Part 3 of the Shamim Iskander series. Part 1: Looting Biman Airlines | Part 2: 17 Years, No Job, Luxury Life

The case had 36 witnesses.

It had a 57-page ACC charge sheet. It had bank records showing a man with no employment for 17 consecutive years somehow owning houses on two continents, a Barclays Platinum credit card in London, and a luxury SUV in Dhaka. It had investigators who had done the work — traced the money, identified the properties, documented exactly how Tk 1.33 crore in assets and Tk 81.81 lakh in concealed wealth appeared from nowhere.

On March 25, 2025, a Dhaka court discharged the case.

Exactly twelve months later, Shamim Iskander — Khaleda Zia’s younger brother, the man those 36 witnesses were prepared to testify against — sat in the VIP gallery of Bangladesh’s newly inaugurated 13th Parliament. His wife Kaniz Fatema was beside him. So was Shahina Khan Bindu, the elder sister of Prime Minister Tarique Rahman’s wife.

No cameras caught anything awkward. No press release mentioned the ACC case. He was simply there, as a guest of the new government, honored and unremarkable.

This is how accountability ends in Bangladesh. Not with a verdict. With a seating arrangement.

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What the Charge Sheet Said

The ACC filed the original case on 5 May 2008. The charge sheet followed on 18 August 2008. Both were specific documents built on specific evidence — not political declarations.

Shamim Iskander had left his job as a Biman flight engineer and, from 1991 onward, held no documented employment. No salary. No business registration. No professional income visible to tax authorities. For seventeen years, on paper, he was a man with almost nothing.

What investigators actually found:

• A house in Australia
• A house in Canada
• A Barclays Platinum credit card — a product that requires demonstrating substantial wealth to obtain in the UK
• A luxury SUV, seized by Dhaka police
• Bank transactions flagged in a parallel NBR inquiry involving his son Fayek Iskander

His own declaration to the ACC: approximately Tk 4 crore in assets plus 75 tola of gold. Investigators documented a further Tk 20.47 lakh beyond even that figure — and acknowledged they were likely seeing only the visible surface.

The 36 witnesses knew where the money came from. So did anyone who had read Part 1 of this series.

Between 2001 and 2006, while Khaleda Zia governed Bangladesh as Prime Minister, Shamim Iskander ran Biman Bangladesh Airlines. Not officially — he held no title. But he controlled which staff were transferred and fired. He decided which aircraft Biman leased and at what price. He determined which foreign maintenance companies won contracts, usually routed through his brother-in-law Shamsul Haque, who acted as their local agent in Dhaka. Shamsul Haque fled the country after the January 11, 2007 emergency and has been in London ever since.

The results were documented in Biman’s own records: Tk 250 crore in lease expenditures for aircraft that could have been purchased outright for less. Tk 40 crore in commissions. A defective Airbus acquired at Tk 100 crore over five years — against a market value of Tk 62 crore. By the end of 2006, Biman’s own pilots and staff had revolted openly against Shamim’s interference. Accounts from the time describe a crowd that nearly became a mob.

The money that built those Australian and Canadian houses came from Biman. The witnesses in the 2008 case knew this. Thirty-six of them were prepared to say so under oath.

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Seventeen Years in Court, Then Gone

The case was filed in the window created by the 1/11 caretaker government — the military-backed administration that arrested both Khaleda Zia and Sheikh Hasina in 2007 and launched the most aggressive anti-corruption drive in Bangladesh’s history. That government was temporary by design. It handed power to the Awami League after the December 2008 elections.

What followed was seventeen years of procedural drift.

The Awami League kept the case alive as political currency — proof of BNP corruption to wave at election time — while showing no urgency about actually finishing it. Hearings were adjourned. Witnesses were summoned and rescheduled. The charge sheet gathered age.

Then August 5, 2024: Sheikh Hasina boarded a military helicopter and left Bangladesh. The Awami League’s fifteen-year government collapsed in an afternoon. Muhammad Yunus was installed as head of an interim administration. And within months, courts across Dhaka began quietly working through the backlog of BNP-era cases — in reverse.

Tarique Rahman’s money laundering conviction — upheld by the High Court in 2016, confirmed by the Supreme Court, carrying a 7-year sentence — was acquitted by the Appellate Division on 6 March 2025. Nineteen days later, on March 25, Shamim Iskander’s case was discharged.

These were not independent judicial outcomes. They were the same outcome, applied systematically.

Discharge is a specific legal finding. It does not mean a defendant was found innocent. It means the court determined the case was insufficient to proceed to full trial. The distinction matters — because 36 witnesses and a documented asset trail across three countries is not normally what “insufficient” looks like. What changed between 2008 and 2025 was not the evidence. What changed was who controlled the government.

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The Erasure Is the Message

BNP spent years arguing that every case filed during the 1/11 period was fabricated — politically motivated prosecutions dressed up as anti-corruption work. This was always a convenient claim, made by defendants who had strong incentives to discredit the cases against them.

But consider what that claim actually requires you to believe about the Shamim Iskander case specifically.

You would have to believe that ACC investigators fabricated or manufactured evidence of houses in Australia and Canada. That they invented a Barclays Platinum credit card. That they created false bank records implicating his sons. That 36 witnesses — individuals who agreed to testify and give sworn statements — were all coordinated participants in a political conspiracy rather than people who had actually seen and experienced what the charge sheet described.

Or the alternative: the evidence was real. A man with no documented income for seventeen years accumulated international property and luxury assets because his sister was Prime Minister and he used that access to extract money from a national institution. The ACC documented it. Thirty-six witnesses confirmed it. And the case was discharged because the political environment had shifted, not because the facts had changed.

There is no version of this that leaves the judiciary looking like an independent institution.

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The Gallery Photograph

The VIP gallery of the 13th Parliament’s inaugural session was not a random collection of people.

It was a portrait of who Bangladesh now belongs to. Tarique Rahman’s in-laws. Senior BNP figures. And Shamim Iskander — the Prime Minister’s uncle by marriage, the man who looted Biman for five years, the man 36 witnesses were prepared to testify against, the man whose case was discharged twelve months before he took his seat.

The Dhaka Tribune photograph from that session shows him settled in the gallery, unremarkable, a face among faces. His wife beside him. Shahina Khan Bindu nearby.

Bangladesh Untold has documented everything that preceded that photograph: the Biman lease contracts, the commission structures, the defective aircraft, the maintenance kickbacks, the ACC investigators who built the case, the charge sheet they filed, the witnesses they assembled. All of it is documented. All of it is sourced. None of it was in the VIP gallery caption.

The photograph is public record. So is everything that preceded it. The distance between those two facts is what this project exists to close.

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While His Father Was Rehabilitated

On December 15, 2025 — three months before the parliamentary ceremony — a different Iskander was in the news.

Fasbir Iskander accepted the Study UK Alumni Award 2026 in the Business & Innovation category at the Radisson Blu in Dhaka. The award recognized his work as co-founder and publisher of The Front Page (@thefrontpagebd), a digital media platform with 212,000 Instagram followers that describes itself as “Bangladesh’s first forum and citizen journalism platform.”

Fasbir — also written Fasbeer in some records — studied at Royal Holloway and UCL, both University of London institutions. He co-founded The Front Page on November 20, 2020, with Shah Md. Akib Majumder, who serves as Chief Editor. In a 2024 interview with The Prestige magazine, Akib explained why they started the platform: because of “lack of freedom of speech for almost 17 years.” That is BNP’s precise political narrative for the Awami League period. It is not presented as a political position. It is presented as a founding principle.

During the July 2024 uprising, Fasbir was in the United States. He ran The Front Page’s coverage solo during the internet blackout, then assembled 20 to 30 international volunteers from Canada, Australia, Japan, Romania, Germany, Malaysia, the UK, and the US. He describes this as “standing with the students.”

In no interview, in no award citation, in no media profile, is Fasbir Iskander identified as Khaleda Zia’s nephew. His father is never named. The family connection — to the Prime Minister, to the man in the VIP gallery, to the subject of the ACC corruption case with 36 witnesses — does not appear anywhere in The Front Page’s public materials.

212,000 followers are reading content produced by a platform whose founder has an undisclosed direct family relationship with the current Prime Minister. That is not independent journalism. That is something else wearing its clothes.

Part 4 of this series will document The Front Page in full: its editorial patterns, its coverage of BNP and Awami League, its business model, and what “Bangladesh’s first citizen journalism platform” looks like when you know who built it and why.

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What Remains

The ACC charge sheet filed on August 18, 2008 still exists.

The statements from 36 witnesses still exist.

The property records for the Australian and Canadian houses still exist.

The Barclays Platinum credit card records still exist.

The Biman lease contracts, the commission payments, the correspondence that went through Khaleda Zia’s PM office — Khaleda’s personal secretary confirmed that Shamim visited the Hatiazar office regularly — all of it still exists.

The court issued a discharge. It did not erase the documents. It did not interview the 36 witnesses and find them dishonest. It did not examine the Australian and Canadian property records and find them fabricated. A discharge is a procedural finding about whether a case should proceed to trial. It is not a historical verdict on whether the events described in the charge sheet occurred.

Shamim Iskander is free. He sat in the VIP gallery. His son wins UK journalism awards. His family is rehabilitated.

The documents are still here.

So are we.

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Sources

• The Daily Star (July 20, 2008): “Shamim rode on Biman” — investigation into Shamim Iskander’s control of Biman Bangladesh Airlines during 2001–2006
• The Daily Star (May 5, 2008): ACC case filed against Shamim Iskander and Kaniz Fatema
• The Daily Star (August 18, 2008): ACC charge sheet submitted — 36 witnesses named, Tk 1.33 crore illegal acquisition, Tk 81.81 lakh concealed assets
• The Daily Star (March 25, 2025): Dhaka court discharges Shamim Iskander and Kaniz Fatema
• Dhaka Tribune (March 2026): Shamim Iskander and Kaniz Fatema photographed in VIP gallery, 13th Parliament inaugural session
• The Daily Star, Dhaka Mirror, The Federal, BD Pratidin (December 30, 2025): Shamim Iskander present at Evercare Hospital at Khaleda Zia’s death alongside Tarique Rahman and family members
• The Prestige (November 19, 2024): Interview with Fasbir Iskander and Shah Md. Akib Majumder, co-founders of The Front Page — founding motivation, July 2024 coverage, editorial claims
• Study UK Alumni Awards 2026: Fasbir Iskander named winner, Business & Innovation category; ceremony at Radisson Blu Dhaka, December 15, 2025
• ACC/NBR Bank Inquiry (2008): Fayek Iskander flagged for unexplained wealth transactions
• Bangladesh High Court (July 21, 2016): Tarique Rahman sentenced to 7 years for money laundering, Tk 20 crore fine
• Bangladesh Appellate Division (March 6, 2025): Tarique Rahman acquitted in money laundering case
• Human Rights Watch Bangladesh reports (2001–2007)
• Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index (2001–2005): Bangladesh ranked most corrupt country globally for five consecutive years

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Bangladesh Untold documents the factual record of Bangladesh’s political history using international human rights reports, diplomatic records, court documents, and verified investigative journalism. We do not accept advertising or political funding. All articles are published with full source citations.

Part 4 — The Front Page: When the Prime Minister’s Nephew Runs “Independent” Media — publishes next week.

“From Fugitive to Prime Minister” — The Incredible Escape, 17-Year Exile, and Return of Tarique Rahman

Part 3 of “The Dark Prince” — Tarique Rahman Exposé. Read Part 1: World Champion of Corruption and Part 2: The Grenade Attack That Nearly Killed Democracy.

In November 2008, the United States Ambassador to Bangladesh sent a classified cable to Washington describing a man he called a “symbol of kleptocratic government and violent politics.” The man was “notorious and widely feared” — someone who had “flagrantly and frequently” demanded bribes, who was linked to the deadliest political attack in Bangladesh’s history, and whose name had surfaced in an FBI investigation into transnational money laundering.

Eighteen years later, on February 17, 2026, that same man took the oath of office as the Prime Minister of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh.

His name is Tarique Rahman. And his journey — from arrest to exile, from fugitive to acquittal, from London drawing room to the Prime Minister’s residence — is perhaps the most extraordinary political resurrection in modern South Asian history. It is also, as this investigation argues, one of the most carefully engineered.

This is the story of how it happened.

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Chapter 1: The Fall — Arrest Under 1/11 (March 2007)

On January 11, 2007, Bangladesh’s military intervened. A caretaker government — nominally civilian but backed entirely by the armed forces — declared a state of emergency, suspended elections, and launched what it called a sweeping anti-corruption drive. The event is known simply as “1/11.”

The two primary targets were the country’s rival political dynasties: the Awami League’s Sheikh Hasina and BNP’s Khaleda Zia. Both were arrested. So were hundreds of politicians, business leaders, and party operatives from both sides.

But no arrest carried more symbolic weight than that of Tarique Rahman.

On March 7, 2007, Tarique was detained by the National Security Intelligence (NSI) and subsequently placed under the custody of the Joint Forces — a combined military-civilian law enforcement body created under emergency powers. He was held for 18 months.

The Charges

The cases filed against Tarique during and after 1/11 were extensive. Over the course of the caretaker government’s tenure, a total of 84 cases were registered against him, spanning:

• Money laundering — Tk 20.41 crore (approximately $2.4 million at the time) laundered through associates and shell entities
• The Zia Orphanage Trust — Siphoning funds from a charitable trust established in the name of former President Ziaur Rahman
• The August 21, 2004 grenade attack — 24 people killed, over 500 injured in a state-sponsored assassination attempt on opposition leader Sheikh Hasina (full investigation here)
• Extortion, arms trafficking, and abuse of power — Cases linked to the Hawa Bhaban shadow government
• The Chittagong arms haul — 10 truckloads of military weapons intercepted in 2004, intended for Indian insurgents (full investigation here)

These were not politically invented charges by any normal measure. Several predated 1/11 entirely. The grenade attack investigation had been running since 2004, interrupted by the BNP government’s own cover-up involving a fabricated suspect named “Joj Mia.” The corruption charges were rooted in evidence collected by the Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC), and the money laundering investigation had drawn the attention of the FBI and the US Department of Justice.

“Tarique Rahman, the notorious and widely feared son of former Prime Minister Khaleda Zia… Notorious for flagrantly and frequently demanding bribes in connection with government procurement actions and appointments to political office, Tarique is a symbol of kleptocratic government and violent politics in Bangladesh.”

— US Embassy Cable 08DHAKA1143, Ambassador James F. Moriarty, November 3, 2008 (WikiLeaks)

Claims of Torture

Tarique and his supporters have consistently claimed that he was tortured during his 18-month detention. BNP alleges that he was subjected to physical abuse by military intelligence officers, that he was denied adequate medical care, and that confessions and cooperation were coerced under duress.

These claims have never been independently verified. No international human rights investigation was permitted access during his detention. What is documented is that Bangladesh’s detention conditions during the emergency period were broadly criticized — for all political detainees, not Tarique alone.

However, the torture narrative would later become the central justification for the revenge that followed.

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Chapter 2: The Escape — September 11, 2008

On September 11, 2008 — a date that would acquire its own symbolism — Tarique Rahman was released on bail. But his release came with a condition that would later be disputed, denied, and ultimately erased from history.

According to multiple contemporaneous reports, Tarique signed a written declaration at Zia International Airport in which he agreed to:

• Leave Bangladesh immediately
• Resign from active politics
• Seek medical treatment abroad

He boarded a flight to London. He would not return for 17 years.

The US Embassy cable, sent just weeks later, described the arrangement with clinical precision:

“[Tarique] was released from prison in September 2008, partly on compassionate grounds and in connection with a written declaration at the airport that he was resigning from political activity.”

— US Embassy Cable 08DHAKA1143

The cable also noted the broader context of the deal:

“Following Tarique’s arrest in March 2007, his mother [Khaleda Zia] was arrested in September 2007 on corruption charges. Both were released before elections; Tarique was allowed to leave the country, reportedly after signing a declaration forgoing political activities.”

The specifics of who negotiated the release and under what exact terms remain partially obscured. What is clear is that Tarique left Bangladesh as a man facing dozens of criminal charges, with a written promise to stay out of politics, and with the understanding that his departure was a negotiated arrangement — not an acquittal.

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Chapter 3: The London Years — Exile and Remote Control (2008–2025)

For the next 17 years, Tarique Rahman lived in London — far from the courtrooms where his cases were being tried, far from the streets where BNP activists were being arrested, but never far from the party’s decision-making.

Running BNP from Abroad

Despite his written declaration to resign from politics, Tarique never stopped. From his London residence, he:

• Maintained daily contact with BNP’s standing committee via phone and video conference
• Approved (or vetoed) all major party decisions, from alliance strategies to candidate selections
• Was formally elevated to Acting Chairman of BNP — effectively running the party while his mother Khaleda Zia was imprisoned in Dhaka
• Directed BNP’s political strategy through a network of loyalists who traveled regularly between Dhaka and London
• Coordinated with diaspora BNP chapters across the UK, US, and Middle East

The irony was not lost on observers. A man who had signed a declaration renouncing politics was, from a flat in London, the single most powerful figure in Bangladesh’s largest opposition party.

Convicted in Absentia

While Tarique lived in London, Bangladesh’s courts continued to process the cases against him:

• 2016: Convicted in the Zia Orphanage Trust case — 7 years imprisonment, Tk 10 lakh fine
• 2018: Convicted in the August 21, 2004 grenade attack — life imprisonment. The court found that the attack was planned at Hawa Bhaban with Tarique’s direct involvement
• Multiple money laundering and corruption convictions accumulated over the years

Tarique’s legal team challenged every verdict. BNP called every conviction “politically motivated.” But the convictions stood — and they made Tarique a convicted criminal under Bangladesh law, ineligible to hold office, and subject to arrest the moment he set foot in the country.

The October 2025 Appearance

On October 2025, Tarique Rahman made his first media appearance in 17 years. In a video statement from London, he called the 1/11 military-backed caretaker government “maliciously motivated” and described its anti-corruption drive as a “conspiracy against democracy.”

He framed the entire 1/11 period — the emergency, the arrests, the investigations, the charges — as an illegitimate exercise designed to destroy BNP and its leadership. The timing was deliberate. By October 2025, the political ground in Bangladesh had already shifted beneath everyone’s feet.

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Chapter 4: The Uprising — July 2024

In July 2024, Bangladesh was convulsed by a student-led uprising that began as protests against a controversial job quota system and escalated into a full-scale movement demanding the resignation of Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina.

The Hasina government’s response was brutal — security forces fired on protesters, internet was shut down nationwide, and hundreds were killed. But the movement could not be stopped. On August 5, 2024, Sheikh Hasina fled Bangladesh by military helicopter, ending 15 years of uninterrupted Awami League rule.

An interim government led by Nobel laureate Dr. Muhammad Yunus took charge. The political landscape was suddenly, radically open. And for Tarique Rahman, the 17-year wait was nearly over.

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Chapter 5: The Great Acquittal — Erasing 84 Cases (Late 2024–2025)

What happened next was one of the most systematic judicial reversals in modern history. Between late 2024 and mid-2025, every single one of Tarique Rahman’s 84 criminal cases was dismissed, acquitted, or otherwise disposed of.

The pace and comprehensiveness of these acquittals were extraordinary:

Case	Original Verdict	Acquittal Date
August 21 Grenade Attack	Life imprisonment (2018)	December 1, 2024
Zia Orphanage Trust	7 years imprisonment (2016)	January 16, 2025
Money Laundering (Tk 20.41 crore)	Convicted	March 6, 2025
Remaining 81 cases	Various charges	Dismissed throughout 2024–2025

Consider what this means. The August 21 grenade attack — in which 24 people died and over 500 were injured, in which the trial court heard from hundreds of witnesses, in which the judge found a “well-orchestrated plan executed through abuse of state power” — was overturned. The life sentence: gone.

The Zia Orphanage Trust case — in which funds meant for orphans were allegedly siphoned into BNP’s political operations — was overturned. The money laundering case — which had drawn the attention of the FBI and the US Department of Justice, as documented in Cable 08DHAKA1143 — was overturned.

Every case. Every conviction. Every sentence. All 84.

Not a single conviction survived the new political dispensation. A man sentenced to life for the deadliest grenade attack in Bangladesh’s history walked free — not because new evidence proved his innocence, but because the political winds had changed.

Critics — including international legal observers, human rights organizations, and the families of August 21 victims — noted that the acquittals followed a clear political pattern: they began only after Hasina’s ouster, accelerated as BNP’s political influence grew under the interim government, and were completed just in time for Tarique to return as a free man.

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Chapter 6: The Return — December 25, 2025

On Christmas Day 2025 — December 25 — Tarique Rahman landed at Hazrat Shahjalal International Airport in Dhaka. He had left as a man on bail facing dozens of charges. He returned as a man acquitted of everything.

Seventeen years. Six thousand two hundred and fourteen days. That is how long Tarique Rahman stayed away from the country where he was born, where he built his political empire, and where courts had sentenced him to life in prison.

BNP organized massive rallies to welcome him. Hundreds of thousands of supporters lined the roads from the airport. The party machinery that had waited 17 years for this moment was in full operation.

The man who left Bangladesh signing a declaration to quit politics had returned to claim its highest office.

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Chapter 7: The Victory — February 2026

On February 12, 2026, Bangladesh held its national election. BNP won a landslide victory with a two-thirds parliamentary majority — the kind of supermajority that allows constitutional amendments.

Five days later, on February 17, 2026, Tarique Rahman was sworn in as the Prime Minister of Bangladesh.

The transformation was complete. The man described by the US Ambassador as a “symbol of kleptocratic government” now led the government. The man convicted of masterminding a grenade attack that killed 24 people now commanded the state. The man whose money laundering had been tracked by the FBI now controlled the nation’s treasury.

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Chapter 8: The Revenge — Arresting the Men Who Arrested Him

Within weeks of taking power, the new government began systematically arresting the officials who had led the 1/11 anti-corruption drive — the very people who had detained Tarique Rahman in 2007.

Lt. Gen. (Retd.) Masud Uddin Chowdhury — Arrested March 23, 2026

Lt. Gen. (Retd.) Masud Uddin Chowdhury was a senior military officer during the 2007-2009 caretaker government. After his military career, he served as Bangladesh High Commissioner to Australia (2008–2014) and was later elected as a Member of Parliament from Feni-3.

On March 23, 2026, he was arrested on 11 charges. His arrest came barely five weeks after Tarique Rahman took office.

Lt. Gen. (Retd.) Sheikh Mamun Khaled — Arrested March 26, 2026

Three days later, Lt. Gen. (Retd.) Sheikh Mamun Khaled — another key military figure during 1/11 — was arrested on charges of murder and corruption.

Mohammad Afzal Naser — Arrested March 30, 2026

On March 30, 2026, Mohammad Afzal Naser was arrested. The prosecution’s statement was remarkably explicit about the motivation:

Mohammad Afzal Naser was arrested because he was “involved in the arrest and torture of Tarique Rahman” during the 2007-2009 caretaker government.

— Bangladesh prosecution statement, March 30, 2026

There was no pretense of neutral justice here. The state openly acknowledged that the arrest was connected to what had been done to Tarique Rahman — not to any ongoing criminal investigation, not to any fresh evidence, but to the fact that this man had participated in detaining the person who was now Prime Minister.

International Response

Human Rights Watch took notice immediately. In a statement on April 1, 2026, HRW confirmed that all three arrested officials were “key figures during the 2007-2009 military-backed government” and called for scrutiny of the legal basis for their detention.

India’s NE News was more blunt, describing the arrests as:

“Acts of revenge and retaliation” by the new government against those who had carried out the 2007 anti-corruption drive.

— NE News India, April 2026

The pattern was unmistakable. The people being arrested were not random officials. They were the specific individuals who had been involved in Tarique Rahman’s detention, investigation, and prosecution. The new government was not pursuing justice — it was settling scores.

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Chapter 9: Why It Matters — The Strategic Logic of Revenge

The arrests of 1/11 officials are not merely acts of personal vengeance. They serve a sophisticated multi-layered strategic purpose:

1. Delegitimizing the Evidence

By framing the entire 1/11 period as illegitimate — as a “maliciously motivated” conspiracy rather than a legitimate anti-corruption drive — the Tarique government retroactively undermines every piece of evidence gathered during that period. If the arrests were illegal, then the investigations were tainted. If the investigations were tainted, then the convictions were unjust. If the convictions were unjust, then the acquittals were not political favors — they were corrections of historic wrongs.

This is circular logic disguised as legal principle.

2. Justifying the Acquittals

The mass acquittal of 84 cases is politically unsustainable without a narrative. The narrative is: 1/11 was a coup, everything that followed was illegitimate, and therefore Tarique was always innocent. The arrests of 1/11 officials reinforce this narrative by turning the investigators into the accused.

3. Exacting Personal Revenge

The prosecution’s own statement — that Afzal Naser was arrested for being “involved in the arrest and torture of Tarique Rahman” — makes the personal dimension explicit. This is the Prime Minister using state power to punish those who once exercised state power against him.

4. Eliminating Witnesses

Several of the 1/11 officials cooperated with international agencies — including the FBI — during their investigation of Tarique’s financial network. As documented in Part 1 of this series, the FBI investigated a $2 million payment from a Singaporean businessman to Tarique, and the US State Department imposed a visa ban on him based on the evidence gathered.

Officials who cooperated with these international investigations are now being arrested. The message to anyone who might testify about Tarique’s past is unmistakable: cooperate at your own risk.

5. Rewriting History

If 1/11 is successfully reframed as a conspiracy rather than an anti-corruption intervention, then everything that came from it — the evidence, the court proceedings, the international cooperation, the WikiLeaks cables — can be dismissed as fruit of a poisoned tree. The entire historical record of BNP’s corruption, Tarique’s money laundering, and the grenade attack conspiracy can be buried under a counter-narrative of persecution.

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Chapter 10: The India Connection

Perhaps the most revealing dimension of Tarique Rahman’s ascent is the role of India.

For 15 years, India under Prime Minister Narendra Modi maintained a close strategic partnership with Sheikh Hasina’s government. India considered Hasina a reliable partner on border security, counter-terrorism, and the containment of Islamist militancy in the region.

When Hasina fell in August 2024, India faced a strategic dilemma. The interim government under Muhammad Yunus was viewed with suspicion in New Delhi. The possibility of a Jamaat-e-Islami-influenced government — BNP’s traditional coalition partner — was India’s nightmare scenario.

India’s Pivot to Tarique

India’s solution was pragmatic and rapid: cultivate Tarique Rahman directly.

• PM Modi was the FIRST world leader to call Tarique on February 12, 2026 — election day — to congratulate him on BNP’s victory. Not after the results were final. On the day itself.
• India sent the Lok Sabha Speaker — one of the highest constitutional officials — to Tarique’s oath-taking ceremony on February 17, carrying a personal letter from PM Modi.
• Indian diplomatic sources described the outreach as a “strategic recalibration” — India would work with whoever was in power, as long as they were “cooperative.”

The calculation was straightforward: India preferred a cooperative Prime Minister with a corruption past it could leverage over an unpredictable Jamaat-influenced alternative it could not control. A compromised leader is, from a strategic standpoint, a useful leader.

India’s pivot from Hasina to Tarique was not an endorsement of his innocence — it was an acknowledgment of his inevitability. In the cold arithmetic of South Asian geopolitics, a pliant partner with baggage beats an ideological wildcard every time.

As India Today and the Indian Express reported extensively, India’s diplomatic machinery moved with unusual speed to establish rapport with Tarique — a man whose party had historically been considered anti-India and whose coalition partner, Jamaat-e-Islami, had openly opposed Bangladesh’s independence in 1971.

The message from New Delhi was clear: the past is negotiable when the future is at stake.

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The Full Circle: From “Kleptocrat” to Prime Minister

Consider the arc:

• 2001–2006: Tarique Rahman runs a shadow government from Hawa Bhaban, overseeing the most corrupt administration in Bangladesh’s history. The country is ranked the most corrupt nation on Earth for five consecutive years.
• 2004: A grenade attack planned at Hawa Bhaban kills 24 people. The government blames a pickpocket.
• 2005: The US Ambassador calls him a “symbol of kleptocratic government.”
• 2007: Arrested. Held for 18 months.
• 2008: Released on bail. Signs declaration to quit politics. Flees to London.
• 2008–2025: Runs BNP from exile for 17 years while being convicted in absentia on multiple charges including a life sentence for mass murder.
• 2024: The political landscape shifts. Hasina falls.
• 2024–2025: All 84 cases systematically acquitted.
• December 2025: Returns to Bangladesh.
• February 2026: Sworn in as Prime Minister.
• March 2026: Begins arresting the people who arrested him.

This is not a story about justice delayed. This is a story about justice reversed.

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What This Means for Bangladesh

The implications of Tarique Rahman’s ascent extend far beyond one man’s political career. They reach into the foundations of Bangladesh’s democratic institutions.

The judiciary has demonstrated that convictions — even for murder, even based on extensive evidence and witness testimony — can be overturned when political power shifts. Every future court verdict in Bangladesh now carries an implicit asterisk: subject to change based on who is in power.

The anti-corruption apparatus has been gutted. Officials who participated in legitimate investigations are being arrested. The message to every future investigator, prosecutor, and judge is: do not pursue the powerful, because the powerful will one day come for you.

International cooperation on corruption and terrorism — with the FBI, with Interpol, with foreign intelligence agencies — has been rendered dangerous. Bangladeshi officials who cooperated with international investigations are now facing prosecution. No rational official will cooperate again.

Historical truth is being rewritten in real time. The 1/11 anti-corruption drive — which, whatever its flaws, produced evidence that has been validated by international agencies, cited in US diplomatic cables, and adjudicated in courts over more than a decade — is being refashioned as a conspiracy. The message: evidence means nothing. Power means everything.

And the victims — the 24 people killed on August 21, 2004, the 500 injured, the families who waited years for justice — have been told, definitively, that their lives mattered less than one man’s political ambition.

This is the story of a man who was called a kleptocrat by the United States, convicted of mass murder by his own country’s courts, banned from entry by the world’s most powerful nation — and who today sits in the Prime Minister’s chair, using the power of the state to arrest the people who once dared to hold him accountable.

If this does not alarm you, nothing will.

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This is Part 3 of “The Dark Prince” — a three-part investigation into Tarique Rahman by Bangladesh Untold.

• Part 1: World Champion of Corruption — How BNP Made Bangladesh the Most Corrupt Country on Earth
• Part 2: The Grenade Attack That Nearly Killed Democracy — August 21, 2004
• Part 3: From Fugitive to Prime Minister — The Incredible Escape, 17-Year Exile, and Return of Tarique Rahman (this article)

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Sources

• WikiLeaks — US Embassy Cable 08DHAKA1143_a, Ambassador James F. Moriarty, November 3, 2008
• Human Rights Watch — Statement on arrests of former military officials, April 1, 2026
• NE News India — “Acts of revenge and retaliation,” April 2026
• BBC News, Al Jazeera, Reuters, The Guardian — Coverage of Bangladesh 2024 uprising and 2026 elections
• India Today, Indian Express — Coverage of India-Tarique diplomatic relations, February 2026
• Dhaka Tribune, The Daily Star, The Business Standard — Contemporaneous reporting on acquittals, 2024–2025
• Transparency International — Corruption Perceptions Index, 2001–2005

On the morning of August 17, 2005, approximately 500 bombs detonated across 63 of Bangladesh’s 64 districts within a span of thirty minutes. It was the single largest coordinated terrorist attack in Bangladesh’s history — and it happened under a government that had denied the attackers even existed just seven months earlier.

The bombs were small — roughly the size of salt shakers. They were calibrated not to maximize casualties, but to maximize terror. And they succeeded. Two people died. Over 115 were injured. But the real damage was the message: a militant Islamist organization that the BNP government had publicly denied existed had just demonstrated the ability to strike every corner of the nation simultaneously.

This is the story of how Jamaat-ul-Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB) grew from a fringe group into a nationwide terrorist network under the protection of a government that refused to see — or chose not to see — the monster it had nurtured.

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11:00 AM, August 17, 2005: 30 Minutes That Shook a Nation

At exactly 11:00 AM Bangladesh Standard Time, the first bombs detonated. Within the next thirty minutes, approximately 459 to 500 bombs exploded at 300 locations across 63 of Bangladesh’s 64 districts. Only Munshiganj was spared.

The targets were carefully chosen for symbolic impact:

• Dhaka: Bombs detonated near the Bangladesh Secretariat, the Supreme Court Complex, the Prime Minister’s Office, the Dhaka University campus, the Dhaka Sheraton Hotel, and Zia International Airport
• District towns: Government buildings, courthouses, and railway stations were hit across the country
• Strategic timing: The attacks occurred during working hours to ensure maximum public witnesses and media coverage

The Daily Star captured the scale in its headline the next morning: “459 Blasts in 63 Districts in 30 Minutes” (Daily Star, August 18, 2005).

The Victims

Two people were killed:

• Abdus Salam, a 10-year-old schoolboy, was injured when a bomb exploded outside his house in Savar. He died in the hospital.
• Rabiul Islam, a rickshaw driver, was injured when seven bombs exploded at Biswa Road crossing near Shah Neamatullah College in Nawabganj. He died on the way to Rajshahi Medical College Hospital.

Over 115 others were injured, many of them bystanders, market vendors, and government workers caught in the blasts.

The Leaflets

At nearly every bomb site, investigators found leaflets in Bangla and Arabic. They carried a chilling declaration:

“We’re the soldiers of Allah. We’ve taken up arms for the implementation of Allah’s law the way the Prophet, Sahabis and heroic Mujahideen have done for centuries… it is time to implement Islamic law in Bangladesh.“

— JMB leaflet recovered from bomb sites (Bangladesh Observer, August 18, 2005)

Five days later, on August 22, JMB posted a declaration on a jihadist website: “We only want to see the rule of Allah,” it read, and warned of “direct action” should the government “try to repress the clerics and intellectuals of Islam.”

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The Organization Behind the Attack: JMB

Jamaat-ul-Mujahideen Bangladesh was founded in April 1998 by Shaykh Abdur Rahman, a graduate of Madina University who had traveled to Afghanistan to participate in jihad. His co-leader was Siddiqul Islam, known as “Bangla Bhai” — a former member of Islami Chhatra Shibir, the student wing of Jamaat-e-Islami.

This detail is critical: both of JMB’s top leaders were products of the Jamaat-e-Islami ecosystem — the very party that sat in Khaleda Zia’s coalition government as a full partner (Jamestown Foundation, “The Bengali Taliban,” 2006).

JMB’s Structure

By 2005, JMB had built an organizational infrastructure that rivaled a military operation:

Level	Name	Members	Role
Tier 1	Eshar	~200	Full-time operatives reporting to Central Committee
Tier 2	Gayeri Easher	~10,000	Regional network members
Tier 3	Sathis/Sudhis	Thousands	Young foot soldiers and assistants

The group was governed by a seven-member Majlis-e-Shura (Central Committee), had 16 regional commanders and 64 district heads. They maintained at least 10 training camps in Rajshahi, Naogaon, and Natore districts, where recruits were trained using footage from al-Qaeda’s Afghan camps and recorded speeches of Osama bin Laden (Star Weekend Magazine, December 5, 2005).

They even had a dedicated suicide squad: the Shahid Nasirullah Arafat Brigade, whose members received “insurance policies” from the organization (UPI, March 2, 2006).

Funding

JMB’s operations were funded through a combination of:

• Robbery and extortion from local businesses
• Illegal tolls on traders in areas they controlled
• Donations from sympathetic patrons and expatriate Bangladeshis
• 10 Islamic charities and NGOs identified in a joint 2005 report by Bangladesh’s Special Branch, NSI, and DGFI as promoting and funding extremist groups including JMB

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A Government in Denial — Or in Collusion?

Perhaps the most damning aspect of the August 17 bombings is not the attack itself, but what preceded it. The BNP government had years of warnings about JMB — and systematically ignored, downplayed, or suppressed every single one.

The Timeline of Denial

2003: Bangladeshi intelligence agencies warned the BNP government about JMB and the threat it posed to the state (Daily Star, August 28, 2005). The warning was ignored.

January 26, 2005: A BNP state minister publicly denied JMB’s existence — just seven months before the group bombed 63 districts (Council on Foreign Relations, August 29, 2005).

February 23, 2005: JMB and its twin organization JMJB were finally banned — but only after attacks on NGOs and under direct pressure from the United States and the European Union. The ban was largely cosmetic.

Shortly after the ban: Bangla Bhai, the JMJB leader, was allowed to escape across the Indian border. No serious effort was made to apprehend him (CFR, August 29, 2005).

August 17, 2005: 500 bombs across 63 districts. The government expressed “shock” at JMB’s organizational capabilities — capabilities its own intelligence agencies had warned about two years earlier.

Why Did the Government Look Away?

The answer lies in the BNP’s coalition politics. The BNP-led Four-Party Alliance included Jamaat-e-Islami — whose student wing, Islami Chhatra Shibir, had produced both JMB leaders. As the Jamestown Foundation documented:

“JMB drew its ideological and political support from Jamaat-e-Islami — both executed JMB leaders Abdur Rahman and Bangla Bhai were active members [of Shibir] — which was the reason why the BNP government, which relies on JeI support, dragged its feet in taking strong action against religious extremist groups despite credible evidence.“

— Jamestown Foundation, “The Bengali Taliban: Jamaat-ul-Mujahideen Bangladesh”

The International Crisis Group was equally direct:

“Though religious extremism arose under its watch, the BNP-led coalition government (2001-2006), which included the Jamaat, did not target radical Islamist groups.“

— ICG Asia Report No. 277, April 2016

And in a separate report:

“Bangladesh’s political mainstream has either deliberately used [JMB] for narrow political ends, as during the coalition government led by BNP from 2006 to 2007, or been distracted by other concerns.”

— ICG Asia Report No. 187, March 2010, “The Threat from Jamaat-ul Mujahideen Bangladesh”

Political Connections Exposed After Arrest

After the August 17 bombings, phone records and interrogation reports revealed direct lines of communication between JMB leaders and BNP officials:

• After the bombings, Bangla Bhai had a mobile phone conversation with then Deputy Minister Ruhul Quddus Talukder Dulu
• He also spoke with BNP Member of Parliament Nadim Mostafa and then Rajshahi City Mayor Mizanur Rahman Minu
• During interrogation, Bangla Bhai stated that BNP MP Abu Hena maintained regular contact with JMB through his nephew

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The Aftermath: Too Little, Too Late

The Delayed Crackdown

Only after the August 17 bombings did the BNP government finally move against JMB — and even then, only under enormous pressure from the Bangladesh Army and public outrage.

The government offered a reward of US$70,000 for information leading to the arrest of Bangla Bhai and Abdur Rahman (Refworld/BBC, 2006). But the arrests didn’t come for another seven months.

The Escalation That Followed

Between the August 17 bombings and the eventual arrests, JMB escalated dramatically:

November 14, 2005: Two judges were killed by a bomb thrown at their vehicle in Jhalakathi, 120 kilometers south of Dhaka.

November 29, 2005: Bangladesh experienced its first-ever suicide bombing. Seven people were killed in Gazipur, including the suspected bomber. Two police officers were killed in a separate attack in Chittagong. At least 16 others were injured.

These attacks — judge assassinations and suicide bombings — represented a terrifying escalation that might have been prevented had the government acted on its intelligence in 2003.

The Final Reckoning

March 2, 2006: Bangla Bhai was captured by RAB in Mymensingh after a firefight.

March 6, 2006: Shaykh Abdur Rahman was arrested.

March 29, 2007: Six JMB leaders were executed by hanging:

1. Shaykh Abdur Rahman — JMB founder and chief
2. Siddiqul Islam / Bangla Bhai — military commander
3. Ataur Rahman Sunny — military wing leader
4. Abdul Awal — organizational leader
5. Khaled Saifullah — operative
6. Iftekhar Hasan Mamun — operative

By 2013, courts had disposed of 200 out of 273 cases filed in connection with the bombings. 58 people were sentenced to death, 150 to life imprisonment, and 300 others to various prison terms (Dhaka Tribune, August 16, 2013).

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The BNP Response: Blame Everyone Else

In the immediate aftermath, BNP leaders scrambled to deflect responsibility:

• Motiur Rahman Nizami, the Jamaat-e-Islami chief serving as Industries Minister in BNP’s cabinet, blamed India for the bombings (The Economist, August 25, 2005)
• Moudud Ahmed, the BNP Law Minister, dismissed the threat entirely: “If they try for 100 years, they will not turn Bangladesh into a Taliban state” (The Economist, August 25, 2005)

This was the same Motiur Rahman Nizami who was later convicted of war crimes during the 1971 Liberation War and executed in 2016. And the same government that had arms smuggling operations passing through state intelligence agencies (see: The Chittagong Arms Haul).

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International Alarm

“Bangladeshi officials were shocked by JMB’s ability to pull off such a well-organized attack; after all, a state minister denied the group’s existence as recently as January 26.”

— Council on Foreign Relations, August 29, 2005

Ahmad Tariq Karim, former Bangladeshi Ambassador to the United States and senior adviser at the University of Maryland, warned: “The government has been complacent. It needs to get its act together or risk being overrun by fringe groups of radicals” (CFR, 2005).

The South Asia Intelligence Review‘s editor wrote: “That a conspiracy of such magnitude could escape the notice of intelligence agencies defies belief” (August 22, 2005).

The Council on Foreign Relations noted that the government’s crackdowns on militants had been “halfhearted” and that “experts say this is the work of government officials who sympathize with the radical Islamists.”

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The Bigger Picture: A Pattern of State-Enabled Terror

The August 17, 2005 bombings cannot be understood in isolation. They were the culmination of a systematic pattern under BNP-Jamaat rule:

Year	Event	State Role
2001	Post-election violence — 18,000+ rapes, targeted minority attacks	BNP supporters; 25 MPs identified by judicial commission
2002	Operation Clean Heart — 44+ deaths in custody	Government-ordered military operation; deaths covered by Indemnity Act
2004	Chittagong Arms Haul — 4,930 guns, 27,020 grenades seized	NSI, DGFI officials charged; weapons for ULFA insurgents
2004	August 21 Grenade Attack — 24 killed targeting Sheikh Hasina	19 sentenced to death including State Home Minister Babar
2004	Bangla Bhai terrorizes northwest Bangladesh	Operated openly with police cooperation; 500+ tortured
2005	August 17 — 500 bombs across 63 districts	Government denied JMB existed 7 months prior; Jamaat links to JMB leadership

As the International Crisis Group concluded, the BNP-Jamaat coalition’s complicity “allowed groups like JMB, HuJI-B, and JMJB to establish training camps, often in collaboration with the Rohingya Solidarity Organization in Bandarban” (Global CDG).

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The Uncomfortable Questions

1. How did JMB build a 10,000-member network with training camps, a suicide squad, and district-level commanders across 64 districts without the government noticing? Intelligence agencies warned the government in 2003. Someone chose to ignore them.
2. Why was Bangla Bhai allowed to escape after the February 2005 ban? He was the most wanted militant in the country, and he walked across the border.
3. Why did it take seven months after the bombings to arrest the leaders? The government had offered a $70,000 reward but couldn’t find two men its own intelligence agencies had been tracking for years.
4. What was the full extent of BNP-JMB coordination? Phone records showed direct contact between JMB leaders and BNP ministers. What other communications were never investigated?
5. Why has the current government — led by many of the same BNP figures — never addressed these questions? Tarique Rahman, now Prime Minister, was convicted (later acquitted) in connection with the August 21 grenade attack. His coalition partner Jamaat-e-Islami produced both JMB leaders.

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A Child Named Abdus Salam

On the morning of August 17, 2005, ten-year-old Abdus Salam was at home in Savar when a bomb exploded outside his house. He was rushed to the hospital. He didn’t make it.

Abdus Salam didn’t know what JMB was. He didn’t know about Bangla Bhai or Abdur Rahman or the Majlis-e-Shura. He didn’t know that a state minister had denied the existence of the organization that killed him. He was ten years old.

He is the reason this history matters. He is the reason we document. He is the reason we refuse to let a government’s willful blindness be forgotten.

Because when a government knows a terrorist organization exists, has the intelligence to prove it, and chooses to look away because that organization is politically useful — the blood of a ten-year-old boy is on the government’s hands.

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Sources

• The Daily Star, “459 Blasts in 63 Districts in 30 Minutes,” August 18, 2005
• BBC News, “Bombs Explode Across Bangladesh,” August 17, 2005
• CNN, “Bomb Blasts Shake Bangladesh,” August 17, 2005
• Council on Foreign Relations, “Bangladesh: Nationwide Attacks Raise Fears of Growing Islamist Presence,” August 29, 2005
• The Economist, “All Over the Place,” August 25, 2005
• Jamestown Foundation, “The Bengali Taliban: Jamaat-ul-Mujahideen Bangladesh”
• International Crisis Group, Asia Report No. 277, “Political Conflict, Extremism and Criminal Justice in Bangladesh,” April 2016
• International Crisis Group, Asia Report No. 187, “The Threat from Jamaat-ul Mujahideen Bangladesh,” March 2010
• International Crisis Group, Asia Report No. 121, “Bangladesh Today,” October 2006
• BBC News, “Ten Bangladesh Militants Condemned to Death,” June 20, 2013
• Dhaka Tribune, “No Compiled Data on Aug 17 Serial Blasts,” August 16, 2013
• UNHCR/Refworld, “Bangladesh: Government Action Taken Against Militants,” 2006
• Bangladesh Observer, JMB leaflet text, August 18, 2005
• Star Weekend Magazine, JMB organizational structure, December 5, 2005
• New York Times, “Bangladesh Executes 6 Islamist Militants,” March 30, 2007
• UPI, “Shahid Nasirullah Arafat Brigade insurance policies,” March 2, 2006
• South Asia Intelligence Review, editorial, August 22, 2005

Bangladesh Untold documents the events that shaped Bangladesh’s modern history — using international sources, court records, and official reports. For the full 1/11 Chronicle series, see Part 1, Part 2, Part 3, and Part 4.

This is Part 2 of a three-part investigative series, “The Dark Prince” — The Tarique Rahman Exposé, documenting the corruption, extortion, and international money trail of the man who now leads Bangladesh as Prime Minister. Read Part 1: “Mr. Ten Percent” — How Tarique Rahman Ran a Parallel Government from Hawa Bhaban.

In Part 1, we documented how Tarique Rahman ran a shadow government from Hawa Bhaban, extorting billions from Bangladesh’s business community between 2001 and 2006. But extortion was only the beginning. The real story — the one that caught the attention of the FBI, the U.S. Department of Justice, and governments across three continents — is about what happened to the money afterward. Where did the hundreds of millions go? The answer leads to a single bank in a city-state 3,200 kilometers from Dhaka: Citibank, Singapore.

This is the story of how U.S. federal investigators followed a money trail from Bangladeshi construction sites and telecom contracts to numbered bank accounts in Singapore — and how, for the first time in history, an FBI agent walked into a Dhaka courtroom to testify about what she found.

The Singapore Connection: Citibank Account #158052

Every money laundering scheme needs an offshore destination — a place where dirty money can be cleaned, stored, and spent beyond the reach of domestic law enforcement. For Tarique Rahman, that destination was Singapore.

According to the FBI’s investigation and U.S. Department of Justice filings, the central node of Tarique Rahman’s offshore financial network was a set of accounts at Citibank Singapore, held under account numbers 158052-008 and 158052-016. The accounts were registered in the name of Giasuddin Al Mamun — Tarique’s business partner and the man who served as the financial conduit for the operation.

But the accounts weren’t just Mamun’s. FBI investigators discovered that a supplementary Gold Visa credit card — number 4568-8170-1006-4122 — was issued on Mamun’s Citibank Singapore account in the name of Tarique Rahman. A photocopy of Tarique’s passport (number Y0085483), listing his father as “late President Ziaur Rahman Bir Uttam” and his mother as “Begum Khaleda Zia,” had been submitted to Citibank Singapore to obtain the card.

This was no loose association. This was Tarique Rahman’s name, passport, and credit card — directly linked to an account that would become the subject of an international money laundering investigation.

How the Money Moved

The scheme operated with brutal simplicity. Bribes were collected in Bangladesh — from construction companies, telecom firms, Chinese state enterprises, and individual businesspeople seeking government favor. The cash, almost always in U.S. dollars, was then physically transported or wire-transferred to Singapore, where it was deposited into Mamun’s Citibank accounts. From there, the funds were used for international travel, luxury purchases, and further investments — all accessible to Tarique Rahman through his supplementary credit card.

Bank records obtained by the FBI covering 2002–2006 revealed that Tarique’s credit card was used for $50,613.97 in charges, including travel to Athens, Frankfurt, Singapore, Bangkok, and Dubai, along with shopping and medical expenses. This may seem modest for a man accused of laundering millions — but the credit card was merely the visible tip of a vast submerged iceberg. The real money sat in the accounts themselves, fed by a steady stream of bribe payments from across Bangladesh’s public contracting landscape.

The FBI Comes to Dhaka: Debra LaPrevotte’s Historic Testimony

On November 16, 2011, something unprecedented happened in a Dhaka courtroom. FBI Supervisory Special Agent Debra LaPrevotte took the witness stand in Special Judge’s Court-3 to testify in the money laundering case against Tarique Rahman and Giasuddin Al Mamun. It was the first time in Bangladesh’s history that an FBI agent had testified before a court in the country.

LaPrevotte, then 50 years old and a 16-year FBI veteran with a master’s degree in forensic science and advanced training in money-laundering techniques, introduced herself to the court with a statement that underscored the gravity of her presence:

“I’m a supervisory special agent for the Federal Bureau of Investigation. I’ve been an FBI agent for 16 years. I have a master’s degree in forensic science and advanced training in money-laundering techniques. In my country, I’m considered an expert in international money-laundering for testimony purposes.”

— FBI Supervisory Special Agent Debra LaPrevotte, testimony before Dhaka Special Judge’s Court-3, November 16, 2011 (The Daily Star)

How the Investigation Began

LaPrevotte told the court that in 2008, Bangladesh’s interim government had submitted a mutual legal assistance request to the United States, asking for help investigating the asset recovery cases connected to Tarique Rahman and his associates. In response, the U.S. government sent representatives from the Department of Justice to Dhaka to assess the request and meet with the Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC).

But here is the critical detail — one that demolishes any claim that the investigation was a political witch hunt:

“The US reviewed this request to ensure that it was not politically motivated.”

— FBI SSA Debra LaPrevotte, Dhaka court testimony, November 16, 2011

The United States government independently verified that the investigation was legitimate before authorizing FBI involvement. This was not a favor to any Bangladeshi political faction. It was a deliberate, vetted decision by the U.S. Department of Justice to pursue evidence of international money laundering that had touched U.S. financial institutions.

What the FBI Found

After receiving authorization, LaPrevotte began her investigation and quickly discovered the Singapore accounts. Through mutual legal assistance requests to Singapore, she obtained detailed banking records for Citibank accounts 158052-008 and 158052-016 for the years 2004 and 2005.

Her findings, presented in a 75-minute deposition, were devastating:

• Two credit cards were issued against Mamun’s account — one Visa card in Mamun’s name (number 4568-8170-0006-4124) and one in Tarique Rahman’s name (number 4568-8170-1006-4122).
• A photocopy of Tarique’s passport (number Y0085483) had been submitted to Citibank Singapore to obtain the card, confirming Tarique’s direct knowledge of and participation in the account.
• A Bangladeshi businesswoman named Khadiza Islam had transferred $750,000 into Mamun’s Singapore account on August 18, 2003. This single transfer constituted the majority of the funds in the account — the same funds used to make payments on Tarique Rahman’s credit card.
• LaPrevotte presented 43 pages of documentary evidence to the court, followed by an additional 229 pages of banking records.
• In December 2009, LaPrevotte had certified that the records received from Singapore by the U.S. and by the Bangladesh government were identical, establishing an unbroken evidentiary chain.

As she concluded her testimony:

“These funds were transferred on August 18, 2003. This makes up most of the funds in Mr. Mamun’s account at Citibank Singapore, which was used to make payments from Tarique Rahman’s credit card. That is my testimony.”

— FBI SSA Debra LaPrevotte, final statement to the court, November 16, 2011 (The Daily Star)

Throughout the proceedings, Giasuddin Al Mamun stood in the dock at the back of the courtroom. Tarique Rahman was absent — a fugitive living in London.

The $750,000 Khadiza Islam Bribe

Who was Khadiza Islam, and why did she transfer three-quarters of a million dollars to a Singapore bank account belonging to a BNP operative?

Khadiza Islam was the chairperson of Nirman Construction Company Ltd. According to the Anti-Corruption Commission’s case statement, she paid BDT 20.41 crore (approximately $2.66 million at the time) to Mamun in exchange for securing a contract for an 80-megawatt power plant in Tongi, near Dhaka. The money was transferred to Mamun’s Citibank NA account in Singapore.

The $750,000 transfer that FBI Agent LaPrevotte traced was a component of this broader payment — the portion that landed directly in the Citibank account that funded Tarique Rahman’s credit card. This was a textbook quid pro quo: a businesswoman pays for government favor, and the money flows offshore to the accounts of the man who controlled those government decisions.

The Siemens Scandal: A 2% Commission on Everything

The Khadiza Islam bribe was damaging. The Siemens scandal was catastrophic — because it wasn’t just a Bangladeshi case. It was part of one of the largest corporate bribery prosecutions in history.

On December 15, 2008, Siemens Aktiengesellschaft (Siemens AG), the German industrial conglomerate, and three of its subsidiaries pleaded guilty to violations of the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA). In its plea, Siemens Bangladesh admitted that from May 2001 to August 2006, it caused corrupt payments of at least $5,319,839 to be made through purported “business consultants” to Bangladeshi officials in exchange for favorable treatment during the bidding process on a mobile telephone project.

But the Bangladesh angle went deeper than Siemens’ global guilty plea. According to the classified U.S. Embassy cable 08DHAKA1143_a, authored by Ambassador James F. Moriarty:

“According to a witness who funneled bribes from Siemens to Tarique and his brother Koko, Tarique received a bribe of approximately two percent on all Siemens deals in Bangladesh (paid in US dollars). This case is currently being pursued by DOJ Asset Forfeiture (POC: Deputy Chief Linda Samuels) and by the FBI (POC: Debra Laprevotte).”

— U.S. Embassy Cable 08DHAKA1143_a, classified by Ambassador James F. Moriarty, November 3, 2008 (WikiLeaks)

Two percent on all Siemens deals. Not one contract. Not one project. Every single Siemens transaction in Bangladesh carried a hidden tax — a personal commission paid in U.S. dollars to Tarique Rahman and his brother Arafat Rahman “Koko.” Given Siemens’ massive footprint in Bangladesh’s telecommunications and energy infrastructure during this period, the total amount funneled to the Rahman brothers would have run into the millions.

And Siemens admitted it. This was not an allegation from a political rival. It was a confession by one of the world’s largest corporations, entered as part of a guilty plea in U.S. federal court.

DOJ Asset Forfeiture: $3 Million in Singapore

On January 8, 2009, the U.S. Department of Justice escalated the case to its logical conclusion. Acting Assistant Attorney General Matthew Friedrich of the Criminal Division announced that the DOJ had filed a forfeiture action against accounts worth nearly $3 million in Singapore — accounts alleged to hold the proceeds of “a wide-ranging conspiracy to bribe public officials in Bangladesh.”

“This action shows the lengths to which U.S. law enforcement will go to recover the proceeds of foreign corruption, including acts of bribery and money laundering. Not only will the Department, for example, prosecute companies and executives who violate the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, we will also use our forfeiture laws to recapture the illicit facilitating payments often used in such schemes.”

— Acting Assistant Attorney General Matthew Friedrich, DOJ Press Release #09-020, January 9, 2009 (U.S. Department of Justice)

The DOJ’s forfeiture complaint related primarily to bribes paid to Arafat “Koko” Rahman — Tarique’s younger brother — in connection with public works projects awarded by the Bangladesh government to Siemens AG and China Harbor Engineering Company. The China Harbor project involved building a new mooring containment terminal at the port of Chittagong.

Key facts from the DOJ filing:

• The bribe payments from Siemens and China Harbor were made in U.S. dollars
• The funds flowed through U.S. financial institutions before being deposited in Singapore accounts — giving the U.S. jurisdiction
• The case was investigated by the FBI’s Washington Field Office in cooperation with Bangladeshi law enforcement
• The case was prosecuted by Deputy Chief Linda Samuel and Trial Attorney Frederick Reynolds of the Criminal Division’s Asset Forfeiture and Money Laundering Section

Koko was ultimately fined $5.2 million, and assets including those of a company in Singapore called Fairhill — also set up by Koko — were confiscated. The case is documented in the World Bank’s Stolen Asset Recovery Initiative (StAR) database, which tracks international kleptocracy cases.

The Full Bribery Ledger: What the U.S. Embassy Documented

The DOJ’s asset forfeiture was aimed at Koko’s accounts, but the U.S. Embassy’s classified cable — 08DHAKA1143_a, signed by Ambassador Moriarty — painted a far broader picture of Tarique Rahman’s personal corruption. The cable, sent on November 3, 2008, laid out case after case in clinical detail:

Source of Bribe	Amount	Purpose
Siemens AG	~2% of all deals (USD)	Commission on all Siemens contracts in Bangladesh
Harbin Company (Chinese)	$750,000	Paid to open a plant; transported to Citibank Singapore
Monem Construction	$450,000	To secure government contracts
Khadiza Islam / Nirman Construction	$750,000+	For power plant contract; transferred to Singapore
Kabir Murder Case	$3.1 million (BDT 210M)	To thwart prosecution of Sanvir Sobhan
Al Amin Construction	$150,000	Extortion — pay or face company closure

The Harbin Company Payment

The Harbin Company, a Chinese construction firm, paid $750,000 to Tarique to secure permission to open a plant in Bangladesh. According to ACC sources cited in the Embassy cable, “one of Tarique’s cronies received the bribe and transported it to Singapore for deposit with Citibank.” The same Citibank. The same Singapore. The same pipeline.

Monem Construction

An ACC investigator advised U.S. Embassy officials that Monem Construction paid a bribe worth $450,000 to Tarique to secure government contracts. In a country where the per capita income was roughly $500 at the time, this single payment represented nearly a thousand lifetimes of average earnings.

The Kabir Murder Case: $3.1 Million to Obstruct Justice

Perhaps the most disturbing item on the ledger involves murder. According to the Embassy cable, the ACC had evidence that Tarique accepted a 210 million taka ($3.1 million USD) bribe to thwart the prosecution of Sanvir Sobhan, son of the chairman of the Bashundara Group — one of Bangladesh’s most powerful industrial conglomerates. Sanvir was accused of killing Humayun Kabir, a Bashundara Group director.

“The ACC has evidence that Tarique accepted a 210 million taka (3.1 million USD) bribe to thwart the prosecution of a murder case against Sanvir Sobhan. Sanvir is the son of the chairman of the Bashundura Group… Sanvir was accused in the killing of Humayun Kabir, a Bashundura Group director. An investigation by the ACC confirmed Tarique had solicited the payment, promising to clear Sanvir of all charges.”

— U.S. Embassy Cable 08DHAKA1143_a, paragraph 6(D) (WikiLeaks)

This was not a bribe for a contract or a favorable business decision. This was $3.1 million to obstruct a murder prosecution. Tarique was selling impunity itself.

Al Amin Construction: “Pay or We Shut You Down”

The extortion was not always sophisticated. In the case of Al Amin Construction, the method was pure coercion. According to the cable, Tarique “threatened Al Amin Construction owner Amin Ahmed with closure of the company unless he received a payment of $150,000 USD.” This was documented alongside similar accusations from multiple business leaders, including Mohammad Aftab Uddin Khan of Reza Construction, Mir Zahir Hossian of Mir Akhter Hossain Ltd., and Harun Ferdousi — each describing “a systematic pattern of extortion on a multi-million dollar scale.”

The U.S. Verdict: Visa Ban and “Hundreds of Millions”

Faced with this mountain of evidence, the U.S. Embassy in Dhaka took the extraordinary step of recommending that Tarique Rahman be banned from entering the United States. The cable explicitly requested a security advisory opinion under Section 212(f) of the Immigration and Nationality Act and Presidential Proclamation 7750, which allows the President to suspend the entry of foreign nationals involved in egregious public corruption.

Ambassador Moriarty did not mince words in his assessment:

“Tarique reportedly has accumulated hundreds of millions of dollars in illicit wealth.”

— Ambassador James F. Moriarty, U.S. Embassy Cable 08DHAKA1143_a, paragraph 5 (WikiLeaks)

Not millions. Hundreds of millions. And this assessment came not from a political opponent, not from the Awami League, not from a Bangladeshi newspaper — but from the United States Ambassador to Bangladesh, in a classified cable to the Secretary of State.

The cable went further, describing Tarique as:

“Notorious for flagrantly and frequently demanding bribes in connection with government procurement actions and appointments to political office, Tarique is a symbol of kleptocratic government and violent politics in Bangladesh… In short, much of what is wrong in Bangladesh can be blamed on Tarique and his cronies.”

— U.S. Embassy Cable 08DHAKA1143_a, paragraphs 4 and 9 (WikiLeaks)

The Money Laundering Case: Convicted, Then Acquitted

The domestic legal proceedings that followed the FBI’s investigation tell a story that raises profound questions about the independence of Bangladesh’s judiciary.

On October 26, 2009, the Anti-Corruption Commission filed the money laundering case, accusing Mamun of laundering BDT 20.41 crore (approximately $2.66 million) to Singapore. The ACC submitted a charge sheet against both Tarique Rahman and Mamun on July 6, 2010, and charges were formally framed on August 8, 2011.

During the trial, 13 witnesses testified — including FBI Agent Debra LaPrevotte. The documentary evidence included hundreds of pages of banking records from Citibank Singapore, passport photocopies, credit card statements, and the FBI’s certification of the records.

Here is the timeline of what followed:

• November 17, 2013: Dhaka Special Judge’s Court-3 acquitted Tarique Rahman but sentenced Mamun to seven years in jail with a BDT 40 crore fine.
• December 5, 2013: The ACC appealed Tarique’s acquittal.
• July 21, 2016: The High Court reversed the acquittal, sentencing Tarique to seven years in prison and a BDT 20 crore fine, while upholding Mamun’s conviction.
• March 6, 2025: After the July 2024 political upheaval that ousted the Awami League government, the Appellate Division — headed by Chief Justice Syed Refaat Ahmed — acquitted both Tarique Rahman and Mamun.

From conviction to acquittal. From seven years in prison to a clean record. The reversal came not because new evidence emerged exonerating Tarique — but because a political earthquake reshaped the Bangladeshi judiciary.

84 Cases. All Acquitted.

The money laundering case was not an isolated reversal. According to multiple reports in Bangladeshi media, including BD24, India Today, and Time Magazine, all 84 cases filed against Tarique Rahman during the 2007–2008 caretaker government period — including embezzlement, money laundering, extortion, and the August 21, 2004 grenade attack case — were systematically dismissed or resulted in acquittal between December 2024 and May 2025, following the July 2024 uprising that toppled the Awami League government.

Eighty-four cases. FBI testimony. DOJ filings. Siemens’ guilty plea. Hundreds of pages of Singapore bank records. Credit card numbers. Passport photocopies. Thirteen witnesses. A U.S. Ambassador’s classified assessment.

All of it — acquitted. Every last case.

The question that hangs over Bangladesh is not whether the evidence existed. It is documented in U.S. federal court filings, in classified diplomatic cables, and in the sworn testimony of an FBI supervisory special agent. The question is: what does it mean for a nation when its judiciary can erase everything?

What the Money Trail Tells Us

Follow the money, and the money tells you everything. It tells you that between 2001 and 2006, Tarique Rahman and his associates operated an international money laundering pipeline that moved millions of dollars from Bangladesh to Singapore. It tells you that the FBI investigated and confirmed the existence of the accounts, the credit cards, the passport submissions, and the fund transfers. It tells you that the U.S. Department of Justice considered the evidence strong enough to file a federal forfeiture action. It tells you that Siemens AG pleaded guilty to paying bribes to Tarique’s brother in connection with Bangladesh contracts. It tells you that the U.S. Ambassador assessed Tarique’s illicit wealth at “hundreds of millions of dollars.”

And it tells you that in 2025, all of it was swept away.

The bank accounts in Singapore are a matter of record. The FBI testimony is a matter of record. The DOJ filing is a matter of record. The Siemens guilty plea is a matter of record. The classified cables are a matter of record.

Courts can acquit. They cannot un-document what happened. They cannot un-testify what an FBI agent said under oath in a Dhaka courtroom. They cannot un-file a DOJ forfeiture action. And they cannot un-write a diplomatic cable that described Tarique Rahman as “a symbol of kleptocratic government and violent politics in Bangladesh.”

The money trail is permanent.

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Coming in Part 3: “The Fugitive Returns” — Tarique Rahman’s escape to London, 17 years of exile, the fall of the Hasina government, and the extraordinary political resurrection that made a convicted money launderer the Prime Minister of Bangladesh. Subscribe to Bangladesh Untold to be notified when Part 3 is published.

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Sources

• U.S. Embassy Cable 08DHAKA1143_a — Classified cable by Ambassador James F. Moriarty, November 3, 2008 (WikiLeaks)
• “What FBI stated in deposition” — The Daily Star, November 17, 2013
• “Tarique laundered money” — The Daily Star, 2011
• DOJ Press Release #09-020 — Department of Justice, January 9, 2009
• “Tarique Rahman, Mamun acquitted in money laundering case” — Prothom Alo, March 6, 2025
• Arafat “Koko” Rahman case — World Bank Stolen Asset Recovery Initiative (StAR)
• “Bangladesh Election: Tarique Rahman’s Big Test” — Time Magazine, January 2026
• “Why son and political heir Tarique Rahman isn’t with her” — India Today, December 2, 2025

28 Judges Punished for Speaking Up — While Parliament Dismantles Judicial Independence

On April 8, 2026, Bangladesh’s Law Ministry issued show cause notices to 28 lower court judges for posting on Facebook about judicial independence. Their crime? Expressing concern about the very institution they serve — the judiciary — on their personal social media accounts.

The same week, Bangladesh’s parliament moved to repeal three ordinances that were the only legal safeguards protecting judicial independence from executive control.

And just one day earlier, the High Court published a 185-page verdict ordering the establishment of a separate judiciary secretariat — a ruling that the government’s own legislative actions are now poised to render meaningless.

This is not a coincidence. This is a coordinated dismantling of judicial independence in Bangladesh, happening in plain sight.

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The Show Cause Notices: Silencing the Judiciary from Within

The Law Ministry’s show cause letters, issued Tuesday, accused the 28 judges of making “adverse comments” and “provocative statements” about their “appointing and controlling authority” on social media. The judges were charged under two provisions:

• Violation of the High Court Division’s directive on social media use by judicial officers
• Rule 2(চ)(2) of the Bangladesh Judicial Service (Discipline) Rules, 2017 — engaging in acts “detrimental to the discipline of service,” classified as misconduct

The judges have been given 7 working days to submit written explanations under Rule 3(2) of the same discipline rules.

But here’s what makes this particularly alarming: these judges weren’t leaking state secrets or making partisan political statements. They were expressing concern about judicial independence — the very principle that underpins the rule of law in any democracy.

“আপনি সামাজিক যোগাযোগ মাধ্যম ব্যবহার করে আপনার নিয়োগকারী ও নিয়ন্ত্রণকারী কর্তৃপক্ষ সম্পর্কে নানাবিধ বিরূপ মন্তব্য উসকানি প্রদানের মাধ্যমে ব্যক্তিগত অনুভূতি প্রকাশ করে… সামাজিক যোগাযোগ মাধ্যম ব্যবহার-সংক্রান্ত নির্দেশনা অমান্য করেছেন, যা অসদাচরণ (Misconduct) হিসেবে গণ্য।”

— From the Law Ministry’s show cause notice

Translation: “You have used social media to express personal sentiments through various adverse comments and provocations about your appointing and controlling authority… violating the High Court Division’s directive on social media use, which constitutes Misconduct.”

The message is unmistakable: criticize the government’s control over the judiciary, and you will be punished.

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The Bigger Picture: Parliament Repeals Judicial Independence Safeguards

The show cause notices didn’t happen in a vacuum. They came during the same week that Law Minister Md Asaduzzaman introduced bills in parliament to repeal three critical ordinances issued by the interim government to protect judicial independence:

1. The Supreme Court Judges Appointment (Repeal) Bill, 2026 — repealing the ordinance that created a statutory process for appointing Supreme Court judges, with the Chief Justice advising the president on appointments
2. The Supreme Court Secretariat (Repeal) Bill, 2026 — repealing the ordinance that established an independent secretariat for the Supreme Court under the Chief Justice’s control
3. The Supreme Court Secretariat (Amendment) Ordinance, 2026 — also targeted for repeal

These ordinances were designed to do something Bangladesh has never sustainably achieved: remove the executive branch’s stranglehold over the judiciary.

Under the secretariat ordinance, authority over the transfer, promotion, and discipline of lower court judges would have been vested in the Supreme Court — not the Law Ministry. Under the appointments ordinance, Supreme Court judges would have been selected through a statutory process rather than pure executive discretion.

Now, both are being repealed.

The Rushed Timeline

The parliamentary process itself has been a study in democratic deficit. A special committee was tasked with reviewing 133 ordinances from the interim government. Out of those, the committee recommended approving 98 in original form and 15 with amendments. But of the 20 it recommended against, four were the judicial independence ordinances.

Chief Whip Nurul Islam admitted that all 133 ordinances had to be passed by April 9 — giving parliament barely any time for meaningful debate. Jamaat-e-Islami MP Saiful Alam Khan stood on a point of order to note that members received a 49-page bill just moments before voting, rather than the required three days in advance.

Three Jamaat-e-Islami MPs issued notes of dissent on all three judiciary-related ordinances. But the bills were pushed through anyway.

“The real question before parliament now is brutally simple. Does it want an independent judiciary, or merely a friendlier one?”

— The Daily Star, April 6, 2026

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The High Court’s 185-Page Verdict — Already Being Undermined

In a bitter irony, on April 7 — one day before the show cause notices — the High Court published its full 185-page verdict ordering the establishment of a separate, independent secretariat for the Supreme Court within three months.

The bench of Justice Ahmed Sohel and Justice Debasish Roy Chowdhury went further: they invalidated the provision of Article 116 of the Constitution that assigned control over subordinate court judges to the president, and cancelled the 2017 Judicial Service (Discipline) Rules entirely.

Read that again. The very discipline rules being used to show-cause the 28 judges were cancelled by the High Court one day earlier.

The verdict returned control of lower court judges to the Supreme Court — exactly as the original 1972 Constitution intended, before the Fourth Amendment of 1974 transferred that power to the executive.

But with parliament simultaneously repealing the ordinances that would operationalize this independence, the High Court’s landmark ruling risks becoming a dead letter.

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TIB Sounds the Alarm

Transparency International Bangladesh (TIB) has publicly condemned the rollback. TIB Executive Director Dr. Iftekharuzzaman stated that the government is “signalling retreat on judiciary, corruption and enforced disappearance issues.”

TIB specifically called for retaining the Supreme Court Judges Appointment Ordinance and the Supreme Court Secretariat Ordinance, warning that their repeal threatens institutional frameworks for the rule of law, justice, and human rights.

TIB also raised concerns about the Bangladesh Telecommunications Regulation Ordinance’s inclusion of “content-related issues,” which could be used to suppress dissenting views — a concern that seems prescient given the show cause notices targeting judges’ Facebook posts.

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A Pattern as Old as Bangladesh Itself

Bangladesh has been here before. Every government promises judicial independence. Every government undermines it.

The Constitutional History

Year	Action	Effect
1972	Original Constitution	Chief Justice role in appointments; Supreme Court controls subordinate judges
1974	Fourth Amendment	Control of subordinate judges transferred to the president (executive)
2011	Fifteenth Amendment (Awami League)	Restored consultation with Chief Justice for permanent appointments under Art. 95 — but deliberately excluded Art. 98 (initial appointments), keeping the entry point under executive control
2025	Interim Government Ordinances	Created statutory appointment process; established independent Supreme Court Secretariat
2026	New Parliament Repeals	All safeguards stripped. Back to square one.

The Judicial Capture Playbook

As legal analyst Khan Khalid Adnan wrote in The Daily Star on April 6:

“A politically pliant judiciary helps governments do three things that raw executive power alone cannot do: it sanitises persecution, legitimises constitutional vandalism, and disciplines dissidents through procedure rather than openly through force.”

The evidence is overwhelming:

• Chief Justice SK Sinha — Forced to resign and flee the country after the 16th Amendment judgment. In his book A Broken Dream, he alleged intimidation by intelligence officials and coercion by the prime minister, law minister, and attorney general at Bangabhaban to deliver a favorable judgment.
• Chief Justice Khairul Haque — Author of the 13th Amendment judgment, in custody since July 24, 2025.
• Chief Justice Obaidul Hassan — Resigned in August 2024 after the July uprising, confirming how shattered public confidence in judicial neutrality had become.
• Khaleda Zia’s prosecution — The Appellate Division later described it as a “manifestly contrived misapplication of the law” amounting to “malicious prosecution.”

And now, 28 lower court judges are being punished for talking about this pattern on Facebook.

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What This Means

When a government simultaneously:

1. Repeals the legal framework protecting judicial independence
2. Punishes judges who speak up about it
3. Rushes legislation through parliament without adequate debate
4. Ignores High Court verdicts ordering separation of powers

…it is not building democracy. It is constructing the infrastructure of control.

The 28 judges who posted on Facebook understood this. They saw the ordinances being repealed. They saw their independence being stripped away. And they spoke up — knowing the personal risk.

The Law Ministry’s response proved them right.

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Sources

• Amar Sangbad — অধস্তন আদালতের ২৮ বিচারককে শোকজ (April 8, 2026)
• The Business Standard — HC full verdict on separate secretariat for judiciary (April 7, 2026)
• The Daily Star — Seven bills passed as parliament speeds through ordinances (April 6, 2026)
• The Daily Star — Repealing Supreme Court ordinances may return courts to political captivity (April 6, 2026)
• Dhaka Tribune — TIB flags concerns over reforms (April 7, 2026)
• Prothom Alo — Govt signalling retreat on judiciary issues (April 6, 2026)

This article is part of Bangladesh Untold’s ongoing coverage of institutional capture and democratic erosion in Bangladesh.

This is Part 1 of a three-part investigative series, “The Dark Prince” — The Tarique Rahman Exposé, documenting the corruption, extortion, and international money trail of the man who now leads Bangladesh as Prime Minister.

In February 2026, Tarique Rahman — son of former Prime Minister Khaleda Zia, convicted felon, and a man once barred from entering the United States for “egregious political corruption” — became the Prime Minister of Bangladesh. To understand how a nation arrived at this moment, you must first understand what happened between 2001 and 2006, when a single building in Dhaka became the real seat of power in Bangladesh. That building was Hawa Bhaban, the BNP party headquarters. And the man who ran it was Tarique Rahman — known to diplomats as “The Dark Prince,” to contractors as “Mr. Ten Percent,” and to ordinary Bangladeshis as “Khamba Tarique.”

This is the story of how one unelected man ran a parallel government, looted billions of taka from public coffers, extorted the nation’s biggest businesses, stole from orphans, and corrupted the justice system — all while his mother sat in the Prime Minister’s office. Every claim in this article is sourced from declassified U.S. diplomatic cables, Transparency International data, Bangladesh Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC) investigations, and reporting from international media including Time Magazine, the Hindustan Times, and The Daily Star.

The Shadow Government at Hawa Bhaban

When the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) won a landslide victory in October 2001, Khaleda Zia became Prime Minister for the second time. But from the very beginning of her tenure, a different kind of power structure took shape. Real decisions — about government contracts, political appointments, civil service postings, and even criminal prosecutions — were not made at the Prime Minister’s Office in the Secretariat. They were made at Hawa Bhaban, the BNP headquarters in Dhaka’s Mogbazar area, under the direct control of Khaleda’s eldest son, Tarique Rahman.

Tarique held the party title of Senior Joint Secretary General of the BNP — a position with no constitutional authority over state affairs. Yet as U.S. diplomatic cables later revealed, he operated what amounted to a “parallel administration.” According to a Hindustan Times report citing WikiLeaks cables, U.S. diplomats described Tarique as “the architect of a parallel administration operating out of Hawa Bhaban.” The phrase that circulated in Dhaka’s political circles during those years summed it up plainly: “Nothing moved without Hawa Bhaban’s approval.”

Government ministers, secretaries, and bureaucrats understood the chain of command. If you wanted a contract approved, a posting confirmed, or a tender awarded — you went to Hawa Bhaban first. The Prime Minister’s Office was, for all practical purposes, a rubber stamp.

How the System Worked

The mechanism was straightforward and ruthless. Tarique and his inner circle of loyalists — referred to in diplomatic cables as “cronies” — controlled access to state resources. Every significant government procurement action, every major political appointment, ran through Hawa Bhaban’s informal approval process. Businessmen, contractors, and even aspiring politicians quickly learned that the price of doing business in Bangladesh was a payment to Tarique Rahman.

As U.S. Ambassador James F. Moriarty documented in his confidential cable to the Secretary of State:

“[Tarique is] notorious for flagrantly and frequently demanding bribes in connection with government procurement actions and appointments to political office.”

This was not speculation. It was the official assessment of the United States government, based on years of intelligence gathering, business community reports, and evidence compiled by Bangladesh’s own Anti-Corruption Commission.

“The Dark Prince” — Named by America’s Own Ambassador

The nickname “Dark Prince” was not coined by opposition politicians or Bangladeshi tabloids. It originated in U.S. diplomatic circles, used by Ambassador Moriarty and his staff to describe the man who wielded enormous, unaccountable power from behind the scenes. The Hindustan Times reported in February 2026 that multiple leaked cables from 2008-2009, authored by Moriarty, painted a devastating portrait of Tarique Rahman:

“[Tarique Rahman is] phenomenally corrupt… inspires few but unnerves many.”

The cables described him as “the notorious and widely feared son of former Prime Minister Khaleda Zia” — a man who was not just personally corrupt, but who had built an entire ecosystem of corruption that permeated the Bangladeshi state. Ambassador Moriarty’s language was unusually blunt for diplomatic communication. In his recommendation that Tarique be banned from entering the United States, he wrote:

“Tarique is a symbol of kleptocratic government and violent politics in Bangladesh.”

And in what may be the most damning single sentence ever written by a U.S. ambassador about a foreign political figure:

“In short, much of what is wrong in Bangladesh can be blamed on Tarique and his cronies.”

“Mr. Ten Percent” — The Systematic Extortion Machine

Tarique Rahman did not merely accept the occasional bribe. He built a systematic extortion machine that extracted payments from virtually every major contractor, foreign corporation, and business owner operating in Bangladesh. The scale was staggering, and the evidence — compiled by the Bangladesh Anti-Corruption Commission and corroborated by U.S. diplomatic intelligence — reads like the ledger of a mafia operation.

The Contractor Shakedowns

According to the WikiLeaks cable 08DHAKA1143_a, the ACC documented a pattern of extortion targeting Bangladesh’s largest construction and infrastructure companies:

• Monem Construction: Paid a bribe of $450,000 USD to Tarique to secure government contracts.
• Al Amin Construction: Owner Amin Ahmed was threatened with closure of his entire company unless he paid $150,000 USD to Tarique.
• Reza Construction, Ltd: Owner Mohammad Aftab Uddin Khan filed formal accusations detailing systematic extortion on a “multi-million dollar scale.”
• Mir Akhter Hossain Ltd: Owner Mir Zahir Hossain filed similar accusations of systemic extortion.

These were not anonymous allegations. These were named business owners who filed formal legal complaints, testified before the ACC, and put their names and livelihoods on the line to expose the extortion. The cable noted that “multiple extortion cases” were pending against Tarique, “founded on the testimony of numerous prominent business owners who he victimized and exploited.”

The Siemens Commission: 2% on Every Deal

Tarique’s corruption was not limited to domestic companies. The cable reveals that he also extracted payments from multinational corporations — including the German industrial giant Siemens. According to the ACC investigation and the WikiLeaks cable:

“According to a witness who funneled bribes from Siemens to Tarique and his brother Koko, Tarique received a bribe of approximately two percent on all Siemens deals in Bangladesh (paid in US dollars).”

This was not a one-time payment. It was a standing commission — roughly 2% of every Siemens contract in the country flowed directly to Tarique Rahman. The case was serious enough that it was being actively pursued by the U.S. Department of Justice Asset Forfeiture division and the FBI.

This is how the nickname “Mr. Ten Percent” was earned — though in reality, the percentage varied by the deal. The principle was consistent: no major contract in Bangladesh moved forward without Tarique’s cut.

“Khamba Tarique” — Electric Poles to Nowhere

Perhaps no single scandal better captures the brazen absurdity of Tarique Rahman’s corruption than the “Khamba” (electric pole) controversy — the scandal that gave him his most enduring and mocking nickname: “Khamba Tarique.”

As reported by Time Magazine in January 2026, the scandal involved thousands of electricity poles that were purchased from an associate of Tarique at grossly inflated prices. These poles were then installed in rural areas across Bangladesh — areas where impoverished villagers desperately needed electricity. There was just one problem: the poles were never connected to any power grid.

Rows of electric poles stood uselessly in fields and along roads, connected to nothing, powering nothing. They became a darkly comic symbol of the BNP government’s corruption — monuments to greed standing in the countryside, mocking the very people they were supposed to help. The Hindustan Times reported that U.S. cables tracked the scandal, noting that “Rahman and his associates used Hawa Bhaban to influence government contracts, specifically the procurement of thousands of electric poles, at inflated prices.”

To ordinary Bangladeshis, these useless poles became the perfect metaphor for Tarique’s governance: grand promises, massive spending, zero benefit for the people, and enormous profit for the connected few. The nickname “Khamba Tarique” stuck. As Time Magazine noted, it persists to this day — even as that same man now occupies the office of Prime Minister.

Stealing from Orphans: The Zia Orphanage Trust Scandal

If there is a single act that distills the moral bankruptcy of Tarique Rahman’s corruption, it is the looting of the Zia Orphanage Trust — a charitable fund established in the name of his own father, assassinated President Ziaur Rahman, to support orphaned children in Bangladesh.

According to the WikiLeaks cable and ACC investigations:

“With the help of several accomplices, Tarique succeeded in looting 20 million taka (300,000 USD) from the Zia Orphanage Trust fund. According to an ACC source, Tarique, who is a co-signer on the trust fund account, used funds from the trust for a land purchase in his hometown. He also provided signed checks drawn from the orphanage fund accounts to BNP party members for their 2006 election campaigns.”

Let this sink in: Tarique Rahman, son of a former president, took $300,000 from a charity for orphaned children — children who had lost their parents — and used the money to buy land for himself and fund political campaigns. He was a co-signer on the trust, meaning he had a fiduciary duty to protect those funds. Instead, he treated the orphan trust as his personal bank account.

This was not an allegation from political opponents. This was documented by the Anti-Corruption Commission of Bangladesh and cited in an official U.S. diplomatic cable from the American Ambassador to the Secretary of State.

The $3.1 Million Kabir Murder Bribe

Tarique’s corruption extended beyond financial extortion into the obstruction of justice — including in a murder case. The WikiLeaks cable documents one of the most shocking allegations:

“The ACC has evidence that Tarique accepted a 210 million taka (3.1 million USD) bribe to thwart the prosecution of a murder case against Sanvir Sobhan. Sanvir is the son of the chairman of the Bashundara Group, one of the nation’s most prominent industrial conglomerates. Sanvir was accused in the killing of Humayun Kabir, a Bashundara Group director. An investigation by the ACC confirmed Tarique had solicited the payment, promising to clear Sanvir of all charges.”

A man was murdered. The accused was the son of one of Bangladesh’s wealthiest industrialists. And Tarique Rahman allegedly accepted $3.1 million to make the prosecution disappear. This is not corruption in the traditional sense — this is the sale of justice itself. For the right price, you could literally get away with murder in Tarique Rahman’s Bangladesh.

The Singapore Money Trail: $750,000 to Citibank

The cables also document Tarique’s use of international banking channels to move illicit wealth offshore. In one case involving the Chinese Harbin Company:

“ACC sources report that the Harbin Company, a Chinese construction company, paid 750,000 USD to Tarique to open a plant. According to the ACC, one of Tarique’s cronies received the bribe and transported it to Singapore for deposit with Citibank.”

This single transaction reveals the sophistication of Tarique’s operation: bribes received in Bangladesh, physically transported to Singapore, and deposited in an international bank. This was not petty corruption. This was an organized, international money laundering operation.

Bangladesh: World’s Most Corrupt Country, Five Years Running

The cumulative impact of the Hawa Bhaban parallel government was measured by the world’s foremost anti-corruption organization. Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) ranked Bangladesh as the most corrupt country in the world for five consecutive years: 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, and 2005 — the exact period of the BNP government during which Tarique Rahman operated his extortion machine from Hawa Bhaban.

This was not a ranking among developing nations or South Asian countries alone. Bangladesh was ranked dead last — the single most corrupt country on the entire planet — for five straight years. As Ambassador Moriarty noted in the cable: “Through 2006, the nation topped Transparency International’s ranking of the world’s most corrupt governments four years in a row.”

The cable further noted that “corruption has lowered Bangladesh’s growth rate by two percent per year, according to experts.” In a country where millions lived below the poverty line, Tarique Rahman’s corruption machine was literally stealing food from the mouths of the poor.

“Hundreds of Millions of Dollars in Illicit Wealth”

The U.S. assessment of Tarique’s total accumulated corruption was breathtaking in scale:

“Tarique reportedly has accumulated hundreds of millions of dollars in illicit wealth.”

Hundreds of millions. Not taka — dollars. In a country where the per capita income was roughly $400 per year during that period, Tarique Rahman amassed a fortune that would be obscene by the standards of any nation on earth. The ACC had filed charges of “concealing ill-gotten wealth,” and the National Board of Revenue brought tax evasion charges. The charges against him included, in the cable’s own words: “corruption, extortion, bribery, embezzlement and tax evasion.”

And what was the impact? Ambassador Moriarty spelled it out:

“His theft of millions of dollars in public money has undermined political stability in this moderate, Muslim-majority nation and subverted US attempts to foster a stable democratic government, a key objective in this strategically important region.”

The Man Who Is Now Prime Minister

After the BNP government fell in 2006 and the military-backed Caretaker Government took power in January 2007, Tarique was arrested in the anti-corruption crackdown. He was released on bail in September 2008 and promptly left for London, where he lived in exile for 17 years — managing the BNP by video link from the suburbs of Richmond.

During his exile, Bangladeshi courts — under the Awami League government of Sheikh Hasina — convicted him in multiple cases, including a life sentence for the 2004 grenade attack. After the July 2024 uprising toppled Hasina, and under the interim government of Nobel laureate Muhammad Yunus, courts began overturning Tarique’s convictions, citing “procedural irregularities.”

In February 2026, the BNP won parliamentary elections. Tarique Rahman returned from London in triumph. The man the U.S. Ambassador once called a “symbol of kleptocratic government” — the man who stole from orphans, took $3.1 million to obstruct a murder prosecution, and ran an extortion ring that made Bangladesh the most corrupt country on earth — is now the Prime Minister of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh.

As the Hindustan Times headline on February 13, 2026 put it: “Tarique Rahman goes from ‘symbol of kleptocracy’ to ‘historic victor.’”

Sources

• WikiLeaks Cable 08DHAKA1143_a (November 3, 2008) — “VISAS DONKEY CORRUPTION 212(F) (RAHMAN, TARIQUE),” classified by Ambassador James F. Moriarty. Full cable text
• Transparency International — Corruption Perceptions Index, 2001-2005. Bangladesh ranked most corrupt country globally for five consecutive years.
• Time Magazine (January 28, 2026) — “Bangladesh Election: Tarique Rahman’s Big Test.” Read article
• Hindustan Times (February 13, 2026) — “Tarique Rahman goes from ‘symbol of kleptocracy’ to ‘historic victor’: Leaked US cables on Bangladesh’s next PM.” Read article
• The Daily Star Bangladesh — “Tarique symbol of violent politics.” Read article
• bdnews24.com — “US envoy recommended ban on Tarique: Wikileaks.” Read article
• Bangladesh Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC) — Multiple case filings and investigations referenced in Cable 08DHAKA1143_a.

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Next in the series: Part 2 of “The Dark Prince” exposé follows the money trail from Dhaka to Singapore to London — the FBI investigation, the Siemens bribery case, the offshore accounts, and how Tarique Rahman moved hundreds of millions of dollars out of one of the world’s poorest countries. Subscribe to Bangladesh Untold to be notified when Part 2 drops.

Have documents, tips, or firsthand accounts related to Tarique Rahman’s corruption? Contact Bangladesh Untold securely through our website: bangladeshuntold.org

When Victims Become Perpetrators: BNP’s Crackdown on Critics Mirrors the Authoritarianism They Once Opposed

International rights groups sound alarm as Rahman government uses same repressive tactics BNP once condemned under Sheikh Hasina

April 6, 2026 — In Patuakhali’s Kalapara area, 45-year-old Md Idris made a critical comment on Facebook about a local BNP leader. Within days, he was beaten to death.

Across the country, someone else was detained simply for criticizing Prime Minister Tarique Rahman on social media. Eight journalists face charges under the Cyber Security Act. Two more were arrested for allegedly “offending religious sentiments.”

These aren’t isolated incidents. They represent a systematic pattern of repression that has emerged in the two months since Rahman took power — a pattern that bears an uncomfortable resemblance to the very authoritarianism that the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) spent 15 years condemning under Sheikh Hasina’s Awami League.

The irony is as stark as it is disturbing: the victims have become the perpetrators.

🚨 The HRSS Documentation

The grim statistics come from the Human Rights Support Society (HRSS), which released its monthly report on April 4, 2026, covering political violence in March.

The report, published in the Dhaka Tribune, documented not just the usual political clashes that have plagued Bangladesh for decades, but something more sinister: the systematic use of state power to silence critics.

“Separately, under different sections of the Cybersecurity Act, eight journalists were charged in two separate cases. One individual was detained for criticizing Prime Minister Tarique Rahman, and two were arrested for allegedly offending religious sentiments.”

— HRSS Report, April 4, 2026

But the most chilling entry was buried in the middle of the report:

“In Patuakhali’s Kalapara area, Md Idris (45) was beaten to death for posting critical comments on Facebook against BNP leader Zahirul Islam.”

Read that again. A 45-year-old man was beaten to death for a Facebook post.

📢 International Alarm

The pattern hasn’t gone unnoticed internationally. On March 19, 2026, nine major human rights organizations wrote an unprecedented joint letter to Prime Minister Rahman, demanding immediate action to protect press freedom and human rights.

The signatories read like a who’s who of international human rights advocacy:

• Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ)
• Amnesty International
• Article 19
• CIVICUS
• FIDH
• Fortify Rights
• Human Rights Watch
• Kennedy Human Rights Center
• Tech Global Institute

Their demands were specific and urgent:

1. Release detained journalists immediately
2. Review cases filed under cybercrime laws including the Digital Security Act and Cyber Security Act
3. End arbitrary surveillance and censorship
4. Investigate attacks on major news outlets including Prothom Alo and Daily Star

The fact that these organizations felt compelled to write such a letter barely two months into Rahman’s tenure speaks volumes about how quickly the situation has deteriorated.

⚖️ The Same Playbook

What makes this crackdown particularly disturbing is how closely it mirrors the tactics that BNP spent 15 years condemning under Sheikh Hasina’s rule.

Under Hasina (2009-2024):

• Used Digital Security Act to arrest social media critics
• Targeted journalists and bloggers for “anti-government” content
• Arrested people for Facebook posts critical of the government
• Made arrests without warrants under cybercrime laws

BNP’s response at the time was unequivocal. They called Hasina’s government “fascist” and “authoritarian.” They claimed that over 300,000 of their leaders and activists faced “false and fabricated” cases. They demanded international intervention to protect human rights.

Under Rahman (2026-present):

• Using Cyber Security Act to arrest social media critics
• Targeting journalists and activists for “anti-government” content
• Arresting people for Facebook posts critical of the government
• Making arrests without warrants under cybercrime laws

The playbook is identical. Only the party in power has changed.

🔄 The Cyber Security Act: A Tool of Repression

The weapon of choice remains the same: Bangladesh’s cybercrime legislation.

The Digital Security Act, passed in 2018 under Hasina, was widely condemned by international rights groups as “draconian.” It was nominally replaced by the Cyber Security Act in 2023, but rights groups immediately noted that the new law retained the most problematic provisions of its predecessor.

The U.S. Embassy in Bangladesh stated bluntly that “the new legislation continues to criminalize freedom of expression, retains non-bailable offenses, and too easily could be misused to arrest, detain, and silence critics.”

Amnesty International called it “a replication of the ‘draconian’ Digital Security Act.”

Key provisions that enable repression:

• Police can arrest without warrants
• Non-bailable offenses for online criticism
• Broadly defined “anti-state” activities
• Power to confiscate equipment without court orders

Under the previous Digital Security Act, approximately 2,000 cases were filed, with journalists often targeted. About 1,000 people were arrested under its predecessor, the Information and Communication Technology Act.

Now, just two months into Rahman’s tenure, the arrests have resumed under the Cyber Security Act — but this time targeting critics of BNP rather than Awami League.

📊 The Historical Context

This isn’t the first time BNP has wielded state power to silence critics. The original Information and Communication Technology Act was actually passed in 2006 under a BNP-Jamaat government and was used to arrest more than 1,200 people.

As Al Jazeera Media Institute noted in 2022: “These digital security laws did not spring out of a vacuum… It has been actively used by all parties, not just BNP-Jamaat.”

The pattern is clear: regardless of which party holds power, Bangladesh’s cybercrime laws become tools of political repression.

🌍 International Precedent

Bangladesh’s use of cybercrime laws to silence critics fits a global pattern documented by human rights organizations.

Human Rights Watch’s 2018 report “No Place for Criticism: Bangladesh Crackdown on Social Media Commentary” detailed how “dozens of arbitrary arrests” occurred under these laws, with “police making arrests without warrant.”

The report noted that as of April 2018, police had submitted 1,271 charge sheets to cyber crime tribunals — a staggering number that illustrated the systematic nature of the crackdown.

What’s happening now under Rahman appears to be a continuation of this pattern, just under different political leadership.

⚰️ The Ultimate Price

But the case of Md Idris represents an escalation beyond even what occurred under Hasina. While the previous government relied primarily on legal harassment and detention, the beating death of a Facebook critic suggests that violence has now been added to the toolkit of repression.

The fact that Idris was killed for criticizing a local BNP leader — not even the Prime Minister himself — suggests that the culture of impunity extends down to the grassroots level of the party.

This represents a dangerous normalization of violence as a response to political criticism.

🔍 What This Means

The emergence of this repression so early in Rahman’s tenure raises several disturbing questions:

1. Institutional Continuity: Does this suggest that Bangladesh’s repressive apparatus transcends party politics? That regardless of who holds power, the tools of authoritarianism remain the same?

2. The Victim-Perpetrator Cycle: How quickly do those who suffered under repression become willing to use the same tactics against their own critics?

3. Democratic Consolidation: If both major parties resort to the same authoritarian tactics when in power, what hope is there for democratic consolidation in Bangladesh?

4. International Response: How will the international community, which welcomed Rahman’s democratic victory, respond to evidence that his government is replicating the authoritarianism it replaced?

📸 The Broader Pattern

This crackdown doesn’t exist in isolation. It’s part of a broader pattern of score-settling that has emerged since Rahman took power:

• March 23: Lt. Gen. (Retd.) Masud Uddin Chowdhury arrested — a key 1/11 figure
• March 26: Lt. Gen. (Retd.) Sheikh Mamun Khaled arrested — former DGFI chief
• March 30: Mohammad Afzal Naser arrested — prosecution openly stated he was detained for being “involved in the arrest and torture of Tarique Rahman”

The arrest of critics appears to be part of a broader campaign to eliminate opposition voices and consolidate power.

🎭 The Irony of History

Perhaps the most damning aspect of this crackdown is how it exposes the hollowness of BNP’s previous rhetoric about democracy and human rights.

For 15 years, BNP leaders gave impassioned speeches about the need to protect free speech. They welcomed international criticism of Hasina’s repression. They positioned themselves as the democratic alternative to authoritarianism.

Yet when given power, they have reached for the same tools of repression they once condemned.

This suggests that their opposition to these tactics was never principled — it was simply partisan. They opposed repression when they were the targets, but they’re perfectly willing to use it when they’re in control.

⏰ A Critical Moment

Bangladesh stands at a critical juncture. The country has just emerged from 15 years of increasingly authoritarian rule under Sheikh Hasina. The February 2026 election was seen as a chance for democratic renewal.

But the early signs from the Rahman government suggest that rather than breaking the cycle of authoritarianism, Bangladesh may simply be changing the victims.

The death of Md Idris for a Facebook post should serve as a wake-up call. When criticism becomes a capital offense — literally — democracy is already dead.

The question now is whether Bangladesh’s democratic institutions, civil society, and international partners will act to prevent further deterioration, or whether they will stand by as the victims of yesterday become the perpetrators of today.

The nine international human rights organizations who wrote to Prime Minister Rahman have sounded the alarm. The question is whether anyone is listening.

And whether, in a country where someone can be beaten to death for a Facebook post, anyone dares to speak up at all.

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📚 Sources

• Human Rights Support Society (HRSS) Report, Dhaka Tribune, April 4, 2026
• Committee to Protect Journalists Joint Letter, March 19, 2026
• Human Rights Watch: “No Place for Criticism: Bangladesh Crackdown on Social Media Commentary” (2018)
• Amnesty International: “Restore freedom of expression in Bangladesh & repeal Cyber Security Act” (2024)
• Al Jazeera Media Institute: “Bangladesh’s Digital Security Act is criminalising journalism” (2022)
• U.S. Embassy Bangladesh statements on Cyber Security Act
• Transparency International Bangladesh: Position Paper on Digital Security Act 2018 and Draft Cyber Security Act 2023

🔴 Bangladesh Untold — The History You Were Never Told

World Champion of Corruption: How BNP Made Bangladesh the Most Corrupt Country on Earth — and How the Money Trail Led to Singapore, the FBI, and a US Entry Ban

For five consecutive years, one country held the unwanted title of “most corrupt nation in the world.” It wasn’t a failed state. It wasn’t a country at war. It was Bangladesh — under the BNP-Jamaat coalition government. And at the center of it all was one family, one shadow office, and a money trail that stretched from Dhaka to Singapore to the doorstep of the FBI.

Five Years at the Bottom: The Transparency International Record

Between 2001 and 2005, Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) — the most authoritative global measure of public sector corruption — ranked Bangladesh dead last. Not once. Not twice. Five consecutive years.

To understand the scale of this achievement: of the 91 to 159 countries surveyed each year, Bangladesh scored at the very bottom. Lower than war zones. Lower than failed states. Lower than countries with no functioning judiciary.

“Bangladesh is a developing nation in which systemic corruption has permeated all aspects of public life. Through 2006, the nation topped Transparency International’s ranking of the world’s most corrupt governments four years in a row.”

— US Embassy Cable 08DHAKA1143, classified confidential, sent by Ambassador James F. Moriarty to Washington, November 3, 2008 (released by WikiLeaks)

The CPI scores tell the story:

• 2001: Bangladesh ranked last (91st out of 91 countries surveyed) — CPI score: 0.4
• 2002: Bangladesh ranked last (102nd out of 102) — CPI score: 1.2
• 2003: Bangladesh ranked last (133rd out of 133) — CPI score: 1.3
• 2004: Bangladesh ranked last (145th out of 145) — CPI score: 1.5
• 2005: Bangladesh ranked last (158th out of 158) — CPI score: 1.7

Every single year of BNP-Jamaat governance — from their election in October 2001 to the end of their term — the world’s foremost corruption watchdog placed Bangladesh at the absolute bottom.

As The Daily Star later noted: “From being a world champion in corruption for five years in a row between 2001 and 2005, Bangladesh gradually improved its ranking until 2013.” That improvement only came after the BNP-Jamaat government fell.

“In fact, corruption has lowered Bangladesh’s growth rate by two percent per year, according to experts.”

— US Embassy Cable 08DHAKA1143

Two percent per year. In a country where millions lived below the poverty line, systemic corruption was stealing growth that could have lifted entire communities out of destitution.

The Architect: Tarique Rahman and the Hawa Bhaban Shadow State

At the epicenter of this corruption was Tarique Rahman — the eldest son of Prime Minister Khaleda Zia, Senior Joint Secretary General of BNP, and the man who operated the infamous Hawa Bhaban.

Hawa Bhaban — literally “Air Building,” the BNP chairperson’s political office — became the parallel power center of the Bangladesh government. Government contracts, political appointments, business permits — nothing moved without Hawa Bhaban’s approval. And Hawa Bhaban’s approval came with a price tag.

The US Embassy cable described Tarique in blunt terms that American diplomats rarely use:

“Tarique Rahman, the notorious and widely feared son of former Prime Minister Khaleda Zia… Notorious for flagrantly and frequently demanding bribes in connection with government procurement actions and appointments to political office, Tarique is a symbol of kleptocratic government and violent politics in Bangladesh.”

— Ambassador James F. Moriarty, Cable 08DHAKA1143

“Symbol of kleptocratic government.” These are the words of the United States Ambassador — in an official, classified cable to Washington. Not a political rival. Not a newspaper editorial. The American government’s own assessment.

The Money Trail: From Dhaka to Singapore’s Citibank

Corruption on this scale doesn’t stay local. The money had to go somewhere — and it went to Singapore.

The Tk 20.41 Crore Money Laundering Case

The most documented case involves Giasuddin Al Mamun, Tarique’s close friend and business partner, and a scheme to launder bribes through Singapore’s banking system.

Here’s what happened:

• Khadiza Islam, chairman of Nirman Construction Company Ltd., paid Tk 20.41 crore ($2.5 million) to Mamun — in exchange for securing a contract for an 80MW power plant in Tongi
• The money was transferred to a Citibank NA account in Singapore under Mamun’s name
• A supplementary Gold Visa credit card (No. 4568-8170-1006-4122) was issued in Tarique Rahman’s name on that same Singapore Citibank account
• A photocopy of Tarique’s passport (No. Y 0085483) was submitted to Citibank Singapore to obtain the card
• Tarique used the credit card for travel expenses in Greece, Germany, Singapore, Thailand, and the UAE

This wasn’t abstract corruption. This was the Prime Minister’s son carrying a credit card linked to a bribe-funded account in a foreign country, swiping it across luxury destinations worldwide.

The FBI Enters the Picture

For the first time in Bangladesh’s history, a special agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) testified in a Dhaka courtroom.

FBI Agent Debra LaPrevotte, who conducted the investigation into Bangladeshi corruption, testified before a Bangladesh court that the FBI had traced bribe payments from Khadiza Islam’s OCBC Bank account in Singapore to Mamun’s Singapore Citibank account — the same account linked to Tarique Rahman’s credit card.

The FBI’s testimony — a foreign intelligence agency producing evidence in a sovereign court — was unprecedented. It demonstrated just how far the corruption had spread internationally.

The Court Verdicts

• 2009: Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC) filed the money laundering case
• 2013: Dhaka Special Judge’s Court-3 acquitted Tarique but sentenced Mamun to 7 years. The judge then fled to Malaysia days after the verdict — the Law Minister later stated Tarique was acquitted through judicial manipulation
• 2016: Bangladesh High Court overturned the acquittal, found Tarique guilty, and sentenced him to 7 years’ imprisonment with a Tk 20 crore fine
• 2007: The Singapore government returned the laundered Tk 20 crore to Bangladesh Bank

The High Court’s observation was scathing:

“It is to be noted with regret that Md Tarique Rahman belonging to a political class which was saddled with responsibility of directing the affairs of the country had acted as a conscious part of the financial crime.”

— Bangladesh High Court, Money Laundering Case Verdict, July 21, 2016

“This manner of financial crimes, the upshot of achieving wealth in corrupt ways committed under political shield, is on increase. Time has come to get this type of criminal activities carried out by using political favour and patronisation halted for the cause of well-being of the country and its development process.”

— Bangladesh High Court

Beyond Singapore: The Siemens Scandal and the US DOJ

The Singapore money laundering was only one thread. The international corruption web stretched much further.

The Siemens Bribes

According to the US Embassy cable — citing ACC evidence — Siemens AG, the German industrial giant, paid bribes to the Zia family through intermediaries:

“According to a witness who funneled bribes from Siemens to Tarique and his brother Koko, Tarique received a bribe of approximately two percent on all Siemens deals in Bangladesh (paid in US dollars). This case is currently being pursued by DOJ Asset Forfeiture and by the FBI.”

— Cable 08DHAKA1143

Two percent on all Siemens deals in Bangladesh. A systematic commission on every contract, paid in US dollars.

In December 2008, Siemens AG and three subsidiaries pleaded guilty to violations of the US Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA). Siemens Bangladesh admitted that from May 2001 to August 2006 — the exact period of BNP governance — it paid at least $5,319,839 in corrupt payments to Bangladeshi officials through intermediaries.

The US Department of Justice Forfeiture Action

On January 9, 2009, the US Department of Justice filed a civil forfeiture action against approximately $3 million in funds held in Singapore — linked primarily to bribes paid to Arafat “Koko” Rahman, Tarique’s younger brother, in connection with the Siemens and China Harbor Engineering Company projects.

“This action shows the lengths to which U.S. law enforcement will go to recover the proceeds of foreign corruption, including acts of bribery and money laundering. Not only will the Department prosecute companies and executives who violate the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, we will also use our forfeiture laws to recapture the illicit facilitating payments often used in such schemes.”

— Acting Assistant Attorney General Matthew Friedrich, US Department of Justice, January 9, 2009

The DOJ stated that bribe payments from both Siemens and China Harbor were made in US dollars, flowing through US financial institutions before being deposited in Singapore accounts — giving the United States jurisdiction over the money trail.

The Harbin Company Bribe

The US Embassy cable documented yet another bribery case:

“ACC sources report that the Harbin Company, a Chinese construction company, paid $750,000 to Tarique to open a plant. According to the ACC, one of Tarique’s cronies received the bribe and transported it to Singapore for deposit with Citibank.”

— Cable 08DHAKA1143

The Kabir Murder Cover-Up Bribe

Perhaps the most disturbing allegation: Tarique allegedly accepted a $3.1 million bribe to obstruct a murder prosecution.

“The ACC has evidence that Tarique accepted a 210 million taka ($3.1 million USD) bribe to thwart the prosecution of a murder case against Sanvir Sobhan. Sanvir is the son of the chairman of the Bashundhara Group, one of the nation’s most prominent industrial conglomerates. Sanvir was accused in the killing of Humayun Kabir, a Bashundhara Group director. An investigation by the ACC confirmed Tarique had solicited the payment, promising to clear Sanvir of all charges.”

— Cable 08DHAKA1143

Selling justice. Selling murder acquittals. This is the system that operated from Hawa Bhaban.

Banned from America: The US Visa Prohibition

Given everything documented above, the United States took a rare and decisive step: it moved to ban Tarique Rahman from entering the country.

On November 3, 2008, Ambassador James F. Moriarty sent a classified cable to Washington formally requesting a security advisory opinion under Section 212(f) of the Immigration and Nationality Act and Presidential Proclamation 7750 — which authorizes the suspension of entry into the United States of foreign officials involved in corruption.

“The Embassy believes Tarique is guilty of egregious political corruption that has had a serious adverse effect on U.S. national interests mentioned in Section 4 of the proclamation, namely the stability of democratic institutions and U.S. foreign assistance goals.”

— Ambassador James F. Moriarty, Cable 08DHAKA1143

The cable went further — it laid out exactly why Tarique was a threat to American interests:

“Tarique’s flagrant corruption has also seriously threatened specific US Mission goals. Embassy Dhaka has three key priorities for Bangladesh: democratization, development, and denial of space to terrorists. Tarique’s audaciously corrupt activities jeopardize all three.”

And then, the most devastating line — the US Ambassador’s personal assessment:

“In short, much of what is wrong in Bangladesh can be blamed on Tarique and his cronies.“

— Ambassador James F. Moriarty

Six months after Moriarty’s cable, Chargé d’Affaires Geeta Pasi sent a follow-up cable to Washington confirming that the State Department was considering visa revocation for Tarique under the Presidential Proclamation.

Tarique held a five-year multiple-entry B1/B2 US visa (issued May 11, 2005). The Embassy noted they believed that passport was being held by the Bangladesh government. But they also noted Tarique had multiple passports — including a new one with a UK visa.

The message was clear: the United States of America considered Tarique Rahman so corrupt, so dangerous to democratic institutions, that he should be permanently barred from setting foot on American soil.

“Hundreds of Millions” in Illicit Wealth

The full scale of the alleged corruption is staggering. The US Embassy cable — based on ACC investigations — states plainly:

“Tarique reportedly has accumulated hundreds of millions of dollars in illicit wealth.”

— Cable 08DHAKA1143

Hundreds of millions. From a country where the average annual income was under $500.

The documented cases include:

• Siemens: ~2% commission on all Siemens deals in Bangladesh (2001-2006) — Siemens admitted to $5.3M+ in corrupt payments
• China Harbor Engineering: Majority of ~$3M in forfeited Singapore accounts traced to this project
• Harbin Company: $750,000 bribe deposited in Singapore Citibank
• Nirman Construction / Power Plant: $2.5 million laundered through Singapore
• Monem Construction: $450,000 bribe to secure contracts
• Kabir Murder Case: $3.1 million bribe to obstruct a murder prosecution
• Zia Orphanage Trust: $300,000 embezzled from an orphanage fund for land purchases and election campaigns
• Systematic extortion: Multiple cases from business owners including Al Amin Construction ($150,000 extorted), Reza Construction, Mir Akhter Hossain Ltd., and others — “detailing a systematic pattern of extortion on a multi-million dollar scale”

And these are just the cases that were documented and prosecuted. The Embassy’s assessment — “hundreds of millions” — suggests the full picture may be far larger.

The Zia Orphanage Trust: Stealing from Orphans

If one detail captures the character of this corruption, it is perhaps this: Tarique Rahman stole from an orphanage.

“With the help of several accomplices, Tarique succeeded in looting 20 million taka ($300,000 USD) from the Zia Orphanage Trust fund. According to an ACC source, Tarique, who is a co-signer on the trust fund account, used funds from the trust for a land purchase in his hometown. He also provided signed checks drawn from the orphanage fund accounts to BNP party members for their 2006 election campaigns.”

— Cable 08DHAKA1143

Money meant for orphaned children — used to buy personal property and fund political campaigns.

The Judge Who Fled the Country

One extraordinary detail reveals the depth of judicial corruption. When the money laundering case was first tried in 2013, Dhaka Special Judge’s Court-3 acquitted Tarique while convicting his co-accused Mamun.

Days after delivering this verdict, the judge — Motahar Hossain — left Bangladesh for Malaysia with his family and never returned. The government issued a notice ordering him back to work. He never responded.

Bangladesh’s Law Minister Anisul Huq later stated publicly that Tarique got acquitted by influencing the judge.

The High Court subsequently overturned the acquittal in 2016, finding Tarique guilty and sentencing him to 7 years.

What This Means

This is not a political argument. This is a documented record:

• Transparency International — ranked Bangladesh #1 most corrupt, five years running
• The US Embassy — described Tarique as a “symbol of kleptocratic government” in a classified cable
• The FBI — investigated the money trail, testified in a Dhaka courtroom, traced bribe payments through Singapore
• The US Department of Justice — filed a $3 million forfeiture action against bribe proceeds in Singapore
• Siemens AG — pleaded guilty to paying $5.3M+ in bribes to Bangladesh officials during BNP’s tenure
• The US Ambassador — formally requested Tarique be banned from entering the United States under anti-corruption provisions
• The Singapore government — returned Tk 20 crore in laundered funds to Bangladesh Bank
• The Bangladesh High Court — convicted Tarique of money laundering and sentenced him to 7 years

When the US Ambassador writes in a classified cable that “much of what is wrong in Bangladesh can be blamed on Tarique and his cronies” — that is not partisan politics. That is an intelligence assessment by the world’s most powerful nation.

And when the same country that lectures the world about democracy and rule of law decides that one individual is too corrupt to be allowed on American soil — that tells you everything you need to know.

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Sources

• WikiLeaks Cable 08DHAKA1143 — “VISAS DONKEY CORRUPTION 212(F) (RAHMAN, TARIQUE)” — US Embassy Dhaka to Secretary of State, November 3, 2008, classified CONFIDENTIAL by Ambassador James F. Moriarty
• Transparency International — Corruption Perceptions Index (2001-2005) — Bangladesh ranked last consecutively
• US Department of Justice — “Department of Justice Seeks to Recover Approximately $3 Million in Illegal Proceeds from Foreign Bribe Payments” — Press Release, January 9, 2009
• FBI — DOJ Seeks to Recover Approximately $3 Million in Illegal Proceeds from Foreign Bribe Payments — FBI Washington Field Office, January 9, 2009
• Al Jazeera — “Bangladesh: Tarique Rahman jailed for money laundering” — July 21, 2016
• The Daily Star — “Tarique convicted, jailed for 7 years” — July 22, 2016
• The Daily Star — “Tarique symbol of violent politics” (WikiLeaks cable analysis) — September 8, 2011
• bdnews24.com — “US envoy recommended ban on Tarique: Wikileaks” — February 11, 2014
• The Daily Star — “Bangladesh’s disappointing position in TI corruption index” — January 30, 2024
• The Business Standard — “Bangladesh scores higher, yet slips to 13th on global corruption index” — February 10, 2026
• Prothom Alo — “Tarique Rahman, Mamun acquitted in money laundering case” — March 6, 2025
• Bangladesh Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC) — Case filings, charge sheets, and investigation records
• FBI testimony of Special Agent Debra LaPrevotte — Dhaka court proceedings, 2011
• Siemens AG guilty plea — US Foreign Corrupt Practices Act violations, December 15, 2008

Every claim in this article is sourced from international organizations, US government documents, court records, or verified news reports from Bangladesh’s leading publications.

How a former student wing activist built a private army, tortured 500+ people, bombed 63 districts in a single day — and operated freely under the BNP-Jamaat government for years before anyone lifted a finger.

In 2004, a man calling himself “Bangla Bhai” — Bengali Brother — began patrolling the villages of northwestern Rajshahi. He said he was fighting crime. Local police helped him. Government officials looked the other way. Within months, he had built a private militia that tortured, kidnapped, and terrorized entire communities.

His real name was Siddiqul Islam. He was the military commander of Jagrata Muslim Janata Bangladesh (JMJB) and the operational mastermind of Jama’atul Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB) — the most dangerous militant organization in Bangladesh’s history.

On August 17, 2005, his organization detonated 459 to 500 bombs across 63 of Bangladesh’s 64 districts within a single hour — the most synchronized terrorist attack the country had ever seen.

And throughout it all, the BNP-Jamaat government did nothing. Until it was too late.

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I. Origins: From Shibir Activist to Militant Commander

Siddiqul Islam was born in 1970 in Rajshahi Division, northwestern Bangladesh. His path to militancy ran through the very political infrastructure that would later protect him:

• He was a former member of Islami Chhatra Shibir — the student wing of Jamaat-e-Islami, the BNP’s coalition partner in government
• He claimed to have an MA in Bangla from Rajshahi University — but the university found no record of him ever being enrolled
• By the early 2000s, he had evolved from student politics to militant Islamism, connecting with Shaykh Abdur Rahman, the founder and supreme leader of JMB

The connection to Jamaat-e-Islami’s student wing is not incidental. It was through these networks — madrasas, student organizations, and political patronage — that JMB and JMJB recruited, trained, and expanded. The BNP-Jamaat coalition government (2001–2006) was not just negligent; it was structurally complicit in creating the ecosystem that produced Bangla Bhai.

II. The “Crime Fighter” Cover: How Bangla Bhai Operated in Plain Sight

In 2004, Bangla Bhai began operations in the Rajshahi region with a clever cover story. As the New York Times reported:

He started “by campaigning against neighborhood criminals, purportedly with the help of the police and some government officials.”
— New York Times, March 30, 2007

This was the genius of Bangla Bhai’s strategy: he positioned himself as a vigilante fighting petty crime — thieves, drug dealers, local troublemakers — in areas where police were ineffective. Local communities initially welcomed him. Police cooperated. Government officials endorsed the effort.

But behind the “crime-fighting” facade, something far darker was happening:

• The Taskforce Against Torture, a Bangladeshi human rights organization, documented 500+ instances of individuals being threatened and tortured by Bangla Bhai and his associates
• JMJB established Sharia courts in villages, dispensing their own “justice” — amputations, floggings, forced conversions
• Journalists who tried to report on JMJB activities were attacked, threatened, and driven out (documented by the Committee to Protect Journalists and Refworld)
• Minority communities — Hindus, Ahmadiyyas, moderate Muslims — were targeted with systematic violence
• JMJB and JMB set up training camps in madrasas and remote areas, funded by foreign money intended for building mosques

All of this happened while the BNP-Jamaat coalition held power. All of it was reported in the press. None of it was stopped.

III. The BNP-Jamaat Government’s Complicity

The International Crisis Group — one of the world’s most respected conflict analysis organizations — published multiple reports documenting the BNP government’s deliberate failure to act against JMB and JMJB:

“Though religious extremism arose under its watch, the BNP-led coalition government (2001-2006), which included the Jamaat, did not target radical Islamist groups.”
— International Crisis Group, Asia Report No. 277, April 2016

Bangladesh’s political mainstream “has either deliberately used it [JMB] for narrow political ends, as during the coalition government led by BNP from 2006 to 2007, or been distracted by other concerns.”
— International Crisis Group, Asia Report No. 187, March 2010

The complicity went beyond negligence:

• The BNP-Jamaat coalition’s complicity “allowed groups like JMB, HuJI-B, and JMJB to establish training camps, often in collaboration with the Rohingya Solidarity Organization in Bandarban” (Global CDG)
• Bangla Bhai’s JMJB operated with active support from local police and government officials, not just passive tolerance
• The Home Ministry — under Lutfozzaman Babar, who simultaneously facilitated the Chittagong arms haul and the grenade massacre — took no action against JMJB despite mounting evidence
• Jamaat-e-Islami, whose student wing Shibir had produced Bangla Bhai himself, sat in the cabinet as a coalition partner

The pattern is identical to the BNP’s approach with HuJI: use militant groups as political tools, protect them from law enforcement, and deny everything until international pressure forces action.

IV. August 17, 2005: 63 Districts, 500 Bombs, One Hour

On August 17, 2005, JMB carried out the most audacious terrorist operation in Bangladesh’s history.

The Numbers

Detail	Figure
Districts hit	63 of 64 (all but one)
Bombs detonated	459–500
Timeframe	Approximately one hour
Killed	3
Injured	Approximately 100

The relatively low casualty count was intentional. This was not primarily designed to kill — it was a show of force. JMB was demonstrating to the government and the world that it had operatives in virtually every corner of Bangladesh, that it could coordinate a near-simultaneous nationwide attack, and that it possessed the logistical capability to do far worse.

Leaflets found at bomb sites, written in Bangla and Arabic, declared:

“It is time to implement Islamic law in Bangladesh.”

The synchronized nature of the attack stunned security analysts worldwide. Coordinating 500 bombs across 63 districts required:

• A nationwide network of trained operatives
• Secure communications infrastructure
• Centralized bomb-making and distribution
• Months or years of planning and recruitment
• Financial resources from foreign and domestic sources

All of this had been built in plain sight, under BNP-Jamaat rule, with the active or passive cooperation of the state.

V. The Escalation: Judges Assassinated, Suicide Bombings Begin

August 17 was just the beginning. In the weeks and months that followed, JMB escalated to unprecedented levels of violence:

Mid-November 2005: Judges Assassinated

Two judges were killed when a bomb was thrown at their vehicle in Jhalakathi, approximately 120 km south of Dhaka. This was a targeted assassination of the judiciary — a direct attack on the rule of law itself.

November 29, 2005: Bangladesh’s First Suicide Bombing

JMB carried out the first suicide bomb attack in Bangladesh’s history:

• 7 killed (including the suspected suicide bomber) in Gazipur
• 2 police officers killed in a separate attack in Chittagong
• At least 16 injured across both attacks

Bangladesh had crossed a threshold. Suicide bombings — previously unheard of in the country — had arrived. And they arrived because a government chose to protect the people who built the infrastructure for them.

VI. Too Little, Too Late: The Belated Crackdown

Only after the August 17 bombings did the BNP government finally ban JMB and JMJB. Only under mounting domestic and international pressure did arrests begin.

Timeline of the Belated Response

• August 17, 2005: 500 bombs detonate across 63 districts
• Late August 2005: JMB and JMJB finally banned (years after they should have been)
• September 30, 2005: Mufti Abdul Hannan (HuJI chief, linked to the August 21 grenade attack) arrested — but even then, the government deliberately did not connect him to the grenade massacre, maintaining the fabricated “Joj Mia” cover story instead
• November 2005: Judges assassinated, suicide bombings begin
• March 6, 2006: Bangla Bhai finally captured by RAB in Mymensingh after a firefight
• March 2006: Shaykh Abdur Rahman captured

By the time the BNP government acted, the damage was catastrophic: suicide bombings had entered Bangladesh, judges had been assassinated, 500 bombs had exploded across the country, and hundreds of people had been tortured by JMJB in the northwest.

The International Crisis Group’s verdict was clear: the BNP government either “deliberately used” JMB for political purposes or was so compromised by its Jamaat coalition partner that it couldn’t act against Jamaat’s militant offspring.

VII. Execution: March 30, 2007

After the January 11, 2007 caretaker government took over, the judicial process moved swiftly. On March 30, 2007, six JMB leaders were executed by hanging:

1. Shaykh Abdur Rahman — JMB founder and supreme leader
2. Siddiqul Islam / Bangla Bhai — Military commander, the “Bengali Brother” who terrorized Rajshahi
3. Ataur Rahman Sunny — Military wing leader
4. Abdul Awal — Organizational commander
5. Khaled Saifullah — Operative
6. Iftekhar Hasan Mamun — Operative

The New York Times reported on the executions, noting that the men had been found guilty of carrying out the bombings and establishing a militant infrastructure across the country.

VIII. The Ecosystem of Terror: How Everything Connects

Bangla Bhai did not operate in isolation. He was one node in a network of state-protected militancy that defined BNP-Jamaat rule:

• HuJI — Carried out the August 21 grenade attack, killing 24 people. Protected by the BNP government for years
• JMB/JMJB — Bangla Bhai’s organization. Bombed 63 districts, assassinated judges, introduced suicide bombing. Protected until international pressure forced action
• RAB — The BNP’s elite death squad that killed 600+ people in “crossfire.” Eventually captured Bangla Bhai in 2006 — years after he should have been stopped
• Chittagong Arms Haul — 10 trucks of weapons smuggled under state supervision for foreign insurgents. Same government, same pattern
• World-record corruption — Bangladesh ranked #1 most corrupt for 5 consecutive years. The corruption funded the impunity

The common thread: Lutfozzaman Babar’s Home Ministry. The same ministry that controlled police (who helped Bangla Bhai), that controlled RAB (600+ extrajudicial killings), that facilitated the arms haul, and that covered up the grenade massacre.

IX. The Question Nobody Can Answer

If the BNP government could capture Bangla Bhai in March 2006, why didn’t they do it in 2004 when his crimes were already being documented?

If they could ban JMB after August 17, 2005, why not before — when 500+ torture incidents had already been recorded?

If they knew about militant training camps in madrasas, why did they allow their coalition partner Jamaat — whose student wing Shibir had produced Bangla Bhai — to remain in government?

The answer, as the International Crisis Group documented, is that the BNP-Jamaat government either deliberately used militant groups for political ends or was so deeply compromised by its coalition dynamics that it could not act.

Either way, the result was the same: 500 bombs across 63 districts, judges assassinated, suicide bombings introduced to Bangladesh, and hundreds of people tortured by a private militia operating with state protection.

Bangla Bhai was executed. The system that created him walked free.

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Sources

• New York Times, “Bangladesh Executes 6 Islamist Militants” (March 30, 2007)
• Eliza Griswold, New York Times, “The Next Islamist Revolution?” (January 23, 2005)
• BBC News, Coverage of Bangla Bhai’s capture (March 6, 2006)
• BBC News, Coverage of escalating extremism in Bangladesh (November 29, 2005)
• International Crisis Group, Asia Report No. 121: “Bangladesh Today” (October 2006)
• International Crisis Group, Asia Report No. 187: “The Threat from Jamaat-ul Mujahideen Bangladesh” (March 2010)
• International Crisis Group, Asia Report No. 277 (April 2016)
• Taskforce Against Torture (Bangladesh) — Documentation of 500+ torture cases
• Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ) — Reports on attacks on journalists by JMJB
• Refworld / UNHCR — Documentation of militant activities and attacks on press
• Global CDG — Analysis of BNP-Jamaat complicity in militant camp establishment

Bangladesh Untold is committed to source-backed journalism. Every claim in this article is documented by international organizations, court records, or verified news reports. We invite readers to verify every source.

How the BNP government created a paramilitary force that executed hundreds of Bangladeshis without trial — then the United States sanctioned them for it.

On a June morning in 2004, Bangladesh got a new security force. The Rapid Action Battalion — RAB — was announced as an elite anti-crime unit that would bring order to a country plagued by rising violence. Within months, bodies started appearing.

The victims had bullet wounds. They were found on roadsides, in ditches, in fields. And every single time, the official explanation was the same: “crossfire.” The suspect tried to escape. The suspect grabbed a weapon. The suspect was caught in crossfire between rival gangs.

By the time international organizations started counting, the numbers were staggering: more than 600 people killed without arrest, without charge, without trial. The youngest was 14 years old. The oldest was 65.

This is the story of how the BNP government built a killing machine — and how the world eventually noticed.

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I. Birth of a Death Squad: How RAB Was Created

RAB was established in 2004 under the BNP-Jamaat coalition government led by Prime Minister Khaleda Zia, directly after the controversial Operation Clean Heart ended in January 2003. That operation — which killed at least 44 people in custody and led to 11,000 arrests in 86 days — had exposed the brutality of existing law enforcement. Rather than reform the police, the BNP government’s answer was to create something even more powerful.

RAB was designed as a composite force, drawing personnel from:

• Bangladesh Police
• Bangladesh Army
• Bangladesh Navy
• Bangladesh Air Force
• Bangladesh Ansar
• Border Guard Bangladesh (BDR)

This unique structure — mixing military discipline with police authority — gave RAB extraordinary power. Unlike regular police, RAB operated with military-grade weapons and training. Unlike the military, they had civilian policing jurisdiction. They answered to the Home Ministry, controlled at the time by State Minister for Home Affairs Lutfozzaman Babar — the same official later sentenced to death for masterminding the August 21, 2004 grenade attack that killed 24 people.

“RAB operates in a grey zone — military capability with police powers but accountability to neither.”
— Human Rights Watch, “Judge, Jury, and Executioner,” December 2006

II. The Kill Count: A Statistical Portrait of State Murder

Human Rights Watch, Ain O Shalish Kendra (ASK), and other monitoring organizations meticulously documented RAB’s killings. The numbers tell a horrifying story:

RAB Killings Under the BNP Government (2004–2006)

Year	RAB Killings	Monthly Average	Source
2004	114	11.7/month	Ain O Shalish Kendra
2005	320	10.3/month	Ain O Shalish Kendra
2006 (Jan–Sep)	246 (partial year)	17.9/month	Human Rights Watch
Total by October 2006: 367 confirmed killings (HRW compiled database)

By March 2010, RAB’s own Director General admitted the force had killed 622 people. Independent organizations placed the number higher.

Total Extrajudicial Killings (All Security Forces)

Year	Total Extrajudicial Killings	Source
2005	377	Global Policy Institute
2006	362	Global Policy Institute

Between January and October 2005 alone, an estimated 300 persons were killed at the hands of security forces, according to Human Rights Watch’s World Report 2006.

Every single victim was male. The youngest was 14. None received a trial.

III. The “Crossfire” Script: How State Murder Was Systematized

RAB’s killings followed a pattern so consistent that human rights organizations could predict the official narrative before it was issued. The script went like this:

1. Detain — RAB picks up a suspect, often at night, often without a warrant
2. Torture — The suspect is interrogated using physical coercion (documented in multiple HRW reports)
3. Transport — The suspect is taken to a remote location in the early morning hours
4. Kill — The suspect is shot dead
5. Report — RAB issues a press statement: “The suspect was killed in crossfire/encounter when criminals attempted to free him” or “The suspect grabbed an officer’s weapon and was shot while trying to escape”

“In case after case, the same story was told: the suspect was being taken somewhere, criminals attacked to free him, and in the resulting crossfire, the suspect died. The story was so formulaic that journalists began calling it the ‘crossfire script.’”
— Human Rights Watch, “Crossfire: Continued Human Rights Abuses by Bangladesh’s Rapid Action Battalion,” May 2011

The pattern was so blatant that even RAB’s supporters struggled to explain why:

• Suspects were always killed but officers were never seriously injured
• Suspects managed to “grab weapons” while handcuffed
• Rescue attempts always conveniently happened in isolated locations at dawn
• Bodies bore marks of torture inflicted before the supposed crossfire
• Families reported being denied access to bodies and pressured not to file complaints

IV. Human Rights Watch: “Judge, Jury, and Executioner”

In December 2006, Human Rights Watch published one of the most comprehensive investigations of a security force ever conducted in South Asia: “Judge, Jury, and Executioner: Torture and Extrajudicial Killings by Bangladesh’s Elite Security Force.”

The 85-page report documented:

• A comprehensive database of 367 people killed by RAB as of October 1, 2006
• Systematic patterns of torture during interrogation
• Fabricated “encounter” narratives that followed an identical script
• Witness testimonies from families of victims
• Evidence that many victims were political targets, not hardened criminals
• Complete absence of accountability — no RAB officer was ever prosecuted for a killing

“RAB has become judge, jury, and executioner in Bangladesh. People are being killed not because they pose an imminent threat, but because RAB has decided they are guilty.”
— Brad Adams, Asia Director, Human Rights Watch, December 2006

In May 2011, HRW followed up with “Crossfire: Continued Human Rights Abuses by Bangladesh’s Rapid Action Battalion” — documenting that the pattern of extrajudicial killings continued unabated years after the initial report.

V. Who Were the Victims?

The BNP government marketed RAB as a force targeting “top terrorists” and “hardened criminals.” The reality was far more disturbing.

Human Rights Watch’s database revealed that victims included:

• Political opposition members — particularly Awami League activists
• Trade unionists and labor organizers
• Journalists and media workers
• Human rights activists
• Petty criminals and drug users — people who would normally face minor charges, not death
• Innocent bystanders — people in the wrong place at the wrong time
• Personal enemies of RAB officers or their political patrons

The US Treasury Department later confirmed this pattern, noting:

“NGOs have alleged that RAB and other Bangladeshi law enforcement are responsible for more than 600 disappearances since 2009, nearly 600 extrajudicial killings since 2018, and torture. Some reports suggest these incidents target opposition party members, journalists, and human rights activists.”
— US Treasury Department, December 10, 2021

VI. The Political Architecture: Who Controlled RAB?

RAB did not operate in a vacuum. It was embedded within a political architecture that gave it both its mandate and its impunity.

The Chain of Command

• Prime Minister Khaleda Zia — Head of government, ultimate authority over security forces
• Lutfozzaman Babar — State Minister for Home Affairs (2001–2006), with direct authority over RAB. The same Babar who facilitated the 10-truck Chittagong arms haul, masterminded the August 21 grenade attack, and oversaw a systematic cover-up of that attack
• DMP Commissioner Ashraful Huda — Gave shoot-at-sight orders during Operation Clean Heart, then continued as a senior security official. Later convicted for harboring offenders in the grenade attack case
• RAB Directors General — Senior military and police officers rotated through command, later sanctioned by the United States

The connection between RAB and the BNP’s broader pattern of state violence is unmistakable. RAB was born from Operation Clean Heart, operated under the same Home Ministry that facilitated the Chittagong arms haul and the grenade attack, and served the same political masters who protected HuJI terrorists and enabled systematic corruption on a world-record scale.

VII. Impunity: Zero Accountability

In the entire history of RAB under the BNP government (2004–2006), not a single RAB officer was ever prosecuted for an extrajudicial killing.

This was not an accident. The impunity was structurally engineered:

• The Joint Drive Indemnity Ordinance (2003) — passed after Operation Clean Heart — established the precedent that security forces could kill with legal protection. Although it was later struck down by the High Court as illegal, it signaled to RAB from its inception that the government would protect killers
• Internal investigations were a sham — RAB investigated itself and consistently found no wrongdoing
• Magistrates rubber-stamped “crossfire” narratives without independent inquiry
• The Home Ministry — which controlled RAB — actively blocked external oversight
• Victims’ families who attempted to file complaints faced intimidation and threats

The message was clear: RAB could kill, and nobody would face consequences.

VIII. International Condemnation: The World Takes Notice

While the BNP government celebrated RAB as a success story in “fighting crime,” the international community told a different story.

Human Rights Watch (Multiple Reports)

HRW published multiple detailed reports (2006, 2011) documenting systematic extrajudicial killings, torture, and enforced disappearances. HRW Asia Director Brad Adams publicly condemned RAB and called for accountability.

Amnesty International

Amnesty repeatedly raised concerns about RAB’s killings in annual reports and urgent actions, calling for independent investigations and an end to impunity.

UN Special Rapporteurs

Multiple UN Special Rapporteurs — on extrajudicial killings, on torture, and on human rights defenders — raised concerns about RAB’s conduct and the systematic nature of “crossfire” killings.

International Crisis Group

ICG reports on Bangladesh documented RAB’s role within the broader pattern of state-sanctioned violence under the BNP-Jamaat government.

IX. The US Sanctions: America Says Enough

On December 10, 2021 — International Human Rights Day — the United States took an unprecedented step against a South Asian security force.

The US Treasury Department imposed Global Magnitsky sanctions on RAB as an entity and seven current and former RAB officials, including:

• Benazir Ahmed — Former RAB Director General, then serving as Inspector General of Police (the highest police rank in Bangladesh)
• Six other current and former RAB officials — including former Directors General and Additional Directors General

Simultaneously, the US State Department imposed visa restrictions on additional RAB-connected individuals.

What the Sanctions Meant

• RAB and sanctioned individuals were barred from owning property in the United States
• All financial transactions with US entities were prohibited
• US persons were forbidden from engaging in transactions with RAB
• The sanctions effectively cut RAB off from the US-dollar financial system

This was the first time the United States had ever imposed Magnitsky sanctions on a South Asian security force.

“The United States is committed to putting human rights at the center of our foreign policy. We are taking action against those who perpetrate serious human rights abuse.”
— US Treasury Department statement, December 10, 2021

The Impact

The US government later assessed that following the sanctions, extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances by Bangladeshi security forces “dropped dramatically” (January 2023 assessment). This confirmed what human rights organizations had long argued: the killings were a matter of policy, not rogue behavior. When there were real consequences, the killings stopped.

X. The Pattern: Operation Clean Heart → RAB → Impunity

RAB cannot be understood in isolation. It was part of a deliberate escalation in state-sponsored violence under the BNP-Jamaat government:

1. October 2001: BNP wins election → post-election violence kills hundreds, 18,000+ rapes of Hindu minorities
2. October 2002: Operation Clean Heart launched — 44+ killed in custody, 11,000 arrested, indemnity law passed
3. January 2003: Indemnity Ordinance grants blanket immunity to security forces
4. 2004: RAB created — extrajudicial killings immediately begin
5. April 2004: 10 trucks of weapons seized at Chittagong — state-sponsored arms smuggling exposed
6. August 2004: Grenade attack on Awami League rally kills 24 — masterminded by the same Home Ministry that controls RAB
7. 2004-2006: RAB kills 367+ people in fabricated “crossfire” incidents
8. August 2005: JMB bombs 63 districts — militants that BNP protected for years
9. 2006: Bangladesh ranked most corrupt country in the world for the fifth consecutive year

This was not a government that lost control of its security forces. This was a government that weaponized its security forces — against its own people, against the political opposition, against minorities, and against anyone who stood in the way of its power.

XI. The Numbers That Haunt Bangladesh

Here is what the BNP-Jamaat government’s security apparatus produced between 2001 and 2006:

Category	Number	Source
Operation Clean Heart custody deaths	44–60+	Daily Star / HRW
RAB extrajudicial killings (by Oct 2006)	367	Human Rights Watch
RAB killings (by March 2010)	622	RAB DG admission
Total extrajudicial killings (2005 alone)	377	Global Policy Institute
Total extrajudicial killings (2006 alone)	362	Global Policy Institute
August 21 grenade attack deaths	24	Court records
August 17, 2005 bombing casualties	3 dead, 100+ injured	BBC / NYT
Post-election violence (2001) — rapes	18,000+	Judicial Commission

XII. What Happened After 1/11

When the caretaker government took over on January 11, 2007, one of its first priorities was addressing RAB’s conduct. International pressure, particularly the threat to Bangladesh’s lucrative UN peacekeeping participation, demanded accountability.

The caretaker government:

• Launched investigations into RAB’s extrajudicial killings
• Began prosecutions of BNP-era officials involved in state violence
• Opened investigations into the Chittagong arms haul, the grenade attack, and other crimes

But the deeper structural problem — a security force designed for extrajudicial violence — proved harder to reform than to expose.

XIII. The Legacy: A Force BNP Created, America Sanctioned

The arc of RAB’s story is damning for the BNP:

1. BNP created RAB in 2004 as a composite paramilitary force
2. BNP’s Home Ministry directed RAB — under the same Lutfozzaman Babar convicted for the grenade massacre
3. BNP ensured total impunity — no officer was ever prosecuted under their watch
4. BNP celebrated RAB’s “success” — while bodies piled up at a rate of nearly one per day
5. The United States eventually sanctioned RAB — citing the very same extrajudicial killings, disappearances, and torture that began under BNP rule

The US sanctions on RAB are, in effect, a posthumous indictment of the BNP government’s security philosophy: create a killing machine, give it impunity, use it against your enemies, and deny everything.

Six hundred people are dead. Not one of them got a trial.

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Sources

• Human Rights Watch, “Judge, Jury, and Executioner: Torture and Extrajudicial Killings by Bangladesh’s Elite Security Force” (December 2006)
• Human Rights Watch, “Crossfire: Continued Human Rights Abuses by Bangladesh’s Rapid Action Battalion” (May 2011)
• Human Rights Watch, World Report 2006 — Bangladesh chapter
• Ain O Shalish Kendra (ASK) — Annual human rights monitoring reports
• Global Policy Institute — Extrajudicial killing statistics (2005–2006)
• The Daily Star, “US sanctions RAB, seven top officials” (December 11, 2021)
• bdnews24.com, “US sanctions RAB, seven officials for ‘human rights abuse’” (December 11, 2021)
• US Treasury Department, Global Magnitsky Sanctions Announcement (December 10, 2021)
• US State Department, Human Rights Assessment — Bangladesh (January 2023)
• International Crisis Group, Asia Report No. 121, “Bangladesh Today” (October 2006)
• International Crisis Group, Asia Report No. 187, “The Threat from Jamaat-ul Mujahideen Bangladesh” (March 2010)
• OMCT (World Organisation Against Torture) — Urgent interventions on Operation Clean Heart
• Wikipedia, “United States sanctions on Bangladesh”

Bangladesh Untold is committed to source-backed journalism. Every claim in this article is documented by international organizations, court records, or verified news reports. We invite readers to verify every source.