15 years under Awami League. Patience is what got them July 2024. The question is whether impatience is what will get them the next uprising. And if history is any guide, it will — just with a different party in power when it happens.

    The Same Road, Again

    This is the ninth article in a series about whether BNP 2026 is just Awami League 2.0. I’ve documented the institutional capture, the political persecution, the press freedom erosion, the security state, the development narrative, and the acquittal wave. Each article could stand alone. But together, they form a picture that’s impossible to ignore.

    BNP is walking down the same road that Awami League walked. The scenery is slightly different — the party colors have changed, the slogans have changed, the specific targets of political prosecution have changed. But the road is the same. The destination is the same. And the people walking down it are just as convinced as their predecessors that this time, it’s different.

    It’s not different.

    When Awami League captured the Election Commission, they said it was necessary for “stability.” When BNP does it, they say it’s necessary for “reform.” The justification changes. The capture doesn’t.

    When Awami League passed the Digital Security Act, they said it was to “protect citizens.” When BNP expands cyber security laws, they say it’s to “protect the nation.” The justification changes. The suppression doesn’t.

    When Awami League prosecuted BNP leaders, they said it was “accountability.” When BNP prosecutes BAL leaders, they say the same thing. The word changes. The selective application doesn’t.

    And when the next election comes — whether it’s 2031 or whenever — the party in power will use every institutional lever they’ve built to ensure the outcome. Just like Awami League did. Just like BNP is preparing to do. Just like whichever party comes after BNP will do, unless something fundamental changes.

    That fundamental change is not going to come from BNP. It’s not going to come from Awami League. It’s not going to come from any party that benefits from the current system. It can only come from the people who don’t benefit from it — which is to say, the vast majority of Bangladeshis who just want a country where their vote matters, their rights are protected, and their government serves them instead of serving itself.

    The students who led the July 2024 uprising understood this. They still understand it. The question is whether they’ll be able to build the institutions they deserve, or whether they’ll be forced to watch as another government builds the same institutions they’ve always had — just with different names on the doors.

    The election theater has a new cast. The play is the same. And the audience — the people of Bangladesh — are still paying full price for tickets to a show they’ve seen before.

    They deserve better. They’ve always deserved better. And until the system changes — not the party, the system — they’ll keep waiting for better, just like they’ve been waiting since 1971.


    Sources:

    • Constitution of Bangladesh, Thirteenth Amendment (1996) — Caretaker Government system
    • Constitution of Bangladesh, Fifteenth Amendment (2011) — Abolition of caretaker system
    • Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index, 2001-2005 — Bangladesh ranked most corrupt five consecutive years
    • US Embassy Cable 08DHAKA1143 (WikiLeaks): Tarique Rahman as “symbol of kleptocratic government”
    • Human Rights Watch: “Judge, Jury, and Executioner” (December 2006) — RAB extrajudicial killings
    • International Crisis Group: Asia Reports No. 121 (2006), No. 187 (2010), No. 277 (2016) — Democratic backsliding documentation
    • Digital Security Act 2018 — Sections 21, 28, 32, 43 (criminalizing online speech)
    • Cyber Security Act 2023 — Replaced DSA with similar provisions retained
    • Election Commission of Bangladesh — Appointments and structural independence analysis
    • The Daily Star, Prothom Alo, Dhaka Tribune: Multiple reports on Election Commission reform, local government elections, legal cases against opposition figures
    • US Treasury Department Sanctions on RAB (December 2021) — Continued under BNP government without modification
    • Amnesty International: Reports on Bangladesh election integrity (2014, 2018, 2024)
    • July 2024 Uprising documentation — Student movement demands, reform proposals, government response

    Series 9 — BNP 2026 = BAL 2.0? | Article #74

    Bangladesh Untold documents what happened. What you do with that information is up to you.


  • They Promised Accountability. Then They Pardoned Themselves.

    BNP swore they’d deliver justice for the oppressed. Then every single conviction from their own era vanished. Every. Single. One.

    Let’s get one thing straight before we start.

    The July 2024 uprising was real. The students who died were real. The anger that brought down a 15-year autocracy was genuine and justified. Nobody — least of all this page — is questioning that.

    But something happened on the way to justice. Something that should make every single person who marched in those streets stop and think very carefully about what comes next.

    BNP rode into power on a wave of democratic promise. They talked about accountability. They talked about rule of law. They talked about ending the culture of impunity. And then — systematically, case by case, court by court — they erased every single conviction against their own people. Not some of them. Not the questionable ones. All of them.

    Let me walk you through what that actually looks like.

    The Acquittal Wave: A Complete List

    Since the July 2024 uprising and BNP’s rise to power, every major criminal case from the 2001-2006 BNP-Jamaat era has been acquitted. Not reduced. Not commuted. Acquitted. Here’s the scorecard:

    Tarique Rahman: 84 cases. Eighty-four. Every single one — acquitted. The man US embassy cables called a “symbol of kleptocratic government,” the “Dark Prince” of Bangladeshi politics, accused of laundering $20 million through international networks, of operating a parallel government from Hawa Bhaban, of facilitating the August 21 grenade attack that killed 24 people — walked free on every charge. Not because he was innocent. Because the courts, now under BNP influence, decided he was.

    August 21 Grenade Attack: 49 accused. Death sentences, life imprisonments — all overturned. On December 1, 2024, the High Court acquitted every single person convicted for the attack that killed 24 people and injured over 500. The judge who originally heard the case had declared that “specialised deadly Arges grenades that are used in wars were blasted at the Awami League’s central office in broad daylight with the help of the then state machinery.” The grenades were military-grade. The state machinery was BNP’s. The court didn’t say they were innocent. The court said procedural issues made the convictions untenable. And then, on September 4, 2025, the Appellate Division dismissed the petition for retrial entirely. Case closed. Twenty-four people died and nobody is responsible.

    Chittagong Arms Haul: The largest arms smuggling operation in Bangladesh’s history — 4,930 firearms, 27,020 grenades, 840 rocket launchers, over 1.14 million bullets, all destined for an Indian insurgent group, all moving through a state-owned fertilizer jetty under the noses of the National Security Intelligence and DGFI. Death sentences for the masterminds, including State Home Minister Babar and Jamaat chief Nizami. In December 2024, the High Court acquitted Babar and five others. In January 2025, the arms case convictions were also overturned. Paresh Baruah’s death sentence was reduced to 14 years. Everyone else walked.

    Khaleda Zia: The Zia Orphanage Trust case — where she was convicted of embezzling over Tk 2.1 crore meant for orphans. The Zia Charitable Trust case. Three dozen cases total. All acquitted between November 2024 and January 2025. The woman who presided over the most corrupt government in the world — five consecutive years of Transparency International’s #1 ranking — now has a clean legal slate.

    Shamim Iskander: Khaleda’s brother. The man who nearly bankrupted Biman Airlines with Tk 40 crore in corrupt lease commissions. Thirty-six prosecution witnesses documented his crimes. On March 25, 2025, a Dhaka court simply discharged the case. Not acquitted on appeal. Discharged at trial. He now sits in the VIP gallery at Parliament sessions.

    Lutfozzaman Babar: The architect of Operation Clean Heart (44 deaths in custody). The man who oversaw the August 21 grenade attack cover-up. Convicted and sentenced to death for the grenade attack. Acquitted in December 2024 along with everyone else. Free.

    Do you see the pattern? Because it’s not subtle.

    The Selective Justice Problem

    Here’s what makes this so dangerous: BNP didn’t just acquit their own. They weaponized the justice system against their opponents with surgical precision.

    While every BNP-era conviction was being systematically overturned, the new government was busy filing new cases. Against Awami League leaders. Against journalists. Against anyone who questioned the narrative. The Anti-Corruption Commission, which we’ve already covered in this series, was repurposed from an independent watchdog into a political weapon — investigating BAL figures with vigor while BNP figures walked free from far more serious charges.

    This is the exact playbook Awami League used for 15 years. The same selective prosecution. The same two-tiered justice system where your guilt or innocence depends entirely on your political affiliation. The difference is that BNP spent those 15 years in opposition complaining about exactly this kind of politicized justice.

    They knew the system was broken because they were its victims. And then they got power and broke it the same way, just with different names on the indictments.

    What “Acquitted” Actually Means

    I need to be very precise here, because this distinction matters and it’s one BNP supporters will intentionally blur.

    When a court acquits someone, it doesn’t necessarily mean they’re innocent. It means the prosecution failed to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In Bangladesh’s current context, that failure often has less to do with evidence and more to do with who’s running the prosecution.

    Consider the August 21 grenade attack. The original trial court heard testimony from Mufti Abdul Hannan, a HUJI leader who confessed that the attack was coordinated with BNP leaders including Tarique Rahman. He described how the grenades were military-grade Arges weapons, how they were thrown from rooftops with state support, how the investigation was deliberately sabotaged by the Home Minister’s office. This wasn’t speculation. It was sworn testimony from inside the conspiracy.

    The acquittal didn’t contradict any of that. It cited procedural irregularities. Delays in the trial. Questions about the investigation process. These are real issues — but they’re issues that the BNP government itself created during 2001-2006 when it was actively obstructing the investigation, inventing the “Joj Mia” fabrication, and destroying evidence.

    Think about that for a second. BNP obstructed the investigation. The investigation was therefore flawed. Decades later, BNP’s allies in court cite the flawed investigation as grounds for acquittal. They literally benefited from their own obstruction of justice.

    This isn’t a bug. It’s the most elegant feature of authoritarian legal systems. Create the conditions for a flawed prosecution, then use those flaws to escape accountability. Awami League did it. BNP watched. BNP learned. BNP is now doing it better.

    The Impunity Feedback Loop

    Here’s what absolute impunity looks like in practice:

    2001-2006: BNP runs Bangladesh. Opposition members are killed in “crossfire.” Grenade attacks target political rallies. The state smuggles weapons to foreign insurgents. Corruption is so systemic that Transparency International names Bangladesh the world’s most corrupt country five years running. Nobody is held accountable.

    2007-2008: The caretaker government tries to hold people accountable. Cases are filed. Investigations happen. Some convictions are secured. But the process is politically messy and the military-backed government has its own legitimacy problems.

    2009-2024: Awami League weaponizes those cases. They become instruments of political control, not justice. Many cases are genuine, but the selective prosecution undermines their credibility. BAL uses the justice system against opponents while protecting its own criminals.

    2024-present: BNP takes power. Every case against their people is thrown out. Every conviction overturned. The justice system, already discredited by BAL’s manipulation, is now fully captured by BNP. And the cycle continues.

    What does this teach the next generation of Bangladeshi politicians? It teaches them that crime pays. That corruption is consequence-free. That the only risk is being on the wrong side when the government changes, and even that risk can be managed if you’re powerful enough. It teaches them that accountability is a fairy tale told by opposition parties who have zero intention of practicing it themselves.

    And it teaches the people of Bangladesh — the ones who bled in the streets in July 2024, the ones who lost family members to RAB’s crossfire, the families of the 24 grenade attack victims, the Hindu women of Bhola, the students of Shamsunnahar Hall — that their suffering doesn’t matter. That justice in Bangladesh is not a right. It’s a tool. And tools belong to whoever holds power.

    The International Silence

    Here’s what should trouble everyone watching from outside Bangladesh.

    When Awami League was committing its abuses, the international community was vocal. Human Rights Watch issued report after report. The US Treasury sanctioned RAB. The International Crisis Group documented democratic backsliding. Western governments expressed concern.

    Where is that same international community now?

    When every conviction for the August 21 grenade attack is overturned — 24 people killed, 500 injured, military-grade weapons used — where is the statement from the US Embassy? When the man called a “symbol of kleptocratic government” in American diplomatic cables becomes Prime Minister with a clean legal slate, where is the concern from the European Union? When Transparency International’s five-time most corrupt country is now run by the same people who earned that distinction, where is the commentary from the World Bank?

    The silence is deafening. And it’s exactly what BNP is counting on.

    Because here’s the thing about international accountability: it tends to follow political winds. When Awami League was the authoritarian, Western governments felt free to criticize. But Bangladesh under BNP is now presented as a “democratic transition” — a government that came to power through a popular uprising against autocracy. That narrative makes criticism awkward. It complicates diplomatic relationships. It’s easier to stay quiet.

    But staying quiet has consequences. When the international community gives BNP a pass on the same abuses they condemned under BAL, they’re not being neutral. They’re being complicit. They’re telling BNP that accountability is optional — that as long as you came to power through the “right” kind of uprising, you can rewrite your own criminal history without consequence.

    The 2001-2006 Pattern: Why It Matters Now

    Some will argue that this article is living in the past. That 2001-2006 was a different era, different circumstances, different Bangladesh. That we should judge BNP 2026 by what they’re doing now, not what they did twenty years ago.

    To which I say: fine. Let’s judge them by what they’re doing now.

    They are, right now, presiding over a justice system that has acquitted every single person convicted of crimes committed during their previous stint in power. They are, right now, using that same justice system to prosecute their political opponents. They are, right now, capturing institutions — the ACC, the judiciary, the press — in the exact same pattern that Awami League used. They are, right now, telling the international community that this is all legitimate because they were democratically elected.

    And they are, right now, counting on everyone forgetting what they did the last time they had power.

    We haven’t forgotten.

    The 24 people killed on August 21, 2004 haven’t been un-killed. The 44 people who died in Operation Clean Heart custody haven’t been brought back. The 600+ women of Bhola haven’t received justice. The 18,000 rapes documented by the judicial commission haven’t been un-raped. The Tk 2.1 crore stolen from orphans hasn’t been returned. The $20 million laundered through Singapore hasn’t been recovered. The “Khamba Tarique” power poles still stand in rural villages, connected to nothing, monuments to a corruption so brazen it literally installed empty infrastructure.

    These aren’t ancient history. They’re the foundation of the current government’s power structure. The same people who committed these crimes, covered them up, and were convicted for them are now running the country. They haven’t apologized. They haven’t acknowledged wrongdoing. They haven’t offered restitution. They’ve simply declared themselves innocent and moved on.

    What Real Accountability Looks Like

    Real accountability doesn’t mean prosecuting every political opponent while letting your own people walk. It doesn’t mean a “justice system” that conveniently acquits everyone on your team and investigates everyone on the other side.

    Real accountability would mean:

    Acknowledging the crimes. Not deflecting. Not blaming the caretaker government. Not claiming every case was “politically motivated.” Some cases were politically motivated. Many were not. The August 21 grenade attack happened. The Chittagong arms haul happened. 44 people died in Operation Clean Heart custody. These are facts, not opinions. A government committed to accountability would say: “These things happened on our watch. We will not hide from them.”

    Independent prosecution. If the original investigations were flawed — and some were — the answer isn’t acquittal. The answer is a genuinely independent, international-standard reinvestigation. Invite the FBI back. Invite Interpol. Let the evidence lead wherever it leads. If the evidence doesn’t support a conviction, then acquit. But don’t acquit because the prosecution was deliberately sabotaged by your own party and then claim that’s justice.

    Restitution. The people of Bangladesh — not the Awami League, not the BNP, the people — are owed reparations for the corruption, the violence, and the institutional damage. Tk 2.1 crore was stolen from orphans. Return it. $20 million was laundered abroad. Recover it. 44 people died in custody. Their families deserve compensation and an apology. Real accountability means making the victims whole, not just freeing the perpetrators.

    Institutional reform. If the justice system is so broken that it can be weaponized by whichever party is in power, then fix the system. Independent judicial appointments. Protected tenure for judges. An ACC that can investigate the ruling party without fear of being dismantled. These aren’t radical ideas. They’re the minimum requirements for a functioning democracy.

    None of this is happening. And until it does, the acquittal wave isn’t justice. It’s just the other side of the same coin Awami League was flipping for 15 years.

    The Road We’re On

    I’m going to end this article the same way I end most of them, because the conclusion keeps being the same and it keeps being ignored.

    Bangladesh has been here before. Multiple times. A popular movement overthrows an authoritarian government. Hope runs high. The new government promises change. And then, slowly but surely, the same patterns emerge — not because the people are the same, though often they are, but because the system rewards the same behavior. Capture institutions. Prosecute opponents. Protect allies. Repeat.

    Awami League did it for 15 years. BNP is doing it now. And if the pattern holds, whatever replaces BNP in the future will do it again. Because nobody has yet been held genuinely accountable in Bangladesh. Not under BAL. Not under BNP. Not under any government since independence.

    The July 2024 uprising was supposed to break this cycle. It was supposed to be different. And maybe the students who led it still believe that. But the government they helped install is proving, with every acquittal and every new political prosecution, that the cycle isn’t broken. It’s just under new management.

    The cost of impunity isn’t abstract. It’s measured in lives — the lives lost in 2001, 2002, 2004, 2005, 2006, and now the lives being destroyed by a justice system that serves power instead of truth. Every acquittal that’s driven by political affiliation rather than evidence sends a message: you can get away with anything in Bangladesh, as long as you’re on the winning team.

    The winning team changes. The impunity doesn’t.

    And that’s the real scandal. Not that BNP is acquitting its own. Not that BAL prosecuted selectively. But that in 54 years of independence, Bangladesh has never once built a justice system that serves the people instead of the party in power. Every government has had the chance. Every government has chosen otherwise.

    Until that changes, the acquittals will keep coming. The prosecutions will keep being selective. And the people who suffer most — the ordinary citizens of Bangladesh who just want a country where crime has consequences regardless of who commits it — will keep waiting.

    They’ve been waiting since 1971.

    They’re still waiting now.


    Sources:

    • Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index, 2001-2005
    • US Embassy Cable 08DHAKA1143 (WikiLeaks): Tarique Rahman described as “symbol of kleptocratic government”
    • High Court Verdict, July 21, 2016: Tarique Rahman sentenced to 7 years for money laundering (overturned December 2024)
    • Appellate Division, March 6, 2025: Tarique Rahman acquitted in money laundering case
    • High Court, December 1, 2024: All 49 accused acquitted in August 21 grenade attack case
    • Appellate Division, September 4, 2025: Dismissed retrial petition, upholding acquittal
    • High Court, December 18, 2024: Babar and 5 others acquitted in Chittagong arms haul case
    • Supreme Court, January 2025: Khaleda Zia acquitted in Zia Orphanage Trust case
    • High Court, November 2025: Khaleda Zia acquitted in Zia Charitable Trust case
    • Dhaka Court, March 25, 2025: Shamim Iskander discharged from corruption case
    • Human Rights Watch: “Judge, Jury, and Executioner” (December 2006)
    • International Crisis Group: Asia Report No. 121 (October 2006), No. 187 (March 2010), No. 277 (April 2016)
    • The Daily Star, Prothom Alo, Dhaka Tribune: Multiple reports on court proceedings and acquittals

    Series 9 — BNP 2026 = BAL 2.0? | Article #73

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