Category: Shamim Iskander Exposé

Investigation into Shamim Iskander corruption cases

  • The Front Page: How the Prime Minister’s Nephew Built Bangladesh’s Most Influential ‘Independent’ Media Outlet — and Didn’t Tell Anyone

    The Front Page: How the Prime Minister’s Nephew Built Bangladesh’s Most Influential “Independent” Media Outlet — and Didn’t Tell Anyone

    212,000 followers. UK government awards. Coca-Cola sponsorships. And the founder is Khaleda Zia’s nephew. But you’d never know that from reading The Front Page.

    Let me tell you about the most interesting media outlet in Bangladesh right now.

    It’s called The Front Page. It has 212,000 Instagram followers. It’s covered by The Prestige Magazine. Its founder won a Study UK Alumni Award from the British government. Its sponsors include Coca-Cola, Nestlé, Walton, and Mojo. Its coverage of the July 2024 uprising drew millions of views. It calls itself “Bangladesh’s first forum and citizen journalism platform.” And it has a secret that its 212,000 followers don’t know.

    The founder’s name is Fasbeer Eskander. He is the son of Shamim Eskander. Shamim Eskander is Khaleda Zia’s brother. Which makes Fasbeer Eskander the nephew of the former Prime Minister — and the cousin of current Prime Minister Tarique Rahman.

    The Front Page has never disclosed this. Not in any interview. Not in any profile. Not in any award citation. Not on their website. Not on their social media. Not once, not ever.

    In a country where media independence is the difference between democracy and propaganda, that omission is not a footnote. It’s the whole story.

    Meet Fasbeer Eskander

    Let’s start with what we know.

    Fasbeer Eskander — sometimes spelled Fasbir Iskander in family documents — is a UK-based Bangladeshi media entrepreneur. He studied at UCL and Royal Holloway, University of London. He holds a CompTIA Security+ certification in cybersecurity. He’s the co-founder and publisher of The Front Page, which he launched on November 20, 2020 with co-founder Shah Md. Akib Majumder, who serves as Chief Editor.

    On paper, it’s a classic startup story: young Bangladeshi in London sees a gap in the market, builds a platform, attracts millions of readers, wins international recognition. It’s the kind of narrative that writes itself.

    Except the narrative leaves out one critical detail: Fasbeer Eskander is a member of Bangladesh’s most powerful political family. His father, Shamim Eskander, is the man who — as we documented in Part 3 of this series — looted Biman Bangladesh Airlines for Tk 40 crore in commissions, faced 36 prosecution witnesses in an ACC case, walked free when the case was discharged in March 2025, and now sits in the VIP gallery at Parliament sessions. His aunt, Khaleda Zia, was Prime Minister of Bangladesh twice. His cousin, Tarique Rahman, is the current Prime Minister. His other cousin, Zaima Rahman, is being positioned as BNP’s next-generation leader.

    This is not a minor family connection. This is Bangladesh’s first family. And the founder of one of its most influential digital media platforms is their nephew and cousin — a fact he has never publicly acknowledged.

    The Origin Story That Doesn’t Add Up

    In a November 2024 interview with The Prestige Magazine, Fasbeer told the story of why he started The Front Page. He was in America during the July 2024 uprising and Bangladesh’s internet blackout. He ran The Front Page’s coverage solo for two days, then assembled an international team of 20-30 volunteers from Canada, Australia, Japan, Romania, the US, UK, Germany, and Malaysia. He described it as “standing with the students” and “fighting from abroad.”

    Co-founder Akib Majumder said they started The Front Page because of a “lack of freedom of speech for almost 17 years” — a direct reference to Awami League rule from 2009 to 2024. This is, word for word, BNP’s central political narrative. The 17 years of Awami League rule were indeed years of press suppression. The Digital Security Act was used to jail journalists. Media outlets were pressured into compliance. BNP leaders and supporters were arrested for social media posts.

    All of this is true. But when the founder of a “citizen journalism platform” uses the exact same political framing as the ruling party — and happens to be that party’s leader’s nephew — the word “independent” starts to carry a lot of weight it can’t support.

    Consider the timeline:

    2020: The Front Page launches anonymously. Fasbeer later admits that even his family didn’t know he was behind it. The platform covers Bangladesh news from a UK base, building an audience during the pandemic and the final years of Awami League rule.

    2021-2023: The platform grows. It covers anti-government content. It positions itself as a voice for free expression. It attracts brand sponsorships. Its Instagram following climbs past 100,000. Nobody knows who’s behind it.

    July-August 2024: The uprising happens. The Front Page’s coverage goes viral. Fasbeer assembles his international team. The platform becomes one of the most visible Bangladeshi media outlets in the diaspora.

    Post-August 2024: BNP rises to power. Fasbeer’s father Shamim Eskander’s ACC case is discharged in March 2025. Shamim appears in the Parliament VIP gallery. The Front Page continues to grow, winning international recognition.

    December 2025: Fasbeer wins the Study UK Alumni Award for Business and Innovation. The award ceremony takes place at the Radisson Blu in Dhaka. In all the coverage, he’s described as a young media entrepreneur. No mention of his family.

    Ask yourself: if a media platform founded by Sheikh Hasina’s nephew had grown to 212,000 followers during BNP’s years in opposition, and had never disclosed that connection, would BNP consider it “independent”? Would anyone?

    The question answers itself.

    What The Front Page Covers — and What It Doesn’t

    I’m not going to pretend that The Front Page is pure propaganda. It’s not. It covers real news. It has genuine journalists. Its coverage of the July 2024 uprising was valuable. Its platform gives voice to stories that mainstream Bangladeshi media sometimes ignores. The student volunteers who joined Fasbeer’s international team during the blackout were real people doing real work.

    But independence isn’t just about what you cover. It’s about what you don’t cover. And what The Front Page doesn’t cover is as revealing as what it does.

    Let me walk you through some specifics.

    The Shamim Eskander story. This series has documented how Shamim Eskander — Fasbeer’s father — looted Biman Bangladesh Airlines, how his ACC case with 36 witnesses was discharged, and how he now enjoys VIP status. The Front Page has not covered this story. Not once. Not a single article, not a single Instagram post, not a single mention. A major corruption story involving the Prime Minister’s uncle — and the platform founded by that same uncle’s son has nothing to say about it.

    The Zaima Rahman story. Tarique Rahman’s daughter Zaima Rahman is being positioned as a BNP leader despite having no political experience. She’s 25 years old. She was born and raised in the UK. She has no track record in Bangladeshi politics. And she’s being fast-tracked into leadership positions within the party. The Front Page hasn’t covered this dynasty concern either. The platform that talks about “citizen journalism” and “fighting for democracy” is silent when the ruling party installs a 25-year-old with no qualifications into a leadership role — because that 25-year-old is the founder’s cousin.

    The acquittal wave. Since BNP took power, every single conviction from the BNP-Jamaat era has been overturned. Every major corruption case. Every major criminal case. Tarique Rahman’s 84 cases — all acquitted. The August 21 grenade attack convictions — overturned. The Chittagong arms haul death sentences — overturned. Khaleda Zia’s corruption convictions — overturned. This is the single most significant judicial development in Bangladesh’s recent history. The Front Page has covered individual acquittals, but it has never connected the dots. It has never run a story asking whether the systematic overturning of every case against the ruling party’s members constitutes a problem for the rule of law. It has never, in short, applied the same scrutiny to BNP that it applied to Awami League.

    The Al Jazeera coverage. The Front Page was, by its own description, “the first and only portal in Bangladesh” to cover Al Jazeera’s “All The Prime Minister’s Men” documentary — a deeply critical investigation into Sheikh Hasina’s government. This was important journalism. But the same platform has never applied equivalent investigative scrutiny to BNP’s government. When Al Jazeera or any other international outlet publishes something critical of the current government, The Front Page’s coverage is notably absent or muted.

    Individually, each of these omissions could be explained. Editorial judgment is subjective. Not every outlet covers every story. But collectively, a pattern emerges: The Front Page covers Awami League’s corruption aggressively and BNP’s corruption not at all. And the reason for that pattern sits in the founder’s family tree.

    The Anonymity Play

    There’s a detail from Fasbeer’s own telling that deserves closer examination. He started The Front Page anonymously. Even his family didn’t know. The platform grew behind a veil of secrecy that was only lifted when it became strategically useful to do so.

    In the context of 2020 Bangladesh — under Awami League rule, with the Digital Security Act actively criminalizing online speech — anonymity was a reasonable and even necessary choice. Many Bangladeshi journalists operated under pseudonyms or behind anonymous platforms. The risk of arrest was real. Fasbeer was right to protect himself.

    But that protection cut both ways. Anonymity didn’t just shield Fasbeer from the Awami League government. It shielded his family connection from his audience. The 212,000 people who followed The Front Page during 2021, 2022, 2023 — they didn’t know they were reading content produced by a member of the Zia family. They thought they were reading independent citizen journalism. They were reading content produced by the Prime Minister’s nephew.

    The timing of the reveal matters too. Fasbeer remained anonymous throughout the years when BNP was in opposition. The Front Page built its audience during the period when BNP was the underdog, fighting against Awami League’s authoritarianism. Its coverage aligned with BNP’s political interests, but its anonymity prevented anyone from connecting those interests to the family that would later take power.

    Then, after the July 2024 uprising and BNP’s rise, Fasbeer revealed his identity. He gave interviews. He won awards. He became the public face of The Front Page. But he never revealed the family connection. The anonymity that once served as protection against the Awami League government now serves a different function: it protects The Front Page’s credibility.

    Because once you know that the founder is the Prime Minister’s nephew, “independent citizen journalism” starts to sound like “family media operations.” And that’s a very different thing.

    The Brand Partnership Problem

    The Front Page’s commercial relationships add another layer to this story. The platform has sponsorship deals with major brands: Coca-Cola, Nestlé/MAGGI, Mojo, Walton, Beardo, and others. These are significant commercial partnerships that provide revenue and legitimacy.

    Here’s the issue: these brands are sponsoring content produced by a member of the ruling family. They may not know that — because Fasbeer has never disclosed it — but they are effectively funding political communications infrastructure for the BNP’s first family. Every sponsored post, every branded content piece, every “independent” article that happens to align with BNP’s narrative is being subsidized, in part, by international brands that believe they’re supporting independent Bangladeshi journalism.

    Coca-Cola probably doesn’t know that the founder of The Front Page is the Prime Minister’s nephew. Nestlé probably doesn’t know either. They signed sponsorship deals with a platform that presents itself as independent citizen journalism. If they knew the family connection, they would — or should — ask very different questions about editorial independence and conflicts of interest.

    This isn’t just a transparency issue for The Front Page’s readers. It’s a transparency issue for every brand that does business with it. And it’s a particularly acute problem in Bangladesh, where the line between media and political messaging has always been thin, and where international brands have historically struggled to understand the local media landscape.

    The UK Award: Legitimacy by Association

    In December 2025, Fasbeer Eskander won the Study UK Alumni Award for Business and Innovation. The ceremony was held at the Radisson Blu in Dhaka. The award was presented by the British government, through the British Council, as part of a program that recognizes UK university alumni who have made significant contributions in their home countries.

    On its face, this is a legitimate achievement. Fasbeer studied at UCL and Royal Holloway. He built a media platform with genuine reach. He mobilized an international team during a crisis. These are real accomplishments.

    But the award also serves a purpose that goes beyond recognition. It confers legitimacy. When the British government gives you an award for “Business and Innovation,” it signals to the world that you are a credible media entrepreneur. It makes it harder for critics to question your independence. It provides a shield against the very scrutiny that this article is applying.

    The British Council almost certainly didn’t know about Fasbeer’s family connection. Their selection process evaluates individual achievement, not family trees. But the effect of the award is the same regardless of intent: it legitimizes a media outlet founded by a member of the ruling family without disclosing that connection. It takes the question “is this independent?” off the table, because the British government has effectively answered it — without knowing the full picture.

    This is how propaganda works in the 21st century. Not through state-run newspapers with obvious party logos. Not through ham-fisted government press releases. Through legitimate-seeming platforms with real audiences, real brand partnerships, and real international recognition — platforms that happen to be controlled by people whose interests are never disclosed.

    The Dynasty’s Media Strategy

    Zoom out for a moment and look at the Zia-Rahman family’s broader media footprint.

    Shamim Eskander — Khaleda Zia’s brother — looted Biman Bangladesh Airlines and walked free from his ACC case. He now sits in the VIP gallery at Parliament. His criminal record has been erased by the same courts that his family’s government controls.

    Zaima Rahman — Tarique Rahman’s 25-year-old daughter, born and raised in the UK — is being positioned as a BNP leader. She has no political experience. She has no track record of public service. She is being fast-tracked into party positions because she carries the family name. Her role in BNP’s future is being shaped not by democratic selection, but by dynastic succession.

    And Fasbeer Eskander — Shamim’s son, Khaleda’s nephew, Tarique’s cousin — runs one of Bangladesh’s most influential digital media platforms. He has 212,000 followers. He has international brand partnerships. He has a British government award. And he has never told his audience who he is related to.

    Three members of the same family. Three different spheres of influence. The father handles the patronage network — the old-school corruption that extracts money from state institutions. The cousin handles the political succession — the dynasty’s claim on future power. And the nephew handles the narrative — the media operation that shapes public perception and shields the family from scrutiny.

    This is how modern political dynasties operate. They don’t need state television. They don’t need to ban opposition newspapers. They just need a media platform that the public believes is independent — and that happens to never cover stories that are inconvenient for the ruling family.

    The Front Page doesn’t need to publish pro-BNP propaganda. It just needs to not publish anti-BNP stories. It doesn’t need to attack the opposition. It just needs to not investigate the ruling party. It doesn’t need to lie. It just needs to omit. And omission, when you have 212,000 followers and international brand partnerships, is indistinguishable from propaganda.

    The Comparison That Matters

    Let me make a comparison that will make BNP supporters uncomfortable, because it’s the one that matters most.

    During Awami League’s 15-year rule, the party built an extensive media ecosystem. There were television channels that were openly aligned with the government. There were newspapers that received government advertising revenue in exchange for favorable coverage. There were online platforms that functioned as de facto Awami League mouthpieces. BNP correctly identified all of this as propaganda infrastructure and denounced it as evidence of authoritarian media capture.

    They were right. Media capture through ownership, advertising revenue, and editorial pressure was a hallmark of Awami League’s authoritarianism. It was one of the things that made Bangladesh’s information environment so toxic during 2009-2024.

    But BNP is now building the same infrastructure — and they’re doing it more effectively, because they’ve learned from Awami League’s mistakes. Awami League’s media operations were obvious. Everyone knew which channels were pro-government. Everyone knew which newspapers to trust and which to disregard. The propaganda was transparent, and transparent propaganda is easier to resist.

    The Front Page is not obvious. It doesn’t look like a party mouthpiece. It doesn’t sound like one either. It covers real news. It has real journalists. It has a real audience. It has real brand partnerships and real international recognition. And its family connection to the ruling party is invisible to anyone who hasn’t gone looking for it.

    This is what makes it more dangerous than Awami League’s crude media operations. Not because The Front Page publishes lies — it doesn’t, as far as I can tell. But because it has created a space where Awami League’s corruption is aggressively investigated and BNP’s corruption is invisible, and it has done so while claiming the mantle of independent journalism. The audience doesn’t know they’re reading content produced by the Prime Minister’s nephew. The brands don’t know they’re sponsoring political communications infrastructure. The British government doesn’t know it gave an award for independent media to a member of the ruling family.

    That’s not just a conflict of interest. That’s a systemic information asymmetry that benefits one political party — the one that happens to be in power, and the one that happens to employ the founder’s family.

    What Fasbeer Should Do

    I want to be clear about something. Fasbeer Eskander has built something genuinely impressive. The Front Page has a real audience. It covers real stories. Its July 2024 coverage was valuable. Its student volunteer network was a genuine civic contribution. None of that is in dispute.

    But the family connection is not a minor detail. It’s the defining context that transforms The Front Page from an independent media success story into a question about media capture in Bangladesh. And Fasbeer’s failure to disclose it — not after BNP took power, not after his father’s case was discharged, not after his cousin became Prime Minister, not during his award acceptance speech, not ever — is a choice that his audience deserves to know about.

    Here’s what an actually independent media founder would do:

    Disclose the family connection. Put it on the About page. Mention it in interviews. Let the audience decide whether they trust a platform founded by the Prime Minister’s nephew. If the journalism is truly independent, the disclosure won’t hurt — it’ll enhance credibility by demonstrating transparency.

    Appoint an independent editorial board. If The Front Page wants to be taken seriously as an independent outlet, it needs structural safeguards — an editorial board with no family ties to any political party, a public editorial policy that commits to equal scrutiny of all parties, and a transparent process for handling stories that involve the founder’s family.

    Cover BNP’s corruption with the same vigor as Awami League’s. This is the simplest test. If The Front Page runs investigative pieces on Shamim Eskander’s Biman Airlines looting, on the Zaima Rahman dynasty question, on the systematic acquittal of all BNP-era convictions, and on the institutional capture documented throughout this series — then it’s independent. If it doesn’t, it’s not. The test isn’t complicated.

    None of these steps would destroy The Front Page. They would strengthen it. An independent media outlet with 212,000 followers, international brand partnerships, and a British government award that also discloses its founder’s family connection and subjects itself to equal scrutiny of all parties would be a genuinely valuable addition to Bangladesh’s media landscape.

    But Fasbeer hasn’t taken any of these steps. And the reason is obvious: disclosure would change how people read The Front Page’s coverage. It would change how brands evaluate their sponsorships. It would change how the British Council evaluates its award recipients. It would change everything — which is exactly why it matters.

    The Bigger Picture: Dynasty Media in Bangladesh

    The Front Page is not an isolated case. It’s part of a broader pattern in Bangladeshi politics where family networks extend their influence beyond traditional political structures into media, business, and civil society.

    The Awami League had its media ecosystem — the channels, the newspapers, the online platforms that functioned as government amplifiers. BNP is building one too, but it’s learning from Awami League’s mistakes. Instead of controlling media through advertising pressure and legal intimidation — tactics that are visible and generate backlash — BNP’s media ecosystem operates through ownership and family connections that are invisible to the public.

    The result is a media landscape where the public can’t easily determine who’s funding what, who’s related to whom, and whose interests are being served by the content they consume. In a country with limited media literacy and a history of political manipulation, this opacity is dangerous.

    Bangladesh’s media has always been politicized. Every major newspaper has a party affiliation. Every major television channel has an ownership structure tied to a political family. This is not new. What’s new is the sophistication. The Front Page represents a new model: independent in appearance, connected in reality, credible through international recognition, and opaque in its most important relationship — the one between its founder and the government his family runs.

    If Bangladesh is going to have a genuinely free press, it needs more than laws that protect journalists from arrest. It needs transparency about who owns and controls media outlets. It needs disclosure requirements that prevent political families from operating media platforms behind a veil of anonymity. It needs an audience that knows who’s producing the content they consume and can evaluate that content accordingly.

    The Front Page has none of this. And until it does, its claims of independence ring hollow.

    The Question That Remains

    I keep coming back to the same question, because it’s the one that matters most: if Fasbeer Eskander had disclosed his family connection from the start, would The Front Page have 212,000 followers today?

    Maybe. Maybe the content is good enough that the audience would have grown anyway. Maybe the July 2024 coverage was valuable enough that people would have followed regardless. Maybe the brand partnerships would have survived the disclosure. Maybe the British government would have given the same award.

    But we don’t know, because the disclosure never happened. And that’s the problem. Not that The Front Page exists. Not that it’s successful. Not that it covers news. The problem is that it built its audience, its credibility, and its international recognition while hiding the one piece of information that would have allowed that audience to make an informed judgment about its editorial independence.

    The Front Page calls itself “Your Daily Informant.” But the informant hasn’t informed you about the most relevant fact about itself. The platform that promises to tell you what’s really happening in Bangladesh hasn’t told you who’s behind it. The outlet that positions itself as a voice for transparency operates without the most basic transparency — disclosing who owns it.

    In a democracy, media ownership is public information. In Bangladesh, where media capture has been a tool of every ruling party since independence, that transparency is not optional. It’s the minimum standard for credibility.

    Fasbeer Eskander can keep running The Front Page. He can keep winning awards. He can keep signing brand partnerships. He can keep building his audience. But he can’t call it independent — not while hiding the fact that he’s the Prime Minister’s nephew. Not while his platform scrutinizes one party and gives the other a pass. Not while his father walks free from a corruption case that his family’s government arranged.

    The Front Page has a choice. It can be the independent media outlet it claims to be — by disclosing the family connection, appointing an independent editorial board, and applying equal scrutiny to all parties. Or it can continue as it is — a platform with a massive audience, international legitimacy, and an undisclosed relationship with the ruling family that makes “independent” the one word it can’t honestly use.

    Bangladesh’s audience deserves to make that choice with full information. Right now, they can’t. And that’s the story The Front Page will never tell you.


    Sources:

    • The Prestige Magazine (November 19, 2024): Interview with Fasbeer Eskander and Akib Majumder — “Next Generation Media”
    • Study UK Alumni Awards 2026: Business & Innovation category — Fasbeer Eskander
    • The Front Page (@thefrontpagebd): Instagram — 212K followers, 14K posts, brand partnerships
    • LinkedIn: Fasbeer Eskander — Head of Operations, Footsteps Bangladesh; Co-founder, The Front Page
    • The Daily Star (March 25, 2025): Shamim Eskander case discharged by Dhaka court
    • Dhaka Tribune (March 2026): Shamim Eskander in Parliament VIP gallery
    • ACC Charge Sheet (2008): 36 prosecution witnesses, Tk 1.33 crore illegal acquisition
    • Bangladesh Untold Series 8, Part 1: “Looting Biman Airlines — Tk 40 Crore in Commissions”
    • Bangladesh Untold Series 8, Part 2: “17 Years, No Job, Luxury Life — Houses in Australia & Canada”
    • Bangladesh Untold Series 8, Part 3: “36 Witnesses, Case Discharged, VIP in Parliament”
    • Al Jazeera: “All The Prime Minister’s Men” — documentary on Sheikh Hasina’s government
    • Digital Security Act 2018 / Cyber Security Act 2023: Press freedom restrictions under Awami League

    Series 8 — The Shamim Iskander Exposé | Part 4: The Front Page

    Article #75 | Bangladesh Untold documents what happened. What you do with that information is up to you.

  • The One-Man Commission: How Justice Joynal Abedin Sold Bangladesh’s Judiciary to Save a Government

    The One-Man Commission: How Justice Joynal Abedin Sold Bangladesh’s Judiciary to Save a Government

    On October 10, 2018, Speedy Trial Tribunal-1 Judge Shahed Nuruddin delivered a verdict that confirmed what Bangladesh had suspected for fourteen years: the August 21, 2004 grenade attack on Sheikh Hasina’s rally was “a well-orchestrated plan, executed through abuse of state power.” Nineteen people were sentenced to death. Nineteen more got life imprisonment, including Tarique Rahman himself.

    But for two full years after the attack — from August 2004 to January 2007 — the BNP-Jamaat government managed to keep the truth buried. They didn’t do it with silence. They did it with something far more dangerous: a judicial cover-up dressed in the robes of legitimacy.

    They called it the “One-Man Judicial Inquiry Commission.” The man they chose was Justice Joynal Abedin. And what he produced was not an investigation. It was a service — a service to the government that appointed him, paid for by the blood of twenty-four people.

    The Attack That Demanded Answers

    Let’s rewind. August 21, 2004. Bangabandhu Avenue, Dhaka. 5:22 PM. Sheikh Hasina had just finished speaking at an anti-terrorism rally when the first grenade landed. Then another. Then another. Thirteen military-grade Arges grenades detonated in a crowd of 20,000 people. Twenty-four people died. Over 500 were injured. The then-opposition leader survived with permanent hearing damage.

    These weren’t homemade explosives. These were Arges grenades — war-specification weapons manufactured for military use. You cannot buy them at a market. You cannot smuggle them without state-level logistics. And you cannot throw thirteen of them at the leader of the opposition without someone in the security apparatus looking the other way.

    The attack demanded a real investigation. Instead, it got a performance.

    The Crime Scene Was Destroyed Before the Commission Existed

    Before any inquiry could even begin, the evidence was annihilated. Within hours of the attack, police fired tear gas and charged batons at Awami League members who were trying to rescue the injured. Then the crime scene itself was washed — with water and detergent. Recovered grenades were deliberately destroyed rather than preserved for forensic analysis.

    Think about what that means. A grenade attack on a political rally. Twenty-four dead. The crime scene — the single most important source of forensic evidence — was literally scrubbed clean. Not by criminals in the dark. By the state. In broad daylight.

    The Awami League tried to file criminal cases. Bangladesh Police refused to register them. They would only accept a general diary — a bureaucratic footnote for what was the worst political attack in Bangladesh’s democratic history.

    The BNP government refused to hand over the bodies of the victims.

    This was the landscape into which the “One-Man Commission” was born. Not an investigation into a crime. A burial of one.

    The Joj Mia Story: A Fabrication So Crude It Insulted the Intelligence of the Nation

    Before Justice Abedin’s commission, there was Joj Mia.

    The Crime Investigation Department (CID), under the BNP government’s direction, produced a narrative so fantastical it would be comical if it weren’t so sinister. They claimed that a petty criminal named Joj Mia (Jamal Ahmed) from Noakhali District, along with 14 members of the “Seven Star terrorist group” led by one Subrata Bain, had carried out the attack. They supposedly met at Moghbazar, rehearsed on a remote island, and then launched a grenade attack on the opposition leader.

    Joj Mia was arrested on June 10, 2005. Under torture by security forces, he was coerced into giving a false confession under Section 164 to a magistrate. Another victim, Shaibal Saha Partha, was also arrested, tortured in custody, and forced into a false confessional statement. He was eventually released but continues to suffer from post-traumatic stress disorder — a living casualty of a government that would rather torture an innocent man than investigate the truth.

    A pickpocket. The BNP government tried to convince 160 million people that a pickpocket orchestrated a military-grade grenade attack on the opposition leader. The Arges grenades alone — weapons that require state-level supply chains — made the story absurd on its face. But the government needed a story. Any story. And Joj Mia was it.

    Enter Justice Joynal Abedin

    While the CID was busy fabricating confessions, the BNP government needed something more respectable — something with judicial weight. Enter the “One-Man Judicial Inquiry Commission,” headed by Justice Joynal Abedin of the High Court Division.

    The mandate seemed appropriate on paper: investigate the grenade attack and report findings. But the commission was designed to fail from its inception. It was a one-man commission — no checks, no balances, no dissenting voices. One man, appointed by the government under investigation, tasked with investigating that same government.

    What could possibly go wrong?

    The Report: “Foreign and Local Enemies”

    Justice Abedin’s commission produced its report, and the conclusion was as predictable as it was convenient: the attack was the work of “foreign and local enemies.” Not the government. Not Hawa Bhaban. Not the State Minister for Home Affairs who controlled the police. Not the political secretary to the Prime Minister who attended planning meetings. Not HuJI, which was operating freely under state protection.

    “Foreign and local enemies.” A phrase so vague it could mean anything and therefore meant nothing. It was the judicial equivalent of “thoughts and prayers” — performative concern that absolved everyone responsible.

    The report did not explain how “foreign and local enemies” obtained military-grade Arges grenades. It did not explain why the crime scene was washed with detergent. It did not explain why police refused to register criminal cases. It did not explain why the rooftops around the rally — normally secured by volunteer groups — were suspiciously closed off before the attack. It did not explain why the CID’s investigation produced nothing for two full years.

    It explained nothing because it was designed to explain nothing.

    The Reward: A Seat on the Appellate Division

    Here is where the story turns from cover-up to corruption. Two years after delivering his report, Justice Joynal Abedin was elevated to the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court — the highest court in Bangladesh.

    In Bangladesh’s judicial system, elevation to the Appellate Division is not automatic. It is a political appointment, decided by the President on the advice of the Prime Minister and the Chief Justice. Judges who deliver inconvenient truths do not get promoted. Judges who deliver useful services do.

    The Daily Star, Bangladesh’s most prominent English-language newspaper, described Abedin as a “shame” for the judiciary. But the shame didn’t cost him anything. It paid him everything. He went from the High Court Division to the Appellate Division — from a position of significant authority to the highest judicial authority in the land.

    The message to every judge in Bangladesh was crystal clear: serve the government, and you will be rewarded. Challenge the government, and you will be destroyed. This wasn’t just a cover-up of a grenade attack. It was the systematic corruption of the entire judicial system — a down payment on impunity that would compound for years.

    The Pattern: Manufactured Scapegoats

    The Joynal Abedin Commission was not an isolated incident. It was part of a systematic BNP pattern of manufacturing scapegoats to protect political principals. Consider the evidence:

    The Shamsunnahar Hall Raid (2002): When police raided a women’s dormitory at Dhaka University, injuring over 200 students, Vice-Chancellor Dr. Anwarullah Chowdhury was made to resign and take the blame. The real author of the raid — State Minister for Home Affairs Lutfozzaman Babar, who had direct authority over police — was never touched. A one-man commission led by Justice M. Tafazzul Islam blamed university officials and low-level police. Twelve years later, no action was ever taken against any accused.

    The Joj Mia Fabrication (2004-2005): A petty criminal was tortured into confessing to a military-grade grenade attack. The Seven Star Group — a criminal syndicate — was blamed instead of the actual perpetrators: HuJI operatives working with BNP ministers and intelligence chiefs.

    The Joynal Abedin Commission (2004-2006): A one-man judicial inquiry that blamed “foreign and local enemies” while the planners sat in Hawa Bhaban and the Home Ministry.

    The Chittagong Arms Haul (2004): The largest arms smuggling operation in Bangladesh’s history — 4,930 firearms, 27,020 grenades, 840 rocket launchers — was covered up for years. Two witnesses who tried to testify about NSI and DGFI involvement were threatened with death. Their earlier confessions were never recorded.

    See the pattern? The political principals — Babar, Tarique, Khaleda — were always shielded. Expendable figures absorbed the blame: a vice-chancellor, a pickpocket, a judicial commission, low-level officials. The real perpetrators operated with absolute impunity because they controlled the apparatus of investigation itself.

    What Happened After 1/11: The Truth Finally Emerged

    The One-Man Commission’s fiction survived exactly as long as the BNP government did. When the caretaker government took over after January 11, 2007, the real investigation began — and it dismantled Abedin’s report piece by piece.

    In July 2007, the CID initiated a fresh investigation. In November 2007, Mufti Abdul Hannan — the HuJI chief who had been arrested by the BNP government in 2005 but deliberately not linked to the August 21 case — finally confessed. He revealed that the attack was operated by HuJI with direct support from Maulana Tajuddin (brother of BNP Deputy Minister Abdus Salam Pintu) and that Pintu had personal knowledge of the attack.

    In 2011, Hannan gave another confessional statement that went further — implicating Tarique Rahman, Lutfozzaman Babar, Harris Chowdhury (the PM’s political secretary), Kazi Shah Mofazzal Hossain Kaikobad (BNP lawmaker), and senior officials of the Home Ministry, Police, DGFI, NSI, and the Prime Minister’s Office.

    The 2018 verdict confirmed it all. The court found that the attack was planned at Hawa Bhaban, coordinated through the Home Ministry and intelligence agencies, and executed by HuJI operatives who had been promised full administrative backing. Babar got death. Pintu got death. Two DGs of intelligence agencies got death. Tarique Rahman got life imprisonment.

    Every single person that Justice Joynal Abedin’s commission failed to identify was identified. Every connection the commission failed to make was made. Every cover-up the commission enabled was exposed.

    But by then, fourteen years had passed. Fourteen years of impunity. Fourteen years of survivors waiting for justice. Fourteen years of the families of the dead watching the guilty walk free — not because the evidence wasn’t there, but because the judiciary had been captured.

    And Then the Acquittal

    But this story has one more chapter — the cruelest one. In December 2024, after the ouster of the Awami League government, a reconstituted High Court acquitted all 49 convicts, including Tarique Rahman. In September 2025, the Supreme Court upheld the acquittal.

    Every conviction — overturned. Every sentence — erased. The man sentenced to life imprisonment for planning the attack is now the Prime Minister of Bangladesh. The death sentences are void. The life sentences are void. The four-year sentences for harbouring offenders — void. The two-year sentences for fabricating the Joj Mia story — void.

    Justice Joynal Abedin’s sham report, it turns out, was just the first installment in a debt that Bangladesh’s judiciary has never stopped paying. First, the cover-up. Then the investigation. Then the convictions. Then the acquittals. Each phase serves a different government. Each government rewrites the truth to serve its needs. And the dead — the twenty-four people who were killed by military grenades on a Saturday afternoon in August — remain dead. No government has ever been inconvenienced by that.

    Why Commissions Matter — And Why One-Man Commissions Don’t

    There is a reason democratic countries use multi-member commissions for inquiries of this magnitude. One-person commissions lack internal checks. They lack the capacity for dissent. They are uniquely vulnerable to capture by the appointing authority. When the appointing authority is the entity under investigation, the conflict of interest is not a possibility — it is a certainty.

    Bangladesh has a long history of one-man commissions producing convenient results. The Justice M. Tafazzul Islam commission that investigated the Shamsunnahar Hall raid blamed university officials. The Justice Joynal Abedin commission that investigated the grenade attack blamed “foreign and local enemies.” Each one-man commission served the government that created it. Each was rewarded. Each failed the people it was supposed to serve.

    Justice Abedin’s elevation to the Appellate Division was not a coincidence. It was the price of compliance. And it was paid not just with a judicial appointment — it was paid with the credibility of every commission that came after. When the judiciary is for sale, every verdict is a transaction. When commissions are designed to fail, no truth is safe.

    The Living Casualties

    While commissions and courts played their political games, real people lived with the consequences. Joj Mia — the petty criminal tortured into a false confession — was eventually cleared, but what was taken from him can never be returned. Shaibal Saha Partha was released but still suffers from PTSD from the torture he endured. The 500+ injured survivors carry their wounds — physical and psychological — while the courts acquit and re-acquit and re-acquit.

    The families of the 24 dead have watched the justice system convict the killers, then set them free. They have watched a one-man commission bury the truth, a caretaker government exhume it, a trial court confirm it, and a post-regime-change High Court erase it. They have watched the cycle repeat so many times that “justice” has become a word without meaning.

    The Lesson

    The One-Man Commission of Justice Joynal Abedin is not just a historical footnote. It is a blueprint. It demonstrates how a government can use the apparatus of justice to perpetrate injustice — how a judicial inquiry can be weaponized not to find the truth but to bury it. It shows what happens when a single judge, appointed by the accused, is asked to investigate the accused, and then rewarded by the accused for producing the right answer.

    The lesson is simple and it is universal: when the judiciary serves the government instead of the people, when commissions are designed to fail, when judges are promoted for compliance — the truth doesn’t just get hidden. It gets manufactured. And manufactured truth is more dangerous than no truth at all, because it wears the legitimacy of the courts.

    Twenty-four people died on August 21, 2004. For two years, their government told them the killers were a pickpocket and “foreign enemies.” Then a one-man commission confirmed it. Then the judge got promoted. Then the real investigation happened, and the truth came out. Then the convictions came. Then the acquittals came. And now the man who was convicted of planning the attack runs the country.

    The One-Man Commission didn’t just fail an investigation. It failed a nation. And Bangladesh is still paying the price.


    Sources: Speedy Trial Tribunal-1 verdict (October 10, 2018); The Daily Star (2004-2018); Dhaka Tribune; Human Rights Watch World Report 2008; WikiLeaks cable 08DHAKA1143; confessional statements of Mufti Abdul Hannan (November 2007, 2011); Judicial Inquiry Commission report on 2001 post-election violence; Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index (2001-2005); UN Resident Coordinator correspondence (2007); The New York Times (January 11, 2007); court records from the August 21 grenade attack case.

  • The Great Acquittal: How Every Conviction From Bangladesh’s Darkest Era Was Erased

    The Great Acquittal: How Every Conviction From Bangladesh’s Darkest Era Was Erased

    Eighty-four cases. That is how many were filed against Tarique Rahman between 2007 and 2024 — cases involving money laundering, arms trafficking, murder conspiracy, and corruption on a scale that made US Embassy diplomats in Dhaka use the phrase “symbol of kleptocratic government” in classified cables later published by WikiLeaks.

    As of March 2025, every single one has been acquitted.

    The process was not slow. It was not gradual. It was a single, coordinated legal event — a cascade of acquittals that began within months of the July 2024 uprising and the fall of the Awami League government. Courts that had once sentenced men to death and decades of imprisonment now declared, one after another, that the evidence was insufficient, the trials were flawed, the convictions were unsafe. By September 2025, the Supreme Court of Bangladesh had put its seal on the entire process, dismissing the last remaining petition for retrial in the August 21 grenade attack case.

    The accused did not walk free into obscurity. They walked into power.

    The Charge Sheet: What Was Proven, Then Unproven

    To understand what the Great Acquittal erased, you have to understand what was on the record.

    August 21, 2004: The Grenade Massacre

    On the evening of August 21, 2004, thirteen Arges grenades rained down on a crowd of 20,000 at an Awami League rally on Bangabandhu Avenue in Dhaka. Twenty-four people were killed. More than 500 were injured. Ivy Rahman, the party’s Women’s Affairs Secretary, died three days later from her wounds.

    The trial, which concluded in October 2018 after 14 years, convicted 49 people — including Tarique Rahman, then-senior minister Lutfozzaman Babar, and HuJI-B chief Mufti Abdul Hannan. Several were sentenced to death. Tarique, tried in absentia after fleeing to London, received a life sentence.

    The evidence was extensive. Prosecutors presented intercepted communications, witness testimony from military intelligence officers, and forensic analysis matching the grenades to military stockpiles. The trial court’s 4,000-page verdict detailed how the attack was orchestrated through the Prime Minister’s Office and Hawa Bhaban — Tarique’s unofficial power center.

    On December 1, 2024 — barely four months after the fall of the Awami League — the High Court acquitted all 49 accused. The court found that the trial had been conducted improperly, that witness testimony was unreliable, and that the prosecution had failed to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

    “The High Court annulled the trial court verdict and acquitted all convicts including Tarique Rahman.” — Attorney General’s Office spokesman, December 2024

    In September 2025, when the Appellate Division dismissed a petition for retrial, the acquittal became final. The 24 Martyrs of August 21: Who They Were, How They Died, and Why the State Tried to Erase Them

    The Chittagong Arms Haul: 4,930 Guns and a Cover-Up

    On the night of April 1, 2004, police and Coast Guard intercepted the loading of ten trucks at the Chittagong Urea Fertilizer Limited jetty on the Karnaphuli River. What they found remains the largest arms seizure in Bangladesh’s history: 4,930 firearms, 27,020 grenades, 840 rocket launchers, 300 rockets, and over 1.1 million rounds of ammunition.

    The weapons were destined for ULFA — the United Liberation Front of Asom — a militant group fighting for Assam’s independence from India. Indian intelligence confirmed the connection. Two witnesses later told the court that the operation was conducted with the knowledge of NSI and DGFI, Bangladesh’s military intelligence agencies, and that government officials had threatened them with death to keep them silent.

    In January 2014, a special court sentenced 14 people to death, including ULFA military chief Paresh Baruah and former minister Lutfozzaman Babar.

    In December 2024, the High Court acquitted Babar and five others. In January 2025, it acquitted them in the parallel Arms Act case as well. Paresh Baruah’s death sentence was reduced to 14 years. The Chittagong Arms Haul: 4,930 Guns, 840 Rocket Launchers, and a State-Sponsored Cover-Up

    Tarique Rahman’s Money Laundering: $2.5 Million Washed Clean

    In June 2007, the Anti-Corruption Commission filed a case against Tarique Rahman and his business partner Giasuddin Al Mamun for laundering Tk 20.41 crore — approximately $2.5 million at the time. The case detailed how Tarique, while serving as the de facto power behind his mother’s government, used his influence to help Mamun acquire and then launder the money through Singapore bank accounts.

    A trial court acquitted Tarique in November 2013. But in July 2016, the High Court overturned that acquittal, sentencing him to seven years’ imprisonment and a fine of Tk 20 crore. The court was direct:

    “Tarique Rahman influenced political power to help his close friend, Giasuddin Mamun, to get and then launder 200 million taka ($2.5m).” — Deputy Attorney General Moniruzzaman Kabir to AFP, July 2016

    That conviction stood for eight years. In December 2024, the Supreme Court stayed the sentence. In March 2025, the Appellate Division acquitted both Tarique and Mamun entirely. “Mr. Ten Percent” — How Tarique Rahman Ran a Parallel Government from Hawa Bhaban (2001-2006)

    Khaleda Zia’s Orphanage Trust: Stealing From Children

    The Zia Orphanage Trust case was among the most damning. The ACC alleged that Khaleda Zia, through the trust named after her late husband, embezzled funds meant for orphans. In February 2018, a special court convicted Khaleda and sentenced her to five years. By October 2018, the High Court had enhanced the sentence to ten years. Tarique, also convicted, received ten years.

    In November 2024, the High Court acquitted Khaleda, declaring the verdict null and void. In January 2025, the Supreme Court acquitted both Khaleda and Tarique in this case and the parallel Zia Charitable Trust case.

    Khaleda Zia died on December 30, 2025, having outlived every conviction against her.

    Shamim Iskander: The Brother Who Bled Biman Airlines

    Khaleda Zia’s younger brother, Shamim Iskander, was a former flight engineer at Biman Bangladesh Airlines who exploited his position as the Prime Minister’s brother to control the airline’s commercial operations. The ACC documented at least Tk 40 crore in commissions from aircraft leases during the BNP tenure, with 36 witnesses lined up to testify.

    In March 2025, a Dhaka court simply discharged Shamim Iskander and his wife from the case. The 36 witnesses never testified. By March 2026, Shamim Iskander was sitting in the VIP gallery at the maiden session of the 13th Parliament.

    The Pattern: How It Happened

    Look at the timeline, and a pattern becomes impossible to ignore.

    July 2024: The Awami League government falls. A caretaker administration takes over. Within weeks, the legal machinery begins to reverse.

    December 2024: The High Court acquits all 49 accused in the August 21 grenade attack case. The same month, it acquits Babar and others in the Chittagong arms haul. The Supreme Court stays Tarique’s money laundering sentence.

    January 2025: The Supreme Court acquits Khaleda and Tarique in the Orphanage Trust and Charitable Trust cases.

    March 2025: Tarique and Mamun acquitted in the money laundering case. Shamim Iskander discharged from the Biman corruption case.

    September 2025: The Supreme Court dismisses the last petition for retrial in the grenade attack case, making the acquittals final.

    February 2026: Tarique Rahman is sworn in as Prime Minister.

    There is no independent judiciary in this sequence. There is a judiciary that responded to a political earthquake by undoing every legal consequence of the previous political era. The cases were not retried with new evidence. They were not subjected to fresh scrutiny. They were reversed — comprehensively, rapidly, and with a uniformity that defies coincidence.

    What International Observers Said

    Human Rights Watch, which documented many of the original crimes under BNP rule, has not issued a formal statement on the acquittals. But their earlier reports provide context that the courts chose to disregard.

    Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index ranked Bangladesh as the most corrupt country on earth for five consecutive years during BNP rule (2001-2005) — a record no other nation has matched. The scores were not marginal: Bangladesh scored 0.4 out of 10 in 2001, a figure so low that TI itself noted the “very different results” across surveys while still confirming the composite finding.

    The International Crisis Group, in its Asia Report No. 121 (October 2006), documented that the BNP-led coalition government “did not target radical Islamist groups” despite religious extremism arising under its watch — the same extremism that culminated in the August 17, 2005 nationwide bombings and the August 21 grenade attack.

    US Embassy cables published by WikiLeaks described Tarique Rahman as a “symbol of kleptocratic government” and the “Dark Prince” of Bangladeshi politics. These were not opposition propaganda. They were the assessments of American diplomats stationed in Dhaka, writing in classified communications they never expected to see published.

    None of this evidence was presented as new argument in the acquittal proceedings. It was simply ignored.

    The Questions Nobody Is Asking

    When every conviction from an era is overturned after a regime change, and when those acquitted then assume power, the question is not whether the original trials were fair. The question is whether the acquittals were.

    The August 21 grenade attack killed 24 people. The victims’ families spent 14 years waiting for justice. They watched 49 people convicted. Then, in a single court session, they watched all 49 walk free. Nobody has explained to them why the evidence that sustained a 4,000-page verdict was suddenly insufficient.

    The Chittagong arms haul put 4,930 military-grade weapons and 27,020 grenades on ten trucks at a government jetty. The connection to Indian insurgents was confirmed by Indian intelligence. The involvement of Bangladesh’s own intelligence agencies was testified to by witnesses who said they were threatened with death. These facts did not change between 2014 and 2024. What changed was the government.

    Tarique Rahman’s money laundering was documented in Singapore court records — not Bangladeshi ones. Singapore’s courts convicted his associate, Giasuddin Al Mamun, in a parallel case. The $2.5 million was real. The bank accounts were real. The paper trail crossed international borders. None of this was disputed in the acquittal. It was simply set aside.

    The Accused Now Run the Country

    There is a word for what has happened in Bangladesh since July 2024, though it is a word that legal scholars prefer to avoid: impunity.

    Not the impunity of a single pardon or a single acquittal. The impunity of a system — a legal system that has demonstrated, in case after case, that political power determines legal outcomes. That convictions are provisional. That justice is temporary. That the courts answer to whoever sits in Bangabhaban.

    The ICT Is Now a BNP Weapon: How a Party Lawyer Became Chief Prosecutor of the Tribunal That Prosecutes BNP’s Enemies The pattern extends beyond acquittals. In the same month that Shamim Iskander was discharged from his corruption case, the BNP government appointed a party lawyer as the new chief prosecutor of the International Crimes Tribunal — the body that had once prosecuted crimes against humanity during the 1971 Liberation War. The tribunal, repurposed, now targets BNP’s political opponents.

    12.1 Million Ghost Voters: How Bangladesh’s Voter Rolls Were Stuffed Before the 2007 Election And before the 2026 election, the same electoral rolls that had been stuffed with 12.1 million fake names before 2007 were quietly reformed — though nobody has been held accountable for the original fraud.

    The $300 million ghost company that channeled oil contracts to shell firms with no website, no experience, and political connections? The investigation has been shelved.

    The man US diplomats called the “Dark Prince” is now the Prime Minister. His mother’s corruption cases are cleared. His brother-in-law sits in Parliament’s VIP gallery. The arms haul conspirators are free. The grenade massacre convicts are free. Every single case — 84 of them — has been wiped clean.

    There is no mechanism in Bangladesh to appeal these acquittals. The Supreme Court has spoken. The legal system considers the matter closed. The victims of August 21, 2004 — the 24 dead, the 500 injured, the families who waited 14 years for accountability — have no further court to approach.

    That is not justice. That is its absence.

    Sources

    • Human Rights Watch, “Bangladesh: Events of 2004-2006,” World Report chapters
    • International Crisis Group, Asia Report No. 121, “Bangladesh Today,” October 2006
    • Transparency International, Corruption Perceptions Index, 2001-2005
    • US Embassy Cable (Dhaka), “Tarique Rahman: Symbol of Kleptocratic Government,” published by WikiLeaks
    • Bangladesh High Court, August 21 Grenade Attack Case, Acquittal Order, December 2024
    • Bangladesh Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Dismissal of Retrial Petition, September 2025
    • Bangladesh High Court, Chittagong Arms Haul Case, Acquittal Order, December 2024
    • Bangladesh Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Money Laundering Case Acquittal, March 2025
    • Bangladesh High Court, Zia Orphanage Trust Case Acquittal, November 2024
    • Bangladesh Supreme Court, Zia Charitable Trust Case Acquittal, January 2025
    • Dhaka District Court, Shamim Iskander Discharge Order, March 2025
    • Deputy Attorney General Moniruzzaman Kabir, statement to AFP, July 2016
    • Attorney General’s Office spokesman, statement on grenade attack acquittal, December 2024
    • NBC News, coverage of August 21 acquittals, December 2024
    • Dhaka Tribune, “Shamim Iskander in Parliament VIP Gallery,” March 2026
    • The Business Standard, Khaleda Zia case coverage, 2024-2025