The Anti-Corruption Commission was created to be Bangladesh’s answer to impunity. A permanent, independent body that could investigate anyone — ministers, MPs, business tycoons, even prime ministers. That was the promise. For twenty years, BNP said the ACC had been weaponized against them. Now they hold the reins. Let’s see what they’ve done with it.
Here’s what BNP spent two decades saying: the Anti-Corruption Commission was a political weapon. When the ACC filed cases against BNP leaders, the party called them “false and harassing.” When Khaleda Zia was convicted of corruption, BNP called it a “political trial.” When Tarique Rahman was sentenced for money laundering, BNP called it “vendetta politics.” Every ACC investigation into BNP affairs was, in the party’s telling, proof that the commission had been captured by Awami League interests.
They had a point. The ACC under Awami League rule was selective. It filed cases against opposition figures at a rate that strained coincidence. It dragged investigations against ruling party allies. It became, in practice if not in mandate, an instrument of political pressure — a tool the ruling party could deploy against enemies and withhold from friends.
BNP’s critique was correct. The problem is what they’ve done since taking power.
What the ACC Was Supposed to Be
The Anti-Corruption Commission was established in 2004 under the BNP-Jamaat coalition government. Yes — the same BNP. The enabling legislation, the Anti-Corruption Commission Act 2004, was passed by BNP’s own parliament. The ACC was conceived as an independent body modeled on anti-corruption commissions in Hong Kong, Singapore, and other jurisdictions that had successfully built institutional resistance to graft.
The intent, at least on paper, was clear: a permanent, statutory body with suo moto powers to investigate corruption at any level of government, from the lowest clerk to the highest office. The ACC would not need government permission to open an inquiry. It would not be answerable to any ministry. Its commissioners would serve fixed terms and could not be removed except through impeachment.
The reality was different from the start. The ACC’s first years were marked by underfunding, understaffing, and political interference. But the framework — the institutional DNA — was sound. Bangladesh had, on paper, a body that could hold anyone accountable. What it needed was independence and political will.
Then 1/11 happened.
What 1/11’s ACC Actually Did
The military-backed caretaker government that took power on January 11, 2007, did something no elected government had done: it let the ACC work. The reconstituted commission, under new leadership, launched an unprecedented anti-corruption drive that filed cases against over 300 politicians and government officials, including leaders from both major parties.
This was the period when the ACC earned its credibility — and its enemies.
Among those charged:
- Khaleda Zia — Former Prime Minister, charged with corruption in the Orphanage Trust case and the GATCO case
- Tarique Rahman — Charged with money laundering and corruption; later sentenced to 7 years (overturned on appeal after AL’s return)
- Harris Chowdhury — Former Political Secretary to PM, charged with corruption; fugitive since 2007
- M. Morshed Khan — Former Foreign Minister; Interpol traced BDT 141.5 million to his Hong Kong accounts
- Sheikh Hasina — Then opposition leader, also charged with corruption and extortion
- Haji Mohammad Salim — Sentenced to 10 years for illegal wealth accumulation
- Wadud Bhuiyan — Sentenced to 20 years for amassing over $1 million in illegal wealth
One hundred ten convictions across 79 cases. Bank accounts frozen domestically and internationally. Properties confiscated by court order. This was, by any measure, the most sustained anti-corruption enforcement Bangladesh had ever seen.
It was also the last time the ACC operated with genuine independence.
The Awami League Years: Selective Justice
When the Awami League returned to power in 2009, the ACC’s landscape changed. The commission continued to exist. It continued to file cases. But a pattern emerged that was difficult to ignore:
Cases against BNP leaders: pursued aggressively. Khaleda Zia’s Orphanage Trust conviction resulted in a 5-year sentence (later extended to 10 years on appeal). Tarique Rahman’s money laundering conviction was upheld by the High Court in 2016. The ACC filed dozens of cases against BNP figures at every level.
Cases against AL figures: slow-rolled, settled, or never opened. The ACC’s own leadership acknowledged in internal reviews that investigations into ruling party members faced “pressure” — a diplomatic word for interference. Cases that were opened against AL-affiliated businessmen and officials tended to languish. Witness testimony went uncollected. Chargesheets gathered dust.
This is not speculation. The pattern was documented by Transparency International Bangladesh, by Human Rights Watch, and by the ACC’s own performance reports. Between 2009 and 2023, the ACC filed cases against opposition figures at a rate roughly four times higher than against ruling party members. When the same types of allegations — land grabbing, embezzlement, misuse of public funds — were made against AL-connected individuals, the ACC was far less likely to open a formal inquiry.
BNP called this what it was: political weaponization. They were right.
They also promised to fix it.
What BNP Promised
During their years in opposition, BNP made specific promises about anti-corruption reform:
- The ACC would be made truly independent, free from executive interference
- All politically motivated cases would be reviewed and withdrawn
- The ACC would investigate corruption regardless of party affiliation
- Bangladesh would adopt international best practices for anti-corruption institutions
Lawmakers quoted the 142,983 figure constantly. The number became a rallying cry. BNP members spoke about it in parliament, at press conferences, in international fora. The implication was always the same: we understand what it’s like to be targeted by a politicized anti-corruption body, and we will ensure it never happens again.
Let’s see what happened instead.
What BNP Has Done
1. Mass Withdrawal of Cases Against BNP Leaders
Within weeks of taking power, BNP began systematically withdrawing corruption cases against its own leaders. The Law Minister confirmed in parliament that a six-member committee had been formed specifically to withdraw cases filed against BNP leaders and activists between 2007 and January 2025.
Of the 142,983 cases BNP had cited as evidence of political persecution, 23,865 had been withdrawn by early 2026. The committee was working through the rest.
Now, some of these cases were genuinely politically motivated. BNP’s claim that many were filed to harass and deplete the opposition had merit — the same merit BNP is now denying when the Awami League makes identical claims about cases filed against its members.
But here’s the problem: the committee reviewing these cases is not an independent judicial body. It is a government-appointed committee operating under the Law Ministry. The decisions about which cases to withdraw are being made by the same government whose leaders are the subjects of those cases. There is no independent review mechanism. No transparency about the criteria being applied. No process for appeal by citizens or civil society organizations who originally filed the complaints.
The ACC — the body that was supposed to make these determinations — has been sidelined. Its current leadership was appointed by the BNP government. Its investigations into BNP-affiliated individuals have slowed to a crawl. Its public statements, when they come, are carefully worded to avoid any suggestion of investigating the ruling party.
2. The Tarique Rahman Acquittals
The most visible symbol of this pattern is Tarique Rahman himself. In December 2024, the High Court acquitted all 49 individuals convicted in the August 21 grenade attack case — including Tarique Rahman and Lutfozzaman Babar. In March 2025, the Appellate Division acquitted Tarique and Giasuddin Al Mamun in the money laundering case. In total, 84 cases were filed against Tarique between 2007 and 2024. Every single one has been dismissed or acquitted.
Let’s be clear about what happened with the money laundering case specifically. The High Court originally overturned Tarique’s trial court acquittal and sentenced him to 7 years imprisonment, finding that he “influenced political power to help his close friend, Giasuddin Mamun, to get and then launder 200 million taka ($2.5m).” That was in 2016. The conviction stood for eight years. Then, following the July 2024 political transition, the Appellate Division acquitted both men in March 2025.
Whether these acquittals were on the merits or on procedural grounds, the pattern is unmistakable: every case against the current Prime Minister has been resolved in his favor by courts operating under his government’s jurisdiction. That does not prove the cases were wrong. But it does raise a question that BNP has refused to engage with: if 84 out of 84 cases result in acquittal, is that the justice system working — or the justice system being worked?
3. The Arms Haul Acquittals
In December 2024, the High Court acquitted Lutfozzaman Babar and five others — including former DGFI chief Major General Rezzakul Haider Chowdhury — in the Chittagong arms haul case. This was the case involving 4,930 firearms, 27,020 grenades, and over 1 million rounds of ammunition seized from ten trucks at the Chittagong Urea Fertilizer Limited jetty in April 2004. The weapons were bound for ULFA insurgents in India. Two former NSI directors-general were among the convicted. The trial court had sentenced them to death.
The acquittal was not merely a technicality. It reversed a death sentence in the largest arms smuggling case in Bangladesh’s history — a case where the evidence included confessional statements, seized weapons, and established connections between BNP-era intelligence chiefs and foreign militant networks.
4. New Cases Against Awami League Figures
While BNP’s own cases are being withdrawn and acquitted, a torrent of new cases has been filed against Awami League leaders and activists. The Law Minister’s own parliamentary statement confirmed that the government does not maintain centralized statistics on cases filed against political party members, making independent verification of numbers difficult. But what can be documented is the pattern:
- Over 650 cases filed against former Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina alone
- The Awami League, Bangladesh’s oldest political party, banned under anti-terrorism law
- Former Speaker Shirin Sharmin Chaudhury arrested
- Three UN Special Rapporteurs sent a formal letter warning that measures against the AL may constitute “unnecessary and disproportionate restrictions” on fundamental rights
- Human Rights Watch’s 2026 World Report documented “thousands” arrested on political grounds with bail routinely denied
The ACC, which should be investigating corruption on all sides, has been conspicuously absent from any investigation of BNP-affiliated individuals. When opposition figures face hundreds of cases each, and ruling party figures face zero, the commission is not operating as an independent anti-corruption body. It is operating as an extension of political prosecution — exactly what BNP spent twenty years saying was unacceptable.
The DUDOK Three-Time Clearance: A Response
Now, someone will bring up DUDOK. Whenever BNP’s corruption record is mentioned, someone points out that the ACC (referred to by its Bengali acronym, DUDOK) cleared Tarique Rahman three times. This is presented as definitive proof of innocence.
It is not that simple.
The three clearances were issued during the Awami League era — specifically during periods when the ACC was, by BNP’s own later admission, a politically compromised institution. If BNP’s argument is that the ACC was weaponized against them, they cannot simultaneously cite ACC clearances as proof of innocence. Either the ACC was captured and its outputs are suspect, or it was independent and its prosecutions were legitimate. You cannot have it both ways.
Further, the clearances occurred during specific windows:
- First clearance (2010): Issued while the ACC was under heavy political pressure from the newly-installed Awami League government, which had its own reasons to manage the optics of corruption cases rather than pursue them to their conclusion
- Second clearance (2013): Issued during a period when the ACC was being criticized by Transparency International for declining effectiveness and increasing political influence
- Third clearance: Issued in a context where multiple other ACC cases against ruling party figures were also being slow-rolled or dismissed
Each of these clearances came with caveats and procedural questions. Each occurred within an institutional environment that BNP itself later described as corrupt and politically motivated. The clearances do not prove Tarique was innocent any more than the subsequent convictions prove he was guilty. What they prove is that the ACC has been, throughout its existence, an instrument that whoever holds power can point to when it suits them and dismiss when it doesn’t.
The Real Test of Anti-Corruption
Here’s how you can tell whether an anti-corruption commission is genuinely independent or merely a weapon of the ruling party:
It investigates its own side.
Under the caretaker government, the ACC filed cases against both BNP and Awami League leaders. Khaleda Zia was charged. Sheikh Hasina was charged. Morshed Khan, a BNP foreign minister, was charged. Haji Salim, an AL-affiliated businessman, was charged. It was not perfect. It was not comprehensive. But it was bipartisan in its targeting, which is the minimum threshold for credibility.
Under BNP’s current government, the ACC has filed zero cases of substance against any BNP-affiliated figure. Not one. While the commission exists, while it has investigators and prosecutors and a budget, it has not opened a single significant inquiry into corruption allegations involving ruling party members — this, in a country that Transparency International ranked as the most corrupt in the world for five consecutive years under the last BNP government.
This is not reform. This is not accountability. This is the same playbook BNP condemned for twenty years, executed from the other side of the table.
The Numbers BNP Doesn’t Quote Anymore
Remember 142,983? BNP’s number. The cases filed against its members that proved, they said, that the system was rigged. The number they cited in every press conference, every parliamentary session, every international appeal.
They don’t cite it anymore.
The committee withdrawing those cases has processed 23,865 so far. The rest are working their way through. Every acquittal, every withdrawal, every dismissal is presented as justice finally done — proof that the cases were politically motivated all along.
Perhaps many of them were. Perhaps most of them were. That is the tragedy of politicized justice: it makes it impossible to separate legitimate accountability from persecution, because the institution responsible for distinguishing between the two has been compromised by the very people who should be subject to its scrutiny.
But here is what BNP cannot claim: that they have reformed the system. They have not reformed the ACC. They have not made it more independent. They have not instituted safeguards against political weaponization. They have not passed legislation ensuring that future commissions cannot be captured by the ruling party. They have not created independent review mechanisms for case withdrawals. They have done exactly what the Awami League did: appointed loyalists to the commission, withdrawn cases against their own people, and directed the apparatus against their opponents.
The names on the case files have changed. The institution has not.
What an Independent ACC Would Look Like
Bangladesh is not short on models for what genuine anti-corruption reform would require. Transparency International Bangladesh, the International Crisis Group, and the World Bank have all provided detailed recommendations. The key elements are:
- Commissioner selection through bipartisan parliamentary committee, not executive appointment
- Fixed, non-renewable terms with removal only through impeachment
- Guaranteed budgetary independence — the ACC’s budget should not be subject to annual executive review
- Mandatory investigation protocols — requiring the ACC to open inquiries when credible complaints are received, regardless of the political affiliation of the subject
- Public annual reporting on cases opened, pursued, and closed — with statistical breakdowns by party affiliation
- Judicial oversight of case withdrawals — no government committee should have the power to dismiss corruption cases
None of these reforms have been implemented. None have been proposed by BNP. None appear in any legislative agenda. The party that built its identity on being persecuted by a politicized ACC has, upon taking power, ensured that the ACC remains politicized — just in the opposite direction.
The Pattern
This article is part of a series. The previous article in this series documented how BNP’s government punished 28 judges for posting on Facebook about judicial independence, then repealed the legal safeguards that were supposed to protect the courts from executive control. The one before that documented how the security state — RAB, custodial deaths, and the machinery of extrajudicial power — never changed hands because it was never designed to serve one party. It serves whoever is in power.
The Anti-Corruption Commission is the same story. It was not designed to fight corruption. It was designed to be a tool that whoever holds power can use against their enemies while shielding their friends. The Awami League used it against BNP. BNP denounced it as a weapon. Then BNP took power and used the same weapon against the Awami League.
The institutions are not broken. They are working exactly as designed. The design is the problem.
When an anti-corruption commission only investigates the opposition, it is not an anti-corruption commission. It is a political prosecution office with a better letterhead. When case withdrawals are decided by government committees rather than courts, the process is not justice — it is amnesty by another name. When 84 out of 84 cases against a sitting prime minister result in acquittal while 650 cases against a former prime minister proceed simultaneously, the numbers tell a story that no press release can rewrite.
BNP understood this once. They understood it viscerally, because they were on the receiving end. They spent twenty years explaining, correctly, that a politicized ACC is an insult to the rule of law. They promised to fix it.
They didn’t fix it. They just pointed it in a different direction.
Bangladesh Untold documents what the record shows. Every source in this article is independently verifiable. This is part of our ongoing Series 9: BNP 2026 = BAL 2.0?
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