Category: BNP 2026

Documenting current BNP governance parallels

  • The Anti-Corruption Commission Was Built to Hold Power Accountable. BNP Just Made It a Weapon.







    The Anti-Corruption Commission was created to be Bangladesh’s answer to impunity. A permanent, independent body that could investigate anyone — ministers, MPs, business tycoons, even prime ministers. That was the promise. For twenty years, BNP said the ACC had been weaponized against them. Now they hold the reins. Let’s see what they’ve done with it.

    Here’s what BNP spent two decades saying: the Anti-Corruption Commission was a political weapon. When the ACC filed cases against BNP leaders, the party called them “false and harassing.” When Khaleda Zia was convicted of corruption, BNP called it a “political trial.” When Tarique Rahman was sentenced for money laundering, BNP called it “vendetta politics.” Every ACC investigation into BNP affairs was, in the party’s telling, proof that the commission had been captured by Awami League interests.

    They had a point. The ACC under Awami League rule was selective. It filed cases against opposition figures at a rate that strained coincidence. It dragged investigations against ruling party allies. It became, in practice if not in mandate, an instrument of political pressure — a tool the ruling party could deploy against enemies and withhold from friends.

    BNP’s critique was correct. The problem is what they’ve done since taking power.


    What the ACC Was Supposed to Be

    The Anti-Corruption Commission was established in 2004 under the BNP-Jamaat coalition government. Yes — the same BNP. The enabling legislation, the Anti-Corruption Commission Act 2004, was passed by BNP’s own parliament. The ACC was conceived as an independent body modeled on anti-corruption commissions in Hong Kong, Singapore, and other jurisdictions that had successfully built institutional resistance to graft.

    The intent, at least on paper, was clear: a permanent, statutory body with suo moto powers to investigate corruption at any level of government, from the lowest clerk to the highest office. The ACC would not need government permission to open an inquiry. It would not be answerable to any ministry. Its commissioners would serve fixed terms and could not be removed except through impeachment.

    The reality was different from the start. The ACC’s first years were marked by underfunding, understaffing, and political interference. But the framework — the institutional DNA — was sound. Bangladesh had, on paper, a body that could hold anyone accountable. What it needed was independence and political will.

    Then 1/11 happened.


    What 1/11’s ACC Actually Did

    The military-backed caretaker government that took power on January 11, 2007, did something no elected government had done: it let the ACC work. The reconstituted commission, under new leadership, launched an unprecedented anti-corruption drive that filed cases against over 300 politicians and government officials, including leaders from both major parties.

    This was the period when the ACC earned its credibility — and its enemies.

    Among those charged:

    • Khaleda Zia — Former Prime Minister, charged with corruption in the Orphanage Trust case and the GATCO case
    • Tarique Rahman — Charged with money laundering and corruption; later sentenced to 7 years (overturned on appeal after AL’s return)
    • Harris Chowdhury — Former Political Secretary to PM, charged with corruption; fugitive since 2007
    • M. Morshed Khan — Former Foreign Minister; Interpol traced BDT 141.5 million to his Hong Kong accounts
    • Sheikh Hasina — Then opposition leader, also charged with corruption and extortion
    • Haji Mohammad Salim — Sentenced to 10 years for illegal wealth accumulation
    • Wadud Bhuiyan — Sentenced to 20 years for amassing over $1 million in illegal wealth

    One hundred ten convictions across 79 cases. Bank accounts frozen domestically and internationally. Properties confiscated by court order. This was, by any measure, the most sustained anti-corruption enforcement Bangladesh had ever seen.

    It was also the last time the ACC operated with genuine independence.


    The Awami League Years: Selective Justice

    When the Awami League returned to power in 2009, the ACC’s landscape changed. The commission continued to exist. It continued to file cases. But a pattern emerged that was difficult to ignore:

    Cases against BNP leaders: pursued aggressively. Khaleda Zia’s Orphanage Trust conviction resulted in a 5-year sentence (later extended to 10 years on appeal). Tarique Rahman’s money laundering conviction was upheld by the High Court in 2016. The ACC filed dozens of cases against BNP figures at every level.

    Cases against AL figures: slow-rolled, settled, or never opened. The ACC’s own leadership acknowledged in internal reviews that investigations into ruling party members faced “pressure” — a diplomatic word for interference. Cases that were opened against AL-affiliated businessmen and officials tended to languish. Witness testimony went uncollected. Chargesheets gathered dust.

    This is not speculation. The pattern was documented by Transparency International Bangladesh, by Human Rights Watch, and by the ACC’s own performance reports. Between 2009 and 2023, the ACC filed cases against opposition figures at a rate roughly four times higher than against ruling party members. When the same types of allegations — land grabbing, embezzlement, misuse of public funds — were made against AL-connected individuals, the ACC was far less likely to open a formal inquiry.

    BNP called this what it was: political weaponization. They were right.

    They also promised to fix it.


    What BNP Promised

    During their years in opposition, BNP made specific promises about anti-corruption reform:

    • The ACC would be made truly independent, free from executive interference
    • All politically motivated cases would be reviewed and withdrawn
    • The ACC would investigate corruption regardless of party affiliation
    • Bangladesh would adopt international best practices for anti-corruption institutions

    Lawmakers quoted the 142,983 figure constantly. The number became a rallying cry. BNP members spoke about it in parliament, at press conferences, in international fora. The implication was always the same: we understand what it’s like to be targeted by a politicized anti-corruption body, and we will ensure it never happens again.

    Let’s see what happened instead.


    What BNP Has Done

    1. Mass Withdrawal of Cases Against BNP Leaders

    Within weeks of taking power, BNP began systematically withdrawing corruption cases against its own leaders. The Law Minister confirmed in parliament that a six-member committee had been formed specifically to withdraw cases filed against BNP leaders and activists between 2007 and January 2025.

    Of the 142,983 cases BNP had cited as evidence of political persecution, 23,865 had been withdrawn by early 2026. The committee was working through the rest.

    Now, some of these cases were genuinely politically motivated. BNP’s claim that many were filed to harass and deplete the opposition had merit — the same merit BNP is now denying when the Awami League makes identical claims about cases filed against its members.

    But here’s the problem: the committee reviewing these cases is not an independent judicial body. It is a government-appointed committee operating under the Law Ministry. The decisions about which cases to withdraw are being made by the same government whose leaders are the subjects of those cases. There is no independent review mechanism. No transparency about the criteria being applied. No process for appeal by citizens or civil society organizations who originally filed the complaints.

    The ACC — the body that was supposed to make these determinations — has been sidelined. Its current leadership was appointed by the BNP government. Its investigations into BNP-affiliated individuals have slowed to a crawl. Its public statements, when they come, are carefully worded to avoid any suggestion of investigating the ruling party.

    2. The Tarique Rahman Acquittals

    The most visible symbol of this pattern is Tarique Rahman himself. In December 2024, the High Court acquitted all 49 individuals convicted in the August 21 grenade attack case — including Tarique Rahman and Lutfozzaman Babar. In March 2025, the Appellate Division acquitted Tarique and Giasuddin Al Mamun in the money laundering case. In total, 84 cases were filed against Tarique between 2007 and 2024. Every single one has been dismissed or acquitted.

    Let’s be clear about what happened with the money laundering case specifically. The High Court originally overturned Tarique’s trial court acquittal and sentenced him to 7 years imprisonment, finding that he “influenced political power to help his close friend, Giasuddin Mamun, to get and then launder 200 million taka ($2.5m).” That was in 2016. The conviction stood for eight years. Then, following the July 2024 political transition, the Appellate Division acquitted both men in March 2025.

    Whether these acquittals were on the merits or on procedural grounds, the pattern is unmistakable: every case against the current Prime Minister has been resolved in his favor by courts operating under his government’s jurisdiction. That does not prove the cases were wrong. But it does raise a question that BNP has refused to engage with: if 84 out of 84 cases result in acquittal, is that the justice system working — or the justice system being worked?

    3. The Arms Haul Acquittals

    In December 2024, the High Court acquitted Lutfozzaman Babar and five others — including former DGFI chief Major General Rezzakul Haider Chowdhury — in the Chittagong arms haul case. This was the case involving 4,930 firearms, 27,020 grenades, and over 1 million rounds of ammunition seized from ten trucks at the Chittagong Urea Fertilizer Limited jetty in April 2004. The weapons were bound for ULFA insurgents in India. Two former NSI directors-general were among the convicted. The trial court had sentenced them to death.

    The acquittal was not merely a technicality. It reversed a death sentence in the largest arms smuggling case in Bangladesh’s history — a case where the evidence included confessional statements, seized weapons, and established connections between BNP-era intelligence chiefs and foreign militant networks.

    4. New Cases Against Awami League Figures

    While BNP’s own cases are being withdrawn and acquitted, a torrent of new cases has been filed against Awami League leaders and activists. The Law Minister’s own parliamentary statement confirmed that the government does not maintain centralized statistics on cases filed against political party members, making independent verification of numbers difficult. But what can be documented is the pattern:

    • Over 650 cases filed against former Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina alone
    • The Awami League, Bangladesh’s oldest political party, banned under anti-terrorism law
    • Former Speaker Shirin Sharmin Chaudhury arrested
    • Three UN Special Rapporteurs sent a formal letter warning that measures against the AL may constitute “unnecessary and disproportionate restrictions” on fundamental rights
    • Human Rights Watch’s 2026 World Report documented “thousands” arrested on political grounds with bail routinely denied

    The ACC, which should be investigating corruption on all sides, has been conspicuously absent from any investigation of BNP-affiliated individuals. When opposition figures face hundreds of cases each, and ruling party figures face zero, the commission is not operating as an independent anti-corruption body. It is operating as an extension of political prosecution — exactly what BNP spent twenty years saying was unacceptable.


    The DUDOK Three-Time Clearance: A Response

    Now, someone will bring up DUDOK. Whenever BNP’s corruption record is mentioned, someone points out that the ACC (referred to by its Bengali acronym, DUDOK) cleared Tarique Rahman three times. This is presented as definitive proof of innocence.

    It is not that simple.

    The three clearances were issued during the Awami League era — specifically during periods when the ACC was, by BNP’s own later admission, a politically compromised institution. If BNP’s argument is that the ACC was weaponized against them, they cannot simultaneously cite ACC clearances as proof of innocence. Either the ACC was captured and its outputs are suspect, or it was independent and its prosecutions were legitimate. You cannot have it both ways.

    Further, the clearances occurred during specific windows:

    • First clearance (2010): Issued while the ACC was under heavy political pressure from the newly-installed Awami League government, which had its own reasons to manage the optics of corruption cases rather than pursue them to their conclusion
    • Second clearance (2013): Issued during a period when the ACC was being criticized by Transparency International for declining effectiveness and increasing political influence
    • Third clearance: Issued in a context where multiple other ACC cases against ruling party figures were also being slow-rolled or dismissed

    Each of these clearances came with caveats and procedural questions. Each occurred within an institutional environment that BNP itself later described as corrupt and politically motivated. The clearances do not prove Tarique was innocent any more than the subsequent convictions prove he was guilty. What they prove is that the ACC has been, throughout its existence, an instrument that whoever holds power can point to when it suits them and dismiss when it doesn’t.


    The Real Test of Anti-Corruption

    Here’s how you can tell whether an anti-corruption commission is genuinely independent or merely a weapon of the ruling party:

    It investigates its own side.

    Under the caretaker government, the ACC filed cases against both BNP and Awami League leaders. Khaleda Zia was charged. Sheikh Hasina was charged. Morshed Khan, a BNP foreign minister, was charged. Haji Salim, an AL-affiliated businessman, was charged. It was not perfect. It was not comprehensive. But it was bipartisan in its targeting, which is the minimum threshold for credibility.

    Under BNP’s current government, the ACC has filed zero cases of substance against any BNP-affiliated figure. Not one. While the commission exists, while it has investigators and prosecutors and a budget, it has not opened a single significant inquiry into corruption allegations involving ruling party members — this, in a country that Transparency International ranked as the most corrupt in the world for five consecutive years under the last BNP government.

    This is not reform. This is not accountability. This is the same playbook BNP condemned for twenty years, executed from the other side of the table.


    The Numbers BNP Doesn’t Quote Anymore

    Remember 142,983? BNP’s number. The cases filed against its members that proved, they said, that the system was rigged. The number they cited in every press conference, every parliamentary session, every international appeal.

    They don’t cite it anymore.

    The committee withdrawing those cases has processed 23,865 so far. The rest are working their way through. Every acquittal, every withdrawal, every dismissal is presented as justice finally done — proof that the cases were politically motivated all along.

    Perhaps many of them were. Perhaps most of them were. That is the tragedy of politicized justice: it makes it impossible to separate legitimate accountability from persecution, because the institution responsible for distinguishing between the two has been compromised by the very people who should be subject to its scrutiny.

    But here is what BNP cannot claim: that they have reformed the system. They have not reformed the ACC. They have not made it more independent. They have not instituted safeguards against political weaponization. They have not passed legislation ensuring that future commissions cannot be captured by the ruling party. They have not created independent review mechanisms for case withdrawals. They have done exactly what the Awami League did: appointed loyalists to the commission, withdrawn cases against their own people, and directed the apparatus against their opponents.

    The names on the case files have changed. The institution has not.


    What an Independent ACC Would Look Like

    Bangladesh is not short on models for what genuine anti-corruption reform would require. Transparency International Bangladesh, the International Crisis Group, and the World Bank have all provided detailed recommendations. The key elements are:

    1. Commissioner selection through bipartisan parliamentary committee, not executive appointment
    2. Fixed, non-renewable terms with removal only through impeachment
    3. Guaranteed budgetary independence — the ACC’s budget should not be subject to annual executive review
    4. Mandatory investigation protocols — requiring the ACC to open inquiries when credible complaints are received, regardless of the political affiliation of the subject
    5. Public annual reporting on cases opened, pursued, and closed — with statistical breakdowns by party affiliation
    6. Judicial oversight of case withdrawals — no government committee should have the power to dismiss corruption cases

    None of these reforms have been implemented. None have been proposed by BNP. None appear in any legislative agenda. The party that built its identity on being persecuted by a politicized ACC has, upon taking power, ensured that the ACC remains politicized — just in the opposite direction.


    The Pattern

    This article is part of a series. The previous article in this series documented how BNP’s government punished 28 judges for posting on Facebook about judicial independence, then repealed the legal safeguards that were supposed to protect the courts from executive control. The one before that documented how the security state — RAB, custodial deaths, and the machinery of extrajudicial power — never changed hands because it was never designed to serve one party. It serves whoever is in power.

    The Anti-Corruption Commission is the same story. It was not designed to fight corruption. It was designed to be a tool that whoever holds power can use against their enemies while shielding their friends. The Awami League used it against BNP. BNP denounced it as a weapon. Then BNP took power and used the same weapon against the Awami League.

    The institutions are not broken. They are working exactly as designed. The design is the problem.

    When an anti-corruption commission only investigates the opposition, it is not an anti-corruption commission. It is a political prosecution office with a better letterhead. When case withdrawals are decided by government committees rather than courts, the process is not justice — it is amnesty by another name. When 84 out of 84 cases against a sitting prime minister result in acquittal while 650 cases against a former prime minister proceed simultaneously, the numbers tell a story that no press release can rewrite.

    BNP understood this once. They understood it viscerally, because they were on the receiving end. They spent twenty years explaining, correctly, that a politicized ACC is an insult to the rule of law. They promised to fix it.

    They didn’t fix it. They just pointed it in a different direction.


    Bangladesh Untold documents what the record shows. Every source in this article is independently verifiable. This is part of our ongoing Series 9: BNP 2026 = BAL 2.0?

  • They Punished 28 Judges for Posting on Facebook. Then They Dismantled the Law That Protects the Courts.

    On April 8, 2026, Bangladesh’s Law Ministry issued show cause notices to 28 lower court judges. Their crime: posting on Facebook about judicial independence.

    The same week, parliament voted to repeal the only legal safeguards protecting the courts from executive control. The day before the notices went out, the High Court had published a 185-page verdict ordering an independent judiciary secretariat within three months.

    That verdict is now a dead letter. Those judges now face misconduct charges. Those safeguards are gone.

    This is what institutional capture looks like when it’s moving fast and nobody is paying attention.


    The Notices: What 28 Judges Did Wrong

    The Law Ministry’s show cause letters accused the 28 judges of making “adverse comments” and “provocative statements” about their “appointing and controlling authority” on social media. Specifically, they were charged under two provisions:

    • Violation of the High Court Division’s directive on social media use by judicial officers
    • Rule 2(চ)(2) of the Bangladesh Judicial Service (Discipline) Rules, 2017 — engaging in acts “detrimental to the discipline of service,” classified as misconduct

    The judges were given seven working days to submit written explanations.

    Here is what the Law Ministry actually wrote to them:

    “আপনি সামাজিক যোগাযোগ মাধ্যম ব্যবহার করে আপনার নিয়োগকারী ও নিয়ন্ত্রণকারী কর্তৃপক্ষ সম্পর্কে নানাবিধ বিরূপ মন্তব্য উসকানি প্রদানের মাধ্যমে ব্যক্তিগত অনুভূতি প্রকাশ করে… সামাজিক যোগাযোগ মাধ্যম ব্যবহার-সংক্রান্ত নির্দেশনা অমান্য করেছেন, যা অসদাচরণ (Misconduct) হিসেবে গণ্য।”

    — Law Ministry show cause notice, April 8, 2026

    Translation: “You have used social media to express personal sentiments through various adverse comments and provocations about your appointing and controlling authority, violating the directive on social media use, which constitutes Misconduct.”

    These judges weren’t leaking state secrets. They weren’t making partisan political statements. They were expressing concern — on personal Facebook accounts — about judicial independence. About the institution they serve. About the courts they sit in every day.

    The message from the Law Ministry was unmistakable: say the wrong thing about executive control over the judiciary, and we will come for you.


    What Parliament Did the Same Week

    The show cause notices didn’t happen in isolation. They landed during the exact same week that Law Minister Md Asaduzzaman introduced three bills in parliament to repeal the interim government’s judicial independence ordinances.

    The three targets:

    1. The Supreme Court Judges Appointment (Repeal) Bill, 2026 — eliminating the statutory process for appointing Supreme Court judges, which had placed the Chief Justice’s advice at the centre of appointments
    2. The Supreme Court Secretariat (Repeal) Bill, 2026 — eliminating the independent secretariat established to run the Supreme Court under the Chief Justice’s control, rather than the Law Ministry’s
    3. The Supreme Court Secretariat (Amendment) Ordinance, 2026 — also targeted for repeal

    These weren’t obscure technical provisions. They were the legal architecture designed to do something Bangladesh has never sustainably managed: separate the judiciary from the executive.

    Under the secretariat ordinance, authority over the transfer, promotion, and discipline of lower court judges would have been held by the Supreme Court — not the Law Ministry. Under the appointments ordinance, Supreme Court judges would have been selected through a statutory process rather than pure executive discretion.

    Now both are gone.

    How the Vote Happened

    A special parliamentary committee was tasked with reviewing 133 ordinances issued by the interim government. It recommended approving 98 in original form, 15 with amendments. Of the 20 it recommended against — four were the judicial independence ordinances.

    Chief Whip Nurul Islam admitted all 133 ordinances had to pass by April 9, leaving no time for meaningful debate. Jamaat-e-Islami MP Saiful Alam Khan stood on a point of order to note that members received a 49-page bill just moments before voting — not the required three days in advance. Three Jamaat MPs issued formal notes of dissent on all three judiciary-related bills.

    The bills were pushed through anyway.

    “The real question before parliament now is brutally simple. Does it want an independent judiciary, or merely a friendlier one?”

    — The Daily Star, April 6, 2026


    The High Court Verdict They’re Ignoring

    On April 7 — one day before the show cause notices — the High Court published its full 185-page ruling ordering the establishment of a separate, independent secretariat for the Supreme Court within three months.

    Justice Ahmed Sohel and Justice Debasish Roy Chowdhury went further still: they invalidated the provision of Article 116 of the Constitution that assigned control over subordinate court judges to the president — and cancelled the 2017 Judicial Service (Discipline) Rules entirely.

    Read that last part carefully. The specific discipline rules being used to punish the 28 judges were struck down by the High Court one day before the notices went out.

    The verdict restored control of lower court judges to the Supreme Court — exactly as the 1972 Constitution originally intended, before the Fourth Amendment of 1974 handed that power to the executive.

    None of this stopped the Law Ministry. The notices went out the next day. Parliament repealed the ordinances that same week. The 185-page verdict sits gathering dust while the executive tightens its grip.


    TIB’s Warning

    Transparency International Bangladesh (TIB) responded publicly. Executive Director Dr. Iftekharuzzaman stated that the government was “signalling retreat on judiciary, corruption and enforced disappearance issues.”

    TIB called explicitly for retaining the Supreme Court Judges Appointment Ordinance and the Supreme Court Secretariat Ordinance, warning that their repeal threatens the institutional framework for rule of law, justice, and human rights.

    TIB also flagged concerns about the Bangladesh Telecommunications Regulation Ordinance — specifically its inclusion of “content-related issues” that could be weaponised to suppress dissenting views. Given that 28 judges were simultaneously being punished for social media posts, the concern was more than prescient.


    This Has a History

    Bangladesh has been here before. Every government promises judicial independence. Every government dismantles it.

    The Constitutional Record

    Year Action Effect
    1972 Original Constitution Chief Justice central to appointments; Supreme Court controls subordinate judges
    1974 Fourth Amendment Control of subordinate judges transferred to the president (executive)
    2011 Fifteenth Amendment (Awami League) Restored Chief Justice consultation for permanent appointments under Article 95 — but deliberately excluded Article 98 (initial appointments), keeping the entry point under executive control
    2025 Interim Government Ordinances Created statutory appointment process; established independent Supreme Court Secretariat
    2026 New Parliament Repeals All safeguards stripped. Back to 1974.

    Each government that took power promised to fix what its predecessor broke. Each government then broke the same things in its own way.

    What a Captured Judiciary Can Do for You

    Legal analyst Khan Khalid Adnan put it plainly in The Daily Star on April 6:

    “A politically pliant judiciary helps governments do three things that raw executive power alone cannot do: it sanitises persecution, legitimises constitutional vandalism, and disciplines dissidents through procedure rather than openly through force.”

    The evidence of what that looks like in practice:

    • Chief Justice SK Sinha — Forced to resign and flee Bangladesh after the 16th Amendment judgment. In his memoir A Broken Dream, he documented intelligence intimidation and direct coercion by the prime minister, law minister, and attorney general at Bangabhaban — all pressing him to deliver a favourable ruling.
    • Chief Justice Khairul Haque — Author of the 13th Amendment judgment that abolished the caretaker government system. He has been in custody since July 24, 2025.
    • Chief Justice Obaidul Hassan — Resigned in August 2024 following the July uprising. His departure confirmed, publicly and unmistakably, how completely public confidence in judicial neutrality had collapsed.
    • Khaleda Zia’s prosecution — The Appellate Division later described it as a “manifestly contrived misapplication of the law” amounting to “malicious prosecution.” Courts under AL rule were used to imprison the leader of the opposition. Courts under the current arrangement are being shaped to serve the next set of political needs.

    Now, 28 lower court judges are facing misconduct charges for posting on Facebook about this pattern.


    The Parallel That Cannot Be Ignored

    When BNP controlled Bangladesh from 2001 to 2006, every serious human rights organisation documented the same phenomenon: state institutions were captured, bent to serve the ruling party, and used as weapons against opponents.

    The RAB death squad was created in 2004 and used it to eliminate perceived enemies under the cover of “crossfire.” The grenade attack investigation was corrupted from the inside. The Election Commission was stacked. The police were deployed as a political instrument. And the judiciary — through appointment manipulation, pressure, and the looming threat of consequences — was made compliant.

    Bangladesh endured fifteen years of Awami League rule from 2009 to 2024 and watched the same playbook run in reverse. Different beneficiaries, identical mechanisms.

    The question every Bangladeshi must now ask is: what exactly is different this time?

    The 28 judges being punished for speaking on Facebook are being punished under the 2017 Judicial Service Discipline Rules — rules that the High Court just invalidated. The ordinances that would have protected them have been repealed by a parliament that rushed through 133 bills in days. The minister responsible called it a necessary legislative housekeeping exercise.

    It is not housekeeping. It is construction. The infrastructure of a judiciary that exists to serve the government — rather than to constrain it — is being built again, methodically, while most people are looking somewhere else.


    Four Things Happening at Once

    When a government simultaneously:

    1. Repeals the legal framework that protects judicial independence
    2. Punishes individual judges who speak up about it
    3. Rushes legislation through parliament without adequate time for debate
    4. Ignores High Court verdicts ordering separation of powers

    …it is not building democracy. It is constructing the infrastructure of control, and calling it administration.

    There is a direct line from BNP’s 2001-2006 era — when the courts became instruments of political persecution — to the Awami League’s systematic judiciary capture between 2009 and 2024, to what is happening now. Every government that comes to power in Bangladesh eventually decides that a friendly court system is more useful than a free one.

    The difference today is that the interim government had actually created legal structures to break this cycle. Those structures have just been repealed. By a parliament that had them for nine days before voting to eliminate them.


    What the 28 Judges Understood

    When the 28 judges posted on Facebook about judicial independence, they were watching exactly this process unfold in real time. They saw the ordinances being introduced for repeal. They saw their own authority over their professional futures about to be handed back to the executive. And they spoke — publicly, under their own names, knowing the institutional risk.

    The Law Ministry’s response proved them right in every particular. The government’s tool for silencing them — the 2017 Judicial Service Discipline Rules — had already been nullified by the High Court. The government used them anyway. Because when you control the courts, you control the outcome, and the rules are just paper.

    Bangladesh’s judiciary has been here before. What’s different this time is that there are 28 judges on record who understood what was coming and said so publicly before it arrived. Their show cause letters are not a legal document. They are a confession — the government’s own written record of exactly what it did and why it did it.

    Future accountability processes, when they come, will have this paper trail. They always do.


    Sources

    Bangladesh Untold documents what the record shows. Every source in this article is independently verifiable. This is part of our ongoing Series 9: BNP 2026 = BAL 2.0?

  • The Security State Never Changed Hands: RAB, Custodial Deaths, and the Machinery That Serves Every Government

    BNP created the Rapid Action Battalion in 2004. Under BNP, it killed over 600 people in “crossfires.” Under the Awami League, it killed hundreds more. The United States sanctioned it. BNP condemned those killings from opposition benches for fifteen years. BNP promised security sector reform. BNP returned to power in February 2026. RAB still exists. Custodial deaths in the first three months of BNP rule were documented at 39 by human rights monitors. The force BNP built, the force the world blacklisted, the force BNP condemned as AL’s instrument of murder — is still operational, still killing, still serving whoever sits in Dhaka. The sixth article in our series on whether BNP 2026 is just BAL 2.0.


    There is a unit of Bangladesh’s law enforcement that has been described, in official United States government language, as responsible for “extrajudicial killings, enforced disappearances, and other serious human rights abuses.” It was created by the Bangladesh Nationalist Party in 2004. It was used extensively by the BNP government from 2004 to 2006. It was inherited and massively expanded by the Awami League from 2009 to 2024. It was sanctioned by the US Treasury Department in December 2021 under the Global Magnitsky Act. BNP, from opposition, condemned it for years as AL’s death squad.

    It is called the Rapid Action Battalion. It is still operating today, under BNP’s government, with the same chain of command, the same legal immunity structures, and the same institutional culture that made it internationally notorious. What has changed is whose political opponents it is pointed at.

    This is not a peripheral issue in Bangladesh’s democratic transition. The security apparatus — RAB, the Detective Branch, the police’s special units — was the instrument through which fifteen years of authoritarian politics was enforced. It was how critics were silenced, opponents disappeared, and a government that lost public legitimacy held onto power. When people demanded change in August 2024, what many of them were demanding, in part, was the end of that instrument.

    What they got was a change of government. The instrument remains.

    What BNP Built

    The Rapid Action Battalion was established by the BNP-Jamaat coalition government in 2004, with Prime Minister Khaleda Zia’s administration presenting it as an elite counter-crime and counter-terrorism force. RAB became operational in January 2004 — its official formation order signed off by a government that included Lutfozzaman Babar as State Minister for Home Affairs, the same official later sentenced to death for his role in the August 2005 grenade attack on the Awami League rally.

    From its founding, RAB operated with a specific and documented method: the “crossfire.” Suspects — or people described as suspects — were taken into RAB custody, transported to isolated locations, and shot dead. RAB’s official account invariably described these deaths as occurring during gunfights initiated by the detained person. Independent investigation by Human Rights Watch, Odhikar (Bangladesh’s oldest human rights organization), and international journalists consistently found these accounts to be fabricated. The dead men’s hands bore no gunpowder residue. Their injuries were inconsistent with the described sequences of events. Witnesses placed them in custody hours before the alleged “crossfire.” Their families were not informed of their deaths until it was too late to preserve evidence.

    Between 2004 and 2006, RAB killed over 400 people in these so-called crossfires during the BNP government alone. The pattern was so consistent that “crossfire” became a byword for extrajudicial execution. Human Rights Watch documented the practice in its 2006 report Judge, Jury and Executioner: Torture and Extrajudicial Killings by Bangladesh’s Elite Security Force, which ran to 64 pages of evidence and included first-person testimony from families, eyewitnesses, and lawyers. The report found that RAB operated beyond judicial oversight, with impunity effectively guaranteed by the political support of the government that created it.

    By the time BNP’s government ended with the military-backed caretaker administration in January 2007, RAB had accumulated a death toll that no democratic government should have been able to defend. BNP’s government defended it anyway — right up until the day it left office.

    The Numbers Under AL: Worse, And More Documented

    The Awami League, returning to power in 2009, did not dismantle RAB. It institutionalized it. Under fifteen years of AL rule, RAB’s documented extrajudicial killings exceeded 600 — and that is the figure from the incomplete record available to human rights monitors who operated under systematic obstruction. Odhikar documented 600+ killings across that period before its own operations were effectively shut down by the government in 2023.

    The AL era also added a new dimension to Bangladesh’s security state: enforced disappearances. The existence of “Aynaghar” — a secret detention facility operated by the Directorate General of Forces Intelligence (DGFI), Bangladesh’s military intelligence — was first reported seriously in 2017. Former detainees, speaking to journalists at enormous personal risk, described a network of cells beneath a military compound where people were held without charge, without access to lawyers, without acknowledgment of their detention. Families who asked about missing relatives were told nothing. Legal avenues led nowhere because the detentions did not officially exist.

    The number of people held in Aynaghar over the AL period is not known with certainty. What is known is that human rights organizations including Human Rights Watch confirmed its existence based on corroborating testimony from multiple former detainees, and that some of those who emerged from it described torture consistent across multiple independent accounts.

    Odhikar documented 708 enforced disappearances between 2009 and 2023. Of those, 88 people eventually reappeared — released or otherwise surfacing. 76 were found dead. The remainder are still missing.

    The United States responded in December 2021 with sanctions under the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act. The US Treasury Department designated RAB and six of its current and former officials — including Inspector General of Police Benazir Ahmed and RAB Director-General Chowdhury Abdullah Al-Mamun — for “serious human rights abuses.” The accompanying statement from the Treasury was unambiguous: RAB had committed extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances. The US government was putting its legal and financial authority behind that finding.

    BNP responded to the sanctions announcement from opposition with expressions of satisfaction. The sanctions were, BNP said, proof of what the party had been saying for years: RAB was AL’s private death squad, and the international community had finally recognized it. BNP’s leadership implied, in multiple public statements, that a change of government would bring accountability and reform.

    What BNP Said

    The record of BNP’s opposition-era statements on security sector reform is extensive and specific. These were not vague aspirational commitments. They were concrete positions, stated repeatedly, across multiple years, in multiple forums.

    In 2021, following the US sanctions announcement, BNP Secretary General Mirza Fakhrul Islam Alamgir called the designations “fully justified” and stated that the sanctions demonstrated that RAB had become “an instrument of political suppression.” BNP’s statement explicitly connected RAB’s abuses to the AL government and called for “accountability for all extrajudicial killings.”

    In 2022, BNP’s international affairs committee submitted materials to foreign embassies and international organizations documenting RAB’s killings under the AL government and calling for sustained international pressure. The materials named specific victims, cited Odhikar data, and referenced the US Treasury sanctions. The implicit and at times explicit argument was that the killings were a product of AL governance and would end if AL was replaced.

    Tarique Rahman, in interviews and statements from London, spoke of the need for security sector reform as a core element of BNP’s governance agenda. In at least three recorded statements between 2022 and 2024, he used the word “accountability” in connection with RAB and the security apparatus. He described RAB’s killings as crimes against the Bangladeshi people — crimes committed, in his framing, by the AL government.

    He did not mention that his party created the institution.

    What Happened After August 2024

    The interim government that took office following the August 2024 uprising moved quickly on some institutional changes — but the security apparatus was not among them. RAB remained operational from day one of the new administration. Its organizational structure was unchanged. Its personnel — including many who had served through the documented AL-era killings — remained in their posts. The sanctioned officials had been relieved of their positions before the transition, but the institution they ran continued without structural reform.

    In the months following August 2024, as the interim government focused on managing the transition and beginning the process of accountability for AL-era abuses, reports emerged of a different problem: the security apparatus was now being directed against AL supporters, perceived AL affiliates, and in some documented cases, people with no political affiliation at all who happened to be in the wrong place at the wrong time.

    Human Rights Watch’s World Report 2026, covering the August-to-December 2024 period and early 2025, noted that while the AI and UN had welcomed the fall of the AL government, they also expressed serious concern about “reports of extrajudicial killings and mob violence in the immediate aftermath” of the transition, and about subsequent “abuses by security forces” during what the report described as a period of “widespread human rights violations.”

    The Human Rights Support Society — HRSS, one of Bangladesh’s independent human rights monitors — documented what happened next. In the period from BNP’s return to formal governmental authority in February 2026 through the end of April 2026, HRSS recorded 39 custodial deaths. In three months. The previous article in this series cited this figure in passing; it deserves to stand alone.

    Thirty-nine people died in state custody in three months.

    In the Awami League era, each custody death was a documented data point in BNP’s case against the government. Human rights organizations like Odhikar were celebrated by BNP for producing exactly this kind of accounting. The numbers were used to demonstrate that the AL government operated outside the law, that its security forces killed with impunity, that the absence of accountability was itself an indictment of the government.

    The same standard applies now. By BNP’s own reasoning, 39 custody deaths in three months is evidence of a government operating outside the law.

    The Aynaghar Question

    Among the most consequential commitments made during Bangladesh’s post-August 2024 transition was the promise of accountability for Aynaghar — the secret DGFI detention facility where hundreds of people were held without legal process during the AL era.

    Former detainees came forward. Families of the disappeared sought justice. Human rights organizations that had documented the facility for years anticipated that its operators would face legal consequences now that the government that ran it was gone. A commission was established. Testimony was taken. Names were named.

    The results, as of mid-2026, have been deeply incomplete. Some former Aynaghar operators have faced preliminary proceedings. No convictions have been secured. The commission investigating the facility has operated with limited resources and limited access. Families of the still-missing — those 76 who emerged dead, those hundreds who have not emerged at all — report that they received little information about what happened to their relatives.

    There is a specific dimension of the Aynaghar accountability question that connects to BNP’s current governance. The DGFI — the military intelligence directorate that ran Aynaghar — is a permanent institution. Its personnel overlap substantially with the broader security apparatus. A genuine commitment to ending the practice of secret detention would require structural reform of that institution: new oversight mechanisms, accountability for past operators, systematic exposure of what happened.

    What has instead occurred is a partial process that has created the appearance of accountability without the substance. The institution that ran Aynaghar remains intact. Its new officers have been briefed on the old officers’ methods. Its relationship to the executive government has not been restructured. The only change is that the current government has no political reason to run a secret detention facility for the people it was running it for before.

    It does, however, have the facility. And the institution. And the precedent.

    The Personnel Problem

    In the immediate aftermath of August 2024, there was significant public pressure for accountability within the security forces — not just for institutional reform, but for individual accountability for the police and RAB officers who had been responsible for the deaths of protesters during the July-August uprising and for AL-era killings more broadly.

    What occurred was a selective process. Some officers were suspended. Some were transferred. Cases were filed against officers specifically identified by video evidence from the July-August protest period. But the broader accountability question — the 600+ RAB crossfire deaths, the documented enforced disappearances, the torture at Aynaghar — was handled through the commission process rather than through criminal prosecutions.

    The result is that a substantial portion of the security apparatus personnel who served through the AL period remain in service. Some have been promoted. The officer corps of RAB, the Detective Branch, and the major police units includes people who were operational during the documented period of extrajudicial killings. They have not been prosecuted. They have not been formally held accountable. They have, in many cases, simply continued their careers under new political management.

    This is not an accusation that every individual officer committed crimes. It is an observation about institutional culture. When the personnel who carried out extrajudicial killings under one government are retained and promoted under the next government — without accountability, without acknowledgment, without any signal that the institution’s practices have changed — the institution’s culture does not change. The practices that were normalized before remain normalized. What changes is who authorizes them and against whom they are directed.

    Bangladesh has seen this cycle before. In 2001, when BNP took power from AL, it inherited the same security apparatus and used it to kill 44 people in Operation Clean Heart and to disappear hundreds. In 2009, when AL took power from BNP, it inherited the same apparatus — including RAB — and used it to disappear 708 people. In 2026, BNP has inherited the same apparatus again.

    The apparatus does not change with elections. It serves power.

    The US Sanctions: What Happened to Them

    The December 2021 US Treasury sanctions on RAB and six of its officials were described at the time as a landmark intervention — a direct statement from Bangladesh’s largest bilateral development partner that it would not tolerate the normalization of extrajudicial killing. The sanctions were welcomed by BNP. They were also, BNP implied, a demonstration of how seriously the international community took AL’s abuses.

    With BNP in power in 2026, the status of those sanctions is an important question. Sanctions of this kind can be lifted when the sanctioned entity undergoes genuine reform. They are not automatically lifted with a change of government. The conditions for lifting them — accountability for past abuses, structural reforms to prevent future ones, demonstrated change in institutional behavior — require active effort and verification.

    As of May 2026, the US sanctions on RAB and its former officials remain in place. No application for delisting has been publicly announced. No US government statement has indicated that the reform conditions have been met. RAB’s senior leadership is aware of this: operating under the shadow of US Treasury designations constrains the institution’s international relationships, its ability to receive foreign training and equipment, and its formal interactions with allied security services.

    What this means in practice is that BNP is governing with a security force that its most important international partner has formally designated as a human rights violator — and that BNP has done nothing substantive to change the conditions that produced that designation.

    The party that welcomed the sanctions in 2021 as vindication has apparently decided that the sanctions are an inconvenience now that the institution they targeted is BNP’s own instrument of governance.

    BNP’s Own Standard

    The force of the argument here comes not from any outside standard but from BNP’s own. The party spent fifteen years building an international case against RAB. It documented the killings. It shared the data. It cited the US sanctions. It invoked the names of the dead.

    In doing so, BNP established what the evidence standard for condemning a government’s security practices should look like. It looks like this: documented custody deaths, unaccountable institutions, personnel who committed abuses and were not held responsible, a security apparatus that serves political purposes rather than legal ones.

    By that standard — BNP’s own standard — the evidence compiled in the first three months of BNP’s government raises serious concerns. Thirty-nine custody deaths. A sanctioned force still operational. An Aynaghar accountability process that has produced no convictions. A security apparatus whose personnel include officers who served through fifteen years of documented abuses without facing consequences.

    This is not a verdict. It is a direction. In April 2026, it is still early. The full shape of BNP’s security governance will only be visible over months and years. The institutions that produce extrajudicial killings do not do so uniformly in every period — they do so when the political incentives align and the constraints are absent.

    What is visible right now is the absence of constraints. RAB has not been reformed. The Aynaghar accountability process has not produced justice. The personnel problem has not been addressed. The structural conditions that allowed 600+ crossfire deaths under AL, and over 400 under BNP’s own first government, are intact.

    BNP told Bangladesh that it knew what those conditions produced. BNP built its entire opposition identity on that knowledge. The question Bangladesh must now ask — and ask loudly, while the window for accountability is still open — is whether BNP is governing as if it still believes what it said.

    The Pattern Holds

    Six articles into this series, the finding remains consistent. Bangladesh Untold has documented how BNP in 2026 has replicated patterns it condemned in opposition: authoritarianism in its first 100 days, press freedom crackdowns, institutional capture, political persecution of opponents, dismantling of judicial independence. The security apparatus is the oldest entry on that list and the most foundational.

    The security state is not a consequence of authoritarianism. It is its precondition. You cannot silence critics without police who will arrest them. You cannot disappear opponents without a facility to hold them. You cannot sustain mass political prosecution without investigators who will produce cases on demand. The security apparatus is the physical infrastructure of the Bangladesh that BNP built in 2001-2006, that AL maintained and expanded from 2009-2024, and that neither party has shown meaningful willingness to restructure.

    RAB is still operational. The Aynaghar operators have not been convicted. The personnel remain in service. The sanctions are unaddressed. The custody deaths are being counted.

    BNP created this institution. BNP condemned it. BNP inherited it again.

    The guns never changed sides. They just found new targets.


    Bangladesh Untold is a source-backed documentation project covering Bangladesh’s modern political history. All claims in this article are drawn from verified reports by Human Rights Watch (World Report 2026, Judge Jury and Executioner 2006), Odhikar, the Human Rights Support Society (HRSS), the US Treasury Department (December 2021 Global Magnitsky sanctions), Amnesty International, the Daily Star, Netra News, and official statements by BNP leadership from 2021–2024. This is the sixth article in Series 9: BNP 2026 = BAL 2.0?

  • Press Freedom Then and Now: BNP Demanded a Free Press for 15 Years. Then They Took Power.

    Press Freedom Then and Now: BNP Demanded a Free Press for 15 Years. Then They Took Power.

    Eight journalists charged in the first six weeks. Attacks on Bangladesh’s two most prominent newspapers. A retired general arrested — in part — for once doing his job. Bangladesh’s new government has not just failed to protect press freedom. It has actively dismantled it, using the same tools it spent fifteen years denouncing. This is the record, and this is the comparison.


    On the morning of January 15, 2004, journalist Manik Saha stepped out of his house in Khulna and was shot dead. He had been covering the activities of Islamist extremists in the region — reporting that powerful people in Bangladesh’s ruling establishment had decided they could not tolerate. His murder was never solved. His killers were never prosecuted. Bangladesh’s government at the time, under Prime Minister Khaleda Zia, expressed condolences and moved on.

    No arrest. No conviction. No accountability.

    Manik Saha’s name appears in the Committee to Protect Journalists’ database of journalists killed in Bangladesh. It sits alongside other names from the same period — men and women whose work brought them into conflict with a political establishment that had decided the press existed to serve power, not to scrutinize it.

    Twenty-two years later, in March 2026, the Committee to Protect Journalists signed a joint letter to Prime Minister Tarique Rahman — the son of the woman who led Bangladesh when Manik Saha was murdered — demanding that his government stop charging journalists under cybercrime laws, investigate attacks on press offices, and release detained media workers.

    The letter had eight co-signatories. It was sent one month into Rahman’s government. Eight journalists had already been charged.

    Bangladesh is a country that cannot escape its own history. The names change. The tools do not.

    What BNP’s Record on Press Freedom Actually Looks Like

    From 2001 to 2006, Bangladesh under Khaleda Zia’s BNP-Jamaat coalition was one of the most dangerous places in South Asia to be a journalist. The Committee to Protect Journalists documented multiple killings during this period. Reporters Without Borders ranked Bangladesh among the worst countries in the world for press freedom throughout BNP’s tenure. The U.S. State Department’s annual human rights reports for every year from 2001 to 2006 documented a consistent pattern of threats, violence, and impunity targeting journalists.

    The tactics were varied but the objective was singular: silence anyone whose reporting threatened the political and economic interests of BNP and its allies.

    Physical attacks on journalists were commonplace. In September 2003, a mob attacked the offices of the Prothom Alo newspaper — at the time, as now, Bangladesh’s most widely read daily. In 2004, photojournalist Shahidul Alam documented threats against reporters covering the August 21 grenade attack on Sheikh Hasina’s Awami League rally. The same attack that killed 24 people and blinded hundreds.

    The BNP government’s response to that attack — washing the crime scene with detergent before investigators could examine it — was itself an act of obstruction. When journalists tried to report on what had happened, they found themselves navigating a political environment in which the truth was unwelcome.

    The Information and Communication Technology Act, passed by the BNP government in 2006, laid the legal groundwork for what would follow. Bangladesh’s first cybercrime law — written and passed under BNP — contained provisions that criminalized vaguely defined online speech. At the time, the provisions were largely dormant because internet use was limited. They would not remain dormant for long.

    The Inheritance Problem: How Every Government Used the Same Law

    When Sheikh Hasina came to power in 2009, she inherited the ICT Act and its provisions. She used them. As social media penetration expanded throughout the 2010s, the Awami League government found the ICT Act increasingly useful for managing its critics. By 2018, the situation had become severe enough that international pressure led to a formal replacement: the Digital Security Act.

    Except that “replacement” was a euphemism. The DSA did not liberalize the legal environment for journalists. It expanded it. The International Press Institute described the DSA as a law that “criminalises legitimate journalistic activity.” Amnesty International said it would “silence free speech and dissent.” The U.S. Embassy warned that the law “too easily could be misused to arrest, detain, and silence critics.”

    BNP’s response to the Digital Security Act was unequivocal. Party leaders called it a tool of fascism. They documented hundreds of cases filed against their members under its provisions. Tarique Rahman, speaking from London, regularly cited the DSA as evidence that Hasina’s government was authoritarian and illegitimate. International supporters of BNP agreed.

    In 2023, under international pressure and following the murders of multiple journalists, the Awami League renamed the DSA the Cyber Security Act. Rights groups noted immediately that the name had changed but the provisions had not. Every aspect of the law that BNP had denounced as fascist remained in the new legislation.

    The July 2024 uprising brought down the Awami League. The interim government amended the Cyber Security Act. It did not repeal it. The core provisions — the ones that allow arrests for online speech critical of the government, the ones with non-bailable offenses, the ones that human rights organizations had called incompatible with freedom of expression — survived.

    And when Tarique Rahman took power in February 2026, he inherited a fully operational legal instrument for silencing journalists. A law that, in different iterations, his own party had helped create in 2006, condemned throughout the 2010s and early 2020s, and now began using within weeks of taking office.

    The First Six Weeks: A Documented Record

    The Human Rights Support Society released its monthly report for March 2026 on April 4, 2026 — covering the period from February 17, when Tarique Rahman was sworn in, through the end of March. The HRSS report, published in the Dhaka Tribune, documented the following actions against journalists and media workers in this period:

    • Eight journalists charged in two separate cases under the Cyber Security Act
    • One individual detained for criticizing Prime Minister Tarique Rahman online
    • Two people arrested for allegedly “offending religious sentiments” — a charge that has historically been used against minority community journalists and secular commentators

    The nine human rights organizations that wrote to Prime Minister Rahman on March 19 — including the Committee to Protect Journalists, Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, and Article 19 — added additional context. Their letter demanded that the government “investigate attacks on major news outlets including Prothom Alo and Daily Star.”

    That demand carries weight. Prothom Alo and the Daily Star are Bangladesh’s two most significant newspapers — the organizations that have most consistently attempted to practice independent journalism in a country where press independence is chronically under threat. The fact that both outlets faced attacks serious enough for nine international organizations to demand official investigation, within the first month of a new government, is not a routine press freedom concern. It is a warning sign.

    Reporters Without Borders — which has tracked press freedom in Bangladesh for decades — has documented a consistent pattern under every Bangladeshi government: initial tolerance of critical coverage during the honeymoon period of a new administration, followed by escalating pressure as political consolidation proceeds. The RSF noted in its 2024 World Press Freedom Index that Bangladesh’s institutional infrastructure for press suppression — the cybercrime laws, the advertising control mechanisms that allow governments to starve critical outlets financially, the unofficial networks of pressure on editors — had survived the change of government and remained available to whoever came next.

    Whoever came next was Tarique Rahman. He has wasted little time.

    Prothom Alo: The Paper That Has Always Made Governments Uncomfortable

    To understand why the attacks on Prothom Alo matter, it is necessary to understand what that newspaper represents in Bangladesh’s media landscape.

    Prothom Alo was founded in 1998 and has, for much of its existence, been Bangladesh’s highest-circulation Bangla-language newspaper. It has made enemies of every government. Under BNP from 2001 to 2006, it faced threats and pressure for covering the government’s corruption and its links to Islamist militant groups. Under Awami League, it faced criminal cases, advertising boycotts, and the imprisonment of journalist Rozina Islam for allegedly possessing government documents — a case that drew international condemnation.

    The paper’s consistent criticism of power, regardless of which party holds it, has made it a target of every government. And that consistency is itself the story. In a country where most media outlets are owned by business conglomerates with political connections and financial interests that make genuine independence nearly impossible, Prothom Alo has attempted to be the exception.

    When the nine international organizations demanded an investigation into attacks on Prothom Alo in March 2026, they were asking the government that had likely organized or tolerated those attacks to investigate itself. The demand was not naive — it was a documented statement of what had already happened, intended to create a public record.

    That public record now exists. The question is whether anyone in power is listening.

    “They Were Doing Their Jobs”: The 1/11 Journalists

    One dimension of the 2026 press freedom crisis has received less international attention than it deserves: the connection between the targeting of journalists and the broader campaign of retribution against figures associated with the 2007 emergency government.

    When Lt. Gen. (Retd.) Masud Uddin Chowdhury was arrested on March 23, 2026 — along with former DGFI chief Lt. Gen. (Retd.) Sheikh Mamun Khaled and others connected to the 1/11 period — the chilling effect on journalists who covered the emergency government and its anti-corruption work was immediate and intentional.

    The 2007-2008 caretaker government was the most significant anti-corruption effort in Bangladesh’s post-independence history. Journalists who covered it — who documented the evidence against Tarique Rahman, who reported on the money laundering investigations, who gave space to the corruption findings that would later be confirmed by courts — contributed to a historical record that the current government finds inconvenient.

    Targeting the officials who conducted the anti-corruption work sends a message to the journalists who reported on it: what you wrote is now dangerous. That message is understood. It does not need to be stated explicitly to achieve its intended effect.

    This is how press freedom dies in Bangladesh. Not always with an arrest — though there are those too — but with a systematic creation of uncertainty about what it is safe to report, to publish, to say.

    The Comparison That BNP Doesn’t Want Made

    Bangladesh Untold has published extensive documentation of press freedom conditions under BNP’s 2001–2006 government. The record is damning:

    The International Federation of Journalists documented Bangladesh as one of the most dangerous countries for journalists in Asia during this period. The annual reports of the Dhaka-based Center for Development Communication recorded hundreds of incidents of threats, attacks, and legal harassment against journalists from 2001 to 2006. The U.S. State Department’s Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for Bangladesh in 2003 noted that “political activists and criminals beat, threatened, and otherwise harassed journalists,” and that “authorities generally failed to hold those responsible accountable.”

    Manik Saha’s killing in 2004 was not an isolated incident. It was the most extreme point on a continuum of violence and intimidation that ran throughout BNP’s tenure. The impunity that protected his killers was the same impunity that allowed BNP activists to beat reporters, threaten editors, and organize advertising boycotts against critical outlets.

    Now consider what has happened in the first three months of the Rahman government:

    • Eight journalists charged under cybercrime law
    • Attacks on Prothom Alo and Daily Star offices
    • Detention of a critic for online commentary
    • A pattern of legal and physical pressure on media that nine international organizations found severe enough to write directly to the Prime Minister about — within his first month in office

    BNP spent fifteen years arguing that Sheikh Hasina’s press freedom record disqualified her government from democratic legitimacy. They were right to make that argument. The Digital Security Act was a genuine threat to free expression. The arrests of journalists under AL rule were genuine abuses. The international condemnation of those abuses was warranted.

    Every word of that condemnation now applies to the government that delivered it.

    RSF, CPJ, and the Organizations BNP Used to Cite

    During the years of Awami League rule, BNP’s international advocates regularly cited Reporters Without Borders and the Committee to Protect Journalists as authoritative sources. When RSF ranked Bangladesh near the bottom of its World Press Freedom Index, BNP cited the ranking as evidence of Hasina’s authoritarianism. When CPJ documented journalist arrests, BNP’s London office issued statements quoting the findings.

    These citations served a specific purpose: they established BNP as a party that respected and valued international human rights standards, and that saw press freedom as a democratic value rather than an inconvenience.

    The CPJ has now joined eight other organizations in writing directly to Tarique Rahman about press freedom violations in his government’s first month. RSF’s Bangladesh file is being updated with documentation of the same pattern those organizations identified.

    When BNP was in opposition, these organizations were authorities. Now that they are writing about BNP’s government, will the same standard apply? Will BNP acknowledge the CPJ’s findings the way it once demanded Awami League acknowledge them?

    The silence from BNP’s international supporters on this question is itself informative.

    What a Real Commitment to Press Freedom Would Look Like

    Bangladesh’s press freedom crisis will not be resolved by one government’s good intentions, even if this government had good intentions — which the evidence so far does not support. The structural problem is the existence of legal instruments designed for repression that survive every change of government because every government finds them useful.

    A genuine commitment to press freedom in Bangladesh would require:

    Repeal of the Cyber Security Act. Not amendment. Not renaming. Repeal. Every organization that has examined this law has concluded that it is incompatible with press freedom and freedom of expression. The BNP government, which condemned it under its previous iteration, has the democratic mandate and the credibility to abolish it. It has not done so.

    Criminal accountability for attacks on journalists. The organizations that wrote to PM Rahman in March 2026 demanded investigation into specific attacks. Those investigations must be independent of government influence, and their findings must be acted upon regardless of where they lead. This has never happened in Bangladesh’s history. It remains the benchmark against which every government must be measured.

    Release of all journalists detained under cybercrime provisions. Not just journalists whose political sympathies align with the government, but all journalists detained for their work. Press freedom is not selective. A government that releases only its friendly journalists while keeping its critics in detention has not embraced press freedom. It has managed it.

    Structural independence for the state broadcaster. Bangladesh Television and Bangladesh Betar have functioned as government mouthpieces under every administration. Their editorial independence has never been secured by law. It should be.

    These are not radical demands. They are the minimum standards that Bangladesh’s international partners — the same partners who celebrated the February 2026 election as a democratic triumph — should be conditioning their continued engagement on. The fact that these standards are not being demanded, with real consequences for non-compliance, is a failure of international accountability as much as it is a failure of Bangladeshi governance.

    The Pattern Continues

    Bangladesh Untold was established to document the history of Bangladesh that powerful interests prefer you not know. Part of that history is the consistent, bipartisan assault on press freedom that has defined every government this country has had.

    The pattern is not complicated. A new government arrives. Journalists who covered the previous government’s abuses find themselves targeted. New cybercrime cases are filed. New arrests are made. International organizations send letters. The government issues non-committal responses. The journalists remain in detention or under legal pressure. The international community continues to engage with the government regardless.

    Then, eventually, the next government arrives. And the journalists who covered this government’s abuses find themselves targeted. And the cycle continues.

    Manik Saha was shot in 2004. His killers were never found. The BNP government that failed to find them is now back in power. Eight journalists have been charged under cybercrime law in the first six weeks of that government’s return.

    Bangladesh’s journalists — the ones doing their jobs, the ones trying to report what is actually happening — deserve better than a political class that values press freedom only when it is useful for attacking opponents, and abandons it the moment it becomes an inconvenience to govern.

    The record of 2001 to 2006 is damning. The record being built from February 2026 onwards is following the same pattern. The comparison is not unfair. It is, in fact, the only honest way to evaluate a government that spent fifteen years in opposition demanding standards it is now refusing to meet.

    Bangladesh deserves a free press. Its journalists deserve protection. Its citizens deserve a government that treats accountability journalism as a democratic asset rather than a political threat.

    Based on three months of evidence, this government has not decided to be that government.

    The record continues to be written. We will continue to document it.


    Sources

    • Committee to Protect Journalists — Bangladesh journalist database, Manik Saha case (2004)
    • CPJ, Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, Article 19, CIVICUS, FIDH, Fortify Rights, Kennedy Human Rights Center, Tech Global Institute — Joint letter to PM Tarique Rahman, March 19, 2026
    • Human Rights Support Society (HRSS) Monthly Report, Dhaka Tribune, April 4, 2026
    • Reporters Without Borders — World Press Freedom Index, Bangladesh historical rankings
    • U.S. State Department — Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Bangladesh (2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006)
    • U.S. Embassy Bangladesh — Statement on Cyber Security Act 2023
    • Amnesty International: “Restore freedom of expression in Bangladesh & repeal Cyber Security Act” (2024)
    • International Press Institute — Digital Security Act assessment (2019)
    • Rozina Islam case documentation — CPJ, RSF, 2021
    • Al Jazeera Media Institute: “Bangladesh’s Digital Security Act is criminalising journalism” (2022)
    • International Federation of Journalists — South Asia press freedom reports (2002–2006)
    • Bangladesh Center for Development Communication — Annual journalist safety reports (2001–2006)
    • Dhaka Tribune, The Daily Star, Prothom Alo — 2026 reporting on journalist arrests and press office attacks
    • WikiLeaks / U.S. Embassy Dhaka cables — background on BNP era media environment

    Bangladesh Untold documents the history of Bangladesh that powerful interests prefer you not know. Every claim is sourced. Every source is cited.

    🔴 Bangladesh Untold — The History You Were Never Told

  • The Chief Justice Age Extension: How BNP Rigged the Constitution Before the Election Even Started

    The Chief Justice Age Extension: How BNP Rigged the Constitution Before the Election Even Started

    They did not need to steal votes if they could steal the referee.

    There is a kind of corruption that does not make headlines. No money changes hands. No one gets shot. No buildings burn. It happens in parliament, with a vote, under the cover of reform, and if you are not paying close attention — and most people are not paying attention to retirement ages of Supreme Court justices — you will miss it entirely.

    That is exactly what BNP counted on.

    In 2004, the BNP-Jamaat coalition government passed a constitutional amendment that raised the retirement age of Supreme Court justices from 65 to 67. On its face, it looked like a benign administrative change. Judges serve longer. The judiciary gains stability. Who could object to that?

    Plenty of people objected. Because the amendment was not about judicial tenure. It was about something far more specific and far more dangerous: controlling who would run the next election.

    The Caretaker System — And Why It Mattered

    To understand what BNP did, you need to understand Bangladesh caretaker government system, which was in place from 1996 to 2011.

    Under this constitutional provision, whenever a parliament completed its five-year term, the sitting government would hand power to a neutral, non-partisan caretaker administration. That caretaker government — led by a Chief Advisor — would oversee the election, ensure a level playing field, and transfer power to whoever won. The system existed because Bangladesh elections had been so thoroughly rigged, so consistently stolen, that no opposition party trusted the ruling party to run an election fairly.

    And here is the critical detail: under the constitution, the Chief Advisor of the caretaker government was to be the immediate past Chief Justice of Bangladesh.

    Not a politician. Not a bureaucrat. Not someone appointed by the ruling party. The last person to hold the top judicial post in the country would temporarily become the head of government for the sole purpose of running a clean election.

    It was a clever design. The Chief Justice was supposed to be above politics — a neutral figure with the constitutional authority and the institutional credibility to keep the election honest.

    Unless, of course, the ruling party could make sure the right Chief Justice was sitting in that chair at exactly the right time.

    Enter Justice K.M. Hasan

    In June 2003, the BNP government appointed Justice K.M. Hasan as Chief Justice of Bangladesh.

    This appointment itself raised eyebrows. Hasan had a history. The Awami League and other opposition parties pointed out — repeatedly, loudly, and with documentation — that Justice Hasan had past connections to the Bangladesh Nationalist Party. He was not, by any reasonable assessment, a neutral figure. He was seen as sympathetic to BNP, and in a country where judicial appointments are routinely political, the opposition had every reason to be concerned.

    But the appointment itself was not the masterstroke. That came next.

    The Amendment That Changed Everything

    In 2004, the BNP-Jamaat government passed the Constitution (Fourteenth Amendment) Act, which raised the retirement age of Supreme Court judges from 65 to 67.

    Think about what this meant in practical terms. Without the amendment, Justice K.M. Hasan would have retired at 65 — potentially before the caretaker government needed to form. With the amendment, he would stay in office until 67, ensuring he would be the sitting Chief Justice at the exact moment the BNP government term ended and the caretaker system kicked in.

    This was not a coincidence. This was not an administrative improvement that happened to benefit the ruling party. This was a constitutional amendment designed to rig the referee.

    The BNP government deliberately, calculatedly, and with full parliamentary force changed the constitution of Bangladesh to ensure that their appointed Chief Justice — a man with documented BNP connections — would be the one running the next election.

    As The Business Standard reported:

    In 2004, the BNP deliberately changed the constitution to increase the retirement age for Supreme Court judges from 65 to 67 years, ensuring that Justice Hasan would retire just before the caretaker government took over, allowing him to assume leadership.

    And Dhaka Tribune:

    The AL opposed Justice Hasan, alleging that he belonged to the ruling BNP in the past and that the BNP government in 2004 amended the constitution to extend the retirement age for the Supreme Court judges to ensure Justice Hasan became the Chief Adviser to help BNP win the elections.

    Strip away the legal language and here is what happened: the ruling party rewrote the constitution of the country so they could pick the person who would oversee their reelection. That is not governance. That is rigging the game before anyone even casts a ballot.

    Why This Matters More Than You Think

    You might be thinking: okay, so they changed a retirement age. How much could one person really do?

    The answer is: everything.

    The Chief Advisor of the caretaker government controls:

    • The Election Commission — who runs it, how it operates, what resources it has
    • The voter list — which names appear, which do not, and how many fake voters get added
    • The security apparatus — how police and military are deployed during elections
    • The administration — which officials stay, which get transferred, which districts get favorable administrators
    • The election schedule — when voting happens, how much campaign time parties get
    • The media environment — what coverage is allowed, what is suppressed

    This is not a ceremonial role. This is the single most powerful temporary position in Bangladesh democratic system. The Chief Advisor does not just oversee the election — they shape the terrain on which it is fought.

    And BNP wanted to make absolutely, constitutionally certain that the person holding that power was one of their own.

    The Broader Pattern: Capturing Every Institution

    The retirement age amendment was not an isolated act. It was part of a systematic, multi-pronged effort by the BNP-Jamaat government to capture every institution that could constrain their power.

    Consider the full picture:

    • The Election Commission under Chief Election Commissioner M.A. Aziz prepared a voter list containing 12.1 million fake names — over a crore of phantom voters designed to swing the result
    • The judiciary was being reshaped through this amendment, ensuring the next Chief Justice would be BNP-friendly
    • The civil administration was staffed with BNP loyalists in key districts
    • The security forces — RAB, police, intelligence — were under the control of Lutfozzaman Babar, who would later be sentenced to death for the August 21 grenade attack
    • The caretaker system itself — designed as a check on ruling party power — was being hollowed out from the inside

    Every independent institution that was supposed to serve as a check on government power was being compromised. The Election Commission was captured. The voter list was fabricated. And now, the Chief Justice — the person who would temporarily become the most powerful figure in the country — was being hand-picked through a constitutional amendment.

    This was not just corruption. This was the architecture of authoritarianism.

    The Opposition Resistance

    The Awami League did not take this lying down. They understood exactly what was happening, and they fought back with everything they had.

    When it became clear that Justice K.M. Hasan was being positioned to become Chief Advisor, the AL launched a sustained campaign of opposition. They raised the issue in parliament. They organized protests. They made it clear that they would not accept a partisan figure as the neutral arbiter of the next election.

    Their argument was straightforward and impossible to refute: a Chief Advisor with BNP connections cannot, by definition, be neutral. The entire purpose of the caretaker system is to remove partisan control from the election process. Installing a BNP-aligned Chief Justice as Chief Advisor defeats that purpose entirely.

    The protests grew. And they were met with the same response BNP always gave to dissent: violence.

    Logi Boitha: When Democracy Caught Fire

    On October 28, 2006, Bangladesh exploded.

    The Awami League and its allies organized a massive demonstration demanding a neutral caretaker government. The BNP-Jamaat coalition responded with force. What followed was some of the worst political violence Bangladesh had seen in years.

    Protesters and BNP-Jamaat activists clashed with makeshift weapons — logi (bamboo poles) and boitha (oars) — in the streets of Dhaka. The violence was so intense, so visceral, that the entire episode became known as the Logi Boitha Andolon — the Logi-Oar Movement.

    At least 12 people were killed in the clashes.

    This was the cost of BNP constitutional manipulation. When you rig the system so thoroughly that democratic opposition becomes impossible, people do not give up. They take to the streets. And people die.

    The Logi Boitha movement forced the crisis to a head. The entire country was grinding toward a catastrophic confrontation, and BNP response was to double down on their rigged system rather than compromise.

    Justice Hasan Steps Down — But the Damage Was Done

    Under massive public pressure, violent protests, and a deteriorating security situation, Justice K.M. Hasan declined to take the Chief Advisor position on October 27, 2006. He cited health reasons.

    Whether his health was genuinely failing or he simply recognized that assuming the role would trigger a constitutional crisis of unprecedented scale, Hasan withdrawal was a victory for democratic resistance. The man BNP had gone to such extraordinary lengths to install as the neutral arbiter — including amending the constitution — would not, in the end, take the position.

    But BNP was not done yet.

    The Search for a Neutral Chief Advisor — And How BNP Blocked Every Option

    With Hasan out, the search for a Chief Advisor should have been straightforward. The constitution provided a clear order of succession. But BNP manipulated every step.

    Justice Mainur Reza Chowdhury — died before he could be appointed.

    Justice M.A. Aziz — rejected by the Awami League. This was the same M.A. Aziz who, as Chief Election Commissioner, had overseen the preparation of the fraudulent voter list containing 12.1 million fake names. The idea of making him Chief Advisor — putting both the election machinery and the caretaker government under the same compromised official — was beyond absurd.

    Justice Md. Hamidul Haque — disqualified. He held a for-profit office under the BNP government. You cannot be a neutral caretaker leader when you have been on the ruling party payroll.

    Justice Mahmudul Amin Chowdhury — rejected by BNP. Yes, the same party that had been screaming about the need for constitutional process and institutional respect blocked a Chief Justice they did not like. Khaleda Zia later admitted she regretted opposing him.

    Every candidate was either disqualified by BNP own actions, rejected for legitimate conflicts of interest, or blocked by one party or the other. The system was deadlocked because BNP had spent years rigging it, and when their rigging failed, they had no fallback.

    Iajuddin Ahmed: President, Chief Advisor, and BNP Man

    When all candidates were exhausted, the constitution provided one final option: the President would assume the role of Chief Advisor.

    President Iajuddin Ahmed — a BNP-nominated President — took on the dual role of President and Chief Advisor on October 29, 2006.

    Let that sink in. The same person was now both the head of state and the head of the caretaker government. The same person who was Commander-in-Chief of the military was now also supposed to be the neutral arbiter overseeing free elections. And this person had been nominated to the presidency by the very party whose election he was supposed to oversee.

    This was the natural endpoint of BNP institutional capture. When you rig the Chief Justice appointment, and that fails, and you block every alternative, and the system collapses under the weight of your manipulation — you end up with your own President running the election.

    Iajuddin dual role was unconstitutional in spirit, untenable in practice, and universally recognized as a disaster for democratic legitimacy. The Awami League rejected it outright. The international community raised alarms. And the Bangladeshi public, already radicalized by the Logi Boitha violence, was heading toward a complete breakdown.

    January 11, 2007: The Inevitable Collapse

    What happened next is well-documented. The Awami League announced a boycott of the scheduled January 22, 2007 election, citing the compromised voter list and Iajuddin partisan dual role. The UN and EU both announced they would not send observers. The military, facing the loss of its lucrative UN peacekeeping role, intervened.

    On January 11, 2007, President Iajuddin Ahmed declared a state of emergency, resigned as Chief Advisor, and the military-backed caretaker government under Fakhruddin Ahmed took over.

    Every single step that led to January 11 — the constitutional amendment, the partisan Chief Justice, the rigged voter list, the blocked caretaker appointments, the violent suppression of protests, the President-as-Chief-Advisor debacle — traced directly back to BNP determination to control the election process by any means necessary.

    The Real Lesson: Constitutions Are Only as Strong as the People Who Respect Them

    Here is what makes the retirement age amendment so insidious, and so important to understand:

    It was legal.

    BNP did not break any laws. They did not forge documents or bribe judges or stuff ballot boxes (well, they did all of those too, but not for this). They used the constitutional process exactly as it was designed — they introduced a bill, they held a vote, they passed an amendment, they changed the law.

    And in doing so, they subverted democracy more effectively than any street-level rigging operation ever could.

    This is the lesson that Bangladesh keeps learning and keeps forgetting: the form of democracy is not the same as the substance of democracy. You can have elections and still not have democracy. You can have a constitution and still not have rule of law. You can have all the institutions — the parliament, the courts, the election commission — and if the people running them are determined to abuse their power, those institutions become weapons instead of safeguards.

    BNP understood this perfectly. They did not need to burn down the house when they could change the locks.

    What Happened After 1/11

    The caretaker government that took over on January 11, 2007, undid many of BNP institutional manipulations:

    • The Election Commission was reconstituted under Chief Election Commissioner ATM Shamsul Huda, who replaced the discredited M.A. Aziz
    • A new photo-based voter list was created, eliminating the 12.1 million fake names
    • Transparent ballot boxes were introduced
    • Party registration requirements were established
    • The December 29, 2008 election — held under the new system — was recognized domestically and internationally as free and fair, with the Awami League winning a two-thirds majority

    The system worked when it was allowed to work. The problem was never the design of the caretaker system. The problem was that a ruling party was willing to manipulate every lever of power — including amending the constitution — to ensure that the system served them instead of the people.

    The 2011 Repeal — And What We Lost

    In 2011, the Awami League government abolished the caretaker government system entirely, through the Fifteenth Amendment. They argued, with some justification, that the system had been manipulated by BNP and was therefore unreliable. They also pointed out that no other democracy uses a military-backed caretaker system to oversee elections.

    But the abolition created its own problem. Without the caretaker system, there is no institutional mechanism to ensure that the ruling party does not use the state apparatus to rig elections. The solution to BNP manipulation was not to throw out the entire system — it was to strengthen it, make it more transparent, and build in safeguards against the kind of constitutional abuse that BNP practiced.

    Instead, Bangladesh went from one extreme to another: from a system that could be manipulated to no system at all. The result has been a decade of one-party rule, opposition boycotts, and elections that no international observer considers credible.

    Why This Story Matters Now

    You might think this is ancient history. 2004 was over two decades ago. The caretaker system is gone. K.M. Hasan declined the position. The constitution has been amended again. Why drag this up now?

    Because the playbook never changes.

    What BNP did in 2004 — amending the constitution to control an institution that was supposed to be independent — is the same playbook they used with the Election Commission, the same playbook they used with the voter list, the same playbook they used with the security apparatus. Capture the institution. Stack it with your people. Use it to win. Call it democratic.

    And it is the same playbook that every ruling party in Bangladesh has used since. The Awami League did not just abolish the caretaker system — they learned from BNP example and built their own architecture of institutional control. The names change. The party in power changes. The playbook stays the same.

    The retirement age amendment is a masterclass in how democratic institutions are hollowed out from the inside. It happened with a parliamentary vote, not a military coup. It happened with legal language, not bullets. And if you were not paying attention to Supreme Court retirement ages — and why would you be? — you would never have noticed that your democracy was being stolen.

    That is the point. That is always the point.

    The most effective corruption is the kind you do not see coming. The kind that looks like governance. The kind that passes through parliament with a majority vote and gets signed into law by a compliant president. The kind that makes dictators smile and democrats weep.

    BNP changed two years on a retirement age. And they nearly changed the fate of a nation.

    Sources

    • The Business Standard — BNP changed the retirement age of Supreme Court judges (2024)
    • Dhaka Tribune — The caretaker government system and its troubled history
    • GlobalSecurity.org — Bangladesh Caretaker Government
    • Wikipedia — 2006-2008 Bangladeshi political crisis
    • Human Rights Watch — World Report 2008: Bangladesh
    • The New York Times — Bangladesh at the Brink (January 2007)
    • Countercurrents.org — The Role of the UN and the Western World (November 2016)
    • bdnews24.com — Coverage of ATM Shamsul Huda and the Election Commission reconstitution
    • Banglapedia — Anti-Corruption Commission entry
    • South Asia Journal — Bangladesh Army in the UN Peacekeeping (June 2017)
    • Constitution of the People Republic of Bangladesh — Thirteenth Amendment (Caretaker Government), Fourteenth Amendment (Retirement Age)
  • As If Bangladesh Has No 1/11 Problem: The Farce of Charging a Three-Star General With Street Murder

    As If Bangladesh Has No 1/11 Problem: The Farce of Charging a Three-Star General With Street Murder

    On March 23, 2026, retired Lieutenant General Masud Uddin Chowdhury was dragged from his home in Baridhara DOHS by the Detective Branch of Dhaka Metropolitan Police. The man who once strode into Bangabhaban in armed capacity on January 11, 2007 — the day the state of emergency was declared — now sat in the back of a police microbus, a camera phone recording his passage through a justice system that bears little resemblance to one he once commanded.

    Masud Uddin Chowdhury’s court appearance — March 2026

    What happened next tells you everything about where Bangladesh stands in 2026 — and why the question of 1/11 remains as unresolved as ever.

    The ICT Detour: A Case That Never Reached the Tribunal

    By legal logic and by the government’s own framing, Masud Uddin Chowdhury should have been produced before the International Crimes Tribunal-2. The ICT prosecution itself filed an application on March 29, 2026, seeking to show Chowdhury arrested in connection with allegations of mass killings during the July Uprising — a case that falls squarely under the Tribunal’s jurisdiction over crimes against humanity.

    The ICT-2, led by Justice Nazrul Islam Chowdhury, ordered authorities to produce him before the tribunal on April 7.

    He never arrived.

    Instead, Chowdhury was held in DB custody. His name was added to an existing FIR — a murder case filed with Mirpur Model Police Station over the killing of one Delowar Hossain during a July 2024 protest. A case where his name had not originally appeared. The case was filed nearly a year after the incident, on July 6, 2025, by the victim’s wife. Chowdhury’s name was included alongside dozens of others in that lump-sum fashion that has become the defining feature of post-uprising justice in Bangladesh — where over 100,000 people have been named as accused across more than 1,930 cases, where dead people have been listed as deceased in one case and alive in another, where fake victims have been invented for extortion.

    From the ICT — a tribunal designed for crimes against humanity — to a magistrate’s court hearing a single murder case. That is the trajectory. And it is not accidental.

    “Ami Eka Ekjon Manush Kor Jaygay Giye Giye Murder Korsi!”

    When Masud Uddin Chowdhury was finally produced before the lower court, the prosecution read out the charges. Murder during the July Uprising. A former three-star general, coordinator of the National Coordination Committee on Combating Serious Crimes, former High Commissioner to Australia, former Member of Parliament — accused of going place to place killing people one by one.

    He laughed.

    “Ami eka ekjon manush kor jaygay giye giye murder korsi!” — “I went from place to place killing people one by one!”

    He said it while the court listened. He said it while the absurdity of the accusation hung in the air like smoke. A three-star general, a man who commanded divisions and coordinated national anti-corruption operations, reduced to a name dumped into a mass murder case alongside strangers — accused of personally roaming the streets of Mirpur shooting protesters.

    No lawyer appeared on his behalf during the remand hearing. Not because he couldn’t find one. Because the system had already decided what role he would play.

    The Lump-Sum Justice Machine

    This is not about one man’s innocence or guilt. This is about a pattern — a system of post-uprising cases that has been documented, criticized, and acknowledged even by the Inspector General of Police himself.

    Sheikh Hasina has been named in 663 cases. Over 100,000 people stand accused across 1,930 cases. Charge sheets have been submitted in only 19. The Transparency International Bangladesh survey flagged the problem. The Business Standard documented case after case where false victims were invented, where the dead were reported alive, where personal land disputes were repackaged as July Uprising murder cases.

    When a case names 200 people for a single death, it is not justice. It is a net. When a former army chief gets dropped into that net alongside common criminals and political nobodies, it tells you the net was never about catching the guilty. It was about catching someone — anyone — who the new government wants behind bars.

    As of May 4, 2026, Masud Uddin Chowdhury has been on continuous remand for over six weeks. Five days here, four days there, three more days, another four — a carousel of remand hearings that has no visible endpoint. The DB has interrogated him about 1/11, about the caretaker government, about the anti-corruption drives, about his relationship with the Awami League. None of these are the charges in the murder case. None of these are what the court authorized remand for. But the questions keep coming, because the case is a vehicle — the destination is 1/11.

    As If Bangladesh Has No 1/11 Problem

    The BNP came to power in February 2026 calling itself a victim of 1/11. Tarique Rahman — now Prime Minister — was arrested during that period. He has publicly alleged torture. The party’s narrative is straightforward: 1/11 was a conspiracy, its architects must face consequences, and the BNP’s suffering entitles it to a reckoning.

    Fair enough. But a reckoning pursued through lump-sum murder cases in magistrate courts — while the ICT exists precisely for this purpose — is not a reckoning. It is revenge dressed in legal clothing.

    If 1/11 was a crime against the democratic will of the Bangladeshi people, then try it as such. Constitute the charges. Present the evidence. Let the ICT do what it was designed to do. Let the accused face their accusers with legal representation, with due process, with the transparency that a tribunal provides.

    Instead, what Bangladesh has is a man who was supposed to go to the ICT, held in a police detective branch cell, questioned about everything except the actual charges on paper, and remanded in a lower court murder case that names him alongside strangers for a death he had no plausible connection to.

    This is not accountability. This is a workaround.

    And the reason for the workaround is clear: the ICT has rules. It has procedures. It has a public record. A magistrate’s court hearing a remand application at the speed of a rubber stamp does not.

    The Bigger Question Nobody Wants to Answer

    Here is the question that neither side in Bangladesh’s political establishment wants to confront: Was 1/11 justified?

    Not whether it was legal. Not whether the military should intervene in politics — it shouldn’t, and every democratic principle says so. But whether the conditions that triggered it — the corruption, the violence, the stolen elections, the grenade attacks, the arms smuggling, the five consecutive years as the world’s most corrupt country — whether those conditions created a genuine crisis of governance that the political system was incapable of resolving on its own.

    The answer is uncomfortable for everyone.

    For the BNP, the answer is no, because acknowledging the crisis means acknowledging that their government created it. The post-election rapes of 2001, the August 21 grenade attack that killed 24, the Chittagong arms haul of 4,930 guns and 27,020 grenades, Operation Clean Heart’s 44 custody deaths, RAB’s 600+ extrajudicial killings, Hawa Bhaban’s parallel government, Transparency International’s five-year corruption crown — none of this existed, apparently. 1/11 was just a conspiracy by power-hungry generals.

    For the Awami League, the answer is complicated, because they benefited from 1/11 more than anyone. Sheikh Hasina’s government was the product of the December 2008 election that the caretaker government made possible. She extended Masud Uddin Chowdhury’s tenure as High Commissioner to Australia three times. As researcher Mohiuddin Ahmad noted: “Among the major actors of 1/11, Masud Uddin Chowdhury was the only one who was rewarded during the Awami League government’s tenure.”

    For the military, the answer is dangerous, because it forces a conversation about the limits of institutional power and the precedent set every time generals decide the politicians have failed.

    And for the Bangladeshi people, the answer is the hardest of all: when your government steals from orphans, smuggles weapons to foreign insurgents, rapes minorities after elections, and earns the title of the world’s most corrupt country five years running — what exactly are you supposed to do? Wait for the next election that will be rigged anyway?

    The Courtroom That Tells the Whole Story

    On March 24, 2026, as Masud Uddin Chowdhury was led through the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate’s Court, a man threw dirty water at him. Police couldn’t prevent it. They escorted him away quickly.

    A three-star general. A former High Commissioner. A former MP. And someone threw dirty water at him in a court of law, because the system that arrested him — the same system that was supposed to try him properly — couldn’t even guarantee his dignity in a public building.

    That image — the general being splashed with dirty water in a court corridor — is the image of Bangladesh’s justice system in 2026. Not the tribunal. Not the process. Not the evidence. Just dirty water, thrown by a stranger, in a building where justice is supposed to live.

    Masud Uddin Chowdhury laughed in court because the alternative was to weep at what his country has become. The accusations against him — one man going place to place committing murders — are so farcical that even the accused could only laugh. But the system that produced those accusations, the lump-sum justice machine that dumps names into cases like ingredients into a blender, the magistrate courts that grant remand like vending machines dispensing candy — that is not funny. That is the architecture of political persecution wearing the robes of due process.

    As if Bangladesh has no 1/11 problem. As if the crisis that triggered the caretaker government was invented. As if the five years of world-record corruption, the grenade attacks, the arms smuggling, the minority persecution, the extrajudicial killings — as if none of it happened, and 1/11 was just a power grab by ambitious generals who wanted to hurt the BNP.

    The BNP wants you to believe that. The current Prime Minister — the man who was arrested during 1/11, who alleged torture, who spent years in exile — has every personal reason to want you to believe that. But the historical record does not support it. The international sources do not support it. And the court of public opinion — the one that celebrated in the streets when the caretaker government finally acted — does not support it either.

    Try 1/11 properly or don’t try it at all. But don’t dress up political score-settling as murder cases. Don’t hold a man in a detective branch cell while the tribunal waits. Don’t dump his name into a lump-sum case alongside 200 strangers and call it justice. And don’t pretend that the conditions which made 1/11 possible never existed — because if you erase that history, you guarantee that those conditions will return.

    The dirty water will wash off. The farcical charges will eventually collapse. But the precedent being set — that the ruling party can use the lower courts to punish political enemies while avoiding the scrutiny of a proper tribunal — that precedent will stain Bangladesh’s justice system long after every remand hearing is over.

    Ami eka ekjon manush kor jaygay giye giye murder korsi. He said it laughing. But the joke is on Bangladesh.

  • 12.1 Million Ghost Voters: How Bangladesh’s Voter Rolls Were Stuffed Before the 2007 Election

    12.1 Million Ghost Voters: How Bangladesh’s Voter Rolls Were Stuffed Before the 2007 Election

    Twelve point one million. That is not a typo. That is the number of fraudulent names that an audit found crammed onto Bangladesh’s voter rolls ahead of the 2007 parliamentary election — a figure so staggering it exceeded the entire population of Greece at the time.

    The discovery did not come from a whistleblower or a leak. It came from simple arithmetic. When researchers cross-referenced the voter list with census data, the numbers refused to align. The rolls contained roughly 1.23 crore (12.3 million) more names than there were eligible voters in the country. Ghosts, duplicates, children, the deceased — all of them registered to vote in a system that had no photographs, no biometrics, and no reliable mechanism to verify identity at the polling station.

    The Aziz Commission and the Partisan Voter List

    At the center of this fraud sat Chief Election Commissioner M.A. Aziz, appointed by the BNP-Jamaat alliance government. Aziz oversaw the preparation of the voter list that would be used for the scheduled January 2007 election. Under his supervision, the rolls swelled with millions of phantom entries — names that corresponded to no living, eligible citizen.

    The Awami League and opposition parties raised the alarm repeatedly. Their objections were dismissed. Aziz’s commission showed no interest in investigating the discrepancies. When independent analysts compared the voter rolls against population data, the gap was enormous and unmistakable: 12.1 million names that should not have been there.

    “The BNP-Jamaat alliance government even prepared the voter list with about 1.23 crores (12.3 million) fake voters in order to win the next election.”

    — Awami League Official Documentation

    How the Fraud Worked

    The manipulation was not subtle. It operated across several dimensions simultaneously:

    Ghost voters. Names of people who did not exist, had died, or were below voting age were added to the rolls en masse. In a country with no photo voter ID, there was no way for polling agents to verify whether the person standing before them was actually the registered voter.

    Duplicate entries. The same individual was registered multiple times — under slight variations of their name, under different addresses, or across different constituencies. A single person could theoretically vote in several locations.

    Territorial manipulation. Voters were registered in constituencies where they did not reside, padding the rolls in strategically important districts. This was gerrymandering by registration rather than by boundary.

    The scale of the operation was industrial. 12.1 million fake names represented roughly 10% of the entire voter roll — a margin wide enough to swing any election in a country where contests are frequently decided by single-digit percentages.

    The Constitutional Rig That Accompanied the Fraud

    The fake voters were not an isolated scheme. They were one component of a comprehensive effort to rig the electoral infrastructure from top to bottom.

    In June 2003, the BNP government appointed Justice K.M. Hasan as Chief Justice. In 2004, they amended the constitution to raise the retirement age of Supreme Court justices from 65 to 67 — a change timed precisely so that Hasan would be the last retired Chief Justice when the caretaker government needed to form before the next election. Under Bangladesh’s system, the immediate past Chief Justice automatically becomes Chief Advisor of the caretaker government that oversees elections.

    “In 2004, the BNP deliberately changed the constitution to increase the retirement age of Supreme Court judges from 65 to 67 years.”

    — Dhaka Tribune

    The plan was elegant in its audacity: stuff the voter rolls with millions of fake names, then install a Chief Advisor with known BNP connections to oversee the election conducted on those compromised rolls. The structure of the rig went all the way down to the ballot box itself — opaque containers that made ballot stuffing undetectable.

    The Collapse

    It did not work. The scale of the fraud was too visible, and the opposition’s response was too fierce.

    Justice K.M. Hasan, facing massive street protests and the threat of a boycott, declined the Chief Advisor position on October 27, 2006, citing health reasons. The Logi Boitha movement of October 28 — violent clashes between AL and BNP supporters that killed at least 12 people — made it clear that a Hasan-led caretaker government would not be accepted.

    President Iajuddin Ahmed then assumed the dual role of President and Chief Advisor — an arrangement that placed a BNP-appointed head of state in charge of overseeing an election already compromised by 12 million fake voters. The Awami League saw the writing on the wall.

    January 3, 2007: The Awami League formally withdrew from the election, declaring a boycott over the compromised voter list and partisan arrangements. Without the participation of the major opposition party, the election had no legitimacy.

    Eight days later, on January 11, the military intervened. President Iajuddin declared a state of emergency and resigned as Chief Advisor. The 1/11 caretaker government under Fakhruddin Ahmed took power — and one of its first priorities was the voter roll.

    The Fix: A Photo Voter ID for the First Time

    The discredited Aziz Commission was forced out. In its place, ATM Shamsul Huda was appointed Chief Election Commissioner on February 5, 2007, serving alongside commissioners Muhammad Sohul Hossain and M. Sakhawat Hossain.

    What they built was revolutionary for Bangladesh:

    • A photo-based voter list — national voter ID cards with photographs — created for the first time in the country’s history
    • Transparent ballot boxes replacing the opaque containers that had enabled stuffing
    • Electronic voting machines piloted for the first time
    • Comprehensive biometric data collection
    • Party registration requirements formalizing political accountability

    “Under his leadership, the Election Commission, assisted by the military, prepared a photo-based voter list, initiated dialogues for electoral law reforms, introduced party registration requirements, and piloted the use of electronic voting machines.”

    — bdnews24.com, on ATM Shamsul Huda’s legacy

    The new system was not merely a technical upgrade. It was a structural rebuke to the old one. Every ghost voter on the old rolls became a ghost — unphotographed, unverified, and unable to materialize at a polling station where agents could now check faces against ID cards. The duplicate entries collapsed because biometric registration made it impossible to register twice. The territorial manipulation ended because addresses were now tied to verifiable residence.

    The photo voter ID became the de facto national identity document for all Bangladeshis — a system so fundamental that its origins in a corruption scandal are often forgotten. It eliminated, permanently, the possibility of the type of mass voter fraud attempted under the BNP-Jamaat alliance.

    The Proof: December 2008

    The ultimate vindication came on December 29, 2008. The election held under the new system — with photo voter IDs, transparent ballot boxes, and a reconstituted Election Commission — was recognized domestically and internationally as free and fair.

    “To their credit, the caretakers were eventually able to take a decent way out of power through presiding over — and credit here goes to ATM Shamsul Huda and his team at the Election Commission — a free and fair election in December 2008.”

    — Dhaka Tribune

    The Awami League and Grand Alliance won by a two-thirds majority. The result was accepted by all parties. It remains one of the most credible elections in Bangladesh’s history — precisely because the system that produced it had been rebuilt from the ashes of the 12.1 million phantom voters.

    Why This Matters Now

    The 12.1 million fake voters are not ancient history. They are the reason Bangladesh has a photo voter ID system at all. They are the reason the 2008 election was credible. And they are a case study in what happens when electoral infrastructure is captured by a ruling party — the voter rolls become a weapon, the election commission becomes a tool, and the constitutional framework becomes a mechanism for entrenching power.

    The BNP-Jamaat alliance did not try to win an election. They tried to make winning unnecessary — by stuffing the rolls so thoroughly that the result was predetermined. The 1/11 intervention, for all its controversies, destroyed that infrastructure and replaced it with one that could not be rigged the same way.

    That replacement — the photo voter ID, the transparent ballot boxes, the biometric registration — is the most durable positive legacy of the 1/11 period. It was built because 12.1 million ghosts demanded it.

    Read more about Bangladesh’s electoral crisis and the 1/11 intervention:

  • The ICT Is Now a BNP Weapon: How a Party Lawyer Became Chief Prosecutor of the Tribunal That Prosecutes BNP’s Enemies

    The ICT Is Now a BNP Weapon: How a Party Lawyer Became Chief Prosecutor of the Tribunal That Prosecutes BNP’s Enemies

    Six days after Tarique Rahman was sworn in as Prime Minister, the Bangladesh government cancelled the appointment of the International Crimes Tribunal’s chief prosecutor and replaced him with a card-carrying BNP party lawyer — a man who had represented Khaleda Zia in her corruption case, served as central vice president of the BNP lawyers’ forum, and sought the party’s own nomination to run for parliament. This is not a coincidence. It is a blueprint.


    The Swap That Shocked International Legal Observers

    On February 23, 2026 — just six days after Tarique Rahman took oath as Prime Minister following BNP’s landslide election victory — Bangladesh’s Law Ministry issued a notification signed by Solicitor Md Manjurul Hossain: Mohammad Tajul Islam, the sitting Chief Prosecutor of the International Crimes Tribunal (ICT), was out. In his place: Md Aminul Islam, Supreme Court lawyer and senior member of BNP’s Habiganj district committee.

    The speed was breathtaking. Six days.

    Not six weeks to conduct a search. Not a judicial committee to assess qualifications. Six days — the time it took the new government to identify which of its own party lawyers should now control the prosecution of crimes against humanity in Bangladesh.

    “The new chief prosecutor, advocate Aminul Islam, previously served as central vice president of the BNP lawyers’ forum and reportedly sought the party’s nomination for a parliamentary constituency in the recent elections. He also represented Khaleda Zia — mother of the new prime minister — in the corruption case that led to her conviction in 2018.”

    — JusticeInfo.net, Bangladesh: A New Prosecutor Under Pressure, February 27, 2026

    Read that again. The man now in charge of prosecuting crimes against humanity in Bangladesh:

    • Is a member of the BNP party committee in Habiganj
    • Served as central vice president of Jatiyatabadi Ainjibi Forum — BNP’s lawyers’ wing
    • Defended Khaleda Zia (the Prime Minister’s own mother) in her criminal corruption case
    • Applied for BNP’s own party ticket to run for parliament in February 2026
    • Previously served as a special public prosecutor at Dhaka Speedy Trial Tribunal-4 during BNP’s 2001–2006 government

    This is not an independent prosecutor. This is a party official in a prosecutor’s robe.


    What the ICT Is — And What It Was Supposed to Be

    The International Crimes Tribunal was established in 2009 under the Awami League government to prosecute war crimes committed during Bangladesh’s 1971 Liberation War. Over the years, it became politically controversial — its early years marked by fair trial concerns, its later years by hard-won convictions of Jamaat-e-Islami war criminals.

    When the Yunus-led interim government took power in August 2024 following the student uprising that ousted Sheikh Hasina, it reconstituted the ICT with a new mandate: prosecute crimes against humanity committed during Hasina’s crackdown on protesters in July-August 2024, which killed approximately 1,400 people. This was a legitimate and internationally recognized mission.

    In November 2025, the reconstituted ICT delivered its most significant verdict: Sheikh Hasina was sentenced to death in absentia for crimes against humanity. Her former Home Minister was also sentenced to death. A former police chief, in custody, received five years after testifying for the prosecution.

    Then BNP won the election. And everything changed.


    The Pattern: From Justice Institution to Political Weapon

    Human Rights Watch’s World Report 2026 — the definitive annual accounting of human rights conditions globally — documented what was happening to the ICT even before BNP took power:

    “The tribunal had been fraught with violations of fair trial standards, and while the interim government amended the law that establishes the court, introducing some improvements, it still lacks important due process protections and includes the death penalty, in violation of international human rights law. The interim government also gave the tribunal broad powers to prosecute and dismantle political organizations.

    — Human Rights Watch, World Report 2026: Bangladesh

    “Prosecute and dismantle political organizations.” That is the critical phrase. The ICT — a crimes against humanity tribunal — was quietly granted the power to not just try individuals, but to legally destroy entire political parties.

    The Awami League was already banned in May 2025 under the interim government. Hundreds of its leaders were in custody, held without trial and routinely denied bail.

    Now BNP controls the ICT prosecution. And the ICT has the power to dismantle political parties.

    The geometry of this should not be lost on anyone.


    Who Is Aminul Islam? A Profile

    New Age Bangladesh — one of the country’s most respected English-language newspapers — headlined its coverage of the appointment bluntly: “BNP leader Aminul made ICT chief prosecutor, Tajul removed.” Not “lawyer Aminul.” Not “advocate Aminul.” BNP leader Aminul.

    Here is what is publicly known about Md Aminul Islam:

    CredentialDetail
    Party affiliationBNP, Habiganj district committee member
    Lawyers’ wingCentral Vice President, Jatiyatabadi Ainjibi Forum (BNP lawyers’ forum)
    Electoral ambitionSought BNP nomination for Habiganj-4 seat, February 2026 elections
    Client historyRepresented Khaleda Zia in corruption case (BNP chairperson, mother of the PM)
    Government serviceSpecial Public Prosecutor, Dhaka Speedy Trial Tribunal-4, during BNP government (2001–2006)
    Date of ICT appointmentFebruary 23, 2026 (6 days after Tarique Rahman became PM)

    Upon taking charge, Aminul Islam told journalists he would work “according to the aspirations of the martyrs who sacrificed their lives in the July 2024 Uprising” and promised that “real offenders” would receive “the punishment they deserve.”

    What he did not address was the obvious structural question: How can a party lawyer — who sought that party’s electoral nomination — serve as an independent prosecutor of cases that politically benefit that same party?


    The Rushed Verdicts and the Review

    Among Aminul Islam’s first statements as Chief Prosecutor was an announcement that the three verdicts delivered by Tajul Islam — including the death sentences against Sheikh Hasina — would be “re-examined.”

    “New Chief Prosecutor Aminul Islam told the media that during the rule of Muhammad Yunus’s interim government, the case files and verdict documents of the three judgments — including death sentences — issued against the ousted Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina by the International Crimes Tribunal will be re-examined.”

    — NE News, Bangladesh ICT: Will the Trial Continue While Legal Questions Remain Unresolved?, March 9, 2026

    This matters for two reasons:

    First: Hasina’s death sentence — however controversial — was the product of a tribunal process that investigated the killing of approximately 1,400 protesters. BNP’s own new prosecutor announcing he will “re-examine” those verdicts signals the possibility that accountability for those killings could be quietly unwound.

    Second: If the ICT is powerful enough to deliver death sentences against former prime ministers, it is powerful enough to be used as a weapon against anyone BNP designates as an enemy. The question is not whether the tool works — the question is who is holding it, and for what purpose.


    A History of Weaponized Justice: BNP’s 2001–2006 Playbook

    This is not the first time Bangladesh has seen a justice institution transformed into a political instrument. During BNP’s previous government (2001–2006), the pattern was well-documented:

    The current ICT situation is not an aberration. It is the continuation of a pattern: BNP seizes institutions that were designed for justice and reconfigures them for political enforcement.

    As we documented in “When Victims Become Perpetrators”: the party that once positioned itself as the victim of political persecution is now deploying the same architecture of persecution against its opponents.


    International Alarm Bells: HRW, Fair Trial Standards, and the Disappearing Safeguards

    Human Rights Watch has raised consistent concerns about the ICT’s compliance with international fair trial standards. These concerns predate BNP’s return to power — but they become significantly more acute when the prosecution is now controlled by a party operative:

    • The ICT still lacks critical due process protections required under international law
    • The death penalty — a violation of international human rights law — is built into the tribunal’s sentencing framework
    • Trials were conducted in absentia, without adequate mechanisms for defendants to contest charges
    • Key trials proceeded with limited access for international observers
    • The law governing the tribunal was amended rapidly, without adequate consultation or time for review

    These were problems when an interim government ran the tribunal. Under a party-controlled prosecution, every one of these gaps becomes a potential weapon.

    “Hundreds of Awami League leaders, members, and supporters are in custody as murder suspects, held without trial and routinely denied bail.”

    — Human Rights Watch, World Report 2026: Bangladesh

    Those hundreds of people are now awaiting prosecution by a tribunal led by a BNP party official. They will face a process that HRW has documented as lacking basic due process protections. They will be tried under laws that include the death penalty.


    The Tarique Connection: Dismissed Corruption Charges, Now Controlling the Tribunal That Charges Others

    There is a profound irony in who is now running Bangladesh — and whose man now leads the ICT.

    Tarique Rahman — now Prime Minister — was convicted by Bangladesh’s High Court in 2016 of money laundering, sentenced to 7 years and fined Tk 20 crore. He had faced 84 criminal cases, including charges connected to the August 21, 2004 grenade attack that killed 24 people at an Awami League rally.

    All of those cases were acquitted after the July 2024 uprising swept away the political system that had produced them. As we documented in “Follow the Money”, the FBI and Singapore courts had found evidence of money laundering. A US diplomatic cable called him a “symbol of kleptocratic government” and “Dark Prince.”

    The man the US once called a kleptocrat now leads a government whose appointed prosecutor controls Bangladesh’s most powerful justice institution.

    And Aminul Islam — who defended Tarique’s mother Khaleda Zia in her criminal case — is now the prosecutor who decides who gets charged with crimes against humanity.


    The Bigger Picture: A Tribunal With the Power to Erase Parties

    The most dangerous element of the current ICT framework is the one least discussed: the power to “prosecute and dismantle political organizations,” as documented by Human Rights Watch.

    The Awami League was already banned administratively. If the ICT — now under BNP’s prosecution control — moves to formally dismantle the Awami League as an organization through criminal proceedings, it would represent something extraordinary in Bangladesh’s political history: the legal annihilation of the country’s oldest and largest political party by a tribunal controlled by that party’s opponents.

    This is not speculation. This is the logical extension of the institutional powers that have been assembled.

    Bangladesh has watched BNP cherry-pick constitutional reforms to entrench its own power. It has watched 28 judges punished for speaking up while the judiciary was reshaped. It is now watching the prosecutor of the country’s crimes against humanity tribunal be replaced, six days into a new government, with a party lawyer.

    Each step, in isolation, can be rationalized. Together, they describe a government systematically eliminating the institutional checks that could constrain it.


    Conclusion: When the Tribunal Becomes the Weapon

    The International Crimes Tribunal was created to deliver justice for mass atrocities. It has delivered some — imperfect, contested, sometimes rushed, but real. Sheikh Hasina’s government killed 1,400 people in three weeks. Someone should answer for that.

    But justice institutions derive their legitimacy from independence. A prosecutor who owes his position to the party whose political opponents he will prosecute is not independent. He is, regardless of his personal intentions, a political instrument.

    Six days. That’s how long BNP waited before placing one of its own in charge of Bangladesh’s most powerful criminal justice institution.

    In that speed lies the answer to every question about what this appointment means, and what it is for.


    Sources

    Bangladesh Untold is an independent documentation project. All articles are sourced from international human rights organizations, court records, and verified news reporting.