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On February 12, 2026, Bangladesh voted. They voted for a new parliament. They voted “Yes” in a historic referendum on 84 reforms. And they voted for the Bangladesh Nationalist Party, which won a landslide 209 of 297 seats. Six weeks later, the BNP has refused the reform oath, blocked the Constitution Reform Council, and is systematically gutting every provision that would limit its power. The people voted for change. BNP is delivering the same old playbook.

What the People Voted For

The February 12 referendum was the most significant democratic exercise in Bangladesh since independence. Held alongside the parliamentary election, it asked voters a simple question: do you approve the July National Charter — a package of 84 reforms, including 48 constitutional amendments, designed to prevent the concentration of power that had plagued Bangladesh for decades?

The voters said “Yes.”

The reforms they endorsed included:

• Term limits for the Prime Minister — no person can serve more than two terms
• Reduced PM powers — curbing the sweeping authority that allowed previous PMs to act as virtual dictators
• Increased presidential powers — creating a genuine check on executive overreach
• A bicameral parliament — with an upper house (Senate) elected through proportional representation
• Upper house approval required for constitutional amendments — preventing any single party from rewriting the constitution at will
• Independent appointment processes for the ombudsman, Public Service Commission, and Anti-Corruption Commission
• Judicial independence reforms
• Increased women’s representation

These reforms were the product of months of negotiation — drafted by reform commissions, endorsed by 24 political parties, and ratified by the people in a national referendum. They were the mandate.

The referendum refers political reforms that include prime ministerial term limits, stronger checks on executive power and other safeguards preventing parliamentary power consolidation.

— PBS News, February 17, 2026

What BNP Is Actually Doing

Within days of taking power, the BNP began systematically dismantling the reform framework it had publicly endorsed. The pattern is unmistakable: accept reforms that don’t threaten BNP’s power, reject every reform that does.

The Refused Oath

On February 17, 2026 — the swearing-in day — newly elected MPs were supposed to take two oaths:

1. The parliamentary oath (as MPs)
2. The reform council oath (as members of the Constitution Reform Council tasked with implementing the referendum reforms)

Jamaat-e-Islami and the National Citizen Party (NCP) took both oaths. Every single BNP MP refused the second oath.

Their excuse? BNP standing committee member Salahuddin Ahmed claimed the Constitution “contains no provision regarding the oath of members of such a council.” In other words: we’ll use constitutional technicalities to avoid implementing the constitution the people just voted to change.

BNP MPs took the oath as MPs in line with the party decision, but they did not take the oath as members of the reform council. This shows the BNP has taken a “U-turn” after forming the government and moved to a completely opposite position, which is a betrayal of the nation and an insult to those who voted “Yes” in the referendum.

— Hamidur Rahman Azad, Jamaat-e-Islami, reported by Prothom Alo (March 15, 2026)

The Blocked Reform Council

The July National Charter implementation order required the Constitution Reform Council to convene within 30 calendar days of the election results. That deadline was March 15, 2026.

It was never convened.

Because BNP MPs — who hold more than a two-thirds majority — refused to take the reform oath, the council couldn’t be fully constituted. No council = no reform implementation. The 180-day reform timeline? Dead before it started.

BNP’s alternative proposal: “discussions on the Constitution Reform Council could take place on the floor of the house.” Translation: we’ll handle reforms through regular parliament, where our two-thirds majority means we control everything.

The Cherry-Picked Constitution

The most revealing part of BNP’s strategy is which reforms they oppose. It’s not random. It’s surgical:

Reform Proposal	BNP Position	Why They Oppose It
Reducing PM’s sweeping powers	❌ Opposed	Tarique Rahman IS the PM — why limit his own power?
Increasing presidential powers	❌ Opposed	A strong president could check BNP’s PM
Upper house via proportional representation	❌ Opposed	PR gives seats to smaller parties; BNP wants upper house seats proportional to PARLIAMENTARY seats (guaranteeing BNP dominance in both chambers)
Upper house approval for constitutional amendments	❌ Opposed	Would prevent BNP from unilaterally amending the constitution
Independent appointment of ombudsman, PSC, ACC	❌ Opposed	BNP wants to control who watches them
Term limits for PM	✅ Accepted (on paper)	Doesn’t threaten current grip — Tarique’s first term
Bicameral parliament (concept)	✅ Accepted	BNP wants bicameralism — but with an upper house it controls

See the pattern? Every reform that creates genuine checks on BNP’s power is rejected. Every reform that sounds democratic but doesn’t actually threaten their dominance is accepted.

BNP’s Upper House Trick

This deserves special attention. The referendum-approved charter says the upper house (Senate) should be elected through proportional representation of votes — meaning parties get Senate seats based on the percentage of total votes they received nationwide.

BNP’s counter-proposal: Senate seats should be based on the proportion of parliamentary seats won.

Why does this matter? Because Bangladesh uses first-past-the-post voting, where a party can win 70% of seats with 45% of votes. Under proportional representation, smaller parties would finally have meaningful representation in the upper house. Under BNP’s proposal, BNP would dominate BOTH chambers with the same lopsided majority.

The BNP was unsupportive of changing the first-past-the-post system that favors larger parties like itself over proportional representation, which is better suited to multiparty democracy.

— Fair Observer, “Mandate for Reform, Battle for Identity” (March 2026)

The Journal of Democracy noted that BNP specifically “dissented from this model, proposing instead that upper-house composition be proportionately derived from the partisan seat distribution of the lower house.”

In plain language: BNP wants a Senate that mirrors Parliament — giving them a supermajority in both houses, with zero new representation for anyone else.

The BNP Playbook: A Pattern Across Decades

This is not the first time BNP has used democratic language to consolidate undemocratic power. The pattern runs through every era of BNP governance:

2001-2006: Democracy as Shield for Dictatorship

• Won elections, then used parliamentary majority to unleash post-election genocide against minorities
• Used state machinery to protect militant groups like HuJI while publicly claiming to fight terrorism
• Fabricated investigations to cover up state-directed attacks
• Manipulated voter rolls — 12.1 million fake voters were removed after 1/11

2026: Same Pattern, New Vocabulary

• Won elections on the promise of reform
• Immediately refused the reform oath
• Blocked the Constitution Reform Council
• Cherry-picked only reforms that preserve BNP dominance
• Cited “constitutional procedure” to delay reforms indefinitely
• Used media trials to persecute political opponents while claiming rule of law

The vocabulary changes. The technique doesn’t.

What International Observers Are Saying

The international community has noticed. Multiple independent analyses have flagged BNP’s selective approach to reform:

A party that enjoys a decisive parliamentary majority can cite constitutional purity today and dilute reforms tomorrow.

— The Daily Star editorial (February 21, 2026)

BNP lawmakers, who control a large majority of seats, took only the constitutional oath required for MPs and declined the second.

— Asia Times, “Bangladesh reform drive hits early constitutional roadblock” (March 2026)

Asking MPs to take a second oath tied to an extra-constitutional institution raises questions about legality — this is the BNP’s argument. But the people voted for precisely this institution in a national referendum.

— Analysis based on ConstitutionNet, Asia Times, and Al Jazeera reporting

The International Republican Institute (IRI), the Journal of Democracy, Al Jazeera, Fair Observer, and ConstitutionNet have all published analyses highlighting the tension between BNP’s reform promises and its post-election actions.

The 11-Party Alliance Pushback

BNP’s coalition partners are not staying silent. The 11-party electoral alliance led by Jamaat-e-Islami has:

• Demanded the Constitution Reform Council be convened immediately
• Staged protests in parliament — walking out of the chamber on the opening day over the issue
• Threatened street protests if reforms are not implemented
• Called BNP’s refusal a “betrayal of the nation” and an “insult to referendum voters”

Even the National Citizen Party (NCP) — formed by the very students who led the 2024 uprising against Hasina — has clashed with BNP over the reform stall.

Why This Matters: The Referendum Was the People’s Voice

The referendum was not a suggestion. It was a democratic mandate. The people of Bangladesh voted to constrain executive power, create genuine checks and balances, and ensure that no single party could monopolize governance.

By refusing the reform oath, blocking the Constitution Reform Council, and cherry-picking only the reforms that preserve its dominance, BNP is sending a clear message: we accept democracy when it gives us power, and reject it when it limits our power.

This is the same party that:

• Stuffed voter rolls with 12.1 million fake voters in 2006
• Used al-Qaeda-linked militants as mercenaries
• Covered up massacres with fabricated scapegoats
• Now uses media trials to convict opponents before courtrooms

The methods evolve. The goal never changes: absolute power, wrapped in democratic language.

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Sources:

• Al Jazeera — “Bangladesh referendum: The big post-election flashpoint?” (Feb 19, 2026); “What does BNP’s landslide mean for Bangladesh’s post-uprising order?” (Feb 13, 2026); “Tarique Rahman sworn in as new Bangladesh prime minister” (Feb 17, 2026)
• Prothom Alo — “Fresh tensions over Constitution Reform Council” (Mar 15, 2026)
• The Daily Star — “The referendum mandate is real, but reform must return to the constitution” (Feb 21, 2026)
• Asia Times — “Bangladesh reform drive hits early constitutional roadblock” (Mar 2026)
• ConstitutionNet (IDEA) — “Bangladesh’s Referendum and Reforms: The Need to Return to a Constitutional Process” (Mar 4, 2026); “July Charter and Constitutional Reforms in Bangladesh” (Dec 1, 2025)
• Journal of Democracy — “Will Bangladesh’s Massive Democratic Experiment Work?” (Feb 11, 2026)
• Fair Observer — “Mandate for Reform, Battle for Identity: Bangladesh After the Election” (Mar 2026)
• The Diplomat — “Plebiscite or Refounding?” (Feb 6, 2026); “Why Bangladesh’s Referendum is a Gamble” (Feb 9, 2026)
• International Republican Institute — Pre-Election Assessment Mission findings (Nov 17, 2025)
• PBS News — “New Bangladesh prime minister sworn in after party’s landslide win” (Feb 17, 2026)
• bdnews24.com — “Two oaths for new lawmakers trigger constitutional debate” (Feb 17, 2026)
• The Wire — “A Charter Without a Clear Path” (Mar 2026)
• LSE South Asia Blog — “Bangladesh Elections: Democratic Transition or Ideological Shift?” (Feb 16, 2026)

Read the full 1/11 Chronicle: Part 1 · Part 2 · Part 3 · Part 4 (Finale)

In Bangladesh, you don’t need a courtroom to destroy someone. You need a headline. For months — sometimes years — before an arrest, a coordinated media campaign plants a narrative so deeply into public consciousness that by the time handcuffs appear, the verdict is already in. This is the anatomy of a media trial — Bangladesh’s most sophisticated weapon of political persecution.

The Evolution: From Joj Mia to the Modern Media Trial

Bangladesh’s political establishment has a long history of manufacturing scapegoats. Under the BNP-Jamaat government (2001-2006), the method was crude but effective:

1. Arrest a nobody
2. Torture a confession
3. Present it to the media
4. Promote the officials who cooperated

This is exactly what happened with “Joj Mia” — a pickpocket framed for the August 21 grenade massacre. It was crude. It eventually fell apart. And it took a change of government to expose the truth.

But political operators learn from their mistakes. The new method is more sophisticated — and far more dangerous:

1. Plant the narrative in media FIRST — months before any arrest
2. Use emotionally loaded language — “human trafficking,” “manob pachar” (মানব পাচার), terms designed to make the accused indefensible
3. Inflate the numbers beyond comprehension — figures so astronomical they become the headline themselves
4. Saturate every outlet — repeat the narrative until it becomes accepted truth
5. THEN arrest — now the “evidence” is “everyone already knows”

The difference is devastating. In the old method, the fabrication had to withstand judicial scrutiny. In the new method, the court of public opinion has already convicted — the actual court is almost irrelevant.

Case Study: The ৳24,000 Crore Headline

In 2024-2026, Bangladesh saw one of the most systematic media trial campaigns in its recent history — targeting over 100 people connected to the manpower export sector, including former government officials, military officers, and their families.

The Number: ৳24,000 Crore

The figure “৳24,000 crore” became the defining headline. It appeared in every major Bangladeshi outlet — The Daily Star, Dhaka Tribune, The Business Standard, bdnews24, New Age — repeated hundreds of times before a single court heard a single argument.

But look at what the actual investigations found:

Source	Alleged Amount	Context
Original case (Sept 2024)	৳24,000 crore	Alleged total across ALL 103 accused over years
CID investigation (Aug 2025)	৳100.75 crore	The actual amount CID could trace in money laundering case
ACC investigation (Mar 2025)	৳119 crore	Amount attributed to one specific company

Notice the pattern: the headline says ৳24,000 crore. The actual investigation found ৳100 crore. That’s a 240x discrepancy. But which number does the public remember? Which number has already convicted the accused in the minds of 170 million Bangladeshis?

The ৳24,000 crore figure is the total alleged amount embezzled by a “syndicate” of 103 different people over multiple years across dozens of companies. But in headlines, it gets attached to individual names — creating the impression that one person stole ৳24,000 crore.

No court has verified the ৳24,000 crore figure. No audit has confirmed it. No forensic accounting has been presented. Yet it has been printed as established fact in virtually every Bangladeshi media outlet.

The Language: “মানব পাচার” (Human Trafficking)

The choice of language is not accidental. The legal issue in these cases involves manpower export agencies — companies licensed by the Bangladeshi government to recruit workers for overseas employment, primarily in Malaysia. The allegations concern overcharging workers and financial irregularities.

But in media coverage, “manpower recruitment fraud” was systematically replaced with “মানব পাচার” — human trafficking. The two are not the same:

• Manpower recruitment fraud: Overcharging workers, financial irregularities in a licensed business — a serious but prosecutable financial crime
• Human trafficking (মানব পাচার): The forcible trafficking of human beings — one of the most emotionally revulsive crimes imaginable

By framing recruitment irregularities as “human trafficking,” the media narrative made it impossible for any accused person to publicly defend themselves. Who defends themselves against “human trafficking”? The mere denial sounds guilty.

This is a deliberate strategic choice. It turns a white-collar financial case into an emotional human rights atrocity in the public mind — without a single court ruling establishing the facts.

The Timeline: Narrative First, Arrest Later

The timeline reveals the media trial methodology with surgical precision:

Date	Event	Media Narrative Phase
August 5, 2024	Government change — targets go into hiding after political violence	Vulnerability established
September 3, 2024	Case filed by Altaf Khan (a competing recruiting agency owner) naming 103 people	The “৳24,000 crore” headline is born
Oct-Nov 2024	Former minister Imran Ahmad arrested, remanded — media frenzy	Narrative saturates all outlets
August 28, 2025	CID files separate money laundering case — now targeting family members (wives, daughters)	Net widens, narrative deepens
March 2025	ACC announces intention to sue	Institutional validation of narrative
Late 2024 – Early 2026	Months of continuous media coverage — “syndicate,” “manob pachar,” “24,000 crore” repeated constantly	Public conviction complete
March 24, 2026	Late-night raid, arrest at home	Arrest is now a formality — public already “knows”
March 25-29, 2026	5-day remand, then fresh 6-day remand. DB says “11 cases filed”	Case pile-on begins
March 29, 2026	ICT moves to show accused as arrested in separate “crimes against humanity” case	Political charges layered on top

By the time the arrest happens — 18 months after the narrative first entered the media — the accused has been convicted in public opinion. The arrest isn’t news; it’s confirmation of what “everyone already knows.”

The Methodology: How Media Trials Work

Based on documented patterns in Bangladesh, media trials follow a consistent methodology:

1. The Emotional Frame

Choose language that makes the accused indefensible. “Human trafficking” instead of “recruitment fraud.” “Mass murder” instead of “political decision-making.” The emotional frame ensures that any public defense sounds like defending the indefensible.

2. The Astronomical Number

Cite a figure so large it shocks. ৳24,000 crore. ৳23,000 crore. The number doesn’t need to be verified — it just needs to be big enough that it becomes the headline itself. Nobody fact-checks the number because the number IS the story.

3. The Competing Plaintiff

Cases are often filed not by victims, but by business competitors or political operatives. In the manpower case, the original complaint was filed by Altaf Khan — the owner of Afia Overseas, a competing recruiting agency. This crucial detail is buried in the 15th paragraph of news reports, long after the ৳24,000 crore headline has done its work.

4. The Family Drag

Name not just the target, but their spouse and children in the case. This serves two purposes: it increases the sense of a “criminal syndicate” in public perception, and it creates maximum personal pressure on the accused by threatening their family.

5. The Case Pile-On

Once the narrative is established, multiply the cases. One case becomes five. Five becomes eleven. Each new case generates a fresh round of headlines, reinforcing the narrative. Even if each individual case is weak, the sheer volume creates an impression of overwhelming guilt.

According to the DB, a total of 11 cases have so far been filed against the accused.

— Dhaka Tribune, March 29, 2026

6. The Political Layer

Once the accused is in custody on financial charges, add political charges. In this case, the International Crimes Tribunal moved to show the accused as arrested in a separate “crimes against humanity” case — ensuring that the financial narrative and the political narrative merge into one overwhelming impression of guilt.

The Broader Pattern: Who Gets Media-Trialed?

Media trials in Bangladesh don’t target random individuals. They target people who are politically inconvenient:

• Former government officials from the previous administration — prosecuted not for specific evidence but for association
• Military officers who played roles in political transitions — particularly 1/11
• Business people connected to the previous power structure — where financial allegations serve as proxies for political persecution
• Family members — wives and children named in cases to maximize pressure

The Global Centre for Democratic Governance documented that since August 2024, Bangladesh has seen:

Pervasive surveillance, preemptive detention, and the deliberate criminalization of peaceful or symbolic acts of dissent.

— Eurasia Review, “A Nation On Trial” (September 2025)

Over 388 journalists have been implicated in fabricated criminal cases, with at least 38 imprisoned and repeatedly denied bail. When the media itself is under threat, who will question the narratives they are forced to publish?

The International Standard: What Constitutes a Fair Trial?

The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), to which Bangladesh is a signatory, establishes clear principles:

• Article 14(2): “Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall have the right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law”
• Article 14(1): Right to “a fair and public hearing by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal”

Media trials systematically violate both principles. When hundreds of articles establish “guilt” before a single hearing, presumption of innocence is destroyed. When judges read the same newspapers as everyone else, impartiality is compromised.

Bangladesh’s own Constitution, Article 35(3), guarantees: “Every person accused of a criminal offence shall have the right to a speedy and public trial by an independent and impartial Court or tribunal established by law.”

An independent trial is impossible when the trial has already been conducted in the media.

The BNP Pattern: Old Wine, New Bottle

The media trial is the evolution of BNP’s scapegoating playbook:

Era	Method	Example
2001-2006 (BNP-Jamaat)	Arrest → Torture confession → Media	Joj Mia framed for grenade massacre
2001-2006	Scapegoat expendable figures	Anwarullah blamed for 2001 hall raid violence
2001-2006	Probe committee whitewash	Chittagong Arms Haul cover-up
2024-2026	Media narrative → Months of saturation → THEN arrest	“৳24,000 crore manob pachar” campaign

The formula has evolved, but the purpose is identical: use manufactured narratives to neutralize political opponents while maintaining a veneer of legal legitimacy.

What Would Accountability Look Like?

If the allegations were genuine and the process fair, we would expect to see:

• Forensic audits verifying the specific amounts — not headlines citing unverified figures
• Independent investigation — not cases filed by business competitors
• Proportional charges — financial fraud charged as financial fraud, not repackaged as “human trafficking”
• Presumption of innocence in media coverage — not 18 months of conviction-before-trial
• Separation of financial and political charges — not layering unrelated cases to create an impression of overwhelming guilt
• Family members named only with specific evidence — not dragnet inclusion to maximize pressure

None of these conditions were met in the cases documented above.

The Silence Problem

Perhaps the most insidious aspect of the media trial is that it silences the accused and their supporters. When someone is publicly branded a “human trafficker” who stole “৳24,000 crore,” anyone who defends them risks being associated with those crimes. Family members who speak up are accused of “protecting criminals.” Lawyers who take the case face social pressure. Journalists who question the narrative face their own legal threats.

This is by design. The media trial doesn’t just convict the accused — it creates a zone of silence around them, ensuring that the only narrative that reaches the public is the prosecution’s narrative.

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Sources:

• The Daily Star — “CID files case against 33 recruiting agents” (Aug 28, 2025); “Ex-minister Imran placed on 3-day remand” (Oct 21, 2024); “DB seeks five-day remand” (Mar 25, 2026)
• The Business Standard (TBS) — “CID sues 33 over Tk100cr laundering linked to Malaysian recruitment syndicate” (Aug 28, 2025); “Key 1/11 figure ex-Lt Gen Masud Uddin Chowdhury arrested” (Mar 25, 2026)
• Dhaka Tribune — “Ex-MP Masud Uddin Chowdhury placed on 6-day fresh remand” (Mar 29, 2026); “ICT moves to show retired officers arrested” (Mar 29, 2026)
• bdnews24.com — “Ex-general Masud Uddin Chowdhury, a key ‘1/11’ figure, held” (Mar 25, 2026)
• BSS (Bangladesh Sangbad Sangstha) — “Masud Uddin remanded afresh in Tk 24,000-crore embezzlement case” (Mar 29, 2026)
• Global Centre for Democratic Governance — “Press Under Siege” (Nov 2025)
• Eurasia Review — “A Nation On Trial: Bangladesh Arrest Surge Threatens Democracy” (Sep 11, 2025)
• Human Rights Watch — “No Place for Criticism: Bangladesh Crackdown on Social Media Commentary” (2018)
• ICCPR — International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Articles 14(1), 14(2)
• Constitution of Bangladesh — Article 35(3)
• The Business Standard — “Is Media Trial culture in Bangladesh a hindrance to the justice system?” (Feb 2021)
• SSRN — Hussain M.F. Bari, “Legal Aspects of Media Trial in Bangladesh: Free Press Versus Fair Trial Dilemma” (2019)

Read how BNP invented a pickpocket to cover a massacre: The “Joj Mia” Fabrication

Read how BNP’s terrorist militia operated: HuJI: The Terrorist Army BNP Kept in Its Backyard

Read the full 1/11 Chronicle: Part 1 · Part 2 · Part 3 · Part 4 (Finale)

They met Osama bin Laden in Afghanistan. They bombed Bengali New Year celebrations. They tried to kill Sheikh Hasina — twice. And through it all, the BNP-Jamaat government gave them shelter, patronage, and political protection. This is the story of Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami Bangladesh (HuJI-B) — the terrorist organization that operated as the BNP’s private militia.

Born from Jihad: The Origins of HuJI-B

The story begins not in Bangladesh, but in the mountains of Afghanistan during the Soviet-Afghan War. In the 1980s, thousands of young men from across the Muslim world — including Bangladesh — traveled to Pakistan and Afghanistan to fight the Soviets as mujahideen. Among them were Bangladeshi madrasa students and religious activists who would later form the deadliest terrorist organization in Bangladeshi history.

The parent organization, Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami (HuJI), was founded in 1984 in Pakistan by Fazlur Rehman Khalil and Qari Saifullah Akhtar. It had deep connections to Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), which used it as a proxy force.

On April 30, 1992, the Bangladeshi branch — HuJI-B — was formally launched at the Jatiya Press Club in Dhaka by Maulana Abdus Salam and other Afghan war veterans. They held a press conference and publicly demanded the establishment of Islamic rule in Bangladesh.

HuJI-B was established in 1992, reportedly with assistance from Osama bin Laden’s International Islamic Front.

— US State Department, Country Reports on Terrorism

This was not a fringe group operating in the shadows. HuJI-B’s founders openly announced their existence and their goal of establishing an Islamic state in Bangladesh.

The al-Qaeda Connection: They Met bin Laden

HuJI-B’s links to al-Qaeda were not hypothetical — they were direct and personal.

In 1988, a delegation of HuJI-B leaders traveled to Afghanistan via Pakistan. They were hosted by Qari Saifullah Akhtar (HuJI Pakistan chief) and driven by Abdur Rahman Shahi, a Bangladeshi mujahideen, to meet Osama bin Laden himself.

Among those who made the trip:

• Muhammad Habibur Rahman (alias “Bulbuli Huzur”) — a senior HuJI leader and leader of Bangladesh Khelafat Majlish
• Ataur Rahman Khan — who would later be elected to Bangladesh’s Parliament as a BNP member

Let that sink in: a man who personally met Osama bin Laden later sat in Bangladesh’s Parliament, elected on a BNP ticket.

Ataur Rahman Khan, a leader of Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami Bangladesh, was elected member of parliament from Bangladesh Nationalist Party… In 1988, on a tour with senior leaders of HuJI-B, he visited Afghanistan and met with Osama bin Laden.

— The Daily Star, “Target Taliban Rule” (April 7, 2013)

A Decade of Terror: HuJI’s Trail of Blood

From 1999 to 2005, HuJI-B carried out a systematic campaign of bombings, assassinations, and attacks that killed over 100 people and terrorized Bangladesh. Here is the documented record:

1999: The Campaign Begins

• January 18, 1999: Attempted assassination of Bangladesh’s greatest living poet, Shamsur Rahman — a secular intellectual who represented everything the jihadists despised
• March 6, 1999: Bombing of the Udichi cultural event in Jessore — 10 killed, 150 wounded. Udichi, Bangladesh’s largest cultural organization, was targeted for celebrating secular Bengali culture
• October 8, 1999: Bombing of an Ahmadiyya mosque in Khulna — targeting a religious minority

2000-2001: Escalation

• July 20, 2000: First assassination attempt on Sheikh Hasina — the Prime Minister of Bangladesh was targeted directly
• January 20, 2001: Bombing of a Communist Party rally in Dhaka
• April 14, 2001: Ramna Batamul bombing — HuJI bombed the Bengali New Year celebrations at Ramna Park, killing 10 people and injuring dozens. This was an attack on the very identity of Bengali secular culture
• June 3, 2001: Bombing of a church service in Gopalganj — targeting Christians
• June 16, 2001: Bombing of an Awami League office in Narayanganj
• September 23, 2001: Bombing of an Awami League rally in Bagerhat

2004: The Year of Grenades

• May 21, 2004: Shah Jalal Shrine bombing in Sylhet — targeting the British High Commissioner. This attack would eventually lead to Mufti Hannan’s execution
• June 21, 2004: Attack on a Suranjit Sengupta rally in Sunamganj
• August 7, 2004: Attack on an Awami League rally in Sylhet
• August 21, 2004: THE GRENADE ATTACK — military-grade Arges grenades killed 24 people and wounded 500+ at an Awami League rally, nearly assassinating Sheikh Hasina. This was HuJI’s most devastating operation — carried out under direct coordination with BNP leadership

The pattern is unmistakable. HuJI-B targeted: secular culture, religious minorities, political opposition, foreign diplomats, and the Prime Minister herself. This was not random terrorism — it was a systematic campaign to destroy secular democracy in Bangladesh.

BNP’s Terrorist Allies: The Patronage Network

The most damning fact about HuJI-B is not what it did — but who protected it while it did it.

During the BNP-Jamaat coalition government (2001-2006), HuJI-B didn’t just survive — it thrived under direct state patronage:

HuJI Leaders in Parliament

Ataur Rahman Khan, a founding member of HuJI-B who had personally met Osama bin Laden, was elected to Parliament on a BNP ticket. A terrorist leader sitting in the national legislature, protected by the ruling party.

Coalition Partners with Militant Ties

Islami Oikya Jote (IOJ), a coalition partner in the BNP-Jamaat government, had its chairman — Shaikhul Hadith Allama Azizul Haque — as a well-known leader of HuJI-B. The government’s own coalition partner had a militant chief at its helm.

State Machinery as Shield

During the BNP–Jamaat coalition government, extremist groups such as HuJI-B and JMB grew stronger with both open and hidden political support.

— Global Centre for Democratic Governance, “Echoes of the BNP–Jamaat Era” (2025)

The BNP government:

• Denied HuJI-B’s existence — despite overwhelming evidence of its operations
• Refused to ban the organization until 2005, and only then under extreme international pressure
• Protected its operatives from prosecution through the intelligence apparatus
• Used HuJI militants as mercenaries for political assassinations — most notably the August 21 grenade attack

Mufti Hannan: Arrested but Protected

The BNP government arrested HuJI chief Mufti Abdul Hannan on October 31, 2005 — two weeks after finally banning the organization under international pressure. But critically, Hannan was NOT linked to the August 21 grenade attack case. The government kept him in custody but ensured his confession would not expose the BNP leadership’s role in the assassination attempt.

It was only after 1/11 — when the military-backed caretaker government took power in January 2007 — that Hannan was properly interrogated and revealed the full extent of BNP’s involvement.

The August 21 Connection: BNP Aimed, HuJI Fired

The August 21, 2004 grenade attack — the deadliest terrorist strike in Bangladesh’s history — was the ultimate expression of the BNP-HuJI nexus.

According to the charge sheet filed after the 1/11 investigation:

Hannan and his men were used as mercenaries to carry out the August 21 grenade attack. They agreed to execute the plot to assassinate Hasina and other top AL leaders on assurance that they would be provided safety and allowed to continue their activities unhindered after completion of the task. The attack was the outcome of a collaboration between HuJI men, influential leaders of the BNP and the Jamaat-e-Islami, and some officials of the Home Ministry, Police, DGFI, NSI, and Prime Minister’s Office.

— CID Charge Sheet, as reported by The Daily Star

The deal was simple: HuJI would carry out the assassination. In return, the BNP government would guarantee their safety and allow them to continue operating freely.

The key figures who coordinated the attack:

• Tarique Rahman — BNP Acting Chairman, Khaleda Zia’s son (sentenced to life imprisonment)
• Lutfozzaman Babar — State Minister for Home Affairs (sentenced to death)
• Harris Chowdhury — Political Secretary to PM Khaleda Zia
• Abdus Salam Pintu — Deputy Education Minister (sentenced to death)
• Mufti Abdul Hannan — HuJI-B chief, operational commander of the attack

The US Designation: America Saw What BNP Denied

On March 5, 2008, the United States formally designated HuJI-B as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) and a Specially Designated Global Terrorist entity.

The US State Department determination stated that HuJI-B “has committed, or poses a significant risk of committing, acts of terrorism that threaten the security of U.S. nationals or the national security, foreign policy, or economy of the United States.”

The UK’s Terrorism Act 2000 also proscribed HuJI-B as a terrorist organization.

Both designations came after 1/11, when the genuine investigation into Bangladesh’s militant networks finally produced evidence that could no longer be denied. For years, while BNP was in power, these international designations could not happen — because the Bangladeshi government itself was blocking the evidence.

Mufti Hannan: Execution and al-Qaeda’s Response

On April 12, 2017, Mufti Abdul Hannan was hanged at Kashimpur Prison along with his accomplice Sharif Shahedul (alias Bipul) at 10:01 PM. He was executed for the 2004 Shah Jalal Shrine bombing that targeted the British High Commissioner in Sylhet.

Hannan was charged in 25 criminal cases involving terrorism. He had been sentenced to death for multiple attacks, including the 2001 Ramna Batamul bombing that killed 10 people during Bengali New Year celebrations.

The execution triggered a response from al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS), which vowed to avenge Hannan’s death — confirming the direct organizational link between HuJI-B and al-Qaeda’s regional network.

Why This Matters Today

HuJI-B was not an independent terrorist organization that happened to exist in Bangladesh. It was a weapon wielded by the BNP-Jamaat government — deployed against political opponents, secular culture, religious minorities, and anyone who stood in the way of their power.

The facts are documented:

• HuJI leaders met Osama bin Laden — and then entered Parliament on BNP tickets
• HuJI killed over 100 people in a systematic campaign of terror from 1999-2005
• BNP protected HuJI operatives through state intelligence agencies
• BNP used HuJI as mercenaries for the August 21 grenade attack that killed 24 people
• BNP fabricated the “Joj Mia” story to cover up HuJI’s role and their own complicity
• Only after 1/11 was HuJI properly investigated — which is why Tareq Zia despises 1/11

When Tareq Rahman and his allies attack the legacy of 1/11, remember what 1/11 actually exposed: a government that kept an al-Qaeda-linked terrorist army in its backyard, used it to bomb civilians, and then covered up the evidence.

The January 11, 2007 intervention didn’t just change government. It broke the BNP-HuJI nexus. It led to genuine investigations. It led to the 2018 verdict: 19 death sentences and Tarique Rahman’s life imprisonment.

That is why they hate 1/11. Not because it was undemocratic. Because it was accountability.

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Sources:

• US State Department — Country Reports on Terrorism (2008-2021); FTO Designation of HuJI-B (March 5, 2008)
• US Federal Register — Vol. 73, No. 43 (March 5, 2008): Designation of HUJI-B as Specially Designated Global Terrorist
• The Daily Star — “Target Taliban Rule” (April 7, 2013); “Huji kingpin Mufti Hannan hanged” (April 12, 2017); “Ferocious HuJI-B now on the wane” (August 21, 2016)
• Dhaka Tribune — “Al-Qaeda vows to avenge Mufti Hannan execution” (July 3, 2017); “Bangladesh Islamist militants maintain links with al-Qaeda” (February 16, 2014)
• International Crisis Group — “Countering Jihadist Militancy in Bangladesh,” Asia Report No. 295 (February 28, 2018)
• South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP) — HuJI-B Profile and Attack Database
• Global Centre for Democratic Governance — “Echoes of the BNP–Jamaat Era” (2025)
• Stanford University Mapping Militants Project — Harkat-ul-Jihadi al-Islami Profile
• CID Investigation Reports — Charge sheets in the August 21, 2004 grenade attack case
• UK Terrorism Act 2000 — Schedule 2: Proscribed Organisations
• bdnews24.com — “Militant leader Mufti Hannan, his accomplices hanged” (April 12, 2017)
• Speedy Trial Tribunal-1, Dhaka — Judgment of October 10, 2018 (August 21 case)

Read the full story of the August 21 grenade attack: August 21, 2004: The Grenade Attack That Nearly Killed Democracy

Read how BNP fabricated the Joj Mia story: The “Joj Mia” Fabrication: How Tareq Zia’s War on 1/11 Began with a Cover-Up

Read the complete 1/11 Chronicle: Part 1 · Part 2 · Part 3 · Part 4 (Finale)

On August 21, 2004, grenades rained down on an Awami League rally in Dhaka, killing 24 people and wounding over 500. The attack was the most brazen assassination attempt in Bangladesh’s history — targeting Sheikh Hasina herself. But instead of finding the perpetrators, the BNP-Jamaat government manufactured a scapegoat: a petty criminal named “Joj Mia” who had nothing to do with the massacre. This is the story of how a government covered up its own complicity — and how the truth eventually broke through.

The Attack That Demanded Justice

The August 21, 2004 grenade attack on the Awami League rally at Bangabandhu Avenue was not a random act of terrorism. It was a coordinated assassination attempt using military-grade Arges grenades — the same type found in the massive Chittagong arms haul just four months later. Twenty-four people died. Over 500 were injured. Sheikh Hasina survived only because her bodyguards shielded her with their bodies.

The nation demanded answers. International observers called for a credible investigation. The pressure on the BNP-Jamaat government was immense.

Their response was not to find the killers — but to invent a cover story.

Enter the CID: An Investigation Designed to Fail

In 2004, the government assigned the Crime Investigation Department (CID) to investigate the grenade attack. From the outset, the investigation was compromised. Rather than following the evidence — which pointed toward state-linked militant networks — the CID was directed to fabricate a false narrative that would shield the real perpetrators.

“The investigation was not designed to find the truth. It was designed to bury it.”

— Analysis based on subsequent court findings

The CID concocted an elaborate fiction: that the attack was carried out by a ragtag group of criminals led by Subrata Bain’s “Seven Star terrorist group” — a local criminal gang with no connection to political violence or military-grade weaponry.

Who Was “Joj Mia”?

Joj Mia — real name Jamal Ahmed — was a petty criminal from Noakhali District. He was not a militant. He was not an explosives expert. He had no connection to Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami (HuJI) or any political organization. He was, in the most literal sense, a pickpocket being framed for a massacre.

According to the fabricated CID story:

• Joj Mia and 14 other criminals from the Seven Star group carried out the grenade attack
• They allegedly met at Moghbazar before the attack to coordinate
• They had supposedly “rehearsed” the attack on a remote island

The story was absurd on its face. A pickpocket and petty criminals obtaining military-grade Arges grenades? Rehearsing a precision attack on a political rally? None of it withstood scrutiny — but that wasn’t the point. The point was to create a narrative that diverted attention from the real perpetrators.

The Arrest and Torture

On June 10, 2005 — nearly a year after the attack — CID officials arrested Joj Mia from his home. What followed was a textbook case of state-sponsored fabrication:

On June 26, 2005, under torture by security forces, Joj Mia was coerced into giving a false confession under Section 164 to a magistrate. The confession — extracted through physical abuse — implicated the Seven Star Group in the grenade attack.

Shaibal Saha Partha: Another Victim

Joj Mia was not the only victim. Shaibal Saha Partha was also arrested and tortured in custody, forced to give a false confessional statement corroborating the fabricated narrative. Though eventually released, Partha continues to suffer from post-traumatic stress caused by his ordeal at the hands of state security forces.

The Supreme Court Bar Association’s investigation accused the government of destroying evidence related to the grenade attack.

The Sham Judicial Commission

To give the cover-up a veneer of legitimacy, the BNP government formed a one-man judicial probe led by Justice Joynal Abedin.

The commission produced a report that was farcical even by the standards of political whitewashing. Rather than investigating the mounting evidence of state complicity, Justice Abedin’s report absurdly blamed the attack on “foreign and local enemies” — a meaningless catch-all designed to deflect responsibility.

Element	Reality
Commission finding	“Foreign and local enemies” responsible
Evidence considered	Selectively filtered to exclude state links
Duration of investigation	Minimal — designed for speed, not depth
Consequence for Justice Abedin	Elevated to Appellate Division of Supreme Court

The reward was telling. Two years after producing his sham report, Justice Abedin was promoted to the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court — widely understood as a quid pro quo for his cooperation in the cover-up.

The Daily Star described Abedin as a “shame” for the judiciary in Bangladesh.

Two Years of Deliberate Delay

For two full years (2004-2006), the CID failed to submit charge sheets against anyone. BNP leaders repeatedly claimed the investigation was “about to be completed” — a stalling tactic designed to run out the clock on public interest and international pressure.

Meanwhile:

• The government hurriedly buried two unidentified dead bodies connected to the attack in the middle of the night — destroying potential evidence
• Evidence was systematically tampered with or destroyed
• Witnesses were intimidated
• The real perpetrators remained free — and in some cases, in government

The Architects of the Cover-Up

The fabrication was not the work of rogue investigators. It was orchestrated at the highest levels of the BNP government:

Lutfozzaman Babar — State Minister for Home Affairs

As the minister directly overseeing law enforcement, Babar was alleged to have:

• Assured government support for the original attack
• Coordinated with intelligence agencies (DGFI, NSI) to facilitate the plot
• Used state machinery to obstruct the investigation
• Orchestrated the “Joj Mia” false confession story specifically

The Senior Police Officers

The following officers were later convicted for their roles in fabricating the investigation:

• Former IGP Khoda Baksh
• SP Ruhul Amin
• ASP Abdur Rashid
• ASP Munshi Atikur Rahman

All four received 2-year sentences for misleading the investigation and fabricating the Joj Mia story.

How the Truth Emerged: The Post-1/11 Investigation

Everything changed after January 11, 2007, when the military-backed caretaker government took power and launched genuine investigations into the corruption and criminality of the BNP-Jamaat era.

July 2007: Fresh Investigation

The CID initiated a completely new investigation, free from political interference.

November 2007: Mufti Hannan Breaks His Silence

Mufti Abdul Hannan, the leader of Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami (HuJI), had been arrested by the BNP government in September 2005 — but was deliberately NOT linked to the August 21 case. Under the new investigation, Hannan revealed:

• The attack was operated by HuJI, not the Seven Star group
• He received support from Maulana Tajuddin, brother of BNP leader Abdus Salam Pintu
• Abdus Salam Pintu had direct knowledge of the attack

2008: CID Charge Sheet

Lead investigator Mohammad Javed Patwary concluded that:

• The attack aimed to kill Sheikh Hasina
• It was guided by the common grievance of both Mufti Hannan and Abdus Salam Pintu against Hasina
• Abdus Salam Pintu was personally responsible

On June 11, 2008, CID submitted charge sheets against 22 people, including Mufti Hannan and Abdus Salam Pintu.

2011: The Full Picture

Mufti Hannan gave another confessional statement implicating the top leadership of BNP:

• Tarique Rahman (BNP Acting Chairman, Khaleda Zia’s son)
• Lutfozzaman Babar (State Minister for Home)
• Harris Chowdhury (Political Secretary to PM Khaleda Zia)
• Abdus Salam Pintu (Deputy Education Minister)
• Senior officials of the Home Ministry, Police, DGFI, NSI, and Prime Minister’s Office

The 2018 Verdict: Justice, 14 Years Late

On October 10, 2018, Speedy Trial Tribunal-1 in Dhaka delivered its historic judgment. Judge Shahed Nuruddin ruled that the attack was “a well-orchestrated plan, executed through abuse of state power.”

19 Sentenced to Death

Among those sentenced to death:

1. Lutfozzaman Babar — former State Minister for Home
2. Abdus Salam Pintu — former Deputy Education Minister
3. Major General (Retd) Rezzakul Haider Chowdhury — former DGFI Director General
4. Brigadier General (Retd) Abdur Rahim — former NSI Director General
5. 15 others including HuJI operatives and military-linked figures

Sentenced for Life

Tarique Rahman, acting chairman of BNP and son of Khaleda Zia, received a life sentence — cementing the court’s finding that the attack was directed from the very top of the party hierarchy.

2 Years for the Fabricators

Former IGP Khoda Baksh, SP Ruhul Amin, and ASPs Abdur Rashid and Munshi Atikur Rahman received 2-year sentences for misleading the investigation and fabricating the Joj Mia narrative.

What the “Joj Mia” Fabrication Reveals

The Joj Mia fabrication was not an isolated incident. It was part of a systematic pattern of the BNP-Jamaat government using expendable figures to absorb blame while protecting the political principals:

• Anwarullah was used as a scapegoat for the 2001 hall raid violence
• “Joj Mia” was fabricated as the grenade attack perpetrator
• Probe committees were used to whitewash the Chittagong arms haul

In every case, the pattern was identical: arrest a nobody, extract a confession through torture, present it to the media, and promote the officials who cooperated.

The Joj Mia fabrication stands as one of the most cynical episodes in Bangladesh’s political history — a government that orchestrated a grenade massacre against its own citizens, then tortured an innocent man into taking the blame. It took 14 years, a change of government, and the courage of investigators willing to follow the evidence for the truth to finally emerge.

But the full reckoning is still incomplete. Tarique Rahman remains in London. Several convicted figures are fugitives. And the institutional reforms needed to prevent such abuses remain unfinished.

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Sources:

• The Daily Star — Reporting on Justice Joynal Abedin’s role and the CID investigation failures
• Speedy Trial Tribunal-1, Dhaka — Judgment of October 10, 2018 (Case No. 1/2015)
• Supreme Court Bar Association — Investigation accusing the government of destroying evidence
• CID Investigation Reports — Charge sheets of June 11, 2008 and supplementary sheets of July 2011
• Human Rights Watch — Reports on extrajudicial activities during BNP-Jamaat rule
• International Crisis Group — “Bangladesh: Getting Police Reform on Track” (2009)
• bdnews24.com, Prothom Alo — Contemporary reporting on the Joj Mia arrest and confession

Read the full timeline of the grenade attack: August 21, 2004: The Grenade Attack That Nearly Killed Democracy

Read how the BNP government smuggled 10 truckloads of weapons: The Chittagong Arms Haul

Read the full story of how Bangladesh reached the breaking point: The 1/11 Chronicle — Part 1

5:22 PM — The Moment Everything Changed

August 21, 2004. A Saturday afternoon in Dhaka. Twenty thousand people packed Bangabandhu Avenue for an Awami League rally protesting terrorism. Sheikh Hasina, then Leader of the Opposition, addressed the crowd from the back of a truck.

At 5:22 PM, as her speech was ending, Abu Jandal hurled the first grenade from a rooftop. Then came the second. Then a third. In less than sixty seconds, 13 military-grade Arges grenades rained down on a civilian crowd from the rooftops of surrounding buildings.

24 people died. Over 500 were injured. Sheikh Hasina survived with permanent hearing damage she carries to this day.

This was not the work of terrorists acting alone. As a court would later rule, it was “a well-orchestrated plan, executed through abuse of state power.”

The grenades were military weapons. The planners sat in the Prime Minister’s office. The cover-up was run by the state itself. And for two years, the government blamed the attack on a pickpocket named Joj Mia.

This is the full timeline — from planning to execution to cover-up to verdict to acquittal.

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The Background: Why Hasina Was the Target

By mid-2004, Bangladesh under the BNP-Jamaat coalition was descending into organized chaos. The Chittagong arms haul had been intercepted just four months earlier — 10 truckloads of military weapons bound for Indian insurgents, smuggled under the supervision of intelligence agencies. Transparency International had ranked Bangladesh the most corrupt country on Earth for the third consecutive year.

Sheikh Hasina’s Awami League was the only credible opposition. She had survived assassination attempts before. But the BNP-Jamaat alliance, operating through Tarique Rahman’s parallel power center at Hawa Bhaban and State Minister for Home Affairs Lutfozzaman Babar’s control of the security apparatus, decided that the opposition leader had to be eliminated.

The instrument they chose was Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami (HuJI) — a militant group that had been allowed to operate freely under BNP protection.

The Planning: Meetings at Hawa Bhaban

According to confessional statements given by Mufti Abdul Hannan, the chief of HuJI-Bangladesh, and corroborated by the 2018 court verdict, the attack was planned in a series of meetings at Hawa Bhaban — Tarique Rahman’s political office in Gulshan, Dhaka, which functioned as a parallel government.

The attendees of these planning sessions included:

• Tarique Rahman — Son of Prime Minister Khaleda Zia, de facto power center
• Lutfozzaman Babar — State Minister for Home Affairs, with direct control over police and security forces
• Harris Chowdhury — Political Secretary to PM Khaleda Zia
• Ali Ahsan Mohammad Mojaheed — Secretary General of Jamaat-e-Islami, then Social Welfare Minister
• Brig Gen (Retd) Abdur Rahim — Director General of National Security Intelligence (NSI)
• Brig Gen (Retd) Rezzakul Haider Chowdhury — Director General of DGFI (military intelligence)
• Kazi Shah Mofazzal Hossain Kaikobad — BNP lawmaker who arranged meetings between HuJI and the planners

The liaison between BNP’s political leadership and HuJI’s operational team was Maulana Tajuddin — the brother of Abdus Salam Pintu, then Deputy Minister for Education. Planning meetings were also held at Pintu’s Dhanmondi residence.

“The specialised deadly Arges grenades that are used in wars were blasted at the Awami League’s central office on 23 Bangabandhu Avenue in broad daylight with the help of the then state machinery.”
— Judge Shahed Nuruddin, Speedy Trial Tribunal-1, October 2018

The Weapons: Military-Grade Arges Grenades

The grenades used in the attack were Arges grenades — military-grade, war-specification fragmentation grenades that are not available in civilian markets anywhere in the world. Their presence on the streets of Dhaka pointed directly to state-level arms procurement channels.

According to the confessional statement of Abdul Majed Bhat (alias Yusuf Bhat), a Pakistani terrorist:

• Muzaffar Ahmad Shah of Pakistan-based Tehrik-e-Jihad Islami (TEJI) originally provided the grenades to Maulana Tajuddin
• Tajuddin was supposed to forward them to Indian militant groups but kept them
• The grenades were later handed over to Mufti Hannan for the operation against Hasina

15 Arges grenades were distributed to a 12-person attack team. 13 were thrown into the crowd. 4 were later recovered intact — crucial physical evidence that would eventually help unravel the conspiracy.

The Day Before: August 20, 2004

On the eve of the attack, HuJI operatives Kajol and Abu Jandal went to Bangabandhu Avenue to scout the attack scene. They mapped rooftop positions, entry and exit routes, and the layout of the rally stage.

The operation had a code name: “Light Snacks for Sheikh Hasina” (Bengali: “Sheikh Hasina Ke Nashta Korano”).

August 21, 2004: Minute by Minute

Morning

The 12 designated attackers met at a house in Badda, a residential neighborhood in eastern Dhaka. They prayed together and had lunch. Maulana Sayeed delivered a sermon on jihad to steel their resolve.

Early Afternoon

Mufti Hannan personally handed over 15 Arges grenades to the 12 attackers. Some carried two.

After Asr Prayers (~4:00 PM)

The attackers regrouped near Golap Shah Mazar, close to the rally site. They took up their assigned positions around the truck-stage and on rooftops of surrounding buildings.

A critical detail: the volunteer security groups — Sechchasebak League and Chhatra League members who normally secured the rooftops at Awami League rallies — were not allowed access. The rooftops had been closed off. This meant state security agencies or their proxies had cleared the way for the attackers to take position.

5:22 PM — The Attack

As Sheikh Hasina finished her speech, the grenades came.

Abu Jandal hurled the first grenade. Within seconds, 12 more followed — a cascade of explosions ripping through a crowd of 20,000 people. At least 16 people died on the spot. The death toll would eventually reach 24. Over 500 people were injured, many grievously.

Sheikh Hasina was shielded by party workers who threw themselves over her. She survived with ear injuries that have caused permanent hearing damage — a condition she lives with to this day.

Immediate Aftermath

What happened next revealed the depth of state complicity:

• Police on duty fired tear gas shells and charged with batons — not at the attackers, but at Awami League members who were rescuing the injured
• The attackers received help from security and intelligence officials to flee the scene
• The BNP government initially refused to hand over the bodies of the victims to their families

The 24 Martyrs

The attack killed 24 Awami League leaders, activists, and supporters. Among them:

Ivy Rahman (née Jebun Nahar Ivy) — Awami League Women’s Affairs Secretary and wife of Zillur Rahman (who would later become President of Bangladesh). She was critically injured on August 21 and died three days later on August 24, making her death even more agonizing for her family and the nation.

Mahbubur Rahman — Sheikh Hasina’s bodyguard, who died shielding her from the grenades.

The remaining 22 victims were local-level party leaders, activists, and ordinary citizens who had come to a peaceful rally — and never went home.

The Cover-Up: A Masterclass in State-Sponsored Obstruction

Step 1: Destroy the Evidence

Within hours of the attack, the entire crime scene was washed with water and detergent — destroying forensic evidence. Recovered grenade fragments were deliberately destroyed rather than preserved for investigation. The Supreme Court Bar Association later accused the government of systematically destroying evidence.

Step 2: Block the Investigation

Bangladesh Police refused to register any criminal case filed by the Awami League. Only a general diary entry was made — a procedural formality with no investigative teeth. The message was clear: there would be no real investigation.

Step 3: The “Joj Mia” Fabrication

This is perhaps the most brazen element of the cover-up.

The BNP government assigned the Crime Investigation Department (CID) to investigate. Rather than pursuing the real perpetrators, CID fabricated an entirely false narrative:

• They claimed that Joj Mia (real name Jamal Ahmed), a petty criminal from Noakhali District, along with 14 others from the “Seven Star” terrorist group led by Subrata Bain, had carried out the attack
• On June 10, 2005, Joj Mia was arrested from his home
• On June 26, 2005, under torture by security forces, he was coerced into giving a false confession under Section 164 to a magistrate
• Another man, Shaibal Saha Partha, was also arrested and tortured in custody, forced to give a false statement. He was eventually released but continues to suffer from post-traumatic stress

The story collapsed when investigative journalism exposed the holes in the official narrative. A pickpocket and a small-time gang did not have access to military-grade Arges grenades.

Step 4: The Sham Judicial Probe

The BNP government formed a one-man judicial commission led by Justice Joynal Abedin. The commission produced a report that absurdly blamed the attack on “foreign and local enemies” — a vague formulation designed to point fingers everywhere except at the government itself.

The Daily Star described Justice Abedin as a “shame” for the judiciary in Bangladesh.

Two years after the commission submitted its report, Justice Abedin was elevated to the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court — widely seen as his reward for producing the desired cover story.

Step 5: Run Out the Clock

For two full years (2004-2006), the CID failed to submit charge sheets despite BNP leaders repeatedly claiming the probe was “about to be completed.” The goal was simple: delay until the story faded from public memory.

The Truth Comes Out: Post-1/11 Investigation

Everything changed after January 11, 2007, when the military-backed caretaker government took over from the BNP.

July 2007

Under the new caretaker government, CID initiated a fresh investigation from scratch.

November 2007

Mufti Abdul Hannan — who had been arrested by the BNP government in 2005 but deliberately not linked to the August 21 case — finally revealed the truth:

• The attack was operated by HuJI
• He received operational support from Maulana Tajuddin, brother of BNP’s Abdus Salam Pintu
• Abdus Salam Pintu had direct knowledge of the attack plan

2008

Lead CID investigator Mohammad Javed Patwary concluded that the attack was specifically designed to kill Sheikh Hasina, guided by the shared grievance of both Mufti Hannan and Abdus Salam Pintu against the Awami League leader.

On June 11, 2008, CID submitted charge sheets accusing 22 people, including Mufti Hannan and Abdus Salam Pintu.

2009-2011

The Awami League government, now in power after the December 2008 elections, launched a further investigation under retired CID official Abdul Kahar Akhand.

In 2011, Mufti Hannan gave another confessional statement — this time implicating the full chain of command:

• Tarique Rahman
• Lutfozzaman Babar
• Harris Chowdhury
• Abdus Salam Pintu
• Senior officials of the Home Ministry, Police, DGFI, NSI, and the Prime Minister’s Office

In July 2011, CID submitted a supplementary charge sheet against 30 accused. By March 2012, the tribunal had indicted 52 persons on murder charges.

The 2018 Verdict: Justice Delivered

On October 10, 2018, after years of trial, Judge Shahed Nuruddin of Speedy Trial Tribunal-1 in Dhaka delivered one of the most consequential verdicts in Bangladesh’s history.

19 Sentenced to Death

#	Name	Role
1	Lutfozzaman Babar	Former State Minister for Home Affairs
2	Abdus Salam Pintu	Former Deputy Minister for Education
3	Maj Gen (Retd) Rezzakul Haider Chowdhury	Former DG of DGFI
4	Brig Gen (Retd) Abdur Rahim	Former DG of NSI
5	Maulana Md Tajuddin	HuJI-BNP liaison, brother of Pintu
6	Md Hanif	Operative
7	Maulana Sheikh Abdus Salam	Operative
8	Md Abdul Mazed Bhat (alias Yusuf Bhat)	Pakistani operative
9	Abdul Malek (alias GM)	Operative
10	Maulana Shawkat Hossain (alias Sheikh Farid)	Operative
11	Mahibullah (alias Ovi)	Operative
12	Maulana Abu Sayeed (alias Jafar)	Operative
13	Abul Kalam Azad (alias Bulbul)	Operative
14	Md Jahangir Alam	Operative
15	Hafiz Maulana Abu Taher	Operative
16	Hossain Ahmed Tamim	Operative
17	Main Uddin Sheikh (alias Abu Jandal)	Attack team leader, threw first grenade
18	Md Rafiqul Iqbal Islam (alias Sabuj)	Operative
19	Md Ujjal (alias Ratan)	Operative

19 Sentenced to Life Imprisonment

Including three of the most powerful figures in the conspiracy:

• Tarique Rahman — BNP Senior Vice Chairman, son of PM Khaleda Zia
• Harris Chowdhury — Political Secretary to the Prime Minister
• Kazi Shah Mofazzal Hossain Kaikobad — BNP lawmaker

Additional Sentences

• Former IGPs Ashraful Huda and Shahudul Haque — 2 years for harboring offenders
• Lt Commander (Retd) Saiful Islam Duke (Khaleda Zia’s nephew), Saiful Islam Joarder (former DGFI), and Maj Gen (Retd) ATM Amin (former DGFI) — 4 years for harboring and protecting offenders
• Former IGP Khoda Baksh, SP Ruhul Amin, ASPs Abdur Rashid and Munshi Atikur Rahman — 2 years for misleading the investigation and fabricating the “Joj Mia” story

International Condemnation

The August 21 grenade attack drew immediate international condemnation:

• US President George W. Bush expressed “shock” at the attack — the message was conveyed through Secretary of State Colin Powell
• United Kingdom, Netherlands, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, and Sweden all condemned the attack
• The FBI and Interpol made repeated visits to Bangladesh to provide technical investigative support

Yet despite this international attention, the BNP government continued its cover-up for the remaining two years of its term, brazenly obstructing justice under the world’s gaze.

The 2024 Acquittal: Justice Undone

On December 1, 2024, following the ouster of the Awami League government in the July 2024 uprising, a reconstituted High Court acquitted all 49 accused — including Tarique Rahman, Lutfozzaman Babar, and every person convicted in 2018.

On September 4, 2025, the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court dismissed petitions for retrial, upholding the acquittal.

Tarique Rahman — sentenced to life imprisonment for masterminding the assassination attempt that killed 24 people — was cleared of all charges. He returned to Bangladesh and was sworn in as Prime Minister on February 17, 2026.

The 24 victims remain dead. Their families have received no justice. The man whom a court found complicit in their murders now leads the country.

The Pattern

The August 21 grenade attack was not an isolated incident. It was part of a documented pattern of state-sponsored violence under the BNP-Jamaat coalition:

• October 2001: Post-election genocide against Hindus — 18,000+ rapes, 600 women assaulted in Bhola alone
• October 2002 – January 2003: Operation Clean Heart — 44+ killed in custody, 11,000 arrested
• April 2004: Chittagong arms haul — 10 truckloads of weapons for Indian insurgents, smuggled with intelligence agency supervision
• August 2004: This grenade attack — 24 killed, 500+ injured, state-run cover-up
• August 2005: JMB bombed 63 districts in a single day under state protection

Each crime was followed by the same playbook: fabricate a scapegoat, obstruct the investigation, protect the real perpetrators, and run out the clock.

And in 2024, the clock finally ran out — on justice itself.

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Sources

• Speedy Trial Tribunal-1, Dhaka — Verdict of October 10, 2018 (Judge Shahed Nuruddin)
• Human Rights Watch — “Bangladesh: Political Violence on All Sides” (2008)
• BBC News — Coverage of the August 21, 2004 attack and subsequent trials
• The Daily Star — Extensive reporting on the investigation, trial, and verdict (2004-2018)
• AFP — Reporting on Mufti Hannan’s confessions and court proceedings
• US Department of State — Statement of President George W. Bush condemning the attack
• International Crisis Group — Asia Reports on Bangladesh’s political violence
• Amnesty International — Documentation of political violence in Bangladesh
• Supreme Court Bar Association investigation findings on evidence destruction
• CID charge sheets and supplementary charge sheets (2008, 2011)
• Appellate Division, Supreme Court of Bangladesh — September 4, 2025 ruling