Every authoritarian government needs a story. Not the story about enemies. Not the story about threats. Those are secondary. The primary story — the one that makes everything else tolerable, the one that transforms theft into nation-building and repression into stability — is the story about development. “Yes, but look at the roads.” That story is as old as power itself. And in Bangladesh, BNP is telling it with the confidence of a party that believes its audience has forgotten what the roads cost.
There is a particular rhetorical move that BNP’s defenders make, in parliament and on television and across the considerable digital infrastructure the party has built since returning to power. It goes like this: you mention the corruption rankings, and they mention the infrastructure. You mention the grenade attacks, and they mention the GDP growth. You mention the 18,000 documented rapes, and they mention the bridges. You mention the money laundering convictions, and they mention the power plants.
It is a deflection that works because development is real. Bangladesh did build infrastructure under BNP rule. The GDP did grow. There are roads and bridges and power plants that did not exist before. This is not in dispute. What is in dispute is what the development cost, who paid for it, who benefited, and what was destroyed in the process — because the story of BNP-era development is also the story of BNP-era corruption, and you cannot tell one without the other.
This article is about what gets buried when “development” becomes a shield.
The Numbers BNP Quotes
When BNP defenders cite their development record, they point to several indicators:
GDP growth. Under BNP rule (2001-2006), Bangladesh’s GDP growth averaged approximately 5.5% per year. This is presented as evidence of competent economic management.
Infrastructure. The BNP government initiated several major infrastructure projects, including the Jamuna Bridge approach roads, power generation facilities, and various road and highway construction programs.
Foreign investment. Some increases in foreign direct investment were recorded during this period, though the figures are contested and the sources of investment were often opaque.
These are real numbers. GDP growth happened. Infrastructure was built. Some investment did arrive. The question is not whether Bangladesh developed during this period. The question is whether the development was worth what it cost — and who actually paid the cost.
The Numbers BNP Doesn’t Quote
Here are some other numbers from the same period:
Transparency International rankings, 2001-2005: Bangladesh was ranked the most corrupt country in the world for five consecutive years — the entire duration of BNP-Jamaat coalition rule. Not sometimes. Not occasionally. Every single year. Out of 91 countries in 2001, 102 in 2002, 133 in 2003, 145 in 2004, and 158 in 2005, Bangladesh ranked dead last. The CPI scores — 0.4, 1.2, 1.3, 1.5, 1.7 out of 10 — were not just bad. They were the worst ever recorded for any country in the history of the index at that time.
These are not opposition talking points. They are the findings of the world’s leading anti-corruption organization, using methodology that applies the same standards to every country on Earth.
Money laundering through Hawa Bhaban: US$20 million in confirmed transfers through Singapore banks, investigated by the FBI, corroborated by Singapore court convictions. This is the same Hawa Bhaban that functioned as Tarique Rahman’s parallel government — the office where government contracts were allocated in exchange for bribes, as documented by US diplomatic cables.
The “Khamba Tarique” scandal: Thousands of electric poles installed across rural Bangladesh — at inflated prices, with commissions flowing through Hawa Bhaban — that were never connected to any functioning electrical grid. Empty poles. Concrete monuments to corruption that stood in village after village, generating nothing, lighting nothing, serving no purpose except to move public money into private pockets. The nickname “Khamba Tarique” — “Pole Tarique” — became a national shorthand for what BNP’s “development” actually meant.
The Orphanage Trust embezzlement: Tk 2.1 crore stolen from a charitable trust established for the benefit of orphans. Khaleda Zia, the Prime Minister, was convicted of this theft. The money was never recovered. The orphans never received it. The conviction was later overturned — not because the facts were wrong, but because the political context changed.
Biman Bangladesh Airlines: Shamim Iskander — Khaleda Zia’s brother — nearly bankrupted the national carrier through corrupt lease deals, amassing wealth beyond any known source of income. His case was discharged in March 2025. He sat in the VIP gallery at Parliament in March 2026.
The power sector: The same sector that BNP cites as a development achievement was the vector for some of the most brazen corruption of the era. Contracts awarded without competitive bidding. Projects approved at inflated costs. Equipment purchased that never functioned. The “Khamba Tarique” poles were the visible symbol; the invisible corruption in power procurement — the overpriced contracts, the kickbacks, the shell companies — was the substance.
These are not minor irregularities. They are systematic, documented, internationally investigated cases of corruption that occurred in every sector BNP now claims as a development achievement.
The Development-Corruption Pipeline
Here is what BNP’s development narrative systematically omits: in a system ranked as the most corrupt on Earth, every development project is also a corruption opportunity. The roads were built, yes — but they cost three or four or ten times what they should have cost, and the difference went into the pockets of the people who approved the contracts. The power plants generated electricity, some of them — but the procurement process was captured, the contracts were inflated, and the commissions flowed through Hawa Bhaban.
This is not speculation. This is the documented finding of Transparency International, of US diplomatic cables, of Singapore court records, of FBI investigations, and of Bangladeshi courts that convicted BNP officials on these charges — convictions that were later overturned not on the merits but through a political transition that placed the convicted above the courts that convicted them.
The development-corruption pipeline worked like this:
- A development project is announced. This creates the public narrative — the story BNP tells about building the nation. The ribbon-cutting ceremonies. The press releases. The photographs of prime ministers posing in front of new infrastructure.
- The contract is awarded without competitive bidding or through a captured process. The US diplomatic cables describing Hawa Bhaban as a “parallel power centre where government contracts were influenced in exchange for bribes” explain exactly how this worked. The project cost is inflated. The difference is split between the minister who approved it, the Hawa Bhaban intermediary who facilitated it, and the contractor who won it.
- The project is executed at lower quality than specified. Materials are substituted. Specifications are reduced. Oversight is minimal because the people providing oversight are part of the same system. The electric poles go up — but the wiring, the transformers, the grid connections that would actually make them functional, are never completed. The poles stand as concrete proof that “something was built” while the absence of electricity proves that the building was the point, not the functioning.
- The commission is moved through international financial networks. The money doesn’t stay in Bangladesh. It flows through Singapore banks, through shell companies, through intermediaries like Giasuddin Al Mamun — Tarique Rahman’s close friend and business partner, convicted alongside him in the money laundering case. The FBI traced the money. The Singapore courts documented the transfers. The money left Bangladesh. The development, such as it was, stayed — half-built, overpriced, and generating nothing.
This is the system that Transparency International measured when it ranked Bangladesh dead last for five consecutive years. The CPI does not measure infrastructure. It measures the perception of corruption — the extent to which businesses and analysts believe that public funds are being misappropriated, that officials are using their positions for private gain, that the rule of law is subordinated to the interests of the powerful. Bangladesh’s scores of 0.4, 1.2, 1.3, 1.5, and 1.7 were not assessments of how many roads were built. They were assessments of how much of the road-building budget was stolen.
“But the Awami League Was Worse”
The standard BNP response to any discussion of their corruption record is to point to the Awami League’s record. This is a deflection that deserves a direct response.
Yes, the Awami League was corrupt. Spectacularly, systematically corrupt. The 2013-2023 period under Sheikh Hasina saw bank looting on an industrial scale — the Hall-Mark Group scam alone cost Tk 3,547 crore. The Padma Bridge project was nearly derailed by a Canadian corruption investigation. The Rooppur Nuclear Power Plant contract was shrouded in opacity. The share market was manipulated. The banking sector was captured. Opposition leaders were disappeared. The Digital Security Act was used to imprison journalists and critics. The 2014, 2018, and 2024 elections were marred by credible allegations of systematic rigging.
All of this is true. All of this is documented. Bangladesh Untold has no interest in minimizing the Awami League’s corruption or authoritarianism. The Awami League’s record on democracy, human rights, and institutional independence was deeply and comprehensively flawed. This publication has documented those flaws.
But here is the problem with the “but they were worse” defense: it does not address the substance of the charge. If the Awami League’s corruption excuses BNP’s corruption, then BNP’s corruption excuses the next government’s corruption, and the spiral continues indefinitely. The standard for governance cannot be “less corrupt than the last corrupt government.” The standard has to be accountability, transparency, and the rule of law — standards that BNP promised to uphold and has systematically violated since taking power.
Moreover, BNP’s specific defense — that their development achievements outweigh their corruption — only works if the development and the corruption can be separated. They cannot. The same system that produced the infrastructure produced the corruption. The same Hawa Bhaban that directed the contracts directed the commissions. The same Tarique Rahman who is now celebrated as a development leader is the same Tarique Rahman who was described by US diplomats as a “symbol of kleptocratic government.” The same power sector that BNP cites as an achievement is the same power sector that gave rise to the “Khamba Tarique” scandal. The development and the corruption are not separate stories. They are the same story, told from two different angles.
What Development Without Accountability Looks Like
The fundamental problem with BNP’s development narrative is not that the development didn’t happen. It is that the development happened without accountability — and that BNP is now using the development as a justification for dismantling the accountability mechanisms that were supposed to prevent the corruption from happening again.
Consider the sequence:
Step 1: BNP governs from 2001-2006. The country develops, but Transparency International ranks it as the most corrupt on Earth for five consecutive years. The development is real but the cost is hidden — in inflated contracts, in stolen orphan trust funds, in money laundering through international networks, in electric poles that don’t connect to anything.
Step 2: 1/11 happens. The caretaker government launches the most comprehensive anti-corruption drive in Bangladesh’s history. Over 300 politicians are charged. Cases are filed against both BNP and Awami League leaders. For a brief period, corruption has consequences.
Step 3: The cases from Step 2 are systematically reversed. Every conviction against BNP leadership is overturned. Every investigation is closed. The Anti-Corruption Commission, which was briefly independent during the caretaker period, is captured first by the Awami League and then by BNP. The institutional memory of accountability is erased.
Step 4: BNP returns to power in 2026 and cites the development from Step 1 as evidence of good governance, while citing the reversals in Step 3 as evidence that the corruption charges were politically motivated. The development narrative becomes a shield against accountability. “Yes, there were problems,” the argument goes, “but look at what we built.”
This is not a development story. It is a money laundering story with better public relations.
The problem with development without accountability is not abstract. It is specific. It means that the orphanage trust funds that were stolen are never recovered, because the people who stole them are now in power. It means that the families of the 24 people killed in the August 21 grenade attack never receive justice, because the people who planned the attack are now in power. It means that the 44 people who died in military custody during Operation Clean Heart are never acknowledged, because the government that ordered the operation is now back in power. It means that the 600+ people killed by RAB in “crossfire” encounters are never counted, because the institution that killed them is still operating under new management.
Development that only benefits the developers is not development. It is extraction.
The Infrastructure of Impunity
The connection between BNP’s development narrative and BNP’s current governance is not incidental. It is structural. The same mindset that treats development as a justification for corruption — “yes, we took commissions, but look at the roads” — is the mindset that treats institutional capture as a justification for authoritarianism — “yes, we control the courts, but look at the stability.”
This is the infrastructure of impunity, and it has three components:
First, the argument from results. “The country developed. Therefore, the methods used to develop it are justified.” This argument collapses the moment you examine who actually benefited from the development and who paid for it. The electric poles that don’t connect to any grid do not benefit the villagers who live next to them. The contracts that were inflated by 300% do not benefit the taxpayers who funded them. The money that was laundered through Singapore does not benefit the Bangladeshis whose public services were underfunded so that Tarique Rahman’s friends could buy houses in Australia and Canada.
Second, the argument from comparison. “The Awami League was worse. Therefore, BNP’s corruption is acceptable.” This argument has already been addressed. Corruption is not a relative sport. The fact that one government stole more than another does not make the lesser theft legitimate. And the fact that BNP promised to be different — to reform the ACC, to ensure judicial independence, to protect press freedom, to end political persecution — makes their adoption of the same playbook they condemned not just hypocritical but actively destructive. They did not merely fail to reform the system. They explicitly replicated it.
Third, the argument from sovereignty. “International criticism of Bangladesh’s corruption is foreign interference. Bangladesh will develop on its own terms.” This is the argument that BNP deploys whenever Transparency International, Human Rights Watch, the International Crisis Group, the US State Department, or any other international body documents corruption or human rights abuses under BNP rule. It is an argument that sounds patriotic but functions as a shield against accountability. Transparency International’s rankings are not “foreign interference.” They are standardized measurements applied to every country on Earth. The FBI’s investigation of Tarique Rahman’s money laundering was not “foreign interference.” It was the lawful investigation of a crime that crossed international borders, conducted by the law enforcement agency of Bangladesh’s most important diplomatic partner. The US sanctions on RAB were not “foreign interference.” They were the legitimate exercise of sanctions authority by a government that had documented 600+ extrajudicial killings by a force that BNP created and that continued to operate under Awami League rule.
These three arguments — results, comparison, and sovereignty — form the tripod on which BNP’s development narrative rests. Remove any one of them and the structure collapses. The results don’t hold up when you account for the cost. The comparison doesn’t hold up when you apply the same standard to both parties. The sovereignty argument doesn’t hold up when the “interference” is standardized international assessment applied equally to every nation.
What the World Actually Said
BNP’s development narrative depends on a selective reading of the international record. They cite GDP growth. They do not cite the diplomatic cables. They cite infrastructure. They do not cite the corruption rankings. They cite investment. They do not cite the money laundering convictions.
Here is what the international record actually says about BNP-era development:
US Embassy Cable (2005): Described Tarique Rahman as a “symbol of kleptocratic government” and noted that Hawa Bhaban was “frequently accused of acting as a parallel power center where government contracts were influenced in exchange for bribes.” This is not an opposition press release. This is a classified diplomatic assessment from the United States Embassy in Dhaka, later released by WikiLeaks and confirmed as authentic by the State Department.
Transparency International (2001-2005): Five consecutive years as the most corrupt country on Earth. Not “one of the most corrupt.” The most corrupt. Dead last. Every year. The CPI scores — 0.4, 1.2, 1.3, 1.5, 1.7 out of 10 — represent the collective assessment of the world’s leading anti-corruption body based on independent surveys of business executives and country analysts.
FBI Investigation: The United States Federal Bureau of Investigation opened a formal investigation into Tarique Rahman’s money laundering activities. The investigation traced US$2.5 million through Singapore banks, leading to a conviction in a Singapore court and, later, a 7-year sentence from the Bangladesh High Court that stood for eight years before being overturned by an Appellate Division operating under Tarique Rahman’s own government.
Singapore Court: Confirmed the money laundering trail, including the transfer of funds through Giasuddin Al Mamun’s accounts and their connection to Tarique Rahman. The conviction in Singapore was a separate, sovereign judicial proceeding conducted in one of the world’s most respected legal systems.
International Crisis Group: Documented the systematic capture of Bangladeshi institutions under BNP rule, including the judiciary, the election commission, and the anti-corruption apparatus. Their reports describe a country where “money, cronyism and intimidation increasingly dictated the outcome of elections” — a direct quote from their assessment.
Human Rights Watch: Documented extrajudicial killings, custodial deaths, and the systematic use of state power against political opponents and minority communities. Their 2001-2006 reports provide a comprehensive record of human rights abuses that occurred simultaneously with the “development” BNP now cites.
The United Nations: Warned that Bangladesh’s participation in peacekeeping operations was at risk if the country proceeded with a sham election in 2007 — a warning that directly contributed to the 1/11 intervention. The UN did not issue this warning because Bangladesh was developing well. It issued this warning because Bangladesh’s institutions had been so thoroughly captured that a legitimate election was no longer possible.
Every single one of these assessments was issued during the same period that BNP now describes as a golden age of development. They are not retrospective reinterpretations. They are contemporary assessments by the most credible international organizations in the world, issued in real time, based on documented evidence.
The Real Cost
Development is not a number. It is not a road. It is not a bridge. Development, properly understood, is the expansion of human capability — the creation of conditions in which people can live with dignity, exercise their rights, and hold their government accountable. By this standard, Bangladesh under BNP rule was not developing. It was extracting.
The real cost of BNP-era “development” includes:
The financial cost: Every inflated contract, every commission skimmed, every bribe paid, every dollar laundered through Singapore was money that did not go to schools, hospitals, roads that actually connected to power grids, or social services for the 18,000 women who were raped. The opportunity cost of corruption is not abstract. It is the difference between an electric pole that lights a village and an electric pole that stands in a field generating nothing except the commission that paid for it.
The institutional cost: The same period that produced the development also produced the systematic capture of every institution that was supposed to ensure accountability. The Anti-Corruption Commission was created in 2004 — by BNP — and immediately underfunded and undermined. The election commission was stacked. The chief justice’s retirement age was extended to keep a friendly judge in place. The police and intelligence services were used to harass, detain, and kill political opponents. These are not side effects of development. They are the conditions that made the corruption possible, and they are the conditions that BNP is now recreating in 2026.
The human cost: 24 people killed by military-grade grenades thrown into a political rally. 44 people killed in military custody during Operation Clean Heart. 600+ people killed by RAB in “crossfire” encounters. 18,000 women raped in post-election violence. 200 female university students dragged from their beds and beaten in a police raid ordered by the Home Minister. A pickpocket tortured into confessing to a grenade attack he had nothing to do with, while the real planners were protected by the government. A crime scene washed with detergent while victims were still dying. These are not peripheral to the development story. They are the other side of it. They are what the development cost — not in taka, not in dollars, but in human lives.
The democratic cost: 12.1 million fake voters added to the rolls. The opposition driven from parliament. The caretaker government system captured. International election observers withdrawn. The UN threatening to end peacekeeping participation. The country heading toward an election that every credible observer agreed would be a sham. This is the cost that BNP’s development narrative cannot account for, because it is the cost that makes the development narrative possible — a captured system allows the people in power to direct development spending to their allies, their constituencies, and their own bank accounts, while ensuring that no independent institution can investigate or hold them accountable.
The Pattern Repeats
And now the pattern is repeating. BNP is in power again. The Anti-Corruption Commission has been captured again. The courts have been packed again. Cases against the ruling party have been withdrawn again — 23,865 and counting. Cases against the opposition have been filed again — 650 against Sheikh Hasina alone. The Awami League has been banned under anti-terrorism law. Twenty-eight judges have been punished for posting about judicial independence. The constitutional safeguards protecting the courts have been repealed.
The development narrative is repeating too. BNP is already citing GDP growth, infrastructure projects, and economic indicators as evidence of good governance. The same playbook. The same deflections. The same argument from results, the same argument from comparison, the same argument from sovereignty.
But the infrastructure of impunity is already in place. The institutions that could hold the government accountable — the ACC, the judiciary, the press — have been captured or neutralized. The Anti-Corruption Commission has filed zero cases of substance against any BNP-affiliated figure. The courts have acquitted 84 out of 84 cases against Tarique Rahman. The press is operating under new restrictions that echo the Digital Security Act BNP once condemned.
And the development contracts are being awarded again. Without competitive bidding. Without independent oversight. Without the institutional checks that are supposed to prevent the same corruption that Transparency International documented for five consecutive years. The same system. The same people. The same Hawa Bhaban logic — except now it doesn’t need a specific building, because the entire government has become Hawa Bhaban.
What Development Actually Requires
Real development — the kind that expands human capability, not just the kind that produces ribbon-cutting ceremonies — requires three things that BNP has systematically refused to provide:
Accountability. Development spending must be transparent. Contracts must be competitively bid. Procurement must be audited. The institutions that investigate corruption — the ACC, the judiciary, the press — must be independent and empowered. BNP has done the opposite: it has captured the ACC, packed the courts, withdrawn the cases against its own leaders, and restricted the press.
Inclusion. Development must benefit the population, not just the powerful. This means not just building infrastructure but ensuring that it serves the people who need it — that electric poles connect to functioning grids, that roads reach rural communities, that healthcare reaches the poor, that education is funded at a level that produces real human capital rather than just ribbon-cutting statistics. BNP’s record on inclusion is the “Khamba Tarique” scandal: poles without power, development without delivery, growth without shared benefit.
Institutional integrity. Development requires institutions that can survive changes in government. The ACC, the judiciary, the election commission, the press — these institutions must be strong enough to hold whoever is in power accountable, regardless of party affiliation. BNP’s record is the opposite: every institution has been bent to serve the ruling party, just as the Awami League bent them before, and just as whichever party comes next will bend them again unless the structural problem is addressed.
These are not radical demands. They are the minimum requirements for a country that claims to be developing. They are the standards that every international development organization — from the World Bank to Transparency International to the International Crisis Group — has identified as prerequisites for sustainable growth. They are the standards that BNP promised to meet and has violated at every turn.
The Shield Cannot Hold
“But look at the roads” is not a defense. It is a confession. It is an admission that the only argument left is the argument from results — the argument that the ends justify the means, that development justifies corruption, that infrastructure justifies impunity, that GDP growth justifies the systematic destruction of every institution that could hold the government accountable.
The roads are real. The bridges are real. The GDP growth is real. None of that is in dispute. What is in dispute is whether a country can build roads while destroying the institutions that ensure those roads are built at a fair price, serve the people who need them, and are maintained by a government that can be held accountable when they fall apart.
Bangladesh’s experience under BNP says no. The five consecutive years as the world’s most corrupt country say no. The 12.1 million fake voters say no. The electric poles that don’t connect to anything say no. The money laundering convictions — confirmed by the FBI and the Singapore courts — say no. The grenade attacks, the arms hauls, the custodial killings, the rapes, the embezzlement from orphan trusts — all of these say no.
Development is not a shield. It is not an excuse. It is not a justification for the systematic demolition of accountability, transparency, and the rule of law. Every country that has achieved sustainable development has done so by building strong institutions alongside strong infrastructure. BNP built the infrastructure and destroyed the institutions. And now they are using the infrastructure to justify the destruction.
The development narrative will not protect them forever. The roads will crack. The bridges will need maintenance. The GDP growth figures will be revised. But the institutional damage — the captured courts, the neutered ACC, the muzzled press, the 23,865 withdrawn cases, the 84 out of 84 acquittals, the banned opposition party — that damage is structural, and it will persist long after the ribbon-cutting ceremonies are forgotten.
“But look at the roads” only works as long as people don’t look at the price tag. The price tag, in this case, reads: five consecutive years as the most corrupt country on Earth. Zero cases filed against ruling party figures by an ACC that was supposed to be independent. Eighty-four out of eighty-four acquittals for a prime minister described by US diplomats as a symbol of kleptocratic government. An entire institutional architecture redesigned to serve the people in power rather than the people they claim to be developing.
The roads are real. The corruption is real. You cannot separate them. And until Bangladesh builds institutions as strong as its infrastructure, the development narrative will remain what it has always been: a shield for the people who profit from a system that cannot hold them accountable.
Bangladesh Untold documents what the record shows. Every source in this article is independently verifiable. This is part of our ongoing Series 9: BNP 2026 = BAL 2.0? Previous articles in this series have documented institutional capture, political persecution, press freedom, the security apparatus, the Anti-Corruption Commission, and the rewriting of history. The full series is available at bangladeshuntold.org.
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